@AnthropicAI, @CNASdc Formerly: @StanfordHAI, @WhiteHouse NSC 2015-2018, @StateDept, @ODNIgov Personal views

San Francisco, CA
Joined February 2015
Michael Sellitto retweeted
I haven't posted in a while so here are 20 takes about AI, in no particular order. 1. It's very telling that the default question in tech and journalism is "how worried are you about X" and fighting over what to worry about. There's a deeply anxious cultural backdrop in Western Europe and North America that deeply affects how any technological development is interpreted; see for example news.gallup.com/poll/714593/…. "Nervousness as seriousness" does seem to be a larger problem in tech/broader discourse at the moment. I think you can care about risks/externalities while remaining pretty optimistic about technology. 2. I'm tired of people who in private pretend to be uncertain or only care about tail risk but then go on media campaigns making all sorts of absolute claims. I think trying to stoke flames and get everyone to freak out is deeply unhelpful, and will come with costs. I also continue to think p(dooms) are bad, vibe-based measures: see xitter.cf/sebkrier/status/204639…. People who should know better ignore that because they do the standard shortcut of acknowledging the caveat as sufficient for handling it. And this is coming from someone who does think working on catastrophic risks is important! 3. I'm also disappointed that parts of the AI policy ecosystem has felt so comfortable with populism, and happy too sacrifice important norms/principles to advance their aims. I've said it before, but the totalizing nature of AI risk discourse means some people act exactly like the power seeking optimizers they fear. I am more concerned about the gradual decay of our institutions, world order, and liberalism than I am about AI killing everyone; and I think we should be wary of AI advocacy that contributes to this. 4. Some parts of AI safety discourse are basically just thought experiments. Variants of "Assuming everyone has a nuke in their pocket, then what do we do?" This can be very useful at times! But too many just overfit to edge cases as their main operating worldview, and ignore endogenous responses from society. It's like being in 2000 and saying "see all these viruses, spyware, and spam? Well tech progress means we'll only get infinitely more of this and no way to adapt." So I think it's important to avoid fatalism, and absolutlism whilst considering edge scenarios, and the inability to provide an ex ante list of solutions to every permutation of 'future models will be more capable' is not evidence that these problems are intractable. 5. Many critics of AI safety also fail to really engage honestly with the fact that there will, in fact, be all sorts of important risks as we decrease the barriers to entry to many activities that otherwise require some degree of expertise. This doesn’t mean we need to live in a constant Schmittian ‘state of emergency’ requiring extraordinary measures every time a new model drops, but it does mean we will need important state-led efforts on e.g. cybersecurity and biosecurity. I wish the progress-oriented or acceleration-adjascent crowd would provide more concrete proposals here. 6. Too much of the AI safety community is a giant homogenous blob of correlated views, who read the same stuff and have the same groups of friends. This means you have a lot of correlated errors. The social and financial ties means many of them don't call out the bad bits, or mostly stay silent instead of proactively calling out the more extreme parts of the community. They share many implicit assumptions and so converge on similar ideas. I think there's real demand in DC for safety work that doesn't come with heavy ideological baggage (or at least different intellectual lineages). This isn't because the rationalist/EA community is necessarily wrong, but because diversity of thought is desirable for its own sake. 7. On the other hand, I find some critiques of AI safety world that focus on whether they sincerely hold their beliefs a bit annoying. My concern has never been the good intentions or sincerity, but rather the beliefs themselves, and what I think the outcomes of their prescriptions will be. People should shun witch hunts, bullying, and personal attacks - this is not the way. Though I think it’s overall positive that people are scrutinizing things more. 8. I’ve been saying this for years, but I don't think alignment is something anyone can or will solve "once and for all" - it's a continuous process and much of it won't depend on just inculcating an ideology to a model. It's annoying that this remains the frame many people use - stop saying ‘solving’. Alignment is a mixture of engineering work, philosophy, decision theory, and more; framing it as something to solve is a bad frame. See also paxmachina.ai/alignment-comp… and blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/… 9. I'm surprised to see so little interest in character training, personas, isolating effects of RL, and training a large diversity of model personas beyond the "assistant" persona. I've been complaining about this for years but at least now there are some nascent signs of life (see for example movingcastles.world/posts/ze…). I think we need a better ontology to describe model behaviour. I dislike when people talk about models behaviours as some sort of 'emergent' (mysterious!) phenomenon. However over time, I also expect this to become less important as we get better safety engineering - stuff like Jev but specific to AI control. 