
Now: Host @terminalvalue_ Prev: co-founder of @getcenterhq (acq by @americanexpress)
Joined May 2014
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Looking forward to launching the first episode of @TerminalValue_ with CEO and Co-Founder of Frugal, @mweider
AI-native software has a gross margin problem.
@mweider (CEO and Co-Founder of Frugal) explains why the next phase of cloud cost management may move from dashboards and budgets to Application Cost Engineering — tracing cloud, token, and observability costs back to the code driving them.
Full episode Thursday, May 7th.
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Nik Singh retweeted
Another week on the road meeting with a couple dozen IT and AI leaders from large enterprises across banking, media, retail, healthcare, consulting, tech, and sports, to discuss agents in the enterprise.
Some quick takeaways:
* Clear that we’re moving from chat era of AI to agents that use tools, process data, and start to execute real work in the enterprise. Complementing this, enterprises are often evolving from “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach to adoption to targeted automation efforts applied to specific areas of work and workflow.
* Change management still will remain one of the biggest topics for enterprises. Most workflows aren’t setup to just drop agents directly in, and enterprises will need a ton of help to drive these efforts (both internally and from partners). One company has a head of AI in every business unit that roles up to a central team, just to keep all the functions coordinated.
* Tokenmaxxing! Most companies operate with very strict OpEx budgets get locked in for the year ahead, so they’re going through very real trade-off discussions right now on how to budget for tokens. One company recently had an idea for a “shark tank” style way of pitching for compute budget. Others are trying to figure out how to ration compute to the best use-cases internally through some hierarchy of needs (my words not theirs).
* Fixing fragmented and legacy systems remain a huge priority right now. Most enterprises are dealing with decades of either on-prem systems or systems they moved to the cloud but that still haven’t been modernized in any meaningful way. This means agents can’t easily tap into these data sources in a unified way yet, so companies are focused on how they modernize these.
* Most companies are *not* talking about replacing jobs due to agents. The major use-cases for agents are things that the company wasn’t able to do before or couldn’t prioritize. Software upgrades, automating back office processes that were constraining other workflows, processing large amounts of documents to get new business or client insights, and so on. More emphasis on ways to make money vs. cut costs.
* Headless software dominated my conversations. Enterprises need to be able to ensure all of their software works across any set of agents they choose. They will kick out vendors that don’t make this technically or economically easy.
* Clear sense that it can be hard to standardize on anything right now given how fast things are moving. Blessing and a curse of the innovation curve right now - no one wants to get stuck in a paradigm that locks them into the wrong architecture. One other result of this is that companies realize they’re in a multi-agent world, which means that interoperability becomes paramount across systems.
* Unanimous sense that everyone is working more than ever before. AI is not causing anyone to do less work right now, and similar to Silicon Valley people feel their teams are the busiest they’ve ever been.
One final meta observation not called out explicitly. It seems that despite Silicon Valley’s sense that AI has made hard things easy, the most powerful ways to use agents is more “technical” than prior eras of software. Skills, MCP, CLIs, etc. may be simple concepts for tech, but in the real world these are all esoteric concepts that will require technical people to help bring to life in the enterprise.
This both means diffusion will take real work and time, but also everyone’s estimation of engineering jobs is totally off. Engineers may not be “writing” software, but they will certainly be the ones to setup and operate the systems that actually automate most work in the enterprise.
Nik Singh retweeted
less hype, more solutions. @scala_ai is grounded in ai native product tied to operators who have been in the battle. winning combo. scala.ai/resources/when-the-…
For the past four months, the S&P 500 has gone essentially nowhere. What’s easy to miss is that earnings have continued to grow, bringing the forward P/E down from 23 to 21.5 (roughly 7%) without a price correction. That kind of multiple compression is a quiet benefit that often goes unnoticed. Valuations remain elevated historically, but the market is less stretched today than it was 4 months ago. I wouldn't be surprised to see the market flat for a while, and see multiple compression persist for months.
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Nik Singh retweeted
Of course that's your contention. You're a first-time SaaS bear. You just got finished listening to some podcast, Dario on Dwarkesh, probably. Now you think it’s the end of white collar work and seat-based pricing is screwed. You're gonna be convinced of that til tomorrow when you get to “Something Big is Happening”. Then you’ll install ClawdBot on a Mac Mini, vibe code a dashboard on top of a postgres database and say we’re all just a couple ralph loops away from building a Salesforce competitor. That’s gonna last until next week when you discover context graphs, and then you're gonna be talking about how the systems of record will be disintermediated by an agentic layer and reposting OAI marketing graphics.
“Well, as a matter of fact, I won't, because ultimately the application layer is just ….”
The application layer is just business logic on top a CRUD database. You got that from Satya’s appearance on the BG2 pod, December 2024, right? Yeah, I saw that too. Were you gonna plagiarize the whole thing for us? Do you have any thoughts of your own on this matter? Or...is that your thing? You get into the replies of anyone posting a SaaS ticker. You watch some podcast and then pawn it off as your own idea just to impress some VCs and embarrass some anon who’s long SaaS? See the sad thing about a guy like you is in a couple years you're gonna start doing some thinking on your own and you're gonna come up with the fact that there are two certainties in life. One: don't do that. And two: you dropped thirty grand on Mac Minis and LLM API calls to come to the same conclusion you could’ve got for free by following a handful of VC accounts.
I was thinking of writing about the recent selloff in software and then this jack@$$ had to go and write a beautiful one.
Very salient points across the board. Read it!
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youtube.com/watch?v=FBSam25u…
These ads are pretty funny. They will get a lot funnier when Anthropic follows suit 6 months later and adds ads too...
