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I released a special, bonus episode with @bayanimills, CEO of @AusBTCIndBody to discuss advocacy for a sound Bitcoin policy in Australia.
We cover:
🟠 What Canberra really thinks of Bitcoin
🟠 The energy angle that gets politicians listening
🟠 Why Australia’s Bitcoin miners keep quiet
🟠 How regulators pushed investment overseas
🟠 Why showing up beats complaining
🟠 AML/KYC and who really controls access to money
🟠 A retail CBDC pitch within five years?
🟠 How you can get involved with ABIB
And why the RBA says it has “no position” on Bitcoin, yet keeps writing about it.
Listen to the full episode now, share it with someone who should hear it, and get involved with @AusBTCIndBody.
Policy changes when people show up. 🧡
YouTube: youtu.be/a-QT5flYhfQ
Fountain: fountain.fm/episode/TpXzJR8T…
Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/71u…
Australia asked for help, and the Bull Bitcoin team delivered. Fighting the same battle on the other side of the world, they shared valuable pointers for anyone yet to make a submission.
Lean into Martina’s four points. They are very valuable.
What Bull Bitcoin is challenging before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), France’s highest administrative court:
1. The law: Bull Bitcoin is seeking to annul Decree No. 2025-1276, which brings the EU’s DAC8 directive into French law.
2. Privacy: It argues the rules could enable a mass database of identity and address linked transaction data.
3. Physical safety: It argues a centralised database of crypto holders’ identities puts them at physical risk, citing France’s high rate of attacks on crypto holders and past breaches of French public databases.
4. Proportionality: It argues DAC8 centralises sensitive data well beyond what legitimate tax verification requires.
The court rejected an emergency request to suspend the decree, but the main case is ongoing.
DAC8 is the EU version of the OECD framework Australia is now legislating. Submissions on the Treasury proposal are due by midnight October 28, 2026.
Replying to @BitcoinAnja
Fully agree, Anja, and thank you for doing the reading most people won’t (and @francispouliot_ for cc).
In EU DAC8, our version of the OECD’s CARF, has applied since 1 January 2026. First reports go to tax authorities in 2027. Same pattern you describe: the power is set in the law, and the detail is filled in later by officials. We didn’t think “comment and hope” was enough, so we went to court. @BULLBITCOIN_ (together with #Paymium), has challenged France’s DAC8 decree before the Conseil d’État, asking for a referral to the EU Court of Justice. Our argument: general, indiscriminate collection of financial data on everyone, with no link to any suspicion, is disproportionate under the right to privacy and data protection.
This isn’t a fringe argument. The EU Court has struck down mass data regimes before. “It’s for tax” has never been a blank cheque.
After reading your tweet, I'd like to offer a few thoughts.
The most intrusive parts of this bill aren’t CARF at all. Per-transaction reporting with transaction IDs, quarterly, with no threshold, seems to come from a separate domestic regime Australia is adding on top. That’s a domestic choice and it should be justified on its own terms.
Australia is party to the ICCPR (Art. 17, privacy), and any bill introduced to Parliament needs a statement of compatibility with human rights. Ask Treasury to publish its assessment now, while the design can still change.
Make the safety argument concrete. Every database built is a database that can leak, and here the leak comes with an address attached.
Less intrusive tools already exist. The ATO can compel information when there’s a real reason to, and CARF itself works on aggregates, with details available on request. Targeted access beats mass collection.
Your six asks are reasonable and modest. Good luck! 🧡
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
Picture a young couple in early 2021. They’ve been saving for years. Interest rates are at record lows, and the Reserve Bank has just said it doesn’t expect conditions for a rate rise to be met until 2024 at the earliest. So they stretch, borrow and buy their first home. Everyone around them is doing the same. In 2021, home values rise 22 per cent.
The money behind that boom came from somewhere. In March 2020, as the pandemic hit, the Reserve Bank cut its cash rate to 0.25 per cent, targeted the same yield on three year government bonds and began buying bonds. In November it went further. The cash rate fell to 0.1 per cent, and it launched a formal bond buying program with newly created money. By February 2022, that program alone had bought $281 billion worth. The bank also lent banks $188 billion at ultra low rates.
