Communism in the 21st century
Replying to @HeightsLola
你们法国人挺有意思,侮辱自己的国家英雄还觉得挺自豪。贞德、路易十四、拿破仑、戴高乐,都是你们可以随意踩踏的抹布对吧?用不了多久,你们的国家认同和历史记忆就会被掏空。一个连自己国家英雄形象都护不住的失败国家,还整天想给别国输出价值观,没见过你们这么下贱的国民😊
"How are they going to spy on leftists in history?"
#BREAKING: ICE is conducting one of the biggest spy operations on left-wing activists in history.
Because "dictator" has been used as a political swearword, especially by the "liberal democratic" West towards the communist countries. The Chinese are reacting to a perceived insult instead of a political category.
"巴塞罗那是一个一百七十万人口的大城市,加泰罗尼亚的首都,应杀的反动分子似不止200多人。巴塞罗那杀人太少,应在巴塞罗那多杀。"
伟大领袖姆巴佩的名言:
八亿观众,不斗行吗?
世界杯打下来,球迷死一半,剩一半,联赛照样踢,过几年又是满座。
皇马和一切球队都是纸老虎。
一个乌龙球,可以燎原。
凡是裁判反对的,我们就要拥护。
人不铲我,我不铲人;人若铲我,我必铲人。
看台上要百花齐放,百家争鸣。喊得最响的那几十个,下周赛季票作废。
我们不但善于砸烂一个旧更衣室,我们还将善于砸烂一个新更衣室。
主队铲客队,活该;客队铲主队,主队光荣;自己人铲自己人,误会。
姆巴佩主席对美国足协说:我们别的没有,女球迷多。送你们一千万,要不要?他们会给你们制造灾难的。
足球不是请客吃饭,不是做文章,不是绘画绣花,不能那样雅致;足球是暴动,是一个球队推翻另一个球队的暴烈的行动。
主帅退休前在餐巾纸上给接班人写了一句:你办事,我放心。三个赛季后,接班人进了预备队。
赛后发布会只有一句:试看天地翻覆,不须放屁。
最干净的还是看台上的工人农民,尽管他们手是黑的,脚上还有牛屎,比那些看战术分析的球迷干净得多。
人民说,杀反足球人士,比下一场透雨还痛快。杀反足球人士,一般不应超过看台人口比例千分之一。
弗格森算什么?他只封杀了一个 BBC,七年不接受采访;我们封杀了四万六千个足球评论员。你们骂我们是弗格森,是独裁者,我们一概承认。可惜你们说得很不够,往往要我们加以补充。
内鬼就睡在我们身旁,就坐在我们姆巴佩主席的包厢里。
,,, retweeted
伟大领袖姆巴佩的名言:
八亿观众,不斗行吗?
世界杯打下来,球迷死一半,剩一半,联赛照样踢,过几年又是满座。
皇马和一切球队都是纸老虎。
一个乌龙球,可以燎原。
凡是裁判反对的,我们就要拥护。
人不铲我,我不铲人;人若铲我,我必铲人。
看台上要百花齐放,百家争鸣。喊得最响的那几十个,下周赛季票作废。
我们不但善于砸烂一个旧更衣室,我们还将善于砸烂一个新更衣室。
主队铲客队,活该;客队铲主队,主队光荣;自己人铲自己人,误会。
姆巴佩主席对美国足协说:我们别的没有,女球迷多。送你们一千万,要不要?他们会给你们制造灾难的。
足球不是请客吃饭,不是做文章,不是绘画绣花,不能那样雅致;足球是暴动,是一个球队推翻另一个球队的暴烈的行动。
主帅退休前在餐巾纸上给接班人写了一句:你办事,我放心。三个赛季后,接班人进了预备队。
赛后发布会只有一句:试看天地翻覆,不须放屁。
最干净的还是看台上的工人农民,尽管他们手是黑的,脚上还有牛屎,比那些看战术分析的球迷干净得多。
人民说,杀反足球人士,比下一场透雨还痛快。杀反足球人士,一般不应超过看台人口比例千分之一。
弗格森算什么?他只封杀了一个 BBC,七年不接受采访;我们封杀了四万六千个足球评论员。你们骂我们是弗格森,是独裁者,我们一概承认。可惜你们说得很不够,往往要我们加以补充。
内鬼就睡在我们身旁,就坐在我们姆巴佩主席的包厢里。
The rough transcript:
Man A: "Jump off the building for fun, alright? Motherfucker."
Man B: "Oi, oi, bro!"
Man A jumps.
Woman: "He jumped?!"
