Guangyi P (@GuangyiPan) header
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PhD in IR, Lecturer in IPS at @UNSW, Neoclassical realism, Cold War, Chinese intellectual history 人是一粟太仓中

Canberra
Joined March 2020
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My first publication without major revisions.
New article!📰 @GuangyiPan and Thu Hien Phan explore the evolving South China Sea policies of the #Philippines and #Vietnam, aiming to expand the scope of the theory of asymmetric attention and "reveal the motives behind small states’ policy adjustments." bit.ly/3CJQDg7
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“The moment to worry about Chinese stability is not when generals disappear amid an investigation, but when the man who reads their files begins to age out of the role without an answer as to who will follow,” writes Andrew Mertha. foreignaffairs.com/china/chi…
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From Friday: some frank reflections on China, the 14 grievances and the Australian government's response to Beijing's campaign of economic coercion from Graham Fletcher, who was Ambassador to China from 2019 to 2023 (a turbulent time in the relationship!) abc.net.au/news/2026-09-11/f…
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A China Hawk's Case for Studying in China Ten years into my own career, I consider my lack of formal China studies education to be both a blessing and a curse. A blessing because—as Jackie suggests—I was able to piece together a great deal of knowledge about the Middle Kingdom free from bias by the entrenched China hands. Having to figure everything out on my own (with tutoring from some colleagues at @CSETGeorgetown) forced me to learn more, and more deeply, about CCP policy—and to move beyond words-on-paper to consider how China “really works.” If you read my work, you’ll notice I tend to elide commentary on the traditional, politically symbolic policy pronouncements taught in Asian studies programs (who cares?) in favor of brass-tacks calculations of U.S. and Chinese power. But, speaking personally—as rewarding as it’s been to chart my own path and come to my own conclusions, I feel my lack of in-country experience has been a real detriment to my analysis. Looking only at the digital exhaust left behind by the CCP, I came to learn a great deal about China’s policies and the predilections of the ruling Party—and relatively little about China itself. I now teach a class on open-source research methods, and was lucky to spend a few years practicing diplomacy directly with Chinese diplomats. The gulf between what you can observe remotely and what you get face-to-face is massive. Each of these is an indispensable source of knowledge, but believe me when I say they are not substitutable. Ten years on, I have still never lived in China. It is probably one of my life's great regrets. I feel I can credibly claim expertise in U.S.-China relations and segments of China’s technology industry. Yet I still have huge blind spots when it comes to the lived experience, social pressure, cultural references, and general worldview of many Chinese people—blind spots that undoubtedly weaken my analysis of the Asian security environment. This deficiency is common in Washington, and it is getting worse. At a recent conference attended by ~200 undergraduates, I polled the room and was shocked to discover that not one was studying China. And while China once dominated IR masters programs, many of my @GeorgetownCSS students are now refocusing on Russia or Iran. I routinely attend dinners for China policy specialists in Washington where almost nobody besides me has set foot in the country in the past decade. The resulting assessments and policy recommendations are often badly miscalibrated. In my own field notes from last year, I wrote that “there’s a texture to a country that can’t be captured through policy documents or sardonic social media posts—unguarded glimpses of how a society actually feels about itself, which can only be witnessed with one’s own eyes and ears.” I still believe this is true. My advice to most American undergrads contemplating study in China: Go. Take the security risks seriously. Document your contacts, keep your ordinary digital life off any device you bring, and assume you are being monitored. Resist recruitment pitches and report suspicious approaches. Do not endanger Chinese friends or sources merely to satisfy your curiosity. Recognize that some research topics, personal circumstances, or the political calendar may still make your travel inadvisable—and if you're seeking a security clearance, you may have to explain your decision later down the line. But for most students, calculated exposure to risk is not the same thing as naïveté. In many respects, college is the best—and perhaps the last—window in which to immerse yourself in China without carrying the full professional and security liabilities that would accompany such an opportunity later in your career. The opportunity cost of going, and the scrutiny you receive from both U.S. and Chinese security services, will generally only increase as you age. So go, learn the language. Eat the food, hike the Wuyue, learn to negotiate with the waijiaobu. Make friends with princelings, dissidents, nationalists, strivers, cynics, and people who care nothing about politics. My own decision to live and study in Russia before the war was one of the best decisions of my life, and (I believe) has made me a better analyst of life inside of authoritarian systems. Go with eyes wide open. Enjoy being a stranger in an even stranger land. You'll learn so much—about things you would otherwise never know you never knew. Not all of you will enter government. But some of you might. I'm counting on it: America needs China hawks who know China.
