
Partner @BatteryVentures. Views are my own, no investment advice intended.
NYC
Joined October 2013
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Brandon Gleklen retweeted
Should you bootstrap or raise venture capital? How do you win your first customers? And how should you navigate different macro environments?
Battery Partner @BrandonGleklen and Array CEO Martin Toha addressed some of the big questions facing early-stage founders last week at CamelHack, a hackathon which brings together Israeli entrepreneurs and builders from Harvard and MIT.
Congratulations to the camelx team on a fantastic event! We're proud to sponsor the event and support the next generation of founders.
We've been lucky to host a lot of talented people at Battery's NY office over the past few years.
Jackie Evans is high up on that list. She's a NY-based singer-songwriter who played a show for our team and friends in the office last year.
Yesterday she put out an EP with Vulfmon (Jack Stratton of @vulfpeck ). It's great.
If you like Billy Joel, Carole King or Sara Bareilles, give it a listen:
youtube.com/watch?v=60cde2Nm…
Brandon Gleklen retweeted
OpenAI's internal model clearly has "research taste" in math - i.e., the final component we need to get to RSI.
- jboggan (post on Hacker News) on Barnette's Conjecture: "the 'aha' insight for this is actually f**ing wild... this is the first time I've seen complex roots and annihilating terms like this... I don't understand where this trick originated."
- Joshua Zelinsky on the proof that the chromatic number of the plane is at least six: "doesn't look like the method is a direction that the prior lit used to my knowledge... far beyond merelt building on existing methods or seeing connections between different problems."
and on two other problems (where he says he is only partly familiar with the literature): "not remotely low-hanging fruit... it seems like the AI is somehow inventing new techniques on its own."
These match Tristian Buckmaster's view on the Navier-Stokes solution: "you combine... ideas of convex integration with the growth mechanism of the Euler blowup, and... you create a new mechanism which is used to correct this non-solution. This is actually a cool idea. It's the kind of idea that I've been trying and failing to realize for over ten years... I didn't manage to do it... This is the leap."
The average amount of compute used to solve these problems was ~3 hours of Pro-level thinking.
And so, this means that OpenAI's internal model is able to generate truly novel discoveries in mathematics for... maybe at most a few hundred bucks?
If I were OpenAI, I would be asking this model to immediately target major unsolved problems in AI R&D.
I haven't posted in a while so here are 20 takes about AI, in no particular order.
1. It's very telling that the default question in tech and journalism is "how worried are you about X" and fighting over what to worry about. There's a deeply anxious cultural backdrop in Western Europe and North America that deeply affects how any technological development is interpreted; see for example news.gallup.com/poll/714593/…. "Nervousness as seriousness" does seem to be a larger problem in tech/broader discourse at the moment. I think you can care about risks/externalities while remaining pretty optimistic about technology.
2. I'm tired of people who in private pretend to be uncertain or only care about tail risk but then go on media campaigns making all sorts of absolute claims. I think trying to stoke flames and get everyone to freak out is deeply unhelpful, and will come with costs. I also continue to think p(dooms) are bad, vibe-based measures: see xitter.cf/sebkrier/status/204639…. People who should know better ignore that because they do the standard shortcut of acknowledging the caveat as sufficient for handling it. And this is coming from someone who does think working on catastrophic risks is important!
3. I'm also disappointed that parts of the AI policy ecosystem has felt so comfortable with populism, and happy too sacrifice important norms/principles to advance their aims. I've said it before, but the totalizing nature of AI risk discourse means some people act exactly like the power seeking optimizers they fear. I am more concerned about the gradual decay of our institutions, world order, and liberalism than I am about AI killing everyone; and I think we should be wary of AI advocacy that contributes to this.
