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https://teapawt.net/t.co/XjJP3SQesh 🐼

New York, USA
Joined February 2017
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ETH supply is up about 1% since the Merge. In the same time period: > solana:So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112 supply grew 66%, from 354M to about 589M. > ripple:native supply grew 27%, from 49.83B to about 63.1B. > cardano:native supply grew about 10%, from 34.18B to about 37.5B to 38B. > bitcoin:native supply grew 4.96%, from 19.15M to about 20.10M. > ethereum:native supply grew 1.0%, from 120.52M to about 121.7M.
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It's an increasingly common take that AI hacking means cybersecurity is doomed. I disagree. I think cybersecurity is naturally defense-favoring once people get their shit together. And anyone who continues to hold cryptocurrency (including me, ~90% of my net worth) is implicitly making that bet. Here's why I am making that bet. First, the oversimplified punchy one-line statement: If AI can prove Navier-Stokes and FLT, then AI can prove the statement "this program is secure" as a mathematical theorem. Even if the program is very complicated. Now, the nuance: (See also: vitalik.eth.limo/general/202… ) The word "secure" is hiding all kinds of skeletons in the closet in terms of what it actually means. What does it mean for Signal (the encrypted messenger) to be "secure"? The most basic definition you might think of is: no one who doesn't hold the recipient's secret key can read the contents of the message. But: * Did you remember to include _other_ critical forms of security? Can the adversary forge messages? Can the attacker prevent messages from reaching the recipient? Can they cause your client to crash by sending malformed messages? * Have you made sure that your model of the adversary includes attackers that interfere with the protocol actively and not just passively? And attackers that interfere by replaying messages to you or the recipient that either of you sent over the wire at any point earlier? * What if the adversary hacked (or _is_) the Signal server? * How did you learn which public key belongs to the recipient in the first place? What if that process was tampered with? * What if your device gets hacked at some point in the past or future - is your message still safe then? * What if your key leaks because of a bug in your operating system? Or because you got a bugged version of the Signal client? Or what if the database is corrupted? * Or the libraries, interpreter or compiler of the programming language you wrote it in? * What if your key leaks because tiny perturbations in perceptible signals generated by the hardware leak mathematical relationships that can extract the key a few hundredths of a bit at a time? * Are you hiding the *size* of the payload? Does that matter? * You're definitely not hiding the identity of the sender and the recipient, and the exact time each message was sent (think: not just time-of-day, but also time deltas between one message and the next). Is that not enough to deduce a lot of important facts about what relationships you have, and what *kinds* of conversations you are having? So ... even definitions can be over a thousand lines of code, and need deep careful thought to figure them out. Working on making definitions more human-readable is of extreme importance - it's perhaps the only "high-level language" that matters right now. But even still, even despite all of the above, for security-critical components, the definition is a much smaller attack surface than the implementation. Verifying that the definition is adequate is a much more tractable task than scanning over the code directly - and can become even more tractable with better tooling. Definitions are also _additive_: if two groups have two different definitions A and B, then, well, you can just prove that the program satisfies both A and B. Code is not additive in this way: if a program is A + B, a bug in A _or_ B can sink the whole thing. Definitions are additive. And if you can't satisfy A and B at the same time, you've isolated the most important philosophical issue for your project to spend its next few weeks grappling with. Sometimes, definitions are not much smaller than the implementation - UI components might be one example. But for many of the most critical components - message-passing protocols, sandboxes, cryptography like SNARKs and FHE - the asymmetry is real. Historically, a large class of failures with this approach have come from people only verifying a small portion of their code, that they self-declared to be the security-critical portion, and ignoring the rest - and it turns out that something in the rest of the code is security-critical too. This was reasonable back when verification was difficult and scarce. The solution today: sorry, you have to verify over literally your entire program, including database, networking, any caching layers, everything. Modern AI can do it. So it's not about "the good guys find all the vulnerabilities before the bad guys do" - that could maybe work too, after all a finite program only has a finite number of vulns, but it's riskier - it's specifically an asymmetric strategy of making code that is much more resilient in the first place. This is the kind of direction that Ethereum is going in for the next few years. There is no future for blockchains - especially blockchains with scalability and privacy - without doing this. We need to make software actually secure. And we have already made a lot of progress.
