CHP Foreign Policy Council

CHP Foreign Policy Council Current Assessments 1. OTS Ankara Meeting. We welcome the convening of the Organization of Turkic States in Ankara, the participation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the transfer of the rotating chairmanship to Türkiye. We support taking all necessary steps to further develop the Organisation. In this regard, we welcome the Ankara Declaration, which includes decisions to strengthen relations, particularly the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States Defence Industry College, the adoption of a perspective on the Cyprus issue consistent with current political realities, and cooperation projects to develop the East–West Corridor. 2. Israeli Elections and the Knesset. It is evident that the outcome of Israel’s long-awaited general election will create new balances both within Israel and across the region. We expect an executive and peaceful government to be formed in the Knesset without the need for a repeat election, and we regard this as important for regional stability. 3. Cooperative Meeting in Tehran. We view the contacts that the parties to the Mecca Agreement held with Iran in Tehran on 26 October as developments that will enable the countries of the region to take ownership of the sought-after security cooperation. We hope that, within this framework, through an institution such as the Organisation for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East (OBIT), confrontational processes will be replaced by dialogue-based and cooperative approaches. 4. Türkiye–Libya–EEZ. We regard the forthcoming meeting in Türkiye with representatives of the Tripoli and Benghazi administrations, aimed at overcoming differences and achieving political unity, as a development that will facilitate the implementation of the Türkiye–Libya EEZ Agreement (2019). We hope that this agreement (under Article 123 of UNCLOS) will serve as an encouraging example for states in the region that have not yet delimited their Exclusive Economic Zones with Türkiye. 5. Türkiye–Iraq–FAW. Given that the bottleneck in oil and commercial shipping in the Gulf of Basra is anticipated to persist for a long time, it is clear that oil transport, transport links, and rail and road connections between Iraq and Türkiye will present significant opportunities for consumers in Europe and the Mediterranean region. In this context, we believe it would be beneficial to make every effort to accelerate the Iraq Development Corridor (FAW) Project. @herkesicinCHP

Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments 1. Maritime Jurisdiction Areas. As the CHP Foreign Policy Council, we welcome the Libyan Parliament’s unanimous approval, seven years on, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Exclusive Economic Zone concluded with Libya, and consider it an important step towards resolving the differences between eastern and western Libya. We would like to remind EU leaders who object to this that it is absurd for the EU, which does not intervene in the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas within the EU (Croatia–Slovenia, Italy–Malta, Spain–France), to criticise the will expressed in this regard by two Mediterranean coastal states, neither of which is an EU member. The EU must stop putting itself in the place of the ICJ or the ITLOS. We support the government’s steps on this matter. 2. The Mecca Agreement. We welcome the submission to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye of the draft “Mecca Agreement for Joint Defence between the Republic of Türkiye, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, initialled on 7 August 2026, and the clarification of its contents. It is expected that concerns regarding the draft agreement’s objectives and Articles 2, 5 and 16, as well as other elements, will be clarified during parliamentary deliberations. 3. The Russia–Ukraine War. We welcome the fact that the trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the United States have brought the conflict to a point where hostilities may cease, that risks in the Black Sea are being kept under control, and that NATO’s involvement in the war has so far been prevented. The uncompromising application of Article 19 of the Montreux Straits Convention will prevent an increase in risks in the Black Sea. 4. Iran–US/Israel. Reports of potential renewed attacks in the Gulf of Basra are being followed with concern. As the region is drawn into a military impasse, we consider it essential to use diplomatic instruments more effectively to achieve results and to exercise restraint by avoiding pre-emptive attacks. 5. Resolving Chockepoints. We hope that the R4 (Türkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) + E4 (France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) meeting, held in Istanbul under Türkiye’s leadership to ease the chokepoints along hydrocarbon transport routes (Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz), will bring sound solutions to the problems through means other than armed conflict. It would be appropriate to share positive developments on this matter with the public. @herkesicinCHP

Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments 1. The Russia–Ukraine War / US Agreement. We hope that the agreement reached between Russia and the US on a fuel support deal will create positive opportunities beyond mere logistic cooperation between two key leaders in a multipolar world. It is believed that this agreement will not only help overcome the difficulties caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—which has led to the global fuel crisis—but also, through subsequent steps on the Ukraine-Russia front, herald a period of ceasefire, whilst the issue of maritime security in the Black Sea will also be positively affected by these developments. 2. Saudi Vulnerability. In the course of the conflict that began with Saudi Arabia’s strike on Sana’a Airport, controlled by North Yemen, on 13 July, Saudi Arabia has received no oil revenue for the past three months, and this is expected to continue for another 24–80 months. Given these circumstances, the growing risk of Saudi Arabia being drawn into internal instability cannot be overlooked. In this context, it should be recognised that resolving contentious disputes through diplomatic means as soon as possible is the only alternative. 3. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Despite all the statements, it has not been possible to ensure that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye and that its contents are disclosed, thus speculation about its contents continues. Although Türkiye has an interest in the establishment of a new security framework for West Asia–the Middle East, it is considered that Türkiye should not assume a responsibility concerning the security of the particular countries in this region that would commensurate with our national interests. 4. Talks with Syria and the Lateral Maritime Boundary. While the talks between the Syrian and Turkish Naval Forces Command are welcomed, the delineation of the lateral maritime boundary and delimitation of exclusive economic zones, which could be completed with no more than one week of work, is expected to be concluded without further delay. 5. Invitation of the Unrecognised Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) to Türkiye. Türkiye’s unchanged fundamental policy on Cyprus is built on achieving a peaceful two-state solution on the island and, until this is achieved, not recognising the existence of the GCASC. Nevertheless, the invitation of the GCASC first to the International Geography Olympiad in August 2026 and now to COP 31, to be held on 9-20 November 2026 in Antalya, raises doubts about how this national Cyprus policy is being implemented. 6. The Zangezur Corridor–TRIPP. While developments at the Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are welcomed, it is considered that construction of the Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP), which will connect Nakhchivan to mainland Azerbaijan through Armenian territory, should begin as soon as possible, with Iran’s concerns on the matter also addressed. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. Azerbaijan. We believe that relations with Azerbaijan will continue on the basis of traditional brotherhood and close cooperation, and that the principle of “one nation, two states” will be preserved in a spirit of mutual understanding. 2. The Mecca Agreement. We are pleased to hear that, albeit after two months, the draft agreement will be submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye in the coming days for parliamentary scrutiny. It should be borne in mind that, within the framework of Articles 90 and 92 of our Constitution, the agreement can only be implemented once Türkiye and the other signatories have completed and exchanged with each other their approval processes. 3. The Saudi Arabia–Houthi Conflict. This issue cannot be resolved through military means, as historical and geographical examples have repeatedly shown. Support aimed at easing tensions can only be provided through back-channel diplomacy. Linking this issue to the draft Mecca Agreement is still considered misleading. 4. Gulf Conflicts. While the war against Iran initiated by Israel and the United States continues, albeit without armed clashes, elections are scheduled to be held in the two countries on 27 October and 3 November respectively. As these elections approach, it is considered important to maintain maximum vigilance against security-related provocations and false-flag operations. 5. The Black Sea. The reciprocal and indiscriminate use of force by the belligerents is causing increasing damage to Turkish merchant vessels (Turkish-flagged and Turkish-owned) and loss of life among seafarers. As clearly stated in previous Board assessments, Ukraine and Russia should be warned through diplomatic channels. At this stage, it is also considered that losses could be substantially reduced if Turkish merchant vessels avoided entering the actual combat zone and, under no circumstances, sailed north of the latitude passing through Romania—for example, also, by navigating exclusively in the waters east of the north–south line connecting Cape Kerempe and Sevastopol, as well as in Türkiye’s territorial waters. 6. GSI and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) electricity cable project, which is planned to connect Greece to Israel via Southern Cyprus, is regarded as more than a technical electricity connection project; it is a national issue concerning our maritime jurisdiction areas. Ankara’s diplomatic stance on the GSI project and the requirement to reach agreement with Türkiye on any activity on the seabed within Türkiye’s continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean are important for protecting our interests in the Blue Homeland and are supported. 7. Cyprus. Taking into account the military developments in the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus that could disrupt peace and stability on the island, and bearing in mind that peace and sanity have prevailed in Cyprus for 52 years, the prerequisite that intercommunal negotiations be conducted between two equal states must be met if they are expected to achieve anything beyond an intellectual exercise. It would be appropriate to undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives to warn the three states that are taking concrete steps to provide armed support to Southern Cyprus, although none is a guarantor state. It should also be noted that military and folkloric displays of support will not undermine the Republic of Türkiye’s determination and will to defend Northern Cyprus. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. Geopolitical Uncertainties / World War III. Developments in security policy appear to be taking an alarming turn. The following scenarios cannot be ruled out: the Iran–US/Israel war escalating from conventional to nuclear warfare and drawing other major powers into the conflict; the blockage of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea expanding into a wider conflict involving ground operations and intervention by other countries, with a diplomatic settlement ruled out; the Ukraine–Russia conflict escalating and spreading to neighbouring countries and the NATO Alliance; and the Baltic region and Kaliningrad being drawn into armed conflict through various false-flag operations. The time appears to have come to prepare mentally for the various dimensions of the chaos that may unfold before a new international order emerges. 2. Russia–Ukraine/Black Sea Security. It is of critical importance to ensure that a security agreement is reached as soon as possible through negotiations, irrespective of the pace of the war or any successes achieved on the ground, and that the Alliance does not take sides in this war under any circumstances; furthermore, it is essential to proactively take the necessary steps to prioritise the security of Turkish merchant fleets and seafarers in the Black Sea. 3. The Mecca Agreement/Expansion/Saudi-Houthi Conflict. Iran’s supportive statements regarding this agreement are welcomed. Whilst expectations remain that Egypt will be part of the agreement from the outset, the country’s participation in the Trilateral El-Alamein Declaration on 8 September and the joint statement by the defence ministers (Egypt, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration) on 23 September must be closely monitored. Bearing in mind that the draft Mecca Agreement—which has not yet entered into force and whose negotiations have not been finalised—lacks the capacity to resolve the Saudi-Houthi dispute, which does not concern territorial integrity, it is considered beneficial to prioritise a diplomatic solution to the issue and, by prioritising state reason, to avoid destabilising mistakes arising from artificial agendas created by false-flag operations. 4. The Persian Gulf. Hope remains that the US–Iran conflict can be resolved through the proposed seven-day ceasefire and subsequent negotiations. 5. Concerns in the Baltic Region and Kaliningrad. While participating in the Alliance’s deterrence activities, Türkiye should seek to prevent any potential NATO overreach in this area in order to safeguard its interests and its relations with Russia. 6. Iraq. The US withdrawal from Iraq and the restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been welcomed as positive developments and assessed as enhancing the investment climate in the country. The phased withdrawal of the Turkish military presence at Bashika, in line with the reduction of the military threat originating from Iraq, is supported. The disarmament of other militants and Hashd al-Shaabi elements will reinforce this expectation. Whilst a amicbale resolution to the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık Pipeline dispute is anticipated, increasing the pipeline’s capacity to 750,000 mbd will foster the development of the Iraq Development Corridor (FAW) and other areas of cooperation. 7. Greece. A contradiction is evident between Greece’s participation in confidence-building measures with Türkiye and its simultaneous pursuit of unilateral declarations of marine parks in the Aegean, maritime spatial planning (IOC), the militarisation of islands and unfounded maritime jurisdiction claims. The same contradiction is apparent in its encouragement of the Greek Cypriot Administration in ways that undermine the peace and stability that have prevailed in Cyprus for 52 years, and in its efforts to forge alliances against Türkiye. It would be appropriate to conduct bilateral relations with these terms in mind. 8. Protecting Türkiye’s Airspace. As the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Iran, Israel, and between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis clearly demonstrate, the airspace above national territory requires the protection of air defence systems more than ever. In this context, the S-400 remains the most effective air defence system in Türkiye’s inventory. Disposing of these systems for the sake of the F-35 or for any other reason would create gaps in the protection of Turkish airspace that could not be remedied, and would encourage states that are hostile to Türkiye or are becoming a threat to it. It is considered a vital national interest to abandon this idea once and for all. The F-35’s performance has deteriorated substantially since Türkiye was excluded from the programme, and restrictions have been imposed on its use by other countries. Türkiye has already planned to meet this requirement through its indigenous KAAN aircraft and Eurofighter acquisitions. For practical reasons as well, bringing the F-35 back into Türkiye’s inventory is not considered feasible. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. Black Sea Security. We are following with concern the increasing attacks in the Black Sea on Turkish-flagged and/or Turkish-owned merchant vessels, which must be kept outside the hostilities. We support the diplomatic initiatives undertaken following the UN General Assembly regarding Ukraine. It is recognized that, under the Montreux Convention, primary responsibility for maritime security in the Black Sea lies with the coastal states. On this basis, we expect the warring parties to define and declare the naval warfare zones in the Black Sea (Maritime Exclusion Zones or Total Exclusion Zones). To prevent Türkiye from being drawn into this conflict—and to avoid its potential expansion to NATO—the following core measures must be ensured: the belligerents must not interfere with commercial shipping outside declared warfare zones, and merchant vessels must be routed through safe corridors outside the hostilities under the oversight of their respective flag states. We believe Türkiye possesses both the capacity and political will to secure these measures diplomatically. Before the situation escalates further, it is urgent for our commercial maritime operators to take necessary precautions regarding routing, flag-state protection, and war-risk insurance, while Türkiye takes the requisite diplomatic initiatives with all relevant actors. 2. The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden. We hope that the internal divisions in Yemen will be resolved as soon as possible. We support the ongoing constructive negotiations between the Sana’a and Aden administrations. Considering the historical complexity of the issue and the burden it imposes on the global economy, sustained diplomatic support should be provided to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and the Sana’a authorities. We welcome reports that the draft Mecca Agreement is not directed against any party to the conflicts in the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, and we support the continuation of this balanced approach. 3. Cyprus. As highlighted at the United Nations General Assembly this week, Türkiye should firmly reiterate to all relevant parties (Greece, the United Kingdom, the UN Secretary-General, and others) that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not enter into negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side unless its sovereign equality and equal international status as an independent state are formally recognized. In this regard, Türkiye must leave no room for doubt that a two-state solution is the only viable option in Cyprus. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. It is not possible to resolve the attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure through military means. Bearing in mind that this situation is linked to the divisions in Yemen and the Houthis’ relations with the Gulf states, it is considered that supporting political initiatives focused on back-channel diplomacy is the only option for Türkiye. 2. Of the 23 islands whose sovereignty was ceded to Greece on the condition that they be granted non-military status under the Lausanne and Paris Treaties, 16 of these have been militarised, thereby placing their sovereignty in a contentious position. The initiative Türkiye undertook before the United Nations Security Council on 13 July 2021 also strongly placed this issue on record. Türkiye’s démarche last week concerning Meis, one of the islands with this status, is supported. However, it should be recognised that viable and legitimate policies must be consistent, sustainable and aimed at marginalising the unjustified exercise of sovereignty. 3. 12 European states, led by the United Kingdom, are moving towards adopting the right and necessary stance on Gaza, albeit belatedly, through various trade sanctions against Israel. Under these circumstances, it is important for Türkiye, too, to fully suspend its trade relations with Israel so that these initial steps can yield effective results. 4. Attacks and defensive actions continue on the Russia–Ukraine war. The necessary vigorous diplomatic efforts should be undertaken with Ukraine and with the members of the Coalition of the Willing to prevent the hostilities from harming neutral Turkish owned and flagged merchant vessels operating in the Black Sea. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. The assertive statements made by Pakistan, Yemen and a member of the United States Congress regarding the Mecca Agreement and the Houthis point to multidimensional security escalations that could also draw our country in, particularly in the context of an agreement that has been advancing amid misunderstandings. At a time when the draft agreement has not yet entered into force and the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye has not been informed, it is important that statements made as though the Mecca Agreement were already in effect remain limited and measured. It is important that the draft agreement be brought to the approval stage as soon as possible. 2. The conflict between Iran and the United States continues through escalatory actions, while losses in the Gulf are mounting. Back channel diplomacy should be accelerated to resolve the conflict through compromise as soon as possible, as it is also moving towards disrupting the global economic balance. Efforts to bring the parties closer to an agreement through new and constructive ideas should also be intensified. 3. Israel’s hostile actions aimed at arming, provoking and encouraging Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus should be closely monitored. Necessary security measures should be developed and readied for immediate implementation. 