
Director of Nat Sec Policy @EncodeAction | Thinking about AI, warfare, foreign policy & American security | 20-year military veteran | Dad joke enthusiast
Washington, DC
Joined April 2026
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After 20 years in the Air Force, and a summer as a fellow at @GovAIOrg , I’m excited to get to work as the Director of NatSec Policy at @EncodeAction alongside the amazing team led by @SnehaRevanur!
…and hoping to become half as prolific on here as @_NathanCalvin
Jason Baker retweeted
this tweet from a former OAI researcher seems harder to argue with every day that goes by
security is only as strong as the weakest link and these AI companies software stacks have so many links
EXCLUSIVE: In less than 12 hours, a group of ex-DOGE cyber researchers were able to penetrate Anthropic’s systems using AI agents — including Slack channels where the most sensitive models are discussed.
This is just weeks after
Anthropic whistleblower Joseph Coxon charged the company w/launching “a hubristic gamble” from a “private company’s Slack.”
Read our story here (gift link):
wapo.st/4smNlsC
Great group of voices, including Encode's founder and president @SnehaRevanur, on the state of AI risk, the role of federal and state governments, and how to weigh it against competition with China.
nytimes.com/2026/10/26/magaz…
Jason Baker retweeted
EXCLUSIVE: In less than 12 hours, a group of ex-DOGE cyber researchers were able to penetrate Anthropic’s systems using AI agents — including Slack channels where the most sensitive models are discussed.
This is just weeks after
Anthropic whistleblower Joseph Coxon charged the company w/launching “a hubristic gamble” from a “private company’s Slack.”
Read our story here (gift link):
wapo.st/4smNlsC
Jason Baker retweeted
At least encouraging to see a senior Trump admin official treating lab security as a pressing nat sec issue, tantamount to locking down "nuclear weapons grade material."
EXCLUSIVE: In less than 12 hours, a group of ex-DOGE cyber researchers were able to penetrate Anthropic’s systems using AI agents — including Slack channels where the most sensitive models are discussed.
This is just weeks after
Anthropic whistleblower Joseph Coxon charged the company w/launching “a hubristic gamble” from a “private company’s Slack.”
Read our story here (gift link):
wapo.st/4smNlsC
The UK has announced another £120 million for its AI Security Institute, alongside new investments in Britain's cyber defense and biosecurity. Very good things, in my opinion.
Here at home, we need to be just as serious about funding the people and institutions responsible for securing America’s AI lead and ensuring we harness the copious amount of good that can come from AI development while mitigating the risk.
We need to give CAISSI the staffing, compute, and access to test powerful models and assess threats from foreign adversaries so America can stay ahead in the AI race safely. We spend a lot of time pushing the need to lead in AI, but are we, like the UK, willing to fund the work needed to protect that lead?
gov.uk/government/news/chanc…
Jason Baker retweeted
Anthropic notes a number of U.S. political risks in its newly released S-1, citing past run-ins with the U.S. government including:
- The U.S. Department of Defense suggesting in early 2026 that it could invoke the Defense Production Act to compel Anthropic to remote limitations for autonomous weapons and mass surveillance and subsequent litigation
- Export controls similar to the June 2026 restrictions from the Department of Commerce on Fable and Mythos
Jason Baker retweeted
This part of Anthropic's S1 on monitoring/alignment risks is written in a weirdly passive way:
"If we become less able to detect or assess misalignment as our models advance, we may deploy models whose behavior we cannot adequately verify"
Somewhat by definition, shouldn't decisions around deployment be predicated on being able to "adequately verify" model behavior?
E.g. if Anthropic can't adequately verify model behavior, they could also just choose not to deploy the model. (though of course "adequate" may be in the eye of the beholder)
Jason Baker retweeted
Steven Pinker is correct that these extreme warnings coming from the lab leaders while they race ahead is discordant and confusing.
But I am literally chuckling at the recent line i've seen from a few folks (not just Pinker) that "RSI leading to permanent irrevocable loss of control is a smokescreen to avoid scrutiny on real issues like AI enabled bioterrorism and rogue AI swarms shutting down the internet."
Fun to imagine showing this clip to myself in 2022, when a frequent argument was that talking about catastrophic cyber or bio risk was speculative sci fi and a distraction from real issues.
Jason Baker retweeted
Some pretty good stuff here — AI bio institute seems particularly good
1/7 I have two simple tests for British AI, driven by our values. Is it safe? And is it ours to shape? 🇬🇧
Today, Chancellor @JohnHealey_MP is announcing a major, ambitious package of investment to strengthen Britain's defences against emerging threats, back British innovation, and build our technological independence.
Jason Baker retweeted
PSA, AI phishing scam on X
This account (@Futana6) messaged me saying they work at Tech Crunch and asking if I want to be interviewed with a personalized message (I assume to send over an interview schedule link that is actually a phishing link).