,,, retweeted
Kondylis thought that our century would see the collapse of the great illusions of optimism, humanism, and universalism. The normalisation of luxury and the universalisation of hedonistic aspirations would eventually exhaust the earth’s resources. A mode of economic and social organisation predicated on mass production, mass consumption, and the provision of a minimum level of hedonistic satisfaction for all would, if realised on a global scale, prove ecologically disastrous. As the reality of resource scarcity and the pressures of demographic expansion increasingly dawned on humanity, Kondylis predicted a “biologisation of the political”: a reversion to power politics and tribal affiliations, in which the struggle for survival and the defence of material interests would displace universalist ideals.
More than a century before Kondylis, Burckhardt was already thinking along similar lines. In his lectures on the early modern period, he argues that one labours under a great illusion if one imagines that Europeans were eagerly awaiting their liberation from the Middle Ages. Had Europeans been as zealous in exploiting the earth, driven by the mania for progress, as they would become in the 19th century, they might not have lived to see that century. Burckhardt then asks whether this would have been such a loss. The transformations of the period from 1450 to 1830 had brought humanity no greater happiness; nor had the optimism of 1830-1848, or the developments that followed, altered this fundamental condition. However many rights are enshrined in law and however much material production increases, human beings remain unsatisfied. As Burckhardt remarks in his lectures on antiquity:
"Are the three great ages of the world [antiquity, the Middle Ages, modernity] perhaps like the three times of day in the riddle of the Sphinx? They are, rather, a continual metempsychosis of acting and suffering man through countless incarnations. A genuine inquiry will want to recognise all these mutations and abandon any partiality for specific ages (it is all right to have a predilection, for that is a matter of taste), and it will do this all the sooner the livelier the feeling for human inadequacy in general is. Once it is understood that there never were, nor ever will be, any happy, golden ages in a fanciful sense, one will remain free from the foolish overvaluation of some past, from senseless despair of the present or fatuous hope for the future, but one will recognise in the contemplation of historical ages one of the noblest undertakings. It is the story of the life and suffering of mankind viewed as a whole."
One of the root causes underlying the optimist view is a social outlook animated by a philosophy of history. In the case of the pessimists, their view is shaped by an anthropology grounded in historical and social reflection - one that reveals strife, war, and folly as omnipresent features of human affairs. This, in turn, leads to a focus on political order rather than on society as such.
Let us take Machiavelli and Marx as examples. Machiavelli is a pessimist precisely because he begins with men, whereas Marx is an optimist because he begins with the evolution of social formations. Machiavelli sees the struggle among men as irreducible, for it permeates history regardless of the social formation, religion, regime, or ideology that happens to govern a particular age - and, all of these are integral to the rationalisation of the power struggle. Marx, too, regards struggle as constitutive of history. Yet for Marx, struggle is continually sublated into new social orders, in which there is a progressive democratisation of the relations of production. It is precisely this historical development that allows him to envisage an end to struggle.
Marx’s philosophy of history therefore presupposes a long-term historical process, whereas Machiavelli’s political theory identifies the recurrence of cyclical movements throughout history. For Marx, the march of history carries along the men who make it, often independently of their intentions or consciousness. For Machiavelli, by contrast, each man and each group bears a responsibility before history, yet neither can ever fully realise that responsibility in an ideal or ethical manner. The same applies to political regimes. For Machiavelli, the republic remains the political ideal because it balances and moderates competing powers, even though it too remains vulnerable to implosion - because man remains man.
As long as there are friends and enemies, competing interests, wishes, and desires among men and within society, there will always be points of tension. Marx believes that these tensions can ultimately be suspended through the total victory of the proletariat. Machiavelli, by contrast, recognises that the proletariat, like the bourgeoisie, consists of men - and that both are subject to the same fundamental human condition.
"Also in the future, the application of 'Machiavellianism' as a political and ideological weapon will depend on the characteristics and the outcome of social and ethnic conflicts. Theoretically, one can show three options: First, 'Machiavellianism' will disappear with the abolition of the separation of politics and morality in a humane society; second, it will persist into eternity because the separation of politics and morality is immanent, and it will not only persist practically, but it will also agonizingly split the consciousness of humans; third, the separation of politics and morality is not abolished in practice, but it prevails to such an extent that the moral side dwindles and falls into oblivion – in a historical phase in which barbarism, however technologically transfigured, becomes a matter-of-course and carefree lifestyle for brainwashed people who treat and solve every problem only technically; then the performance principle will take the place of morality, of the humanistic ideal. But that these three options were formulated here does not mean that we have all three before us and can choose by weighing each one from the outside; we are already in the middle of the path to one of these three options, whereby the impetus on this path is determined by great and famous events as well as by our daily doing and whereby the heterogeneity of goals is always virulent. This historical impetus, which arises and which changes gradually in the chaos of individual events, forces us, if not to pessimism, then certainly to skepticism."
- Panajotis Kondylis, Machiavelli






