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New Aus natsec “public intellectual” model: - insult everyone more knowledgeable than you. Invite them to debate you. - if challenged, reply with ad hominem attacks. Provide no evidence for your claims. - when they demonstrate you’re an idiot, say you’re too busy to debate them.
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🚨New online! Pan & Song discuss the "limitations of assumed natural partnership between middle powers" in "Symmetric concern and asymmetric attention: strategic convergence & divergence in Australia-Korea relationships". #OpenAccess tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…⬇️
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"While Australian statecraft in Asia has never been more active than it is today, the pipeline building the capability that enables it is in crisis". Hard to argue with @TimWattsMP here. And the intro to the parliamentary committee report on this is ... absolutely blazing
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Guangyi P retweeted
Excited to share this @WarOnTheRocks piece I've been contemplating and working on for a while now: "The Blind Spots in Chinese Military Studies." My contention is the authoritative textbooks and sources published by the PLA are dwindling or becoming outdated in the face of organizational reforms and data restrictions. The result is a community that is increasingly speculating or inferring Chinese military strategy from woefully outdated doctrinal texts, despite valiant efforts to stitch together incomplete pictures from a paucity of sources. This leads to the current challenge facing PLA watchers: deducing how the PLA will bridge the divide between military strategy and campaign-level and tactical-level operations based on outdated texts. Western analysts resort to using partial sources on particular issues to interpret the PLA's collective, authoritative guidance on the key principles of strategy and operational warfighting. This is a demanding task with a high degree of difficulty, and reasonable Western analysts can come to different conclusions. Less capable analysts are likely to mirror-image or get it wrong. I advocate restoring the Open Source Enterprise — formally called the Foreign Broadcast Information Service — back into the public domain. This can be done by empowering existing U.S. government platforms with the capability and experience to support a reconstituted FBIS — such as the Library of Congress — to revive taxpayer-funded open-source intelligence-gathering of translations of foreign military and political news, articles, and textbooks, in particular related to the PLA. This of course will not fundamentally solve the problem, but it will help. Thanks to David M. Finkelstein, @jwuthnow, Lonnie Henley, Dennis Blasko, Phil Saunders, Ken Allen, Chad Sbragia, Joshua Arostegui, and @NathanMBM for their helpful comments on previous drafts. warontherocks.com/the-blind-…
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Deterrence through captivity: China’s use of detention to dissuade threats to regime security | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core - bit.ly/40fQflH
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斥鷃每闻欺大鸟,昆鸡长笑老鹰非。xxxxxxx,国有疑难可问谁?
Recent PLA Daily reporting on Zhang Youxia’s purge has prompted me to revisit the issue in a follow-up analysis just published in @ChinaBriefJT Notes at @JamestownTweets. These materials largely align with my observations and inferences from my January 26 analysis, linking Zhang Youxia’s removal to preparations for the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal—an important political agenda for Xi Jinping. Such defiance by Zhang is framed by Chinese official discourse as undermining political awareness and as trampling the CMC Chairperson Responsibility System. Many thanks again to @Arranjnh for the timely, spot-on edits. Executive Summary: (1) Recent PLA Daily articles include additional details on Zhang Youxia’s purge and reveal differences between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping over the pace of force building, especially in relation to the 2027 PLA centenary goal, a key political priority of Xi. (2) The PLA Daily explicitly links the push to achieve the centenary goal to Zhang Youxia’s purge and reiterates that Zhang and Liu had negative effects on the PLA’s combat capability development. (3) The PLA Daily stresses that the entire force must recognize strategic design, pathways, and target tasks as an established consensus that no one may question, and it underscores that all military planning must submit to political leadership. (4) Past Chinese official information shows that joint operations capability is emphasized in the 2027 goal, but joint training under Zhang Youxia’s leadership lagged behind expectations and carried political implications of defying Xi Jinping’s orders. Follow-up analysis (February 3): jamestown.org/more-informati… Initial analysis (January 26): jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-…
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Guangyi P retweeted
If you want to understand the context for the Zhang/Liu purges, I recommend starting here.
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“Leaders in Beijing and Washington agree that a concert of power (active coordination between China and the United States), not just a balance of power between the two countries, is necessary in today’s world,” writes Wu Xinbo. foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
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“If the jealousies and insecurities that come with succession politics are dangerous, then it is no surprise that Xi has not picked a successor,” writes @JosephTorigian. foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-…
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🚀🚨 New: "Alignment as a process: Explaining the trajectory of the Sino–Russian relationship" by @MariaPa56398884 & @vsfeklyunina. 🇨🇳🇷🇺 👉 Read here: cambridge.org/core/journals/…
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rejection but two minor R&R comments is really disappointing
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