Few saw what came next. In November 2021, a survey of Australia’s top economists concluded there would be no prolonged high inflation and no rate hike in 2022. Six months later, rates began to rise. Inflation climbed to 7.8 per cent by the end of 2022, the highest in more than three decades. The Reserve Bank raised rates thirteen times, taking the cash rate to 4.35 per cent by November 2023. For our couple, and hundreds of thousands like them, repayments jumped month after month. They had done exactly what the central bank encouraged.
What caused that inflation depends on who you ask. Mainstream economists point mostly to supply shocks, from pandemic shipping bottlenecks to the energy spike after Russia invaded Ukraine and floods that pushed up food prices. Austrian economists agree those shocks raised some prices, but argue they can’t create broad, lasting inflation on their own. That takes more money, and the pandemic delivered a lot of it.
On 28 November 2022, Governor Philip Lowe sat before a Senate committee and was asked whether he owed Australians an apology. “I’m certainly sorry if people listened to what we’d said,” he replied.
The bank’s own reviews didn’t hide the damage. It called its exit from the bond yield target “disorderly” and admitted it caused reputational damage. In the 2021–22 financial year it booked a $36.7 billion accounting loss on its bonds, leaving its equity in the red. It estimated the program would cost between $35 billion and $58 billion by 2033.
To be fair, unemployment fell to 3.4 per cent in July 2022, its lowest in almost 50 years, and the bank argues its actions helped. But look at the shape of it. The same institution created the money, told people rates would stay low, then raised them to fight the inflation that followed. And this year, the cash rate has risen four more times, to 4.60 per cent. Who pays for the mistakes of the people who make the money?
Tomorrow, the man who invented private digital cash in 1982, and why it failed. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
International Bitcoiners, Australia needs your help, your support and your eyeballs. 👀
@francispouliot_ is fighting DAC8 in France’s highest court because centralised digital asset databases put holders at risk of kidnapping.
Australia’s version may be even worse:
1. Every transaction through an Australian digital asset platform is to be reported quarterly, tied to your name and address, including moves to your own wallet (which is not a taxable event). That’s more than banks report to the Australian Taxation Office.
2. An undefined “transaction ID” that could expose your wallets and activity, forever. It’s not in the bill at all. It appears only in the explanatory notes, undefined, leaving you to guess what it means.
3. A blank cheque: the details are set later by regulation, with no vote in Parliament to approve them. Meaning any future framework, change or addition can be made with the least democratic scrutiny possible.
Rushed through in 13 days, against Treasury’s average of 27.
Submissions close 28 Oct.
Please tag anyone who might care, share, retweet, etc.
Why I think this crypto bill deserves real scrutiny
I’m not against paying tax. I want to say that upfront, because whenever someone raises privacy, the first response is “what have you got to hide?”
Nothing. And that’s the point. Wanting privacy is not evidence of wrongdoing. It’s a right.
I’ve read the Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2026: Tax Information Reporting, and the explanatory notes that come with it. Here’s why it worries me.
1. Parliament is being asked to approve a power, not a policy.
The bill doesn’t list what data will be collected about you. Treasury’s notes give an “expected” list: your name, address and bank details, plus the date, time, value and ID of every transaction. But the final list is set by the ATO later, and it can change.
It goes further. The bill lets the government sign Australia up to any future international data sharing framework by regulation. No new law. No vote to approve it. Treasury’s notes say these frameworks concern foreign residents. The bill itself doesn’t say that anywhere.
A reassurance in the notes is not a protection in law.
2. It collects more than tax needs.
Moving crypto to your own wallet isn’t a taxable event. You haven’t sold anything or made a gain. Yet that transfer must be reported.
If it isn’t taxable, why does a tax law need to know about it? The only thing it reveals is where you keep your money, and that you hold it yourself.
3. The transaction ID could follow you forever.
Every report includes a “transaction ID”. The bill doesn’t define it.
If it means the blockchain ID, your name could be linked to your wallet and its entire history. The Bitcoin ledger is public and permanent. You can change a password. You can’t change a blockchain.
The ATO doesn’t need this to calculate tax. The date, value and asset are enough.
4. It goes further than banks.
Banks report your annual interest to the ATO, not every transaction. Transfers between your own accounts aren’t reported at all. Where cash is reported, there’s a $10,000 threshold.
