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The official twitter account of GRID, the Global Repository of Income Dynamics.

Princeton, NJ, USA
Joined April 2022
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The Great Recession left scars. The authors follow 109 million workers aged 25–54 in 2004. That year, 82–85% had some recorded pay. By 2009 it was about 78% in every age group, and through 2015 those under 45 in 2004 never got back to pre-recession levels
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Pay became steadier. Year-to-year swings in workers’ earnings narrowed from 1998 to 2019, except during recessions, which brought more big pay drops and fewer big gains. Other research points to one possible reason: people changed jobs less often.
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Inequality rose too, more for men than women. For men, the 90th percentile pulled steadily away from the median. The 10th fell further behind the median until the Great Recession, then moved closer. The overall inequality peaked in 2009.
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Women fared better. From 1998 to 2019 their earnings grew faster than men’s at almost every level of pay. But women still earned less than men at the same percentile.
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Lower down, the authors call it a “roller-coaster ride.” Men’s earnings at the 10th percentile peaked in 2000, sank through two recessions to more than 7% below their 1998 level in 2009, and only regained the 2000 level in 2017.
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The 2000s are sometimes called a “lost decade” due to two recessions, weak job growth and disappointing stock returns. But for working American men, the stagnation lasted even longer. After inflation, median annual earnings were about the same in 2016 as in 2001.
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Brazil formalized fast. In its six largest cities, the share of workers in informal jobs fell from 39% in 2002 to 25% in 2015, with the biggest drop among the lowest paid. Even so, more than half of the lowest-paid quarter still work informally.
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Moving between formal and informal sectors changes pay a lot. Going from a formal to an informal job came with an average earnings fall of about a third. Going the other way, a rise of over 40%.
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Informal earnings are less stable. Big year-to-year gains and losses are much more common, and differences in age, gender, education, industry or occupation explain very little of that.
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Informal jobs pay less. On average, informal workers earn less than half what formal workers do. Most of that gap reflects who works informally, but even for the same person in a similar job, informal work pays about 11% less.
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Earnings became more stable. The risk of a large year-to-year drop in earnings spiked during the hyperinflation years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when annual inflation peaked above 6,500%. It fell sharply after the 1994 stabilization.
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Rapid real earnings growth at the bottom drove the fall, and the authors point to a minimum wage that more than doubled in real terms as one likely factor. The exception is the very top, where the highest earners pulled further ahead.
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In Brazil’s formal sector, inequality fell remarkably. Between 1995 and 2018, the ratio of earnings at the 90th percentile to the 10th roughly halved, for both men and women.
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Another 28% increased their time in formal employment: 16% gradually, and 12% rapidly. In the former group, earnings rose faster, although in both groups they stayed below the cohort average.
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The largest group, 42%, had persistently low formal employment, averaging just over one month a year, and the lowest earnings. This contrasts with the 22% identified earlier which paired high employment in each year and highest earnings in the cohort.
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Only about half of Colombian workers are formal in any given month. But follow Colombians over time and formality looks… fragile. Few workers are persistently formal and even fewer hold a formal job for an entire year. New research by @LeoMoralesZur, @socampdi & @Brenda_Sama👇
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Meanwhile, Taiwan's statutory minimum wage has been raised every year since 2012. This may be part of the story: the positive association is strongest around P10–P30 and fades toward the middle of the distribution, where the minimum wage matters less.
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Could demographic changes explain this pattern? Not really. Almost all of the decline after 2010 came from falling inequality within demographic groups, not changes in the composition of the workforce.
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