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Rudes.eth retweeted
🇺🇸 The U.S. House will hold a hearing on the Crypto CLARITY ACT in just 4 days, on July 17.
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1. Intro Vitalik recently wrote about where the EF should go; Aya added a note to explain how we got here, and why. I’ll write about the execution. We now have enough clarity to stop treating “what is the EF for?” as an open-ended question. Our mandate is clear: The EF exists to ensure Ethereum is, becomes, and remains real permissionless infrastructure for self-sovereignty: censorship (and capture) resistant, free and open source, private, and secure; and capable of supporting sovereignty-preserving coordination at scales where trusted institutions hitherto have been unavoidable. The following are my thoughts on some of the points that follow from the mandate and how we are translating it to action. But first, a short reminder about 2. What the EF is not for We are not here to optimize for EF importance, corpo/pol appeal, or ecosystem popularity. We are also not here to please short-term speculators, prop up TBTF neo-SIFIs, market every app on Ethereum, help anyone look good to their crypto or investor friends, or provide on-demand entertainment for dinner parties and private retreats. 3. What the EF is for: Eliminating weaknesses We are here to defensively strengthen places where Ethereum is, or can still become, extractive, totalizing, or vulnerable to cartel or state capture, or authoritarian tools of surveillance or coercion. We will base our actions on a full examination of what Ethereum is and can be at the protocol layer (what is actually running as “Ethereum”), the access layer (what users use to interact with the protocol), the user layer (the end-users who need and will need Ethereum), and the institutional layer (the intermediated paths that scale self-sovereign usage). The EF exists to harden every surface of Ethereum, including those where Ethereum can remain formally permissionless while becoming practically captured. Some obvious surfaces are the transaction pipeline, staking and network security, access layer standards and interfaces, self-sovereignty norms, privacy expectations, institutional adoption patterns, and social layer governance processes. The primary concerns are similar across most of them: does the status quo and its future trajectory minimize trusted dependencies, minimize points of leverage and capture vectors, make user privacy the default, preserve exit, and make trust assumptions legible? The work starts with the EF itself. We are moving compensation and major financial relationships toward ETH and mandate-compliant Ethereum-native stables, with exceptions where positive law or unavoidable operational constraints require exceptions. Rather than a purity ritual or instruction for people to take unmanaged personal risk, it is robustness, alignment, and product pressure. If the EF’s work is to make Ethereum usable as infrastructure for self-sovereignty, everyone at the EF will increasingly live inside the constraints of the system the EF exists to improve: wallet UX, volatility, accounting, privacy gaps, payment friction, stablecoin trust assumptions, recovery, dependency risk, etc. If we can’t use these tools ourselves, it is unrealistic to expect others to. Ethereum is already mature; those who do not depend on the user-facing stack have no business trying to shape its future, at any layer. The transaction pipeline is next. Preventing toxic MEV capture is core EF work, not a peripheral market-structure concern. Transaction supply, ordering, inclusion, block construction, propagation, and settlement are part of Ethereum’s neutrality boundary. Some MEV may persist as an adversarial phenomenon the protocol contains, but it must be absolutely minimized and, for that to be possible, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by its beneficiaries. If credibly neutral execution is subverted by privileged orderflow, cartelized builders, trusted relays, opaque routing, or validators outsourcing into a narrow supply chain, Ethereum will look permissionless while users experience it as intermediated at the moment value moves. EF protocol work will therefore prioritize lower barriers to block building and validation, stronger inclusion guarantees, reduced extraction opacity, competitive transaction pipelines, user-facing legibility of trust assumptions, and more aggressively exploring the open orderflow solution space. None of this is simple. A good solution in one place can aggravate problems elsewhere. FOCIL is good for censorship resistance, but it may introduce more cross-block MEV. While ePBS solves the relayer trust problem, we must make sure that its implementation does not inadvertently obstruct long-term solutions to even larger problems. It would be unacceptable, for example, if ePBS enshrining the builder economy ends up making it harder to reduce reliance on the private orderflow that has emptied out the public mempool. Encrypted mempools may not only reduce pre-execution transparency and pending orderflow visibility, but also shift competitive advantage to new privileged actors, including specialized hardware operators in some designs, while adding protocol complexity. In order to avoid wasting time playing whack-a-mole, we must commit to solving the extraction problem at a whole system scale. Doing so will require creativity, courage, and the understanding that failure to solve this problem is unacceptable. If we fail, we will have left in place an unnecessary barrier to institutional adoption, but, more