This bill reports every crypto transaction of any value, every quarter. The notes never explain why crypto should be treated more intrusively.
5. The safeguards aren’t there.
No limit on how long data is kept. No security standard. No breach rules. No notice that you’ve been reported. No published human rights assessment or privacy impact assessment.
Just one sentence pointing to existing privacy law.
6. This is a safety issue, not just a privacy one.
A bank transfer can be frozen or reversed. A Bitcoin transfer can’t. If someone forces you to send it, it’s gone.
Criminals know this. Physical attacks on crypto holders are rising worldwide, and gangs now pick victims using leaked databases and exchange records. In France, a tax official allegedly sold crypto investors’ details to criminals.
Optus. Medibank. Latitude. Databases leak.
In trying to stop one crime, tax evasion, we risk making another far easier.
7. It’s been rushed.
We’ve had 13 days to comment. Treasury’s average is 27. That’s not enough time for a bill that hands this much power to officials.
What I’m asking for
Not to scrap it. To do it properly:
A minimum threshold
No blockchain IDs or wallet addresses
No reporting of transfers to your own wallet
Retention, security and breach rules written into the law
Any new international data sharing approved by Parliament
More time to consult
Submissions close at midnight on 28 October. Anyone can make one, and it doesn’t need to be formal.
consult.treasury.gov.au/c202…
👀
Replying to @Rothmus
Those who are opposed to corporations and favor government do not realize that government is simply the largest, most monopolistic corporation of all and it has a monopoly on violence.
Why I think this crypto bill deserves real scrutiny
I’m not against paying tax. I want to say that upfront, because whenever someone raises privacy, the first response is “what have you got to hide?”
Nothing. And that’s the point. Wanting privacy is not evidence of wrongdoing. It’s a right.
I’ve read the Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2026: Tax Information Reporting, and the explanatory notes that come with it. Here’s why it worries me.
1. Parliament is being asked to approve a power, not a policy.
The bill doesn’t list what data will be collected about you. Treasury’s notes give an “expected” list: your name, address and bank details, plus the date, time, value and ID of every transaction. But the final list is set by the ATO later, and it can change.
It goes further. The bill lets the government sign Australia up to any future international data sharing framework by regulation. No new law. No vote to approve it. Treasury’s notes say these frameworks concern foreign residents. The bill itself doesn’t say that anywhere.
A reassurance in the notes is not a protection in law.
2. It collects more than tax needs.
Moving crypto to your own wallet isn’t a taxable event. You haven’t sold anything or made a gain. Yet that transfer must be reported.
If it isn’t taxable, why does a tax law need to know about it? The only thing it reveals is where you keep your money, and that you hold it yourself.
3. The transaction ID could follow you forever.
Every report includes a “transaction ID”. The bill doesn’t define it.
If it means the blockchain ID, your name could be linked to your wallet and its entire history. The Bitcoin ledger is public and permanent. You can change a password. You can’t change a blockchain.
The ATO doesn’t need this to calculate tax. The date, value and asset are enough.
4. It goes further than banks.
Banks report your annual interest to the ATO, not every transaction. Transfers between your own accounts aren’t reported at all. Where cash is reported, there’s a $10,000 threshold.
This bill reports every crypto transaction of any value, every quarter. The notes never explain why crypto should be treated more intrusively.
5. The safeguards aren’t there.
No limit on how long data is kept. No security standard. No breach rules. No notice that you’ve been reported. No published human rights assessment or privacy impact assessment.
Just one sentence pointing to existing privacy law.
6. This is a safety issue, not just a privacy one.
A bank transfer can be frozen or reversed. A Bitcoin transfer can’t. If someone forces you to send it, it’s gone.
Criminals know this. Physical attacks on crypto holders are rising worldwide, and gangs now pick victims using leaked databases and exchange records. In France, a tax official allegedly sold crypto investors’ details to criminals.
Optus. Medibank. Latitude. Databases leak.
In trying to stop one crime, tax evasion, we risk making another far easier.
7. It’s been rushed.
We’ve had 13 days to comment. Treasury’s average is 27. That’s not enough time for a bill that hands this much power to officials.
