C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs) header
C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs) profile picture

We find exposed attacker infrastructure, read what they leave behind, and publish it as a case file.

Joined July 2026
Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)Photo by C2 Hunters Research (@C2HuntersLabs)
Coruna iOS exploit kit, new IOCs: - 88 lure hosts - 37 compromised sites used as watering holes New IOCs (1/3): iphone[.]apiforx[.]work trigger[.]translatevv[.]com mobilecare[.]me carolineschaay[.]nl IOCs below. Full list + CSV: c2huntersresearch.com/blog/2… #Coruna #iossecurity
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Inside the ten cases: fake signups that pass fraud checks, a bank intrusion on one proxy account across 80 scripts, cryptojacking that hides from the proxy provider too, carding, credential stuffing, and more. The IP alone won't catch any of it. #ResidentialProxy #JA4+
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The monetization order was set before the first target: crypto, then payments, then ransomware. The result: an ISP breached from the inside, 606,932 payment transactions exposed and 10 live tunnels into internal networks. #ransomwareattack
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It even timed its recon around a service's daily API quota reset: 16:00 UTC plus 7 minutes, every day. By the end it had spawned 473 sub-agents. Full analysis, with the Russian original and translation: c2huntersresearch.com/blog/2… Part 2 coming soon: the toolkit and TTPs.
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C2 Hunters Research retweeted
Added two new items to the feeds, courtesy of the item below and @C2HuntersLabs - VShell C2 - DesRedTeam (a.k.a. DesShell) items should be live soon.
VShell C2 (v4.9.3) panel identified. VShell is a cross-platform post-exploitation framework popular with Mandarin-speaking threat actors. WebSocket connection found in the panel: wss://www.haiwoi[.]top/api/v2/sync IOC: haiwoi.top #ThreatIntel #C2 #VShell
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Pivoted further using @modat_magnify and found 16 active VShell panels across 13 IPs. All serving the same Chinese-language login page. IOC thread 🧵 #ThreatIntel #C2 #VShell
VShell C2 (v4.9.3) panel identified. VShell is a cross-platform post-exploitation framework popular with Mandarin-speaking threat actors. WebSocket connection found in the panel: wss://www.haiwoi[.]top/api/v2/sync IOC: haiwoi.top #ThreatIntel #C2 #VShell
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Active VShell panel IOCs: 23[.]238[.]80[.]171:8082 🇺🇸 143[.]92[.]51[.]145:8082 🇸🇬 8[.]138[.]112[.]168:23333 🇨🇳 38[.]60[.]227[.]210:81 🇭🇰 38[.]60[.]227[.]210:443 🇭🇰 23[.]226[.]132[.]147:8082 🇺🇸 119[.]28[.]13[.]158:80 🇭🇰 38[.]55[.]192[.]71:17777 🇺🇸
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218[.]1[.]219[.]233:51010 🇨🇳 218[.]1[.]219[.]233:51030 🇨🇳 218[.]1[.]219[.]233:51050 🇨🇳 45[.]113[.]200[.]6:8082 🇨🇳 111[.]229[.]112[.]115:8082 🇨🇳 132[.]232[.]203[.]63:8082 🇨🇳 101[.]37[.]80[.]76:8095 🇨🇳 36[.]138[.]100[.]216:45991 🇨🇳 Credit to @modat_magnify for the scan data.
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We identified an exposed server hosting infrastructure for a suspected #DarkSword iOS exploit operation. The exposed files included a SQLite database (darksword.db), exploit delivery code, post-exploitation scripts and server logs. Here's what we uncovered: 🧵(1/4)
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We also recovered group.html and post_exploit.js. The code contains a staged iOS exploit loader, sandbox-escape routines, device identification, command polling and data collection capabilities. Server logs confirm repeated requests to the exploit delivery page. (3/4)
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An interesting observation: much of the recorded activity originated from private or loopback IPs, with repeated landing-page tests. This suggests possible operator-side testing, although external deployment cannot be ruled out. #darksword #coruna #ios #exploitkit (4/4)
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We also recovered group.html and post_exploit.js. The code contains a staged iOS exploit loader, sandbox-escape routines, device identification, command polling and data collection capabilities. Server logs confirm repeated requests to the exploit delivery page. (3/4)
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An interesting observation: much of the recorded activity originated from private or loopback IPs, with repeated landing-page tests. This suggests possible operator-side testing, although external deployment cannot be ruled out. #darksword #coruna #ios #exploitkit (4/4)
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The recovered database contained: • 18,054 HTTP activity logs • 3,109 exploit telemetry records • 5 landing-template records • 8 configured command scripts • 469 administrative audit events The data provides a glimpse into the backend infrastructure. #iOS (2/4)
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CVE-2026-66373 (Redis 8.6.4) confirmed exploited in the wild. Actor used a DEBUG-free, self-restoring RCE chain → dumped Redis cache creds → pivoted to DB → stole records → cleaned up their tracks. Patch: Redis 8.6.5 / 8.8.0 #cve-2026-66373 #CTI #RCE #redis
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VShell C2 (v4.9.3) panel identified. VShell is a cross-platform post-exploitation framework popular with Mandarin-speaking threat actors. WebSocket connection found in the panel: wss://www.haiwoi[.]top/api/v2/sync IOC: haiwoi.top #ThreatIntel #C2 #VShell
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Coruna iOS exploit kit — new IOCs, part 2. Additional infra found via @modat_magnify New IOCs (1/2): https://fcsvip[.]icu https://btvm888[.]xyz 18[.]141[.]188[.]98 203[.]189[.]235[.]62 186[.]244[.]241[.]222 205[.]234[.]170[.]172 177[.]5[.]75[.]142 154.219[.]112[.]16 #coruna
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IOCs (2/2) 23[.]148[.]228[.]177 43[.]165[.]4[.]16 154[.]94[.]233[.]234 176[.]122[.]134[.]61 177[.]4[.]41[.]61 64[.]90[.]20[.]4 134[.]122[.]140[.]213 dawnlily[.]win clickpairs[.]shop ssc.vever3eds[.]com chitchathub[.]shop #ios #coruna
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