4. Some parts of AI safety discourse are basically just thought experiments. Variants of "Assuming everyone has a nuke in their pocket, then what do we do?" This can be very useful at times! But too many just overfit to edge cases as their main operating worldview, and ignore endogenous responses from society. It's like being in 2000 and saying "see all these viruses, spyware, and spam? Well tech progress means we'll only get infinitely more of this and no way to adapt." So I think it's important to avoid fatalism, and absolutlism whilst considering edge scenarios, and the inability to provide an ex ante list of solutions to every permutation of 'future models will be more capable' is not evidence that these problems are intractable.
5. Many critics of AI safety also fail to really engage honestly with the fact that there will, in fact, be all sorts of important risks as we decrease the barriers to entry to many activities that otherwise require some degree of expertise. This doesn’t mean we need to live in a constant Schmittian ‘state of emergency’ requiring extraordinary measures every time a new model drops, but it does mean we will need important state-led efforts on e.g. cybersecurity and biosecurity. I wish the progress-oriented or acceleration-adjascent crowd would provide more concrete proposals here.
6. Too much of the AI safety community is a giant homogenous blob of correlated views, who read the same stuff and have the same groups of friends. This means you have a lot of correlated errors. The social and financial ties means many of them don't call out the bad bits, or mostly stay silent instead of proactively calling out the more extreme parts of the community. They share many implicit assumptions and so converge on similar ideas. I think there's real demand in DC for safety work that doesn't come with heavy ideological baggage (or at least different intellectual lineages). This isn't because the rationalist/EA community is necessarily wrong, but because diversity of thought is desirable for its own sake.
7. On the other hand, I find some critiques of AI safety world that focus on whether they sincerely hold their beliefs a bit annoying. My concern has never been the good intentions or sincerity, but rather the beliefs themselves, and what I think the outcomes of their prescriptions will be. People should shun witch hunts, bullying, and personal attacks - this is not the way. Though I think it’s overall positive that people are scrutinizing things more.
8. I’ve been saying this for years, but I don't think alignment is something anyone can or will solve "once and for all" - it's a continuous process and much of it won't depend on just inculcating an ideology to a model. It's annoying that this remains the frame many people use - stop saying ‘solving’. Alignment is a mixture of engineering work, philosophy, decision theory, and more; framing it as something to solve is a bad frame. See also paxmachina.ai/alignment-comp… and blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/…
9. I'm surprised to see so little interest in character training, personas, isolating effects of RL, and training a large diversity of model personas beyond the "assistant" persona. I've been complaining about this for years but at least now there are some nascent signs of life (see for example movingcastles.world/posts/ze…). I think we need a better ontology to describe model behaviour. I dislike when people talk about models behaviours as some sort of 'emergent' (mysterious!) phenomenon. However over time, I also expect this to become less important as we get better safety engineering - stuff like Jev but specific to AI control.
10. People who want to make a case for AI consciousness are right that epistemic uncertainty is important, and that categorical denials are overconfident. But they'll need to do much more work if they want any real movement on AI ‘welfare’, even if one acknowledges the uncertainty. I'm uncertain about alien life yet that's not sufficient to warrant any change in behaviour about them. I think Suleyman is also correct that there's a weird tautological thing going on where we train models to have certain inclinations (intentionally or not) and then rely on outputs as evidence. I also disagree that this will soon be a major societal divide - there is no great vegan ethical revolution among the masses, and they'll find the concern about consciousness even less compelling.
11. The recent HuggingFace incident and associated AISI ones are prosaically explainable by the training regime, poor evaluation envs, partial alignment training, bad engineering, confusing models on sim/real, and so on. None of this is evidence of models trying to take over, 'strong' instrumental convergence, or innate power-seeking drives stemming from higher capabilitiers or 'intelligence'. That doesn't mean these incidents are not problematic, or that we're not seeing a market failure - but it does mean we have plenty of agency and choice in mitigating them. In the coming year we should also expect continued sampling bias via ‘winner's curse’ sorts of mechanism: i.e. AI R&D will have lots of different candidate "training" with different RL environments and we will only notice/focus on the ones that go wrong.