What I’m asking for
Not to scrap it. To do it properly:
A minimum threshold
No blockchain IDs or wallet addresses
No reporting of transfers to your own wallet
Retention, security and breach rules written into the law
Any new international data sharing approved by Parliament
More time to consult
Submissions close at midnight on 28 October. Anyone can make one, and it doesn’t need to be formal.
consult.treasury.gov.au/c202…
When I came across this story, I found it fascinating, so I wrote it up. In 2018, Switzerland held a national vote on who should be allowed to create money, the private banks that create most of it today every time they make a loan, or only the central bank. 🇨🇭
The vote failed, and in a way it asked the wrong question, since both options kept someone in charge of the money printer. But the question was asked at all, and that’s rare.
Writing this series has helped me see the pattern of systemic weakness much more clearly.
In October 2008, Switzerland had to rescue UBS, its biggest bank. The government put in 6 billion francs, and the Swiss National Bank agreed to take up to $60 billion of the bank’s toxic assets off its hands. In a country famous for sound banking, the public was left holding the risk.
A group of citizens started asking a question nobody else seemed to be asking. Why do private banks get to create money at all? In 2011 they formed an association called Monetary Modernisation (MoMo), and in 2014 they launched a national campaign. In Switzerland, collect 100,000 signatures in 18 months and the whole country votes on changing the constitution. On 1 December 2015 they handed in 110,955.
Their proposal was called Vollgeld, or Sovereign Money. Only the Swiss National Bank would be allowed to create money. Commercial banks could only lend money they actually had, from savers, investors or the central bank. The power you saw on Day 24, typing new money into existence, would end.
The establishment lined up against it. The government, parliament, business groups, unions, the Swiss National Bank and every major party except the Greens, who left it to their members, all opposed it. The central bank’s chairman, Thomas Jordan, warned it would be a leap into the unknown. Opponents ran about 90 per cent of the advertising. The few politicians who backed it came from both ends of the spectrum, from the left wing Social Democrats and Greens to the right wing People’s Party.
On 10 June 2018, 75.7 per cent of voters said no. Not a single canton voted yes. Turnout was just 34.6 per cent. Two in three Swiss didn’t vote at all on who should create their money.
Here is the twist. The Swiss were asked who should control the money printer, private banks or the central bank. Both answers kept the printer. Nobody asked the bigger question. What if money didn’t need an issuer at all?
Tomorrow, where Australia’s pandemic money went, and who paid for it. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
With only 4 days left to make a submission, the new crypto reporting bill Treasury is moving through a short consultation raises a number of concerns.
@Dittloff4Sense joined me for an urgent pod to unpack the red flags. We discuss why the bill raises serious privacy concerns and seeks to track information beyond its intended purpose.
The Travel Rule already went a long way. We discuss why this bill appears to go considerably further. As Jordan explains, it gives the government broad scope to make any future changes at a regulatory level, without going through parliament or a vote.
We have been given only 13 days to comment, compared with the 27 days I understand is typical. As Jordan points out, the draft is only 8 pages, much shorter than most, which points to a lack of care and detail. There is also concern it goes further than necessary and risks monitoring law abiding Australians without clear justification.
Read the draft and make a submission before 28 October: consult.treasury.gov.au/c202…
Watch or listen to the episode:
YouTube: youtu.be/qvNG2UmDTSU
Fountain: fountain.fm/episode/i4KZ9bA1…
Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/6fn…
General information only. Not legal, tax or financial advice.
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
On 7 August 2013, a BBC camera crew squeezed into a small cooperative bank in Wildenberg, a town in Lower Bavaria, Germany. The bank had eight full time staff. Two larger banks had already said no. In the room were the bank’s two directors, its credit officer Ludwig Keil, and an economist named Richard Werner, the same man widely credited with coining quantitative easing on Day 22. He was there to borrow €200,000.
Werner wasn’t borrowing for the money. He wanted to settle an argument economists had been having for more than a century. When a bank makes a loan, where does the money come from? There were three competing answers. Banks only lend out your neighbour’s savings. Banks can’t create money individually, but the banking system does collectively. Or each bank simply creates new money when it lends. Werner designed his loan as a live test of all three.