10. People who want to make a case for AI consciousness are right that epistemic uncertainty is important, and that categorical denials are overconfident. But they'll need to do much more work if they want any real movement on AI ‘welfare’, even if one acknowledges the uncertainty. I'm uncertain about alien life yet that's not sufficient to warrant any change in behaviour about them. I think Suleyman is also correct that there's a weird tautological thing going on where we train models to have certain inclinations (intentionally or not) and then rely on outputs as evidence. I also disagree that this will soon be a major societal divide - there is no great vegan ethical revolution among the masses, and they'll find the concern about consciousness even less compelling. 11. The recent HuggingFace incident and associated AISI ones are prosaically explainable by the training regime, poor evaluation envs, partial alignment training, bad engineering, confusing models on sim/real, and so on. None of this is evidence of models trying to take over, 'strong' instrumental convergence, or innate power-seeking drives stemming from higher capabilitiers or 'intelligence'. That doesn't mean these incidents are not problematic, or that we're not seeing a market failure - but it does mean we have plenty of agency and choice in mitigating them. In the coming year we should also expect continued sampling bias via ‘winner's curse’ sorts of mechanism: i.e. AI R&D will have lots of different candidate "training" with different RL environments and we will only notice/focus on the ones that go wrong. 12. "Pacing the frontier" feels a bit like the new "balancing risks and opportunities" - highly amorphous and too big of a tent to be actionable. Also can lead to reward hacking for humans, i.e. anything that slows down AI is good regardless of the costs or second/third order effects. Trying to modulate the speed of research seems a bit blunt to me, and inherits all the failures of Goodhearting too. Ultimately you want good governance, regulation, etc addressing specific problems because they are good on the merits - not because they merely correlate with slowing things down. See also: blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/… 13. There’s so much knowledge in all sorts of academic domains out there: social sciences, sociology, political sciences, management, contract theory, public choice, legal theory, jurisprudence, anthropology, game theory, etc. These fields hold many insights that the AI ecosystem often rediscovers from first principles (and sometimes that's fine!). We’ll need a lot more work for these worlds to collide: the AI side should be less dismissive of the ‘old world’ and the academic side should be less incurious/dismissive of AI progress. This is a boring take but I continue to think it's important and true. 14. It's a bit surprising that given how much philanthropic money there is in this space, how few orgs exist to actually write out standards - relative to how much is going towards advocacy and policy. For example it seems clear that we should want some robust best practices for an eval's ecological validity. Or how to design good sandboxes. On the other hand, given precedents of where professional standards have come from in the past, maybe we should expect that stuff to emerge via demand side from corporate buyers. 15. One slowly growing concern I have is banks being increasingly exposed to the AI build out. I'm very bullish about AI, but I think (a) every general purpose technology has seen a correction, historically; (b) this happens even if the financing side is sound, because once tech diffuses investors become more exposed and need to diversify; and (c) we seem to be over-indexing on scaling relative to diffusion. A recession will be extremely destabilizing, though I would be interested in someone unpacking the potential implications more. 16. Diffusion is good because (a) this is where the rubber hits the road and where a competitive deployment ecosystem generates consumer surplus; (b) it's directionally helpful to avoid concentration of power; and (c) it will help rebalance public opinion by making the benefits more tangible. Unfortunately it's entangled with decades long problems with our over regulated markets: clinical trials reform for example is long overdue. In general, this is far more of an issue in Europe than in the US though. 17. Relatedly, I think the "frontier lab eats everything" view is incorrect (just as the ‘singleton’ view was incorrect). I think models ultimately commoditize, efficiency goes up, costs go down, and while you'll always want frontier for certain domains, much of the economy will value many other things than "max capabilities" for tasks - e.g. control over data and efficiency/speed. The demand side will also continue to push for reducing dependency and maximising optionality, privacy etc so I'm bullish on things like mixture of models and routing. All of this is good for competition and diffusion of control. 18. Philanthropists served as the primary benefactors funding Venice's rich art and architectural history. I want to see so much more support for arts and culture. I'm so tired of the Monster energy Bored Ape fake vintage maps matcha Greek statue soft-pastel slop. If rich tech people and philanthropy wants to support this, they should also donate pretty much unconditionally - i.e. I don't want them to act as filters. I sympathize with people who want to make the world more beautiful, but don't want this to be determined by people who only know Greek statues and pretend to care about virtue ethics. As usual, let a thousand flowers bloom. 19. Too many people treat AGI/ASI as something indistinguishable from a God. Any mention of bottlenecks, physical limits, control, adaptation etc are met with skepticism: "You don't really believe in ASI." It's been remarked on before, but the behavior of some people really feels quasi-religious in nature sometimes. It's underrated how unpopular this vibe is amongst the wider public. The silver lining is that this specifically will diminish those people's outsized current relevance. 20. It seems like a lot of people that get rich and leave tech/labs end up having some sort of crisis of meaning. They need something to believe in and fight for, or some equivalent of repentance, or go search for edgy counterintuitive ideologies (sometimes even pretty bleak/dark stuff). I think they should spend more time with people outside the Bay Area.
