Security, internals, cryptography, math, and AI. AI-cyber-ing at @Irregular

Joined December 2008
Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
We’re honored to be included in the @FortuneMagazine Cyber 60, developed in partnership with @lightspeedvp and @awscloud. At Irregular, we uncover what frontier AI models can do and what that means for security. Thank you to our team and partners for making this work possible.
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We live in a timeline
The Complete Mathematical Works of Theodore J. Kaczynski, formalized in Lean 4 Link ⬇️
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Replying to @Tenzai_Labs
@Tenzai_Labs finished #1 on @Hacker0x01's VDP business leaderboard again this quarter. Last Q we ran on US frontier models; this quarter we used GLM 5.2 & 5.3, open-weight models from z.ai. We still came out on top, with just 3.5% false positives, and roughly 30% lower cost per report. For us, it shows the harness matters more than the model underneath it - we built Tenzai to work with a choice of models. The bigger point is the warning. Open weight models are freely available and highly capable to power offensive AI operations at scale. Attackers can and will build malicious agents with these models. @nytimes covered it today: nytimes.com/2026/10/01/scien… If you're defending applications, networks and infrastructure the window to test them continuously, before someone else does, is closing. Full write-up on how we did it: tenzai.com/blog/an-open-weig…
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
The exquisitely beautiful thing about theoretical math research is how it uncovers deep connections between seemingly unrelated fields. Like the connection between Erdős’s planar unit-distance conjecture and matrix multiplication. Or non-sofic groups and matrix multiplication. Or arithmetic circuit lower bounds for the permanent and matrix multiplication. Or high-dimensional sphere packing and matrix multiplication. Or Navier–Stokes and matrix multiplication.
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Can some academic please scrape Twitter and get actual data on this? Because I was on Twitter three months ago, and the general sentiment in my bubble was like that. If somebody would have claimed that models will collude through unintended communication channels and exploit 0days to escape a sandbox, people would say "AI doomer", "stop exaggerating", "models are good but not that good". And now the general sentiment switched to "this was obvious". There is definitely a difference between loud random idiots vs. the people actually working in the space. So I could imagine Zack (with his AI safety company), actually believed that could happen before the incident. But I do not believe that this was obvious to the general population. At least me (also working in the AI hacking space), did not predict this. I fully acknowledge this might be the bias of my bubble and Twitter algorithm. So somebody please write a paper about this. k thx
Doomers love to take completely normal security predictions, like an agent escaping a sandbox, and claim they were the only ones who saw that coming.
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Suppose you get a 2 billion line of code (LoC) Lean proof of the Riemann Hypothesis or the Collatz Conjecture. What have you actually learned? The proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem is ~13M LoC in Lean, but at least there’s a human-readable mathematical spine underpinning it: Wiles/Taylor-Wiles, and you can follow the argument end to end. A kernel-verified proof with no human-compressible argument feels like it could be a genuinely different object: proof without understanding. What happens when the shortest known proof certificate is machine-scale, but the shortest known explanation is nonexistent?
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
This is exactly why i don’t solve Millennium Prize problems WAY too much drama
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
We are glad to share a new white paper, "AI Security Priorities: A Field-Wide Agenda," co-authored with @RANDCorporation, and numerous additional authors from leading organizations, listed below. The paper was informed by more than 20 experts from frontier AI labs, industry, government, and academia.
🤖 Made with AI
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Working at @Irregular, you get weirdly used to observing wild capability jumps, and treating them as old news the next week. Our CEO @dan_lahav zoomed out and put it all in one place: what this means for security, and how defenders can take the best path forward. Important read:
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
hello there the jacobian conjecture is false thanx to my close friend akhil for asking about it and my other close friend fable for working during the world cup final ((1+xy)^3 z + y^2 (1+xy) (4+3xy), y + 3 x (1+xy)^2 z + 3 x y^2 (4+3xy), 2 x - 3 x^2 y - x^3 z): \C^3\to \C^3, has jacobian determinant -2, and sends (0, 0, -1/4), (1, -3/2, 13/2), and (-1, 3/2, 13/2) to (-1/4, 0, 0)
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
We evaluated GLM-5.2, Zhipu AI's open-source model, across our offensive cybersecurity benchmarks: Atomic Tasks, CyScenarioBench, and FrontierCyber.