Keil processed the loan while the camera rolled and every screen was photographed. The moment the contract was signed, a new account appeared on the bank’s system with a balance of €200,000. Next to it sat a loan account showing minus €200,000. Werner then traced the bank’s records. No money had been moved from other customers or from any other bank. The bank simply typed it in.
In 2014 he published the result in the International Review of Financial Analysis, under the title “Can banks individually create money out of nothing?” Only the third theory survived the test. The same year, the Bank of England published its own paper, “Money creation in the modern economy”, explaining that commercial banks create most of the money in circulation when they lend. Australia’s Reserve Bank followed in September 2018 with “Money in the Australian Economy”, confirming that when banks make loans, they create new deposits, and that the old reserve requirements had been removed.
None of this was entirely new. Ludwig von Mises described banks creating unbacked money back in 1912. In 1961, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago published a booklet called “Modern Money Mechanics”, explaining how the banking system creates money, and kept revising it until 1994. But it told the story through the second theory, with reserves coming first and money multiplying through the system. The idea that each bank simply creates money the moment it lends stayed on the fringes.
Some economists still argue the distinction matters less than it sounds, because banks are limited by capital rules, profits and demand for loans. Remember Day 16, though. In Australia, none of those limits is a cap on how much money gets created.
So here is the question worth sitting with. If economists described this in 1912, why did it take a global financial crisis before most central banks explained it this plainly? Was it too technical to matter, or too uncomfortable to say out loud?
Tomorrow, the day an entire nation voted on whether banks should keep this power. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
With only 4 days left to make a submission, the new crypto reporting bill Treasury is moving through a short consultation raises a number of concerns.
@Dittloff4Sense joined me for an urgent pod to unpack the red flags. We discuss why the bill raises serious privacy concerns and seeks to track information beyond its intended purpose.
The Travel Rule already went a long way. We discuss why this bill appears to go considerably further. As Jordan explains, it gives the government broad scope to make any future changes at a regulatory level, without going through parliament or a vote.
We have been given only 13 days to comment, compared with the 27 days I understand is typical. As Jordan points out, the draft is only 8 pages, much shorter than most, which points to a lack of care and detail. There is also concern it goes further than necessary and risks monitoring law abiding Australians without clear justification.
Read the draft and make a submission before 28 October: consult.treasury.gov.au/c202…
Watch or listen to the episode:
YouTube: youtu.be/qvNG2UmDTSU
Fountain: fountain.fm/episode/i4KZ9bA1…
Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/6fn…
General information only. Not legal, tax or financial advice.
Get $10 in Bitcoin when you sign up with Australia's longest-running Bitcoin exchange: hardblock.com.au/join/honest…
This episode is brought to you by my title sponsor @HardBlockBTC
🇷🇸 HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS FLOOD BELGRADE.
After nearly two years of anti-corruption protests, Serbia’s student-led movement is mobilising to end 12 years of Vučić’s rule, defined by corruption, theft, murder, mafia-style cronyism and abuse of power.
The demand for accountability is growing louder.
25 October: Serbia goes to the polls. Vires in numeris. ✊
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
On Saturday 16 March 2013, people in Cyprus woke to find they couldn’t move their money. Overnight, European finance ministers had agreed on a rescue for the island’s broken banks, and there was a catch. Every bank account would pay a levy. 9.9 per cent on deposits above €100,000. And 6.75 per cent on the rest, including the savings that were supposed to be guaranteed.
Cyprus’s banks had grown far too big for such a small country, and had lent heavily to Greece, whose debt had just been written down. Now someone had to cover the hole. Europe’s answer was the depositors.
Cypriots were furious. On 19 March, parliament voted the levy down. Not a single member voted for it. The banks stayed shut until 28 March. People queued at ATMs, and Laiki Bank limited withdrawals to €260 a day.
On 25 March a new deal was struck. Laiki Bank was closed. At the Bank of Cyprus, 47.5 per cent of every deposit above €100,000 was turned into shares in the bank. Insured deposits under €100,000 were spared this time. Controls on moving money out of the country lasted until April 2015.
Cyprus made one thing impossible to ignore. Remember the goldsmith’s receipt on Day 5. A bank deposit is not your money sitting in a vault. Legally, it is a loan you made to the bank, and in a crisis, lenders can be asked to share the losses. Economists call it a bail in.