4. We support the renewed talks initiated by the United States to find a peaceful solution to the war between Russia and Ukraine and bring it to an end before more lives are lost. 5. The significant momentum gained by the AfD in Germany’s state elections is regarded as a byproduct of the confrontational and uncompromising policies pursued by European Union countries. There is concern that this momentum gained by the far right in Germany could spread to other European Union countries. 6. The relevant authorities should clarify how Egypt’s rapprochement with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, as well as its policies of maintaining distance from the Mecca Agreement, are to be reconciled with relations between Türkiye and Egypt. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. On the 107th anniversary of the Sivas Congress, convened on 4 September 1919, we, as the Foreign Policy Council of the Republican People’s Party, pay tribute to the Sivas Congress Delegation and our leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. They unequivocally rejected any mandate or protectorate and laid the foundations of a new and fully independent state. By uniting the Anatolian and Rumelian Associations for the Defence of Rights, they also founded our party. Their legacy continues to illuminate our party’s path today. 2. We observe that a third global war for the redivision of the world, which has thus far remained a low intensity conflict, is evolving into a phase of open armed confrontation. In this context, new alliances are being formed. At the same time, the uncertainty and instability arising from multipolarity continue to deepen. Against this backdrop, the Republic of Türkiye must reassess its alliance policies in light of its national interests. Particular attention should be given to the policies pursued through the Coalition of the Willing. As the war between Russia and Ukraine approaches its conclusion, Türkiye must resolutely avoid becoming a party to the hostilities through the Coalition of the Willing. 3. In light of the latest developments regarding the declaration of intent as called the Mecca Defence Agreement, for now, we would welcome the intention of participation of two other nations (Bangladesh and Syria) which would strengthen regional ownership and a shared commitment in reaching to peace and stability throughout the greater Middle East. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. Risk of the Ukraine–Russia War Spreading. The war in Ukraine has entered a phase that could potentially draw other states into the conflict, as certain NATO and EU member states acting as part of the “Coalition of the Willing” (the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland) encouraging attacks on civilian targets deep inside Russia. There are growing indications that Russia may launch a forceful military response against certain members of the Coalition of the Willing. Meanwhile, attacks by Ukraine on Turkish merchant vessels in the Black Sea, carried out with targeting intelligence supplied by certain external actors, have brought the war to a critical stage. In light of the lessons learned from history and the need to safeguard our strategic interests, preserving the Russian Federation’s trust, warning Ukraine in the strongest possible terms, and preventing any fait accompli within NATO that could draw us into the war are regarded as the most important conclusions drawn from the past four years of the conflict. 2. Energy Security. The energy insecurity associated with oil and gas supplies and caused by the joint attack by the United States and Israel on Iran in the Persian Gulf persists. Efforts to secure another ceasefire in the war, in line with the June 2026 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), should be supported as earliest. In response to the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s statement of 24 August calling for Iran’s “economic isolation and exposure to secondary sanctions”, it is considered appropriate for Türkiye, as a BRICS “partner country”, to oppose this policy, both in view of the interests of affected BRICS policies and within the framework of Türkiye’s Global South standing, and to continue trading with Iran. 3. Greece–Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. While Türkiye remains committed to maintaining friendly and peaceful relations with Greece, the steps being taken by Greece in the Aegean and by the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) in Cyprus are making it increasingly difficult to sustain this policy. 3.1. In view of the unilateral actions being taken in the Aegean, including the designation of national marine park areas on the high seas and the militarisation of the islands in breach of the commitments under the Lausanne and Paris Treaties, it is considered appropriate for Turkish governments to take diplomatic action concerning the sovereignty of the islands and, if such action proves insufficient, to pursue other measures. 3.2. The course of events makes it clearer by the day that the GCASC’s advocacy of a confederal structure is also meaningless, given its unwillingness to agree to a solution based on two states in Cyprus. Its intolerance of even the participation of young players from Barcelona between the ages of 6 and 18 in football matches in the north of the island has once again laid bare just how distorted and confrontational its conception of social reconciliation is. Bringing this matter to the attention of UN Secretary General Guterres is worth considering. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments: 1. