According to preliminary results of the October 25 parliamentary elections, the “Student List” won the majority of votes and secured enough seats to form Serbia’s new government independently. The “Student List” has collective leadership. Its lead candidate is cardiologist Ilija Srdanović, but no consensus candidate for prime minister or lineup for the future government has been announced yet. The core of its domestic policy program is an 11-point plan. It calls for freeing the courts and prosecution service from political influence, reforming law enforcement agencies, scrutinizing the origins of officials’ wealth, implementing lustration, ensuring transparency in public procurement and government contracts, safeguarding media independence, and introducing economic and social measures. The biggest questions concern Serbia’s foreign policy: an opposition victory does not, in itself, guarantee a pro-Western shift. Dismantling the authoritarian system and restoring institutional independence could create opportunities for closer ties with the EU. However, the new government’s willingness to align its foreign policy with Brussels remains uncertain. As for sanctions against Russia, the “Student List” has already made its position clear: it opposes imposing them. On September 30, the list published a statement declaring that Serbia would maintain its refusal to impose restrictive measures against Russia. It also expressed opposition to sanctions in general, describing them as an expression of political positioning and questioning their effectiveness in resolving political and security crises. The statement cited Serbia’s own experience and the consequences for civilian populations. On October 14, Aleksandar Baucal, a representative of the “Student List”, said during a debate on RTS: “We have taken the position that sanctions against Russia will not be imposed. On the other hand, there is a need to align our foreign policy, but, as I said, that is all a matter of negotiation.” The key question, therefore, is whether Belgrade and Brussels will be able to reset their relationship while Serbia maintains this position, and whether the new government will be willing to reconsider it as the country moves closer to the EU. For Ukraine, a separate practical concern is whether the new government will allow Serbian ammunition exports to continue, including shipments that could subsequently reach Ukraine through third countries. Serbian ammunition has reached the Ukrainian Armed Forces through intermediaries. The future of these supply channels will depend on decisions made by the new government. On October 26, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed hope that Serbia’s new leadership would develop relations with Moscow and consider cooperation with Russia beneficial to the country. The new government will have to decide how to manage these relations while pursuing the prospect of European integration. Despite all the uncertainty, a change of government in Serbia presents more opportunities than risks. Restoring institutional independence and media freedom could create the conditions for a more open public debate about the country’s foreign policy, its relations with Russia, and its support for Ukraine. These domestic changes provide grounds for cautious optimism about Serbia’s future rapprochement with the EU.

Interesting coincidences that are not coincidences at all: ◾️ On October 19, Russian deputy prime minister Grigorenko, head of the Russian government’s executive office, was announced to be leaving his post, leaving PM Mishustin effectively without his own people in the government. ◾️ On October 21, the Chairman of the State Council of China met with Mishustin in St. Petersburg. Irina Okladnikova, who at the time was First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, was invited to the meeting. ◾️ On October 24, Okladnikova became deputy prime minister. As we can see, before receiving senior appointments, officials are first introduced to the Chinese representative. This directly points to Russia’s growing dependence on China. ◾️ On October 24, Aleksandr Blikman, Deputy Head of the Electronic Document Management Department of Russia’s Federal Tax Service, was detained. He was an associate of former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Grigorenko, who, in turn, was Prime Minister Mishustin’s right-hand man in the government. Mishustin has often been described as a potential successor to Putin. According to political analyst Vadym Denysenko, these developments indicate not only Putin’s fear and paranoia. They are also part of an attempt by the FSB to regain the position it held before 2016. In 2016, Putin reshaped the state apparatus and built a technocratic-bureaucratic power structure that became equal in influence to the FSB’s own power structure. The key figures in this technocratic hierarchy were Vaino (Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office), Kiriyenko (First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office), Nabiullina (Governor of the Central Bank of Russia) and Mishustin. Nabiullina is due to leave her post in March 2027. Vaino is untouchable and has direct contacts with Russian security services. Kiriyenko has faced several significant attacks, the most symbolic of which was the arrest of political scientist Kinev. Moreover, the State Duma elections showed that Kiriyenko’s complex political maneuvers are, in fact, no longer wanted by anyone. According to Denysenko, Mishustin appears to be next in line. The FSB cannot arrest figures at Mishustin’s or Kiriyenko’s level, particularly after the failures of the cases involving the Rotenberg brothers and businessman Traber. But the FSB can target people at Blikman’s level to accumulate compromising material. The main question in Russia’s current political power struggle is whether Putin will replace Bortnikov (Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service) in a month. Bortnikov is turning 75, and Putin must either extend his tenure or dismiss him. If he does dismiss him, whom will he choose as his successor? According to Denysenko, a series of fundamental changes is taking place within Russia’s highest levels of government in 2026. The most significant development is the growing influence of the FSB, which has a real chance of reshaping the system of governance to bring it back under its own control. And if it succeeds, Putin himself could be its next victim.