Max_97

As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment proposal. My rationale: I want to be clear at the beginning. I want to support Strike. It is one of the most visible DeFi protocols on Cardano. I recognize the importance of liquidity and trading infrastructure for the ecosystem. I also appreciate that the proposal is not framed as a grant, but as a productive treasury deployment intended to return principal and yield to the Treasury. However, as a responsible DRep, I must apply a high standard when Treasury assets are exposed to significant risks. For a 9M ADA request, the proposal does not yet provide enough detail, safeguards, or evidence to justify a YES vote. I remain open to supporting a revised proposal if these issues are addressed. One concern is trade transparency. Strike reports strong growth numbers. However, because Strike V2 trading happens on the Strike execution layer rather than fully on-chain, DReps and the community need more information to verify the quality of this activity. Strike should publish anonymized V2 trade concentration data, including the top 5, top 10, and top 20 accounts by volume and trade count, the percentage of volume generated by market makers, the percentage generated by the official liquidity vault, self-trade prevention rules, wash-trading controls, and a clear definition of what “unique traders” means. Another concern is the need for support from the public treasury. The proposal states that Strike has generated millions of dollars in profit for liquidity providers and over $1M in protocol revenue. These numbers make Strike look successful, but they also weaken the argument that Treasury support is necessary. If the protocol has already generated substantial LP profit and revenue, Strike should explain why the required liquidity cannot come from reinvested protocol revenue, LP profits, or the STRIKE token treasury. I am also concerned about market timing. The proposal requires Treasury ADA to be sold into USDM. ADA is currently trading at low levels, which makes this a high-conviction treasury decision. Selling ADA at low prices to support USDM liquidity and a private DeFi protocol is difficult to justify without stronger Treasury protection and upside alignment. Custody is another important issue. A 3-person council is relatively small for a 9M ADA deployment. I would expect a larger and more independent structure, potentially something like a 5-of-7 multisig. Including respected top DReps or other independent ecosystem representatives would add legitimacy and reduce concentration risk. The proposal should also provide exact signers, thresholds, wallet addresses, responsibilities, and conflict-of-interest disclosures before approval. Audit readiness is also not sufficient yet. Strike has public evidence of prior audit work for older smart-contract components, but the official Strike V2 audit relevant to this 9M ADA deployment has not been published yet. DReps should require the final V2 audit report, audited commit hashes, and deployed contract addresses before approving a treasury deployment of this size. The proposal should also include a clear commitment that, during the 12-month Treasury liquidity deployment, Strike will not unilaterally change protocol settings or economic terms in a way that materially increases Treasury risk or reduces Treasury upside. Any necessary changes should be disclosed publicly, clearly justified, reviewed by the independent council, and included in regular transparency reporting. Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently describe how the ADA-to-USDM conversion will be executed. Since the Treasury position depends on selling 9M ADA into USDM, execution fees, spreads, slippage, and counterparties are material risks. These details should be specified before approval, not only reported afterwards. Overall, I see a potentially interesting idea, but the proposal form is not adequate for the size and risk of the request. It describes the intention, but not enough of the execution plan, audit status, custody mechanics, conflict management, and downside protection. For these reasons, I vote NO on the current proposal, while remaining open to a revised version with stronger Treasury protection and a more complete risk framework. If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance. MANDA Pool ID: pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8 My DRep ID: drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp Buy me a beer: pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5…