Angel Petrov

The third option (maintaining the status quo of neither peace nor war) appears, at least on the surface, to be the most attractive alternative. It spares President Trump the need to accept an agreement with Iran that would require concessions not only from Tehran but also from the president himself. Such an agreement would serve as clear evidence of the failure to achieve the war’s main objectives or even to return to the status quo ante regarding the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, this option avoids, at least for now, another round of military confrontation with Iran, whose prospects of improving the strategic landscape are highly questionable. It seems more likely that following such a round, whose consequences would probably be even more devastating than those of the previous one, both for Iran and for its neighbors and the global economy, the parties would find themselves back at the same impasse. Another military campaign would therefore fail to resolve the fundamental challenges, including the survival of the Iranian regime, its nuclear program, and Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, there is a significant risk that, assuming the Iranian regime survives another round of fighting (as seems likely), the credibility of the military option against Iran will be substantially undermined, at least for the foreseeable future. From the Iranian leadership’s perspective, such a confrontation, which would likely include attacks on strategic infrastructure, would represent the realization of its worst-case scenario. If the regime manages to survive it, the ability to deter Tehran in the future would be significantly weakened. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the third option—maintaining economic pressure over an extended period—will provide a way out of the deadlock. At this stage, there is no indication that the Islamic Republic is on the verge of economic collapse, let alone political collapse. Iran continues to rebuild its strategic capabilities, its nuclear capabilities remain intact, calls for a revision of its nuclear doctrine are growing in Tehran, and Iran shows no willingness to compromise on its core demands vis-à-vis the U.S. It is reasonable to assess that if economic pressure continues, it is unlikely to lead Iran to decide, several months from now, to make concessions. On the contrary, it may well push Tehran toward further escalation, and it is far from certain that the ability to act effectively against Iran will improve in the coming months. The bottom line is that while the decision not to decide may be understandable at this stage, it is doubtful that it will eliminate the need, in the near future, for difficult decisions in both Tehran and Washington—one way or another—to break the current impasse.