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. With no satisfactory information having been provided since 7 August regarding the content of this agreement, it has become increasingly necessary to address the lack of information concerning its implications for Türkiye’s national interests, as well as the risks and commitments to be assumed in return. Information on this issue should be provided by the Government to the political parties represented in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. 2. Israeli Attack on Syria. The Israeli Prime Minister’s struggle to remain in power domestically by carrying out attacks against the sovereign territories of neighbouring countries not only runs contrary to the tacit understanding on the matter, but also creates the conditions for undesirable crises with Türkiye. 3. The Establishment of National Parks in the Aegean and Mediterranean. The most recent development between the two states to add to the existing disputes in the Aegean has been Greece’s declaration of national parks which, despite Türkiye’s warnings to the contrary, will result in a reduction in the extent of the high seas in the Aegean. In this regard, Türkiye’s decision last week to declare national marine parks in the Aegean in response to Greece’s move is viewed as an entirely appropriate and measured step. The enactment of the draft bill known as the ‘Blue Homeland Act’ following the end of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s recess will be an appropriate step towards safeguarding peace and stability. 4. Membership of the Socialist International. The Socialist International has failed to develop sustainable policies in response to the economic and political crises emerging around the world and in our immediate region. It is also observed that the organisation persistently follows a course that supports the policies of international finance capital. It is further noted that the Socialist International has been reluctant to undertake effective and peaceful initiatives with regard to unjust regional and global conflicts. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments – August 14, 2026 1. Ambiguities Surrounding the Mecca Agreement & Constitutional Oversight. Uncertainties regarding the Mecca Agreement persist. Critical operational aspects—including its entry into force, duration, termination clauses, geographic scope, the formulation of intervention obligations, joint command structures, intelligence sharing, and integrated military mechanisms—remain unresolved. In accordance with Article 90/1 of the Turkish Constitution, the agreement must be submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) for ratification, which will allow for a thorough evaluation of whether its provisions align with Türkiye’s national interests. Furthermore, third-party states declaring accession to this pact should not be permitted to act upon it prior to TBMM ratification. Executing actions under this agreement—such as deploying military units abroad—before it officially enters into force constitutes a grave legal risk under Article 92 of the Constitution. 2. Protecting Strategic Interests & Iraq Regional Dynamics. Considering our evolving cooperation with the Iraqi government regarding the Iraq Development Road Project, joint border security, and hydrocarbon trade, due caution must be exercised. The government should formally highlight to the signatories of the Mecca Agreement—which envisions armed military action against certain religious factions within Iraq—that actions targeting these groups carry significant risks of undermining Türkiye's vital strategic and economic interests in Iraq. 3. Energy Cooperation in the Black Sea & Long-Overdue Agreements with Syria. The hydrocarbon exploration and extraction agreement concluded between Türkiye and Bulgaria (TPAO and Bulgargaz) on July 7, 2026, is a welcome development. However, pursuing comparable energy and hydrocarbon agreements with Syria—following the finalized agreements on Maritime Lateral Border Delimitation and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—must no longer be delayed. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board, Recent Assessments – August 8, 2026 1. Cyprus Negotiations & Protecting Sovereign Rights. Maximum vigilance is imperative against the traps embedded in the Greek Cypriot Administration's "loose federation" proposals—proposals disguised as compromises yet laden with demands to surrender territorial sovereignty, guarantor rights, and Maraş (Varosha) region. Under no circumstances must Türkiye compromise its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean or dilute its standing as the triumphant force of the Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974. 2. Black Sea Security & Neutrality in the Ukraine Conflict. Ukraine’s strikes on civilian vessels in the Black Sea in violation of international law, alongside its targeting of civilian infrastructure on land, have critically altered the trajectory of the conflict. Türkiye must refrain from associating with any "coalition of the willing" initiatives that could undermine its neutral posture, maintaining instead its balanced and principled policy toward both belligerents. 3. Condemnation of Unilateral Military Actions against Iran. Escalating rhetoric regarding potential US military actions against Iran—coupled with Israel's repeated assertions of its readiness to join such strikes—appears driven primarily by domestic political considerations. These proposed aggressive actions constitute a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter and must be unequivocally condemned by the international community. 