importantly, we will also have surrendered a core part of the promise of Ethereum - the replacement of extractive middlemen with permissionless, credibly neutral infrastructure and competitive markets. That must not happen. MEV is likely to be the next major front in the cypherpunk war. We must set ourselves up to win here. Privacy is just as fundamental. A public ledger without serious privacy defaults is a surveillance substrate with settlement guarantees. That is not an acceptable end state for the world computer. Unconditional privacy will be readily available across Ethereum, with programmability on top for selective disclosure, proofs, auditability, compliance logic, reputation, governance, identity, and other constraints chosen by users and their communities. The temporal order matters: unconditional privacy must exist first, opt-in constraints come second. It is also important to avoid forcing users to assemble a fragile stack of special wallets, RPCs, bridges, apps, compliance providers, and operational habits to attain privacy. Deep privacy must be more secure than this. Privacy is a condition for Ethereum’s viability as freedom-respecting coordination infrastructure and as such must be robust. Staking must be treated as protocol infrastructure risk. Staking is not merely a yield product, and liquid staking is not merely an app-layer market. If stake, liquidity, validator access, DeFi collateral, and governance influence concentrate around a small set of issuers or operators, Ethereum’s security layer becomes vulnerable to capture through capture of the economic layer around it. EF will support research, specifications, and designs that keep staking permissionless, private where possible, plural in operation, and resistant to intermediaries becoming permanent control points. The access interfaces are where users access either the protocol directly or through intermediated defaults. The primary problem to solve here is not getting Ethereum into more rooms directly, but making its users, both end users and institutions, more self-sovereign and less susceptible to coercion, and avoiding normalization of soft coercion in exchange for reach. EF will not help Ethereum become more acceptable by sanding off the properties that make it uniquely valuable. Ethereum does not need to become another permissioned settlement backend with better branding. It needs to show, in production, that self-sovereign coordination at scale is possible. Across Ethereum, the EF’s defensive work seeks to ensure that Ethereum is infrastructure people can still use when counterparties fail, platforms censor, governments overreach, intermediaries extract, and coordination problems become infeasible for trusted systems to handle. A core part of that is to make that infrastructure secure and robust against capture at every layer wherever capture opportunities can hide. 4. What the EF is also for: Seizing opportunities Shoring up the fundamentals is not enough. Ethereum’s potential is still largely unrealized, but that does not mean that the path ahead is going to be straight. Opportunities must be seized when the time is right. At this moment in time, a number are visible, including: * Ethereum becoming the first quantum-resistant global infrastructure. Ethereum researchers will lead the post-quantum cryptographic migration before the threat becomes urgent, not after it becomes a governance emergency. That means hardening Ethereum’s cryptographic foundations while there is still time to design carefully. The same applies to other long-horizon risks, where waiting for market demand means waiting until the window for principled design has already closed. * Verifiably self-sovereign stack, from soup to nuts, whether local or remote, with no censorship or extraction openings: browsers, wallets, intents, broadcasts, orderflow, inclusion, block construction, proposal, proving, exit, and recovery. Minimal MEV, and zero toxic MEV entrenchment, either in or around the protocol. No execution layer that is formally permissionless but practically gatekept by privileged supply chains. If there’s a funnel towards an extractive private lane, there’s other options that keep the game live. The goal is not only to prevent extraction or capture, but to make credibly neutral execution competitive enough that serious users prefer it. * Making ETH normal digital cash: a private, dignity-respecting, debasement-resistant and surveillance-resistant medium of exchange and store of value, as well as the native asset of private computation and private coordination for both humans and their agents. If Ethereum can make private economic life and private institutional life possible without routing users back through the friction and potential abuse of custodians, surveillance vendors, or permissioned ledgers with softer branding, as well as provide a venue for secure and competitive machine economics, the value unlocks will be immense. * Personal wallets with personal AI agents that users can actually own and run on their own personal computers. Not your keys, not your coins; not your model, not your mind. As agents become interfaces for more economic and social action, the question of who owns the wallet, the model, the memory, the policy, and the signing authority becomes an existential question about sovereignty instead of UX details - we are all users above any other roles, and no one at EF will forget this. * Institutional and enterprise use cases where Ethereum wins by not disappearing into an invisible backend, gatekept by intermediaries or terrible UX, and by not compromising into a compliant fintech rail with web3 