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How I Bombed Tiger Hill From A Mirage 2000 ndtv.com/blog/how-i-bombed-t…
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Seminar-room agendas cannot erase operational reality. Air Marshal Nambiar exposes how Shukla mistakes Indian cultural confidence for military leadership failure.
Colonel Shukla's recent critique of the IAF mistakes cultural confidence for institutional decay & selective nostalgia for strategic analysis.
As a veteran IAF officer I find the piece more revealing of the author’s assumptions than of any genuine leadership deficit in the service.
The charge that Sanskrit quotations and references to the Ramayana at official briefings somehow “Hindutva-ise” the Air Force is particularly thin. Indian public life has always drawn upon our civilisational language. When an air marshal opens a media briefing with a verse, it is treated as ideological signalling. Had the same officer quoted Churchill or Clausewitz, it would have been praised as intellectual breadth. The objection appears less about professionalism and more about discomfort with any open affirmation of Indian civilisational identity within uniformed institutions. That discomfort is the author’s, not the IAF’s.
The suggestion that Air Marshal Jeetendra Mishra’s post-retirement appointment is evidence of ideological reward is equally unconvincing. Officers who plan and execute complex operations under real constraints are often asked to take on civilian responsibilities for a variety of reasons, competence being high among them. Reducing a successful operational career to a political transaction does a disservice. It also assumes that every subsequent appointment must be viewed through a single ideological lens. This makes an analyst with an agenda.
On the “zero-error syndrome,” the article recycles an old complaint. Risk aversion is a real institutional tendency in any large military, particularly one that operates under nuclear thresholds and simultaneous continental and maritime pressures. Equating measured caution in 2020 with a permanent loss of offensive spirit is an oversimplification. The same service now accused of timidity has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to hold and dominate difficult terrain when the operational picture and political guidance aligned. Leadership is not measured by how quickly one escalates; it is measured by whether the force remains ready, cohesive and capable when the moment actually arrives.
The claim of a growing disconnect between “lions” and “donkeys” is the oldest refrain in military commentary. Junior officers have always grumbled about seniors; seniors have always fretted about the quality of juniors. What has changed is the volume of public commentary that turns ordinary institutional friction into a civilisation-level crisis. The IAF continues to attract, train and retain officers who fly demanding missions in difficult conditions. That record is more relevant than seminar-room complaints about language and vocabulary.
Colonel Shukla ends by invoking the Truman–MacArthur clash as a model of principled military independence. The analogy is misplaced. India’s constitutional framework and civil-military traditions are not those of America in 1951. Indian service chiefs have long given candid military advice while remaining within the boundary set by elected authority. That is not weakness; it is the system working as designed. Demanding that senior officers “seize the moment” by publicly challenging government policy is not a call for better leadership. It is a call for a different political arrangement altogether—something practised in Pakistan.
In the end, the article reads less like a diagnosis of military leadership and more like serious discomfort with the cultural self-confidence now visible in parts of the armed forces. One can debate the wisdom of particular public statements or post-retirement appointments. Turning those debates into a sweeping indictment of the IAF’s professional character is rather like criticising the entire batting order because one batsman prefers a particular stance. The scoreboard of operational performance remains the best measure. On that measure, the IAF continues to hold its own explains Air Marshal Nambiar of the Kargil fame.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @arunp2810
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
My brother !
Air Marshal Vikram Gaur has been appointed as the Additional Secretary in the Department of Military Affairs under the Defence Ministry. He is the the first ever Indian Air Force officer to have been appointed to this position. The ace fighter pilot has held several important positions in his career including that of the Joint Secretary (Air and Staff Duties), Air Officer Commanding Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and has over 3200 hours of flying different fighter aircraft including the Su-30MKI.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Colonel Shukla's recent critique of the IAF mistakes cultural confidence for institutional decay & selective nostalgia for strategic analysis.
As a veteran IAF officer I find the piece more revealing of the author’s assumptions than of any genuine leadership deficit in the service.
The charge that Sanskrit quotations and references to the Ramayana at official briefings somehow “Hindutva-ise” the Air Force is particularly thin. Indian public life has always drawn upon our civilisational language. When an air marshal opens a media briefing with a verse, it is treated as ideological signalling. Had the same officer quoted Churchill or Clausewitz, it would have been praised as intellectual breadth. The objection appears less about professionalism and more about discomfort with any open affirmation of Indian civilisational identity within uniformed institutions. That discomfort is the author’s, not the IAF’s.