The account has 3,900 followers and a pinned tweet about Tech Crunch which makes it more sophisticated than some other versions of this scam I saw before, but when I Google their name I find no evidence they work there and Pangram classifies their message as 100% AI.
Please ban them and do a better job cracking down on these sorts of scams @Support
Jason Baker retweeted
yeah as others have said, two different trends around AI + cyber are happening at the same time and its confusing:
AI helping cybersecurity situation:
- 5.6 sol (yay daybreak) discovering this PHP vulnerability that was already there so people can patch it (of course can be worse in short term while lots of systems go unpatched, and also long tail of legacy unpatched systems)
AI not helping cybersecurity situation:
- lots of AI powered automated cyberattacks (e.g. railway and opencode hacks)
Vulnerability discovery probably on average favors defenders in the medium term. Automating cyber operations will help attackers a lot though, and probably enough to overwhelm positive effects on the former (every random community bank or old person is not gonna have AI swarms protecting them against AI swarm attacks). Of course the cycle of patching vulnerabilities is becoming a lot harder because of how fast automated cyberattacks are.
Also an aside on AI spear fishing in particular -
Literally today I had one of those fake tech crunch reporters reach out over DMs and the fake was pretty convincing (thousands of followers, tweets and photos about tech crunch, but when I googled became clear person didn't exist).
People who are not used to the idea that people can lie in convincing ways on the internet are going to get exploited over and over again and its gonna be bad (and also generally make it way harder to have good interactions with humans you don't know online).
Jason Baker retweeted
Tried to inject some ~nuance~ into the AI cyber discussion: the cyber disaster is real, but it looks different from what we might have imagined.
transformernews.ai/p/php-fla…
1/7 Chris McGuire’s thread sent me down a Treasury regulations rabbit hole due to my interest in the AI and biosecurity implications. Unfortunately, Treasury outbound investment regulations are very much not in my usual bag of tricks. So, for anyone else who needs “outbound investment 101” with their coffee, here’s my understanding - with a link to the Axios explanation in the final post.
Treasury just published new proposed Outbound Investment regulations, which would represent a significant expansion of the existing program. This is just a proposed rule, and it deserves a thorough review, but some initial reactions:
1. The rule would prohibit most private investment in any Chinese firm that develops an “SI system,” including any product that operates using an SI system. It defines “SI system” extremely broadly, such that it likely captures the vast majority of Chinese software products. As a result, the proposed rule likely would prohibit most private investment in Chinese software firms, as well as Chinese firms that build products that incorporate AI (i.e., the entire Chinese robotics and drone industry, and undoubtedly many others).
2. The rule adds biotech as a covered sector and would prohibit most private investment in the vast majority of the sector. It would ban private investment in Chinese companies that use biological systems to modify, enhance, produce, or control any pharmaceutical compound, to include both small and large molecules. This likely captures most Chinese firms engaged in biologic drug manufacturing or drug discovery. Biotech and biomanufacturing are areas where U.S. investment has massively fueled China’s capabilities, which are rapidly approaching--and in some cases surpassing--those of the United States. The scope of this rule signals that the administration sees this as a massive national security concern.
3. The rule does not make major changes to the types of transactions covered. Crucially, this means it does NOT prohibit investment in publicly traded securities of these companies, the purchase of goods or licensing of products from these companies, or the export of goods to these companies. But it does ban most types of private investment (i.e., VC, PE, joint ventures, greenfield investments, etc) in companies engaging in these activities.
4. This rule will no doubt change before it is finalized, and I expect the definitions of prohibited activity related to SI and biological systems will be narrowed in the final rule. But it is also a strong signal that the administration does not want U.S. investment or know-how supporting China’s development of advanced technologies, and as a result may be willing to significantly expand outbound investment restrictions.
5. Finally, this highlights a major schism inside the administration on how to prevent China from catching up to the United States in the most advanced technologies. The Treasury Department is signaling that it is willing to significantly tighten restrictions on Americans’ ability to invest in critical technology sectors in China that would help develop these technologies, given their importance to national security. And meanwhile, the Department of Commerce is taking the exact opposite approach, loosening restrictions on American companies that seek to export goods to these companies. It doesn’t make sense for the administration to be tightening restrictions on investments, while loosening restrictions on exports. Something has to give.
6/7 What interests me is how we will judge which relationships could strengthen the capabilities of competitors that threaten U.S. security, and which could benefit us. AI and biotech make those judgments difficult, so we’ll need clear rules, evidence behind the distinctions, and (most importantly, I would argue) the ability to enforce them.
7/x Chris’s tweet is an excellent start for understanding, as well as the Treasury proposal sheet link he shared. I’ll also commend this Axios coverage if, like me, you need it explained simply and straightforwardly.
Axios on the biotech implications:
axios.com/2026/10/23/trump-c…




