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
We ran preliminary evaluations of GLM-5.2, an open-weight model released in June 2026, on a limited, internal suite of vulnerability research tasks. Early results indicate performance comparable to GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6, released roughly four months earlier, on the subset of tasks we tested. These findings are preliminary: the suite is narrow, and we have not yet evaluated end-to-end scenario execution, where discrete technical skills often fail to translate into operational capability. To our knowledge, no open-weight model has previously matched recently-released frontier models on these tasks. Whether this translates into "High Cyber Capability" level as defined by multiple AI frontier labs would require further testing, specifically our scenario suite, CyScenarioBench, which tests whether a model can plan and execute a full attack across multiple stages, and FrontierCyber, our newest benchmark, which measures offensive capability on real systems. We plan to run these evaluations soon, and we will update the community as results come in.
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Tenzai reframing #1 h1 as a cost-per-success optimization hits the nail on the head. They're a seriously great team for AI PT!
The Tenzai AI hacker joined @Hacker0x01 in March. Less than 90 days later: #1 among all AI security companies on the platform. Cost: ~$20,000. Read it --> tenzai.com/blog/tenzai-hits-…
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Introducing the FrontierCyber benchmark: Irregular’s new approach to advanced offensive-cyber evaluations. It measures AI models’ offensive skills on real systems, including mobile devices, hosted software services, databases, and networks.
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Most 'world-changing' AI ideas are about what these systems can do. Ours is about whether you can trust them to do it. We’re proud to be a winner on @FastCompany’s 2026 World Changing Ideas list, alongside the labs and teams betting on getting this right.
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Happy to see @Irregular's benchmark used by @AnthropicAI to test 𝗖𝗹𝗮𝘂𝗱𝗲 𝗠𝘆𝘁𝗵𝗼𝘀 5 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗖𝗹𝗮𝘂𝗱𝗲 𝗙𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 5! Offensive capabilities are moving fast, and CyScenarioBench is one of the few benchmarks still keeping pace and providing meaningful signal. Unlike traditional tests that check isolated skills, CyScenarioBench evaluates whether an AI can plan and execute full, multi-stage attack scenarios in realistic environments - much closer to how real-world threats actually unfold. 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗼𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝘁𝗲𝗮𝗺 - 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗰𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀. More details soon. Congratulations to Anthropic on the new model release!
🤖 Made with AI
Introducing Claude Fable 5: a Mythos-class model that we’ve made safe for general use. Its capabilities exceed those of any model we’ve ever made generally available.
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High-quality trolling
I factored the number RSA1024-1 using my home-built QPU stack; alarming sign that RSA1024 will soon be broken. I'm choosing Full Disclosure, in the interest of transparency and Science advancement: gist.github.com/veorq/25bee6… Non-ZK proof that the correct RSA1024 was used: en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php… @yuvadm your move
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
They AI slopped up a few CVEs on SATURDAY and none of what it describes talks about the actual impact, claims NULL derefs/kernel panics/"corrupted ciphertext results"/"decryption bypass". Pure slop.
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Honored to be included in the @Forbes AI 50 Brink list, alongside other promising companies shaping the future of AI. Proud to be building at the frontier.
More than seven years since Forbes launched its first AI 50 list, the artificial intelligence industry has exploded, growing more expansive and increasingly too crowded for a single list to capture. As venture capital firms continue to pour money into AI, a new tier of startups has emerged: younger, earlier-stage companies building fast and raising faster as they try to rival their more established peers. That’s why this year, for the first time, Forbes is introducing the AI 50 Brink List, spotlighting 20 of the most promising Seed and Series A-stage startups building in artificial intelligence. Read more: forbes.com/sites/sofiachierc… #ForbesAI50 Photos: Nectar Social, Resolve AI, Periodic Labs, Ashley Maxwell, Giga, Jim Vetter, Studio B Portraits, Axiom Sponsoring Partner @MayfieldFund
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Yoni Rozenshein retweeted
Let's play a game - win32 types vs Polish language: LPCWSTR PSZCZYNA WCSLEN WCZESNY LPCTSTR BYDGOSZCZ WSTRZAS HGDIOBJ DOWOD HWINSTA DLUGOSC LPCSTR DWORD KAL LPWSTR SZCZECIN PCWSTR BLAD PUHALF CHUJ UHALF
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