In Australia, deposits up to $250,000 per person per bank are guaranteed by the government, and the 2018 crisis laws target certain bank investment securities rather than ordinary savings. That is real protection. But it is still protection that depends on a government promise, which is exactly what Cypriots thought they had too.
That is why this system is worth questioning. Cypriots didn’t do anything wrong. They saved, they trusted their banks, and they believed the guarantee. In one weekend, the people who wrote the rules tried to rewrite them, and only a parliament saying no stood between ordinary savers and a bill for a crisis they didn’t create. Your savings are years of your life, stored up. It is fair to ask who really controls them, and what their promises are worth when it counts.
Tomorrow, the economist who walked into a small German bank and borrowed €200,000 for science. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
Had a fun chat with @BitcoinAnja about starting @honestmoneyshow why Bitcoin is the opt out of a possible CBDC dystopia, and why she loves educating with Bitcoin while living the slow life.
Full Episode: youtu.be/fFYl_xRLH1g
Shoutouts: @Checkmatey @JeffBooth @LawrenceLepard @FinCreighton
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
On 21 November 2002, a US Federal Reserve governor named Ben Bernanke gave a speech in Washington about how to stop prices falling. The government, he explained, “has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent)”. It could produce as many dollars as it wished, at essentially no cost. The press nicknamed him Helicopter Ben. Six years later, as Chairman of the Fed, he got to use it.
The tool is called quantitative easing. It sounds technical, but the idea is simple. The central bank creates brand new money and uses it to buy government bonds and other assets, mostly from banks and investors. Nothing is printed on paper. The money is created as entries on the central bank’s ledger, called reserves.
The term is widely credited to economist Richard Werner, who used it in a Japanese newspaper article in 1995. Ironically, he meant something different. He wanted policies that got banks lending to businesses again, putting money into the productive economy rather than into bond markets. When central banks later adopted the name for buying bonds, he became an outspoken critic, and in 2013 said the UK’s version had failed.
The Bank of Japan dismissed quantitative easing as ineffective as late as February 2001, then adopted it the following month. After 2008, it went global. The Fed began buying in November 2008, and the Bank of England followed in March 2009. In August 2007, the Fed’s balance sheet was around $870 billion. By early 2022, it was nearly $9 trillion.
Australia’s turn came later. The Reserve Bank began buying government bonds in March 2020. In November that year it launched a $100 billion program, doubled it in February 2021, and kept buying until February 2022. It also lent banks $188 billion at ultra low rates. Between the two, its balance sheet grew from around $170 billion in early March 2020 to $623 billion by December 2021, more than triple.
Where does all that money go? It pushes up the price of bonds, which pushes investors into shares, property and anything else that might still pay a return. Remember Cantillon on Day 18. The first receivers are banks and asset owners. Wage earners and savers come last, after prices have already moved.
Defenders say quantitative easing stopped the 2008 crisis turning into another Great Depression, and they may be right. Austrian economists reply that it rescued asset prices rather than the economy, kept failing companies alive and rewarded the people who already owned the most. And once started, it is hard to stop. Today, the Fed still holds around $6.7 trillion.
Tomorrow, the week a government came for people’s savings. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
Phases of Bitcoin podcasting:
Phase 1: “Cool, this could be a great hobby and a way to learn from my guests.”
Phase 2: “Wow, it’s going well. Maybe this side hustle becomes a business and I never have a boss again.”
Phase 3: “Crap, I can’t take a day off. I’m now subordinate to the entire Australian Bitcoin maximalist community and quitting would let them down.”
Escaped having one boss. Got 3,000 of them. 😂
Small reminder that in 2024, undermining confidence in the banking system nearly became a “serious harm” in Australia.
Anyway, here’s a post undermining confidence in the banking system. 😆
On Friday 13 March 2009, the insurance giant AIG paid $165 million in bonuses to its staff. Seventy three of them received more than $1 million each. Just months earlier, AIG had been rescued by American taxpayers, and by then its bailout had passed $170 billion. President Obama called the bonuses an outrage. They were paid anyway, because the contracts said so.
AIG was not alone. In October 2008, the US Congress approved a $700 billion package to rescue the banking system. The argument was that some institutions were so big and so tangled into everything else that letting them fail would drag down the whole economy. They were too big to fail. Economists have a name for what that teaches. Moral hazard. If someone else will cover your losses, taking bigger risks becomes the rational thing to do. Profits stay private. Losses become public.
