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Exploring the challenges & opportunities of contemporary China. Housed at @ucisocsci, supported by @UCILaw @UCIrvine_MBA. Facebook: https://teapawt.net/t.co/Jr4eNCJV1V

Irvine, CA
Joined October 2017
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China’s industrial overcapacity fuels both global competition and domestic strain. Our Executive Director Dr. Ann Tang @anntang2025, unpacks these dynamics in her new commentary with @IGCC_UCSD:
👉 ucigcc.org/blog/chinese-over… #ChinaPolicy #GlobalEconomy #APEC #UCIrvine
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📣 Next week at UC Irvine Long US-China Institute Join Dr. Lev Nachman @lnachman32 (NTU; UCI PoliSci PhD ’21) for: Contested Taiwan: Sovereignty, Social Movements & Party Formation 🗓️ Oct 22 | 4–5:30pm | SBSG 1511 👉 RSVP: forms.gle/86VyUKtAidCtBbG58 #Taiwan #USChina #UCI
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🏔️ What do China’s highest mountains reveal about politics, culture & identity? Join us for Socialism at Altitude: Chinese Mountaineering & Mountaineering in China w/ Dr. Maggie Greene (Montana State). 📅 Mon, Oct 6 | 4–5:30pm PT
📍 UCI + Zoom 🔗 Scan the QR code to register
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📢 Join us at UCI for:
Contested Taiwan: Sovereignty, Social Movements, and Party Formation 🗓️ Wed, Oct 22 | 4–5:30pm
📍 SBSG 1511, UC Irvine Speaker: Dr. Lev Nachman (NTU; UCI PoliSci PhD ’21)
👉 RSVP: forms.gle/86VyUKtAidCtBbG58 @UCIrvine @UCIPoliSci #Taiwan #USChina
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Join us at UC Irvine on Oct 9 for Tianlong Jiao: Exploring the Wonder of the Terracotta Warriors. Discover new insights from the @BowersMuseum VP & Chief Curator. Reception to follow. 🔗 Register: eventbrite.com/e/tianlong-ji… #LongUSChinaInstitute #UCIIlluminations
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We are pleased to welcome Dr. Beijie Ann Tang as the new Director of the Long U.S.–China Institute at @ucirvine. Learn more 👉 linkedin.com/posts/ucisocsci… #UCIrvine #USChinaRelations #GlobalEngagement #HigherEducation
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🌄 The Long U.S.–China Institute at @UCISocialSci welcomes @mcgreenesd Dr. Maggie Greene (Montana State University) for: Socialism at Altitude: Chinese Mountaineering and Mountaineering in China 📅 Oct 6, 2025 | 4 PM PT 🔗 Register: uci.zoom.us/webinar/register… #USChina #History
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Long Institute retweeted
China has made impressive advances in quantum technologies in recent years. Explore our feature to learn more about China’s ambitions and important milestones: chinapower.csis.org/china-qu…
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Long Institute retweeted
On Taiwan, China just has to win the psychological war. And for that, it needs no landing barges or hi-tech ballistics. It just needs the West to carry on ripping itself apart.' Article in Time Magazine. time.com/7304355/china-invas…
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Love back then—engagement photo, July 18, 1969.
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Long Institute retweeted
Chinese AI startup StepFun recently announced a new Model-Chip Ecosystem Innovation Alliance (模芯生态创新联盟) with Huawei, Biren, Enflame, Moore Threads, etc. to help develop alternatives to Nvidia. Here’s a great profile of StepFun by @economicsnoah thewirechina.com/2025/06/08/…
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China will provide each newborn with an annual subsidy of $500 until the age of three (the typical age for public kindergarten enrollment) in an effort to address its declining birth rate. According to official statistics, China's annual number of births has dropped from 19 million in 2014 to 9.5 million in 2024. During a State Council press conference held today, additional measures were announced to support childbirth, including extended maternity leave, tax incentives, and expanded childcare services. 7 siblings from a big Chinese family, 1930s.
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“Rumors are an endemic feature of the Chinese system,” @JosephTorigian “And the kind of rumors people want to believe spread more easily.”