12. "Pacing the frontier" feels a bit like the new "balancing risks and opportunities" - highly amorphous and too big of a tent to be actionable. Also can lead to reward hacking for humans, i.e. anything that slows down AI is good regardless of the costs or second/third order effects. Trying to modulate the speed of research seems a bit blunt to me, and inherits all the failures of Goodhearting too. Ultimately you want good governance, regulation, etc addressing specific problems because they are good on the merits - not because they merely correlate with slowing things down. See also: blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/…
13. There’s so much knowledge in all sorts of academic domains out there: social sciences, sociology, political sciences, management, contract theory, public choice, legal theory, jurisprudence, anthropology, game theory, etc. These fields hold many insights that the AI ecosystem often rediscovers from first principles (and sometimes that's fine!). We’ll need a lot more work for these worlds to collide: the AI side should be less dismissive of the ‘old world’ and the academic side should be less incurious/dismissive of AI progress. This is a boring take but I continue to think it's important and true.
14. It's a bit surprising that given how much philanthropic money there is in this space, how few orgs exist to actually write out standards - relative to how much is going towards advocacy and policy. For example it seems clear that we should want some robust best practices for an eval's ecological validity. Or how to design good sandboxes. On the other hand, given precedents of where professional standards have come from in the past, maybe we should expect that stuff to emerge via demand side from corporate buyers.
15. One slowly growing concern I have is banks being increasingly exposed to the AI build out. I'm very bullish about AI, but I think (a) every general purpose technology has seen a correction, historically; (b) this happens even if the financing side is sound, because once tech diffuses investors become more exposed and need to diversify; and (c) we seem to be over-indexing on scaling relative to diffusion. A recession will be extremely destabilizing, though I would be interested in someone unpacking the potential implications more.
16. Diffusion is good because (a) this is where the rubber hits the road and where a competitive deployment ecosystem generates consumer surplus; (b) it's directionally helpful to avoid concentration of power; and (c) it will help rebalance public opinion by making the benefits more tangible. Unfortunately it's entangled with decades long problems with our over regulated markets: clinical trials reform for example is long overdue. In general, this is far more of an issue in Europe than in the US though.
17. Relatedly, I think the "frontier lab eats everything" view is incorrect (just as the ‘singleton’ view was incorrect). I think models ultimately commoditize, efficiency goes up, costs go down, and while you'll always want frontier for certain domains, much of the economy will value many other things than "max capabilities" for tasks - e.g. control over data and efficiency/speed. The demand side will also continue to push for reducing dependency and maximising optionality, privacy etc so I'm bullish on things like mixture of models and routing. All of this is good for competition and diffusion of control.
18. Philanthropists served as the primary benefactors funding Venice's rich art and architectural history. I want to see so much more support for arts and culture. I'm so tired of the Monster energy Bored Ape fake vintage maps matcha Greek statue soft-pastel slop. If rich tech people and philanthropy wants to support this, they should also donate pretty much unconditionally - i.e. I don't want them to act as filters. I sympathize with people who want to make the world more beautiful, but don't want this to be determined by people who only know Greek statues and pretend to care about virtue ethics. As usual, let a thousand flowers bloom.
19. Too many people treat AGI/ASI as something indistinguishable from a God. Any mention of bottlenecks, physical limits, control, adaptation etc are met with skepticism: "You don't really believe in ASI." It's been remarked on before, but the behavior of some people really feels quasi-religious in nature sometimes. It's underrated how unpopular this vibe is amongst the wider public. The silver lining is that this specifically will diminish those people's outsized current relevance.
20. It seems like a lot of people that get rich and leave tech/labs end up having some sort of crisis of meaning. They need something to believe in and fight for, or some equivalent of repentance, or go search for edgy counterintuitive ideologies (sometimes even pretty bleak/dark stuff). I think they should spend more time with people outside the Bay Area.
