Public Mainnet Update Dear Community, We have decided to postpone Soul’s Public Mainnet launch from October 19. Our revised target date is January 5, 2027. We know this is another delay and that many of you were looking forward to finally using Soul. We are sorry to move the date again, especially this close to launch. We owe you a clear explanation of why we’re taking more time and what that time will be used for. Soul has already undergone two security assessments with Runtime Verification and Arda. Our security partners have recommended building on those assessments with an additional round of adversarial testing using the latest AI models, taking advantage of their improving ability to identify vulnerabilities. We believe this is an extra precaution worth taking before Public Mainnet. As AI gives both security teams and potential attackers more capable tools, we want to use those advances to strengthen Soul’s security further before opening it to public capital. The recent incidents involving Symbiosis, Nostra and NEAR Intents are relevant reminders. Across those cases, the reported failures involved vulnerabilities that could be combined, manipulated collateral prices, and interactions between cross-chain infrastructure and smart contracts. Components can behave as expected individually and still create a vulnerability when they interact. The objective is simple: try to break Soul. We want to test unexpected state transitions, failed or delayed cross-chain execution, recovery, liquidations, and whether transaction tracking and accounting remain consistent under stress. We need to understand what happens when several things go wrong at the same time. If something breaks, we fix it, then we try to break it again. The additional time will allow us to complete this testing, address and retest any findings, and carry out the remaining security checks before launch. No amount of testing can make software risk-free, but that does not lessen our responsibility to do this work thoroughly. We will publish a progress update each month until launch, covering the testing completed, progress on fixes and retesting, and what remains before we open Soul to everyone. These updates will provide visibility into the work while keeping sensitive security details confidential. We know that explaining the decision does not remove the frustration of another delay. But our responsibility is not simply to launch Soul; it is to ensure we have done the work necessary to make it ready to handle user capital. We are not comfortable opening it before this work is done. The Soul Team ( )

Hey Andrei, thanks for the interest. Please read the first comment. This is built for businesses, not for crypto people :) P.S. This is not a crypto product. And we will not turn every post about it into a crypto discussion, because that is simply not the focus. Will repeat this on every post until it sticks. The Finance Computer is a *distribution-first product*. It abstracts modules we've built, connects the financial rails we've developed, and makes them accessible to real businesses that integrate them, solve real problems, and derive real value. It is a seamless and phased approach to enable the gradual digitalization and tokenization of everything around money, without caring about technology. We've already explained how the Finance Computer uses MultiversX and how that benefits EGLD. A quick look at the website, or even a question to Grok, would clarify that. There is vastly more to finance and money than crypto. Blockchains have now become backend infrastructure for money. Invisible rails powering financial products and services. Businesses don't care about the underlying technology nearly as much as they care about solving problems, improving their products, and growing their bottom line. And they certainly don't need every conversation about their business dragged back into the same repetitive and tribal crypto debates. On a broader note, I'm genuinely baffled by the toxicity and lack of perspective that parts of the crypto people display, particularly toward the enormous financial markets, businesses, and money flows immediately upstream and downstream of crypto. An autoimmune disease, resulting in an industry attacking the very ecosystem it needs to integrate with to achieve meaningful adoption. I've rarely seen anything quite like it in any other industry.

Infrastructure tends to win quietly before everyone notices.

Hate to admit it. But true. As a long term holder, I will continue with dca strategy. Hopefully, entering here will balance the other entries.

TODAY: Chainlink announced it is working to enable financial institutions to connect to @swiftcommunity’s blockchain ledger through the Chainlink platform. Swift moves the equivalent of the world's GDP roughly every three days ⬇️