branding. Rather, we will win through proving that credibly neutral infrastructure can handle disintermediated coordination so competitively that trusted intermediaries have to meet Ethereum users on Ethereum’s terms. * Security-preserving scaling. L2s and related infrastructure will be able to meet institutional-level needs without accepting dependencies on closed operators, opaque sequencing, custodial UX, or upgrade committees that users cannot realistically exit. Scale is not throughput alone. Scale is the guaranteed availability of self-sovereignty under real load. We are ensuring Ethereum remains the hardest bedrock for settlement, local and worldwide; and beyond that, a civilizational ledger and execution substrate to stand the test of time. When future civilizations speak of the infrastructure they inherited from the Antiquity of the Information Age, their first example should be Ethereum. Ethereum will outlast all of us. More than enough people watching understand this. Many wondered why it needed saying at all, but it did. If you don't believe us or don't get it, we don't have time to try to convince you, sorry. 5. Addressing departures There has been a lot of online speculation about departures from EF, both before and after the mandate. Some people resigned, others were terminated. Some departures were about strategy, some about role fit, some about normal institutional change, and some simply about people deciding that their best work for Ethereum should happen somewhere else. We will not litigate individual personnel matters on Twitter. That is the default because it is better for EF, better for the people involved, and better for Ethereum. People who contributed through EF deserve dignity on the way out. They do not deserve to have their employment history turned into factional content. Where possible, we have let people describe their departures in their own words as a matter of courtesy, and not concession. If public claims materially mislead people about EF’s direction, decision-making, or mandate, we may correct the record at the level of policy, process, and institutional facts. We still will not turn personal files into public spectacle. Ethereum is permissionless. People may disagree, criticize, compete, fork, and build elsewhere. We intend to keep exits dignified and expect others to do the same. It will suffice to say that we are thankful for what all contributors have built; we will continue to do work Ethereum needs. 6. Addressing EF spinouts Some work should and will leave the EF in the months to come. We hope and expect this process to result in some excellent work being done in service of scaling self-sovereign adoption, but we also must take care lest it becomes an abdication of responsibility or an excuse for undisciplined spending. Some work is not mandate-compatible and should not be carried forward with EF funds or EF endorsement, either inside or outside the Foundation. The efforts carried out by the spinouts will vary widely. Some efforts will leave EF because another org would be a better home for them; others will leave because markets should decide on their worth. Some will leave because they are not compatible with the direction set out in the mandate; others because they are useful but not EF work. Just as a spinout is not automatically good because it reduces EF headcount, former EF affiliation is not a claim on EF funding. The question we ask when deciding on funding is not “did this come from the EF?” But, rather the questions that should be asked about all external funding: “Is this work mandate-critical? Would the EF do this work internally if it had the organizational and financial capacity? Is there no better natural home? Can the external party execute without increasing capture risk, private extraction, opacity, or dependence? Does supporting it reduce Ethereum’s dependence on the EF over time, without prematurely transferring resources and legitimacy to new organizations and thereby risking operational failure or mission drift?” EF funding for work being done externally can be appropriate when it is a capacity solution for mandate work - work the EF should responsibly want done; work that protects CROPS; work that advances self-sovereignty and scales it; essential work that no actor can or will reliably do without EF funding; and work that can be scoped, reviewed, and held accountable without creating a permanent dependency. Such funding is not appropriate when it is a lazy continuity payment, a friendship payment, a reputational hedge, a way to avoid making a hard decision, or a way to support work that is not compatible with the mandate. EF has finite funds, finite legitimacy, and a specific mandate. We will spend all three as if they matter. When we say “EF is one of many nodes”, we mean that we intend to be one of many nodes working to keep self-sovereignty and its scaling the North Star, and working to keep CROPS the undisplaceable first-class properties of the network. We don’t mean that we will support orgs or projects with different priorities. Diversity that leads to ecosystem resilience, coordination cost right-sizing, and better decision-making is good. Diversity that leads to mission drift is not. We are not neutral on the direction Ethereum takes. CROPS are not just things we “believe in”, they are characteristics we understand must be thoughtfully prioritized at every fork for Ethereum to realize its potential. We are partisans for and builders of something of such incredible neutrality that it will fundamentally reshape the world we live in; we wish to work with everyone committed to this shared purpose.