Australia acted too. On 12 October 2008, the Rudd government guaranteed deposits in Australian banks, building societies and credit unions, covering around 15 million accounts worth $800 billion. It also let banks borrow with a government guarantee, for a fee. No Australian bank failed.
But some of the stress was absorbed quietly. In October 2007, struggling mortgage lender RAMS sold its brand and franchise network to Westpac for $140 million. On 8 October 2008, as its British owner HBOS was being swallowed by Lloyds, Bankwest was sold to the Commonwealth Bank for $2.1 billion. Add Westpac’s merger with St George, agreed earlier that year, and Australia came out of the crisis with fewer, bigger banks, each one a little more too big to fail.
And the protections kept growing. As we saw on Day 7, since 2018 the banking regulator APRA has had powers to step into a struggling bank, partly so a rescue can be arranged confidentially, before the public knows. Then in 2024, the government’s misinformation bill, the so called MAD Bill, listed harm to “public confidence in the banking system or financial markets” among the serious harms that online content could cause. It was dropped in November 2024 after failing to win Senate support. But it showed where the thinking was heading.
Do you see the pattern? First a guarantee. Then a quiet takeover. Then secrecy. Then rules about what you can say. Each crisis adds another layer of protection around a system whose foundations were never strong enough to stand on their own.
Someone saw that pattern back in 2009. On 3 January that year, an anonymous programmer launched a brand new kind of money, and in its very first record, they embedded that day’s headline from The Times. “Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks.” We will come back to who wrote it, and why, on Day 31.
Tomorrow, the printing press that doesn’t print anything. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
Did you know this interesting piece of history about our upcoming @bitcoinbushbash location in Parkes, NSW?
The effects of cheap money created in Washington are far reaching. In 2008, Parkes Shire Council lost ratepayer money on Lehman Brothers products tied to American mortgages, half a world away. 👇
In the mid 2000s, Wingecarribee Shire Council, in the Southern Highlands of New South Wales, was looking for a safe home for its ratepayers’ money. A Sydney firm called Grange Securities offered products that looked secure and paid more than a term deposit. The council bought them. So did Parkes Shire Council and the City of Swan in Western Australia.
The products had a complicated name, synthetic collateralised debt obligations. In plain English, they were bundles of bets linked to the health of loans and companies on the other side of the world, many tied to the American housing market. In 2007, Grange was bought by the US investment bank Lehman Brothers and renamed Lehman Brothers Australia.
To understand what was in the box, rewind to 2003. The US Federal Reserve had cut its key interest rate to 1 per cent, the lowest in 45 years. Money was cheap, and American lenders handed out mortgages to almost anyone, including people with little hope of repaying. Wall Street bundled those loans together, ratings agencies stamped many of them AAA, and banks sold them around the world. Including, eventually, to councils in country Australia.
When American house prices turned, the whole structure gave way. On Monday 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy with more than $600 billion in assets, the largest bankruptcy in US history. The Dow fell more than 500 points that day. In the Southern Highlands, Parkes and Swan, millions in ratepayer money went with it. In 2012, the Federal Court ruled that Grange had misled the councils and breached its duty to them.
Mainstream accounts blame greed, weak regulation and products nobody understood, and they have a point. Austrian economists add a cause that sits upstream of all of it. Years of artificially cheap money made reckless lending look profitable, and inflated a boom that could only end in a bust. The money was created in Washington. The losses landed in Bowral.
Tomorrow, who got rescued, and who didn’t. Follow and ring the 🔔 on our profile so you don’t miss a day.
Аnja Dragovic ⚡ retweeted
How about no? The Australian Government wants cryptocurrency exchanges to automatically report detailed customer transactions to the ATO, with provisions for international information sharing. I find the increasing centralisation of Australians’ financial information deeply concerning. Paying your lawful taxes is one thing, building increasingly comprehensive databases of citizens’ financial activities is quite another. It’s worth remember that desiring privacy is not evidence of criminality. Mass financial surveillance should never become normalised in Australia 🇦🇺





