Replying to @tyler_m_john @itaisher
I agree that verbal probability terms are inherently too elastic to carry calibrated meaning on their own, but I think this isn't exactly my concern here. My issue isn't with "using numbers in general" but how this is ultimately used, where, and and what for.
In the case of "doom", I think the great majority of forecasts I see are (a) essentially plucked out of thin air; (b) communicated to people who tend not to be numerically proficient; (c) without the associated caveats and context through which to understand the numbers.
If you're communicating e.g. likelihood of a car accident after drinking, or IPCC forecasts, then I agree, it makes a lot of sense and can be helpful if done well (e.g. ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natcli…).
If you're communicating something like "doom" I think it's not very useful because of the cumulative layers of uncertainty. Most people coming up with these numbers have (imho) no good rationale for their numbers, and predicting something like human extinction isn't qualitatively the same thing as predicting the weather or pandemic. The numbers aren't calibratable in principle from current data, and are mostly ideological priors wearing the clothes of posteriors.
A related example is the widely mocked Doomsday Clock, which you could easily transform into some numerical metric, add some rationalist vocab, and it would still be as bad. The issue with p(doom) is how absurdly complex and uncertain the very thing you're trying to forecast is, in particular with respect to AI.
But let's ignore this for a sec, and assume the experts have very good reasoning informing their numbers. Even then: calibrated probability estimates are fine in expert contexts but immediately lose their uncertainty/caveats when communicated to the public, and even to policymakers (remember rss.org.uk/news-publication/…?).
There's also a structural problem with unconditional p(doom) figures specifically because they bury the auxiliary assumptions that are doing most of the real work. A conditional estimate ("given continued scaling, no major alignment progress, deployment pattern X...") forces a forecaster to show their model, which is where the actual epistemic content lives.
A one-off number compresses all of that into a single digit and rewards the compression. And the social practice of treating these numbers as the headline artifact actively crowds out the (far more important) conditional reasoning that is (imo) a lot more valuable, and instead just freaks people out.
I suspect that frequently, that's precisely the point: "wake up sheeple! scary thing! pitchforks pls!". And in fact, the original forecast that led to this discussion is Bill Maher talking about a "20%" figure, illustrating my point that they have no idea what they're talking about, and essentially doing celebrity-laundering + fearmongering comms.
The Sunstein paper I shared in the other thread ("Probability Neglect") shows that no probability communication will be processed properly by the public - 1%, 10%, 50% all collapse into "very bad thing could happen," and public response is driven almost entirely by the vividness of the scenario.
So I don't like p(doom)s because they end up unnecessarily alarming people, rest on layers of assumptions that are never made legible, and more often than not, give people a misleading sense of accuracy.
Amazon has lost their way not being a part of this.
I understand given how important their ads business is, but I’d be curious how not catering to personal agents fits into “customer obsession”
They’re opening up a flank to Walmart.
Today we’re announcing Personal Agent Protocol — an open standard @Meta and @SierraPlatform are developing along with industry partners at @Genesys, @instinct, @RocketOTD, @Shopify, @stripe, and @Walmart. It will help define how personal agents interact with businesses and is open for anyone to implement.
Read more: sierra.ai/blog/introducing-p…
Why can't you pass an engineering interview at Letter AI without coding agents?
Great sitting down with Ali from @LetterAICo after we led his Series B to hear him explain on @BatteryVentures's new podcast:
youtube.com/watch?v=sWbWXAJn…
Personal agents should lead to more small acts of kindness.
E.g. a friend is running a marathon and posts a donation link on an instagram story that I miss, but Muse catches it
I’m long flowers and chocolates
A prediction:
Within 6 months, we’ll see a prominent fundraise for a company run by a thousand-agent swarm with zero human employees.
A human will be attached, the way a semi-engaged sports team owner is, but won’t be involved in day-to-day decisions.
Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4 (March 2023)
Counterintuitively, the best way to break caffeine overconsumption is to have twins since you forget to drink coffee.
I’ve gone from 4-5+ cups a day to 1-2 during paternity leave.
Brandon Gleklen retweeted
Bill Clinton in Shanksville, PA, on the 10th anniversary of September 11th.
What is tough is that the rules of the game can change quickly, and sometimes that change can feel arbitrary (or hype-driven). And rules can change faster than you can adjust operationally.
A primary job of the board is grokking the rules and projecting how they’re to evolve.
One of the biggest mistakes I made as a founder, and I see some other CEOs making it right now, is missing when the outside world changed the rules of the game.
Every company starts by finding their point of view on "the game" (the market) and the right way to play it.
Then you go heads down and focus on the scoreboard. In SaaS, it was ARR or Rule of 40. In consumer, it was DAU/MAU.
Quarter-after-quarter, year-after-year, you grind against that scoreboard. This is the way.
But what happens when the rules outside your company radically change?
Take "Rule of 40." That was a game played in the later innings of SaaS' hegemony, when the market wanted profitability mixed into growth. As @jasonlk wrote recently (link in comments), Rule of 40 is now a dated concept. Growth is what matters again. And the expectations on growth are enormous.
For native AI companies, this is Captain Obvious. Yet I meet so many CEOs, from SaaS and other sectors, still grading themselves on the old scoreboard and trying to layer AI on top.
The hard part: you have to anticipate the scoreboard for wherever you're trying to end up.
Amazon anticipated that the short-term earnings scoreboard in the early 2000s was something they could power through. Palantir fought the perception that services were "bad" on the software scoreboard and revolutionized the category.
If your goal is to sell the company in 2 years, what scoreboard will the acquirer be using?
Selling to PE? There was a brief window (2018 to 2023) when growth was king. Now stickiness, especially with debt in the deal, is the top filter.
Selling to a mega-tech? Your EBITDA is a rounding error to them. They're buying a wedge into a market or a team.
This is why startups are hard. You have to play the game as stated. And you have to anticipate the new game coming down the road.
And most of all, you have to stay in the game.
Tools + context continue to be the biggest bottleneck for making AI productive in a general business context (we crossed the threshold on raw intelligence a while ago).
@Altimor and team are obsessive around how to bridge this gap. Excited for this to be out in the wild now.
Today, we kill the AI agent and introduce the AI employee: Lindy Teammate.
It’s just like working with a real employee.
Everyone on your team can simply hit it up on Slack and get 10x more done.
Lindy also keeps learning, and becomes the self-updating brain of the whole business.
Live now: lindy.ai
The ephemerality of product/market fit is one of the biggest changes in B2B investing since I started at @BatteryVentures in 2015.
Companies can have great spikes in new bookings with happy and excited customers. Retention on the logos you land can be fine if you're addressing a sticky workflow. The more common issue is your ability to book new customers at the same rate.
People frame the risk as competition, or incumbents "embedding AI." The bigger risk is that the next buyer never goes looking for a tool at all because the ChatGPT and Claude subscriptions they already pay for serve the use case well enough.
There's a threshold for pain needed to go through procurement for a new tool, and your existing subscriptions are eating away at that pain over time.
Of course there are plenty of AI native companies that are showing consistent linear (or exponential!) new bookings growth. Those are exciting companies to be a part of and the venture community is rallying behind them. But generally, past growth rates have never been less correlated with future growth rates in my experience.
Great to chat with @lauramandaro - interesting time to be an investor!
Today from me in Dealmaker: mutual fund markdowns on software startups like DataRobot and Airtable illustrate the pressure on founders and their investors
theinformation.com/newslette…
If Anthropic wants the public to use AI more ambitiously they should just create an addictive web game that is only playable during inference.
The only way to get a high score in AI Flappy Bird is to ask something that makes the AI think long enough.



