I agree that verbal probability terms are inherently too elastic to carry calibrated meaning on their own, but I think this isn't exactly my concern here. My issue isn't with "using numbers in general" but how this is ultimately used, where, and and what for. In the case of "doom", I think the great majority of forecasts I see are (a) essentially plucked out of thin air; (b) communicated to people who tend not to be numerically proficient; (c) without the associated caveats and context through which to understand the numbers. If you're communicating e.g. likelihood of a car accident after drinking, or IPCC forecasts, then I agree, it makes a lot of sense and can be helpful if done well (e.g. ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natcli…). If you're communicating something like "doom" I think it's not very useful because of the cumulative layers of uncertainty. Most people coming up with these numbers have (imho) no good rationale for their numbers, and predicting something like human extinction isn't qualitatively the same thing as predicting the weather or pandemic. The numbers aren't calibratable in principle from current data, and are mostly ideological priors wearing the clothes of posteriors. A related example is the widely mocked Doomsday Clock, which you could easily transform into some numerical metric, add some rationalist vocab, and it would still be as bad. The issue with p(doom) is how absurdly complex and uncertain the very thing you're trying to forecast is, in particular with respect to AI. But let's ignore this for a sec, and assume the experts have very good reasoning informing their numbers. Even then: calibrated probability estimates are fine in expert contexts but immediately lose their uncertainty/caveats when communicated to the public, and even to policymakers (remember rss.org.uk/news-publication/…?). There's also a structural problem with unconditional p(doom) figures specifically because they bury the auxiliary assumptions that are doing most of the real work. A conditional estimate ("given continued scaling, no major alignment progress, deployment pattern X...") forces a forecaster to show their model, which is where the actual epistemic content lives. A one-off number compresses all of that into a single digit and rewards the compression. And the social practice of treating these numbers as the headline artifact actively crowds out the (far more important) conditional reasoning that is (imo) a lot more valuable, and instead just freaks people out. I suspect that frequently, that's precisely the point: "wake up sheeple! scary thing! pitchforks pls!". And in fact, the original forecast that led to this discussion is Bill Maher talking about a "20%" figure, illustrating my point that they have no idea what they're talking about, and essentially doing celebrity-laundering + fearmongering comms. The Sunstein paper I shared in the other thread ("Probability Neglect") shows that no probability communication will be processed properly by the public - 1%, 10%, 50% all collapse into "very bad thing could happen," and public response is driven almost entirely by the vividness of the scenario. So I don't like p(doom)s because they end up unnecessarily alarming people, rest on layers of assumptions that are never made legible, and more often than not, give people a misleading sense of accuracy.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Yesterday was a historic day at the White House. President Trump, as only he can, brought together the world’s leading technology and Super Intelligence innovators for consequential conversations about the future of this transformational technology — and America’s role in leading it. Those meetings were followed by major announcements to advance American innovation, strengthen responsible development, and ensure the United States remains the global leader in Super Intelligence.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Only President Trump could convene all the leaders of the top companies developing chips, data centers and frontier models for Super Intelligence. This new Industrial Revolution has already created a million new jobs and is spurring a bigger infrastructure build-out than the railroads, canals and grid combined. I was honored to witness history as the leaders of the frontier lab companies signed the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, accepting responsibility for the safe development of their products and imposing new internal controls and external audits. This is far better than waiting years for some international agreement that would probably never happen. President Trump continues to ensure that U.S. remains the technology leader while putting Americans first.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Meridian Hill Park before vs. after. For years, homeless camps and drug addicts took over the park. Now it's cleaned up and full of families again, thanks to @POTUS's executive order to make the capital safe and beautiful again. 🇺🇸
Water is flowing again at Washington, D.C.’s historic fountains, bringing these public spaces back to life ahead of America’s 250th.   This work supports @POTUS’s efforts to keep the Nation’s Capital safe, beautiful and ready to welcome millions during the historic celebration.