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Rudes.eth retweeted
JUST IN: 🇺🇸 Senate Banking Committee schedules crypto Clarity Act vote for May 14 at 10:30 AM EST.
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1/ The Mandate clearly states what must be protected: EF will, above all else, remain focused on an Ethereum that is censorship resistant, open source, private, and secure (CROPS), in the service of user self-sovereignty, resistant to extraction and with seamless UX. These are conditions that make Ethereum worth building, using, and defending. Read the full blog here: blog.ethereum.org/2026/03/13…
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Rudes.eth retweeted
let me get this straight a team will not be playing in the FIFA World Cup because they are currently being bombed by the FIFA Peace Prize winner
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An important, and perenially underrated, aspect of "trustlessness", "passing the walkaway test" and "self-sovereignty" is protocol simplicity. Even if a protocol is super decentralized with hundreds of thousands of nodes, and it has 49% byzantine fault tolerance, and nodes fully verify everything with quantum-safe peerdas and starks, if the protocol is an unwieldy mess of hundreds of thousands of lines of code and five forms of PhD-level cryptography, ultimately that protocol fails all three tests: * It's not trustless because you have to trust a small class of high priests who tell you what properties the protocol has * It doesn't pass the walkaway test because if existing client teams go away, it's extremely hard for new teams to get up to the same level of quality * It's not self-sovereign because if even the most technical people can't inspect and understand the thing, it's not fully yours It's also less secure, because each part of the protocol, especially if it can interact with other parts in complicated ways, carries a risk of the protocol breaking. One of my fears with Ethereum protocol development is that we can be too eager to add new features to meet highly specific needs, even if those features bloat the protocol or add entire new types of interacting components or complicated cryptography as critical dependencies. This can be nice for short-term functionality gains, but it is highly destructive to preserving long-term self-sovereignty, and creating a hundred-year decentralized hyperstructure that transcends the rise and fall of empires and ideologies. The core problem is that if protocol changes are judged from the perspective of "how big are they as changes to the existing protocol", then the desire to preserve backwards compatibility means that additions happen much more often than subtractions, and the protocol inevitably bloats over time. To counteract this, the Ethereum development process needs an explicit "simplification" / "garbage collection" function. "Simplification" has three metrics: * Minimizing total lines of code in the protocol. An ideal protocol fits onto a single page - or at least a few pages * Avoiding unnecessary dependencies on fundamentally complex technical components. For example, a protocol whose security solely depends on hashes (even better: on exactly one hash function) is better than one that depends on hashes and lattices. Throwing in isogenies is worst of all, because (sorry to the truly brilliant hardworking nerds who figured that stuff out) nobody understands isogenies. * Adding more _invariants_: core properties that the protocol can rely on, for example EIP-6780 (selfdestruct removal) added the property that at most N storage slots can be changedakem per slot, significantly simplifying client development, and EIP-7825 (per-tx gas cap) added a maximum on the cost of processing one transaction, which greatly helps ZK-EVMs and parallel execution. Garbage collection can be piecemeal, or it can be large-scale. The piecemeal approach tries to take existing features, and streamline them so that they are simpler and make more sense. One example is the gas cost reforms in Glamsterdam, which make many gas costs that were previously arbitrary, instead depend on a small number of parameters that are clearly tied to resource consumption. One large-scale garbage collection was replacing PoW with PoS. Another is likely to happen as part of Lean consensus, opening the room to fix a large number of mistakes at the same time ( youtube.com/watch?v=10Ym34y3… ). Another approach is "Rosetta-style backwards compatibility", where features that are complex but little-used remain usable but are "demoted" from