4. Preliminary Analysis of the Mecca Defence Agreement. Developments surrounding the Mecca Defence Pact offer distinct strategic advantages for Türkiye. Beyond augmenting its existing deterrence through access to a secondary source—including nuclear capabilities—the agreement facilitates market diversification for the Turkish defence industry and provides financial mechanisms conducive to rebuilding war-torn Middle Eastern territories. Conversely, the agreement carries notable strategic risks, including the potential for Türkiye to be drawn into unprovoked conflicts involving Iran or Yemen, the exacerbation of regional polarization involving the Israel–UAE–US bloc, and the heavy financial burden of assuming new military commitments alongside existing NATO obligations. Close monitoring of the implementation of this agreement is therefore vital to national security, and its full scope must be transparently debated and clarified within the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM). @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board Recent Assessments – August 1, 2026 1. Escalation in the Iran–Gulf Conflict. The conflict in the Iran–Persian Gulf region continues to escalate. Türkiye must maintain an equidistant posture toward all warring parties from the outset and sustain its diplomatic efforts toward achieving a negotiated settlement based on the principle of sovereign equality. 2. Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Strait of Hormuz. The crises surrounding the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz must be resolved peacefully through direct cooperation among the regional littoral states. Türkiye should strictly avoid becoming a party to these maritime conflicts. 3. Cyprus Developments & UN Secretary-General Guterres’ Visit. In light of UN Secretary-General António Guterres' visit to the island, there must be no hesitation or compromise regarding the two-state solution in Cyprus. The European Union—which holds no guarantor status and stands as one of the key instigators of the dispute—must not be accepted as a counterpart in improving the political situation on the island. While the pipeline projects delivering fresh water and natural gas to the island represent positive developments, it is vital that the construction of the Turkish naval and air bases on the island continues uninterrupted and at an accelerated pace. 4. Al-Faw Port & the Iraq Development Road Project. The swift implementation of the Al- Faw Port and the Iraq Development Road Project is strongly welcomed, given its strategic potential to unblock maritime bottlenecks in the Persian Gulf and its clear logistical superiority over competing trade corridors. 5. Black Sea Security & Regional Risks. Considering the potential risk of Iran being drawn into the Russia–Ukraine war, security in the Black Sea has assumed greater strategic importance than during World War I. Given the risk of the Ukraine war spilling over, maintaining an equidistant stance toward the belligerents and preventing any unprovoked fait accompli within our alliance frameworks is more critical than ever. 6. Deterrence & The Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy. Foreign policy achievements are secured by advancing toward strategic goals within an environment of peace and stability underwritten by robust deterrence. The foundational principle "Peace at home, peace in the world" expresses this truth most succinctly. Turkish foreign policy must be continually deepened on the bedrock of military and political deterrence. @herkesicinCHP

CHP Foreign Policy Advisory Board-Statement & Policy Assessment 28, 07, 2026 As the founding party of the Republic of Türkiye, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) acts with the profound awareness that state policy, grounded in core national interests, is non-partisan, unified, and singular. Foreign policy objectives must remain above daily political debate, representing a single, non-negotiable national posture shared across the entire political spectrum. Within this framework, we outline the following key position points for the week: 1. Maritime Boundaries with Syria: Finalizing the long-overdue Maritime Lateral Border Delimitation and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements with Syria without further delay is of critical importance to Türkiye's strategic interests. We expect this process to be concluded expeditiously. 2. Sovereign Rights in the Aegean Sea: We view Greece's unilateral declarations aiming to de facto extend its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea as unacceptable steps that directly undermine regional peace and stability. We reaffirm our absolute conviction that the unanimous resolution passed by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on June 8, 1995—authorizing the government with a declaration of casus belli—remains fully valid and binding today. 3. Permanent Settlement in Cyprus: We maintain that a two-state solution represents the sole realistic foundation for durable peace and stability in Cyprus. We resolutely oppose any initiative that compromises this peace, disrupts the intercommunal balance, or undermines the sovereign rights of both the Republic of Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). We call on the government to ensure regular and transparent briefings to the public throughout this process. 4. De-escalation in the Persian Gulf & Regional Diplomacy: We advocate for an immediate resolution through dialogue and reconciliation regarding the concerning developments in the Persian Gulf. We hope the ongoing ministerial consultations conducted since March among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan will contribute constructively to regional stability. Furthermore, we urge the government to adopt full public transparency concerning the substance, objectives, and outcomes of these diplomatic contacts. @herkesicinCHP