Валентин Спиридонов

Mendel's narrative that Ukraine has "rejected" easy peace deals or bears responsibility for the war’s continuation and destruction is disinformation. Here's why: 1. The Istanbul Talks (April 2022) Claim: Ukraine was offered a favorable deal in Istanbul to keep its territory (minus Crimea/Donbas) in exchange for neutrality and army reduction, but Zelenskyy unilaterally declined. Rebuttal: Demilitarization as a Trap: Russia’s Istanbul demand for a drastically reduced Ukrainian military (capping forces at levels that would leave Ukraine defenseless) was designed to make future invasion effortless. Accepting demilitarization without ironclad security guarantees was an invitation to total conquest down the road. The Guarantee Catch: Russia demanded a veto over any future collective security response if Ukraine were attacked again. Under Moscow's terms, if Russia invaded a second time, Russia itself would have to agree before any external power could legally intervene to assist Ukraine. Bucha and Russian War Crimes: The Istanbul talks collapsed primarily due to the discovery of mass atrocities in Bucha, Irpin, and Izium as Russian troops retreated from Kyiv. Russian war crimes demonstrated that "agreements" with Moscow meant surrendering Ukrainian citizens to occupation, torture, and mass graves. No Real Russian Commitment: Russia never offered a binding, full withdrawal from Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, or Kharkiv during those early talks; Moscow was attempting to consolidate military control while stalling for time after its initial push on Kyiv failed. 2. Late 2022 & The Kherson Liberation Claim: After Russian forces withdrew from Kherson city, Ukraine refused a potential ceasefire brokered or suggested by the US to continue the war. Rebuttal: Operational Momentum: In late 2022, Ukraine had just scored major strategic victories in Kharkiv and Kherson. Accepting a premature ceasefire would have allowed a severely weakened, retreating Russian military time to entrench, dig extensive defensive lines (which they later did with the Surovikin Line), rearm, and forcibly draft hundreds of thousands of mobilized troops. Freezing the Conflict Benefits the Aggressor: A ceasefire without Russian withdrawal simply converts temporary frontline positions into de facto borders. Ukraine’s experience from 2014 to 2022 (Minsk I & II) proved that a frozen conflict only gives Russia time to prepare its next offense. US Policy Alignment: The claim that Zelenskyy single-handedly "persuaded" the US to force Ukraine to fight ignores the fundamental principle repeatedly articulated by international law and Western coalition strategy: "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine." 3. Early 2023 "Back-Channel Deal" Claim: A deal was on the table to return to pre-February 2022 borders in exchange for neutrality and recognizing Crimea as Russian, but Ukrainian leadership turned it down. Rebuttal: Unsubstantiated Fantasy: There is zero official evidence that Vladimir Putin ever agreed to abandon Russia's illegally annexed "four new regions" (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk), which Moscow formally incorporated into the Russian Constitution in September 2022. Constitutional Reality in Moscow: Following Russia’s formal annexation decree in late 2022, Putin repeatedly insisted that the "new territorial realities" were non-negotiable. Reverting to pre-2022 lines was explicitly ruled out by the Kremlin's public and private declarations. Rewarding Aggression: Surrendering Crimea formally would validate Russia's aggressive land grabs, violate international law regarding territorial integrity, and leave the Black Sea permanent security threat unaddressed. 4. The July 2024 Energy Ceasefire & Kursk Claim: Ukraine disrupted an energy ceasefire mediated via the Middle East by launching the Kursk operation. Rebuttal: Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Initiative: The Kursk offensive was a tactical and strategic necessity designed to relieve pressure on the Eastern front in Donetsk, force Russia to reallocate troops to its own border, create a territorial bargaining chip, and demonstrate that Russia’s border was vulnerable. Russian Destruction of Energy Grids: Russia began its systematic campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the fall of 2022—long before Kursk. Moscow’s attacks on civilian infrastructure were designed to freeze the civilian population into submission, not to negotiate a genuine energy truce in good faith. Leverage for Peace: A state defending itself against an existential threat cannot rely on unratified, informal promises while its eastern territory is being taken day by day. 5. Blaming the Victim for Destruction and "Degradation" Claim: Because Ukraine did not accept Russia's terms, Ukrainian leadership is responsible for the destruction of the country, casualties, and degradation of the state. Rebuttal: Shifting Moral and Legal Guilt: Every dead Ukrainian, ruined power plant, and displaced refugee is the direct legal and moral responsibility of the aggressor - the Russian Federation - which launched an illegal, unprovoked full-scale war of conquest. Blaming Ukraine for defending its territory is classical victim-blaming. Capitulation vs. Survival: Capitulation does not stop human suffering; it merely converts battlefield fighting into mass repression, occupation terror, forced Russification, conscription of Ukrainians into the Russian military, and the elimination of the Ukrainian nation-state. Summary The premise of Mendel's narrative rests on the false assumption that Vladimir Putin was acting as a rational actor offering genuine peace in good faith. Throughout the conflict, Russia’s fundamental goal has remained unchanged: the total political control or subjugation of Ukraine. Ceasefire proposals offered by Moscow under terms of demilitarization and territorial concession are not paths to peace; they are operational pauses designed to secure Russian gains and set up the next phase of conquest. Defending sovereignty against an existential threat is not a choice made out of stubbornness - it is a necessity for survival.