being part of the mandatory protocol and instead become smart contract code, so new client developers do not need to bother with them. Examples: * After we upgrade to full native account abstraction, all old tx types can be retired, and EOAs can be converted into smart contract wallets whose code can process all of those transaction types * We can replace existing precompiles (except those that are _really_ needed) with EVM or later RISC-V code * We can eventually change the VM from EVM to RISC-V (or other simpler VM); EVM could be turned into a smart contract in the new VM. Finally, we want to move away from client developers feeling the need to handle all older versions of the Ethereum protocol. That can be left to older client versions running in docker containers. In the long term, I hope that the rate of change to Ethereum can be slower. I think for various reasons that ultimately that _must_ happen. These first fifteen years should in part be viewed as an adolescence stage where we explored a lot of ideas and saw what works and what is useful and what is not. We should strive to avoid the parts that are not useful being a permanent drag on the Ethereum protocol. Basically, we want to improve Ethereum in a way that looks like this:
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If anyone left on earth is wondering what we meant by hostile sec Amanda was genslers right hand No law degree, no understanding of the tech, just seething politicized hate for DeFi Obv our lawyers don’t think uni is a security, before or after unification
Replying to @haydenzadams
Turning on the fee switch makes UNI even more security-like & I guarantee you that you've had private conversations with your counsel saying as much. The only reason you're doing it now is because your industry bought the WH & therefore illegal securities offerings are now fine.
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Rudes.eth retweeted
There’s a space race for onchain trading + privy wallet + relay + 0x routing into some form factor
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Fed removes 'reputational risk' considerations for banks serving crypto firms. Clear regulatory framework emerging for institutional infrastructure providers. Source: cryptoslate.com/federal-rese…
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$HOOD: I have a wild speculation for the Crypto event in 20 days. I'll explain soon.
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Rudes.eth retweeted
👀 Surprise @RobinhoodApp announcement at EthCC on June 30th
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Wait... is this the best meme ever made?
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🚨SCOOP: @moonpay has secured its New York BitLicense, clearing the way for the firm to serve customers in all 50 states. MoonPay joins a short list of crypto-native firms including @coinbase, @Anchorage and @circle that have been approved to operate in the state by the @NYDFS. More details coming shortly in my @CryptoAmerica_ newsletter.
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Glad to see the team rejoining X!
Rocket Pool is back on X! The recent "Saturn Zero" protocol upgrade has enabled ETH-only minipools, no $RPL required Plus, there's also record $rETH minting capacity available at stake.rocketpool.net Join the Discord to learn more: discord.gg/rocketpool
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There's no marketing gimmick here. No tricks. Rocket Pool has been live on mainnet for three years, and now ANYONE can use it to launch a validator with only 8 Ether. This is huge for decentralization!
Rocket Pool is back on X! The recent "Saturn Zero" protocol upgrade has enabled ETH-only minipools, no $RPL required Plus, there's also record $rETH minting capacity available at stake.rocketpool.net Join the Discord to learn more: discord.gg/rocketpool
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Rocket Pool Reborn Four Steps to Rocket Pool 2.0 -Constellation L2: now live - $xrETH the first full yield LST -Saturn 0: ETH only bonds, <2 wks away!!! -Saturn 1: LEB4s + direct value capture + redesign -Saturn 2: sublinear bonding down to 1.5E + $RPL buy&burn 1/42
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I really wish that @elonmusk had not taken the "For you" tab and turned it into his personal propaganda machine. I don't follow him, I am not American, I don't care about their elections. This is my "For you" tab. Notice how long I scroll until I find a non-Musk post.
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