The suggestion that Air Marshal Jeetendra Mishra’s post-retirement appointment is evidence of ideological reward is equally unconvincing. Officers who plan and execute complex operations under real constraints are often asked to take on civilian responsibilities for a variety of reasons, competence being high among them. Reducing a successful operational career to a political transaction does a disservice. It also assumes that every subsequent appointment must be viewed through a single ideological lens. This makes an analyst with an agenda.
On the “zero-error syndrome,” the article recycles an old complaint. Risk aversion is a real institutional tendency in any large military, particularly one that operates under nuclear thresholds and simultaneous continental and maritime pressures. Equating measured caution in 2020 with a permanent loss of offensive spirit is an oversimplification. The same service now accused of timidity has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to hold and dominate difficult terrain when the operational picture and political guidance aligned. Leadership is not measured by how quickly one escalates; it is measured by whether the force remains ready, cohesive and capable when the moment actually arrives.
The claim of a growing disconnect between “lions” and “donkeys” is the oldest refrain in military commentary. Junior officers have always grumbled about seniors; seniors have always fretted about the quality of juniors. What has changed is the volume of public commentary that turns ordinary institutional friction into a civilisation-level crisis. The IAF continues to attract, train and retain officers who fly demanding missions in difficult conditions. That record is more relevant than seminar-room complaints about language and vocabulary.
Colonel Shukla ends by invoking the Truman–MacArthur clash as a model of principled military independence. The analogy is misplaced. India’s constitutional framework and civil-military traditions are not those of America in 1951. Indian service chiefs have long given candid military advice while remaining within the boundary set by elected authority. That is not weakness; it is the system working as designed. Demanding that senior officers “seize the moment” by publicly challenging government policy is not a call for better leadership. It is a call for a different political arrangement altogether—something practised in Pakistan.
In the end, the article reads less like a diagnosis of military leadership and more like serious discomfort with the cultural self-confidence now visible in parts of the armed forces. One can debate the wisdom of particular public statements or post-retirement appointments. Turning those debates into a sweeping indictment of the IAF’s professional character is rather like criticising the entire batting order because one batsman prefers a particular stance. The scoreboard of operational performance remains the best measure. On that measure, the IAF continues to hold its own explains Air Marshal Nambiar of the Kargil fame.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
#BREAKING
IAF Chief finally rejects original #theaterisation plan. Says:
1) @IAF_MCC will not accept splitting of fighter assets
2) Theaterisation should be in phases so that combat readiness is not compromised
3) No to replicating foreign model.
tribuneindia.com/news/india/…
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Absolute gold. Strategic Forces Command remains unified for a reason. The same logic applies even more strongly to the Air Force.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Perfectly put. In an ideal world we need more squadrons, not artificial geographical fences around the ones we already have.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
बिल्कुल सहमत सर, राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा से जुड़े फैसलों में विशेषज्ञता सर्वोपरि होनी चाहिए।
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Bilkul sahi kaha Sir, air power ki real strength uski flexibility mein hi hai
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Strongly agree. Limited resources + artificial constraints = strategic own-goal. Listen to those who actually understand the domain.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Splitting the IAF is strategic self-harm.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
1962, 1971, Kargil — the lesson is clear.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Brilliant take. IAF’s strength lies in its ability to concentrate force anywhere in hours. Theatreisation will only dilute that advantage. Domain specialists deserve to be heard.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Strongly agree. Limited resources + artificial constraints = strategic own-goal. Listen to those who actually understand the domain.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
Replying to @shiv_cybersurg @Nambitiger1
Air power is India’s ultimate rapid-reaction instrument. Parcel it out and you lose the very thing that makes it decisive.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
In light of the excitement generated by the Safed Sagar series, here's a link to my podcast episodes on the Kargil Conflict:
youtube.com/playlist?list=PL…
Has interviews with Air Mshl @Nambitiger1 and G/C Nachiketa.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
I have been a civilian following the IAF for over 60 years, from before most IAF personnel were born.
I find objections to @Nambitiger1 Air Marshal Nambiar's hard hitting article about theaterization ill thought out. Accusing the IAF of indulging in a turf war over control of resources is a double edged blade. The accuser is doing the same thing.
Take the example of the Strategic forces command, which is another name for control of our nuclear weapons. It is perfectly rational to keep this as one unified command across the nation. Thankfully this will not change, because splitting the assets of the strategic forces into north, south, central, maritime or any other fraction based on the geographical location of a potential target is patently absurd.
The air force, as has been pointed out by countless people, is a force that has the capability to operate at, or across, any of the nation's borders within hours at any time, no matter where they are located. Splitting such a force into penny packets is like tying up the force and saying "You can only look left, not right"
Sadly, in our national strategic ignorance and we have repeatedly tied up the air force, ignorant of its capability, at the cost of lives and resources. Reading history does not appear to be a strong point among our decision makers.