EGLD has been totally exposed for its lies & hidden centralization today! ⚠️ 3 days of downtime is only the tip of the iceberg: 76M EGLD (2.5x supply) was minted & partially sold! EGLD did not halt; the foundation used an off-switch! All consequences of its reckless design! 🧵 Unlike a normal chain halt, where the chain stops due to a "consensus failure/disagreement", this was far, far worse. Instead of the chain stopping because an "inflation bug" caused consensus to fail, it kept going... That is what allowed the hacker to actually send their EGLD into exchanges & cause considerable harm. What comes next is even more unbelievable. As I was wondering how it was even possible to shut down a chain with 3k validators in 66min... That is what made me uncover the next bombshell: There is a literal foundation-controlled off-switch in the code!!! The Off-Switch Every mainnet node runs with a hard-fork trigger enabled that listens for a message signed by one specific public key. That is a remote stop switch held by the Foundation! We cannot know for sure if they pressed that switch, but it is highly unlikely they could have stopped the chain that quickly otherwise & the fact that it even exists is bad enough! This is all a direct consequence of the shortcuts they had to make to bring a sharded chain down to 600ms... Reckless Design Sharding comes with certain trade-offs: EGLD claimed to overcome these trade-offs through its unique design. Turns out, in reality, those trade-offs had some extreme consequences we are feeling now: EGLD sharding splits every transfer into a sender-shard debit & a destination-shard credit that must be reconciled by hand, & on one path the credit had no debit: a money printer. With no global supply invariant, finality before execution, & no protocol-level freeze, the only fix was manually shutting down the chain & a hard fork erasing the "final" history! Lack of Disclosure Given what I just explained, you can judge for yourself whether the team's disclosure is adequate. I argue it absolutely was not. The fourth screenshot shows their communication on the matter so far & exactly what they failed to mention Including the mint, the hackers' success & the off-switch! The fact that it took my own chain & code analysis to reach these conclusions tells us the team cared more about minimizing PR damage than properly disclosing the incident. At least with this piece out, they will not be able to get away with that anymore & will have to also include this information in their report The community deserves to know what is really going on, how centralized EGLD really is & how the tech is not a magical panacea but instead comes with serious trade-offs Chain Analysis The record is clear, all on a public chain for all to see. The attacker exploited this vulnerability in the chain & managed to mint 76M EGLD! Over 2.5x the supply! Along with 430M bridged USDC, about 430M bridged USDT & 5,540 bridged WBTC... The hacker then proceeded to split these into 16 wallet addresses & then send EGLD to multiple exchanges. If we look at the timing of when these exchanges "froze" EGLD, we see that MEXC did not act in time & it perfectly corresponds with very suspicious selling activity on that exchange, which was not even arbitraged out when the full freeze took effect. We cannot tell whether the hacker managed to exit the exchange afterward, but they certainly could have! Which means the hacker was likely able to walk away with around $1M USD, effectively defrauding the exchange in the proccess, by leveraging this EGLD vulnerability Please look at the visuals, as they provide all of the supporting evidence that can also be independently verified with publicly available information Conclusion This is BTC's 2010 inflation bug & ETH's 2016 DAO's hack rolled into one. That this all happened in 2026 is even more embarrassing Unlike those historic failures, there was no full disclosure of the problem as it was happening. People deserve to know; we are blowing the lid off this story now! This is also nothing like SOL's historic downtime, which involved network halts caused by bugs. Something that has happened in over two years. While EGLD managed to beat SOL in total downtime with this single incident! SOL also never ever had an off switch! The irony & I apologize; some degree of schadenfreude cannot be helped in my situation. As the EGLD community was one of the loudest spreading that false narrative. Turns out it was unknowingly a projection! The biggest red flag is still the team itself, after my fallout with EGLD last year. The toxicity & dishonesty became too much to bear This will likely trigger another ad hominem campaign against me, as it did last time & as it did for other influencers/journalists/thinkers. Fortunatly, I am specialized in weathering the storm. While these facts are undeniable & mostly speak for themselves EGLD certainly has some good technology; we can learn something from everyone. However, what we saw here over the last few days is beyond the pale That's where the value lies: In also understanding the character of a chain's leadership, especially at an early stage, as even with decentralized governance, bad leadership can still mess it all up! This is a truly worst-case scenario for a blockchain; there are very few examples of this level of collapse in blockchain history. After such an event, we have to question the competence & the wisdom of the underlying design choices EGLD's design is flawed & reckless, making centralization trade-offs other chains would never even dream of. All while claiming to be holier-than-thou It is never too late to change our minds in the face of new evidence; please study the supporting visuals for yourself. The truth cannot be credibly denied What occurred here is undeniable, while the silence of EGLD's leadership speaks louder than words: 🎓