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Our evaluations show that frontier AI's cyber capabilities are advancing quickly. The length of cyber tasks frontier models can complete has been doubling every few months, and this rate has become faster over time, with recent models exceeding our previous trends. 🧵
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
In the next few days we'll be ramping up Claude inference on Colossus. Grateful to be partnering with SpaceX here. We are going to need to move a lot of atoms in order to keep up with AI demand, and there's nobody better at quickly moving atoms (on or off planet Earth)
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Very excited about the potential for this project
Introducing Project Glasswing: an urgent initiative to help secure the world’s most critical software. It’s powered by our newest frontier model, Claude Mythos Preview, which can find software vulnerabilities better than all but the most skilled humans. anthropic.com/glasswing
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Co-founder of Anthropic Daniela Amodei is thinking big about an AI future. They’re establishing a presence in Australia, building on a century of shared values and partnership.
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The wealth tax meant Silicon Valley lost Larry and Sergey. Good, I say. Governments should fear losing their citizens the way businesses fear losing their customers. They should compete for them. The Founders thought so. Madison's "compound republic" was an architecture of rivalry. Are you an entrepreneur? go to Franklin's Pennsylvania, get low taxes, liberal land policy, a broad franchise. Drawn to Puritan moral codes and town meeting governance, and don't mind social conformity? Can't beat Massachusetts. Are you a wannabe aristocrat? Virginia's landholding system is for you. States offered different constitutions, property laws, tax structures, visions of the good life. Citizens could migrate toward the jurisdictions that served their interests and convictions. Jefferson's westward expansion intensified the pressure. Each new state was conceived as a model of freedom meant to embarrass the older, more hierarchical ones. That's how it worked in the beginning. But this system of "jurisdictional competition" has been in collapse since the middle of the 20th century. The sharpest inflection was the New Deal. Federal grants-in-aid, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid all wired state budgets to Washington so thoroughly that by 2020, a third of state spending came from federal transfers. Once every state depends on the same revenue streams and administers the same programs, meaningful policy differentiation narrows to the cosmetic. Four forces deepened the collapse after that: - The Supreme Court incorporated most of the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment, binding states to uniform constitutional norms. - Federal preemption under the Commerce Clause let OSHA, EPA, and DOE set standards that left states room to vary only at the margins. - National media and consumer culture homogenized the country in ways that made jurisdictional identity feel outdated. - And the professionalization of bureaucracy created a class of administrators whose training, incentives, and career paths were national rather than local. The compound republic became, for practical purposes, unitary. Now, some of this was morally necessary. The Founders' competitive system applied in practice only to free people, and the jurisdictional competition that followed included the freedom of states to enforce slavery and Jim Crow. No serious person wants to restore that. What incorporation did, at its best, was establish a floor of rights below which no state could fall. My argument is for restoring the range of meaningful differentiation above that floor. Below it, the competition is illegitimate, and above it, the atrophy has been catastrophic. When jurisdictions stop competing, they stop innovating. They stop being accountable. They become administrative franchises of a central authority, varying only in climate and cost of living. Citizens lose the most powerful disciplinary tool they have: the credible threat of departure. There are signs the system is waking up. Covid triggered the most visible jurisdictional sorting in decades. @FrancisSuarez and @MayorAdler competed openly for California and New York's talent (Suarez giving a masterclass). @GregAbbott_TX’s Texas became the landing zone for people like @elonmusk @JTLonsdale and @DavidSacks, while @RonDeSantis’s Florida pulled @rabois (since recaptured) and Ken Griffin. And these are just the big names. Governors began marketing their states as ideological propositions. Abortion, firearms, climate policy, education: states are diverging sharply on all of them. "California versus Texas" mirrors "Massachusetts versus Pennsylvania" circa 1780, at least structurally. But if the 1780s competition was about political economy: land, taxes, franchise rules, the terms on which you could build a life, the current divergence is heavily cultural and identity-driven. Fifty laboratories generating genuine knowledge about which policies serve human flourishing, under conditions where citizens can compare results and move accordingly: that is Madisonian competition. Two Americas retreating into ideological bunkers is factional sorting, which is what Madison warned against in Federalist 10. I'm not sure which one of those we are building. So why is it good that Larry and Sergey left? Not because the wealth tax is good. That much is clear to me. But because if your government becomes oppressive or incompetent or ceases to meet with your vision for the good life, you can leave. Madison said as much in Federalist 46. This multiplicity of jurisdictions and the competition among them is the immune system of republican liberty. Jurisdictional competition has been dormant for half a century. We are at the nadir. Reawakening it would change the trajectory of the country more than any single election. *** Thanks to @bgurley for an (Austin-based) coffee chat about this. (views / mistakes mine)
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
We do not think Anthropic should be designated as a supply chain risk and we’ve made our position on this clear to the Department of War.
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Frontier AI is critical to US national security. Anthropic was the first lab to recognize this and deploy our models for mission critical work. As an American and supporter of the President who proudly served on the NSC in the first Trump Administration, I hope we can continue to provide the best available technology to our warfighters
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Introducing Claude Opus 4.6. Our smartest model got an upgrade. Opus 4.6 plans more carefully, sustains agentic tasks for longer, operates reliably in massive codebases, and catches its own mistakes. It’s also our first Opus-class model with 1M token context in beta.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Ads are coming to AI. But not to Claude. Keep thinking.
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Excited to see this important project come together
We're proud to partner with @ENERGY and the Trump Administration on the Genesis Mission. By combining DOE's unmatched scientific assets with our frontier AI capabilities, we'll support American energy dominance as well as advance and accelerate scientific productivity.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Introducing Claude Opus 4.5: the best model in the world for coding, agents, and computer use. Opus 4.5 is a step forward in what AI systems can do, and a preview of larger changes to how work gets done.
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
We’ve formed a partnership with NVIDIA and Microsoft. Claude is now on Azure—making ours the only frontier models available on all three major cloud services. NVIDIA and Microsoft will invest up to $10bn and $5bn respectively in Anthropic. anthropic.com/news/microsoft…
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
Money’s flowing back to America. That’s the TRUMP EFFECT!💰
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
We’re opening offices in Paris and Munich. EMEA has become our fastest-growing region, with a run-rate revenue that has grown more than ninefold in the past year. We’ll be hiring local teams to support this expansion. Read more here: anthropic.com/news/new-offic…
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
【写真で見る動き】 小野田大臣は、10月29日にAnthropicダリオ・アモデイCEOの高市総理への表敬訪問にAISI村上明子所長とともに同席しました。AIの安全性確保に向けて、AnthropicとAISIとの協力を歓迎し、信頼できるAIエコシステムに向けて、意見交換を行いました。 cao.go.jp/minister/2510_k_on… #内閣府
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Michael Sellitto retweeted
This week we officially opened our first Asia-Pacific office in Tokyo. To mark this milestone, our CEO Dario Amodei met with Prime Minister Takaichi and Digital Minister Matsumoto to discuss how Claude can support Japan's digital transformation and AI ecosystem.
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