Such rumors, however unsubstantiated, are not just noise. They expose a system whose opacity breeds paranoia and a public anxious for change. In today’s China, that is a story worth listening to, whether it is spoken aloud or only in whispers. wsjchina.cmail20.com/t/d-e-s…
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A move in the right direction for China's economic policy "China’s government spending has pivoted toward social welfare to a degree unseen for at least a generation, as it runs a record budget deficit with a focus on boosting consumption to cushion the blow from Donald Trump’s tariffs." Let's see if it is a temporary measure or a more permanent shift—next big watchpoint is the Five-Year Plan in March 2026, but Xi Jinping will give authoritative instructions at a CCP plenum later this year. Via @business bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Long Institute retweeted
From Zhu to Xi: The Long March Toward Consumption That Never Arrived Since 1998, Chinese leaders have regularly pledged to boost domestic demand, from Zhu Rongji’s stimulus to Xi’s “dual circulation” strategy. Yet consumption has never taken priority—thwarted not by intent, but by entrenched structural, political, and ideological barriers. Evolution of China’s “Expanding Domestic Demand” Strategy 1. 1998 – Post-Asian Financial Crisis: China first adopted “expanding domestic demand” as a macro policy under Premier Zhu Rongji, launching bond-funded infrastructure investment. Though the goal was internal stimulation, the approach was heavily skewed toward public investment, not household consumption. 2. 2008 – Global Financial Crisis: The Hu-Wen administration rolled out a RMB 4 trillion stimulus, again with nearly half allocated to infrastructure. Despite rhetoric about boosting consumption, funds primarily flowed to local governments and SOEs, reinforcing China’s investment-driven growth model. 3. Post-2020 – Dual Circulation: Faced with COVID and rising U.S.–China tensions, Beijing introduced the “dual circulation” strategy, prioritizing domestic demand. A 15-year roadmap followed in 2022, but structural reforms to lift consumption remained limited and largely aspirational. Why Expansion of Domestic Demand Keeps Falling Short 1. Structural Income Reform Threatens the State-Corporate Model Sustained consumption growth requires raising household incomes, reducing inequality, and expanding welfare. But doing so would shift power from the state and SOEs to households—undermining China’s political-economic foundation. •The household share of GDP remains low (~40%) due to weak labor rights, hukou restrictions, and financial repression. •Rebalancing toward households would shrink the state’s fiscal and capital share—higher wages cut into corporate profits, and more public services reduce local revenues. China’s strong-state, weak-household model is fundamentally at odds with consumption-led growth. 2. Short-Termism Trumps Long-Term Reform Consumption-driven growth depends on: •Building social welfare (e.g. pensions, healthcare, education) to reduce precautionary savings •Urbanizing with equity, not just real estate investment •Cultivating private-sector service jobs with upward mobility All of these require long-term policy patience and institutional trust, neither of which align with the incentives of China’s bureaucratic-political system. Local officials are evaluated based on short-term GDP growth, infrastructure buildouts, and investment attraction—not consumer well-being. 3. Ideological Bias for Production Over Consumption China’s Marxist legacy favors production and thrift over consumption. •From Mao to Deng, growth was framed around output, not welfare. •Even today, “common prosperity” emphasizes top-down redistribution, not empowering consumers. •Consumption in China is tolerated but never idealized; imports, luxury goods, and rising household debt are viewed with suspicion, while “productive” investment is consistently celebrated. Consumer-driven growth is often seen as morally indulgent and strategically weak compared to state-led industrial expansion. In China, expanding domestic demand has always been more slogan than strategy—an aspiration caught in the crossfire of political incentives, vested interests, and ideological habit. Until Beijing is willing to sacrifice control for consumption, talk of a demand-driven economy will remain just that: talk.
1/5 This very good FT article on China's inability stop expanding its already-excess reliance on manufacturing makes what I think are two especially important points. ft.com/content/f7979a8f-874a… via @ft
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我得知,近期中国包括北京在内的各地都有人民受到强降雨影响丧失生命,深感痛心。我们向逝者的家属和亲近的人们表示悼念之意。愿各位平安!
I was very sorry to hear about the loss of life in China, including Beijing, due to the heavy rains. We offer our sincere condolences to those who have lost family members and loved ones. Stay safe!
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Long Institute retweeted
Several former Trump officials, current Trump allies, and Republican experts come out against the administration’s decision to provide China Nvidia’s H20: Steve Bannon Oren Cass Matt Pottinger Kyle Bass David Feith Liza Tobin Michael Sobolik Craig Singleton Peter Mattis
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Long Institute retweeted
The Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Kansas offers a travel grant to scholars from outside Lawrence, Kansas who wish to use the University's East Asian Studies and East Asian language collections held by KU Libraries. Apply by Sep. 19 guides.lib.ku.edu/c.php?g=94…
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Awesome new meta‑analysis of 67 studies on cadre promotion in China -economic growth dominant driver of cadre promotion -environment matters but weakly -social stability & innovation null -public service spending even hinders advancement
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