In 1962 offensive air power was not used at all when we actually had complete air dominance over Ladakh. The Chinese had no aircraft or air bases in the area in 1962. Today we shed tears and sing "Ae mere watan ki logon"
Anyone who bothers to read the history of the air war in 1971 will realize that there are examples of the same squadrons operating on the eastern and western front based on need.
@arunp2810 Admiral Arun Prakash flew some spectacular missions with the IAF on the western front. Here, a navy pilot, a precious resource, was deputed to fly with the air force because there was some doubt whether the INS Vikrant would be ready for war. It is another matter that the Vikrant was made ready in time and played a useful role in 1971
In 1999, the air force, was barred from crossing the LoC, leading to delays, hits and misses while soldiers died on the slopes.
It is important to talk about our economy. Air Marshal Nambiar was spot on. In an ideal world we should have at least 25 squadrons reserved for Pakistan alone and 40 for China, along with the freedom to move them to whatever part of the nation they are needed. They should not be tied down by saying "You look right. I will look left." The Utopian ideal of having such a large number of squadrons that they can be split into parts for north, south east or west is totally dependent on the state of our economy.
Armed forces personnel often say, "We will fight with whatever we have." That is an admirable and courageous statement. We would like them to have the best. But our policy should not be to tie them down and say "Use this over here, and use that over there". There are domain specialists in the forces who know how and when to use their tools. Their opinions must be given the weight they deserve.
Raghu Nambiar retweeted
It is a bit sad that @Nambitiger1 's incisive piece is not tackled head on by Adm Arun Prakash, but it's mere composition deemed a sign of failure.
But the truth is, that there is not even a common understanding of what theatres would be designed to achieve. Let's have a look.
1. The issue of going to war with "19 military commands". But from whatever is available in open domain, TCs are not replacing military commands, which are operational constructs. Instead, TCs will sit atop them as strategic constructs. Hence a 4 star Cdr. In other words, reduction in number of commands if at all, would be minimal. But an additional layer would be introduced a top the commands.
2. Achieve "One Front One Cdr". No. Not against Pak anyway. Where the Navy has been left out to do it's own thing in MTC. The battlespace has been cleaved artificially into continental and maritime, even though it is one seamless expanse. By doing this, the Indian military is eschewing ab initio, a joint sea-land campaign to bring Pak to heel. Should this fundamental disconnect not bother commentators? But it attracts zero attention. Even against China, if the maritime aspect is to be played up, it would be under a separate TC.
3. Quantum of forces. This is a very real concern for the IAF. But the usual reaction is invariably to say that 'nothing stops inter theatre transfer'. But transfer of air forces is not the issue. Real time switching and application is. As Air Mshl Nambiar pointed out, WAC can switch forces between fronts in quick time without change of basing. Doing the same across a theatre boundary is not so simple at all. Then they aren't theatres at all. The design of the theatres (geographical expanse) is also very different for air forces than ground forces here.
These reforms are too important to be "rushed". The constant reference to Goldwater-Nichols is unrepresentative. At the end of the day, whatever reforms come, they need to be sound and based on logic. And they need to be based on common understanding of at least the problems they seek to solve (all will never agree on the solutions). GW reforms happened because the US political class had intimate knowledge of defence matters (Both G and W bring veterans), and interfaced liberally with the military leadership.
India needs not for reforms to 'forced down' by legislation, but rather for political leadership to involve themselves in the PROCESS, along side the military leadership, and not only deal sporadically through the bureaucracy which has zero expertise.
That, a holistic process, in which all 3 services, the civil bureaucracy, and the political leadership is involved to 1st define the problems, and then consider various solutions and choose the best is what is needed.
If a former IAF CinC describes the Theatre Command concept as a “Foolish dream, based on grandiose thoughts that need to be put on the back burner,” the blame has to be placed at the door of our first two Chiefs of Defence Staff who utterly failed to evolve even the shadow of a consensus within the military on this vital issue. A total lack of clarity about the modus operandi also seems to prevail if it is imagined that TCs will “carve limited (air) assets into permanent geographic parcels.”! If we accept the suggestion that India should, “first expand the resource base…and then design command structures” we will remain in a state of stasis (and go to war with 19 military Commands) for at least 3-4 decades more.
The GoI notification of 24.12.2019 directing the CDS to facilitate establishment of joint/theatre commands is now 7 yrs old!! The current CDS must either get on with it or hand the “hot potato” back to the politicians to handle.


