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Nik Singh retweeted
A few thoughts about PayPal, nearly 12 years after I left.
I woke up this morning to dozens of messages from former PayPal colleagues. It pushed me to finally speak up.
I never spoke publicly about the company after I left. Part of that was loyalty to John Donahoe, who gave me an unlikely opportunity, handing the reins of PayPal to a startup guy who, on paper, had no business running a then 15,000-person organization. But part of it was something else: I had left. I chose not to stay and fight for the changes I believed in. Speaking from the sidelines felt like armchair commentary. Easy opinions without the burden of execution. So I stayed quiet.
But twelve years of silence is long enough. And today's news makes it clear the pattern I've watched unfold isn't self-correcting.
I left PayPal in 2014 because I was deeply frustrated. We had executed a silent turnaround of a company that had lost its soul. We brought back engineering talent, shipped good products quickly, and acquired Braintree and Venmo. The company was on a tear. So much so that Carl Icahn felt compelled to accumulate a position in eBay and push for a PayPal spinoff. At the time, eBay decided to fight Icahn.
It was a difficult period for me, caught between what I felt was right for PayPal and my loyalty to the eBay team.
This is when Mark Zuckerberg approached me to join Facebook. The combination of his conviction that messaging would become foundational, the appeal of going back to building products at scale, and my growing exhaustion with the internal politics at PayPal and eBay eventually convinced me to leave and join one of the best teams in the world, one I had admired for a long time.
In the summer of 2014, I met John in a café in Portola Valley and told him I had decided to leave. During that conversation, he told me that Icahn had effectively won the fight, that PayPal was going to become an independent company, and he tried to convince me to stay on as CEO, but I had already said yes to Mark, and my word is my bond. There was no turning back.
After my departure, the board scrambled to find a replacement, and it took a few months for them to land on Dan Schulman. The leadership style shifted from product-led to financially-led. Over time, product conviction gave way to financial optimization.
Much of the momentum we had created still persisted and carried the company forward, mainly driven by Bill Ready, who came over in the Braintree acquisition and rose to COO. Under his leadership, Venmo grew exponentially, and total payment volume (TPV) accelerated quickly. But the shift under Schulman became more pronounced after Bill's departure at the end of 2019. With him went the product conviction that had defined the post-spinoff momentum. Then, for a period, COVID-fueled online shopping hid a lot of the company's new weaknesses.
During that period, the company made a fundamental miscalculation: it optimized for payment volume instead of margin and differentiation. It leaned into unbranded checkout, where PayPal had the least leverage, instead of branded checkout, where the margin, data, and customer relationship actually lived.
Visa masterfully structured a deal that effectively ended PayPal's ability to steer customers toward bank-funded transactions, which had been a core driver of PayPal's economics. Not long after, PayPal lost a significant portion of eBay's volume. Over time, it saw its share of checkout among its most profitable customers steadily erode as Apple Pay and others continued to execute well.
The same pattern repeated itself across lending, buy-now-pay-later (BNPL), and new rails.
On lending, PayPal missed the opportunity to turn it into a platform weapon. Products like Working Capital were conservative, short-duration, and optimized for loss minimization. Lending never became programmable, never became identity-driven, and never became a reason for merchants or consumers to choose PayPal over something else.
The missed opportunity in BNPL was even more striking. Klarna, Affirm, and Afterpay didn't just offer installment payments, they built consumer finance brands, persistent credit identities, and new shopping behaviors. PayPal saw the BNPL turn, entered the market, and had every advantage: distribution, trust, and merchant relationships. But BNPL was treated as a defensive checkout feature rather than an offensive category. There was no attempt to turn it into a core consumer relationship, no super-app behavior, and no meaningful differentiation for merchants. Others built platforms, PayPal added a feature.
The failure to lean into building and owning new rails followed the same logic. After the spinoff, PayPal had a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a global, at scale payment network. Instead, the company focused on building on top of existing networks and third-party rails.
More recently, that mindset carried over to PYUSD. Technically, the product was sound. Strategically, it launched without a compelling transactional reason to exist. PYUSD had distribution, but no organic demand. It was not embedded deeply enough into flows to become a true settlement layer, a cross-border merchant rail, or a programmable money primitive. It sat adjacent to the product instead of inside the core of it.
Acquisitions during this period followed a similar pattern. Honey was not a strategic acquisition for PayPal. It added activity, but not leverage. It lived outside the transaction, monetized affiliate economics rather than payment economics, and never meaningfully strengthened PayPal's control of the customer or the checkout moment. Xoom solved a real problem in remittances, but it never compounded PayPal's advantage. It scaled volume without changing the underlying rails, identity graph, or settlement model, and as importantly, it didn’t cater to a high-value, high-margin customer archetype.
None of these were bad companies. They were just a wrong fit for PayPal and became unnecessary distractions.
The board eventually recognized the problem. In 2023, they brought in Alex Chriss, an Intuit veteran with a strong product background, explicitly to restore product conviction. It was the right instinct.
But Alex came from software, not payments. He understood SMB product development. He didn't have the muscle memory for transaction economics, network effects, or settlement infrastructure.
In hindsight, he also made an error: clearing out much of the leadership team that understood payments deeply. Executives with years of institutional knowledge departed within his first year.
This morning, Alex was removed as CEO. Branded checkout grew 1% last quarter. The board tapped another operator, Enrique Lores, the former HP CEO who's been on the PayPal board for five years.
I don’t know Enrique. And he might be a great leader, but on paper at least, he’s a hardware executive. For a payments company.
The common thread through all of this is incentive design. Once PayPal became independent, short/medium-term predictability beat long-term vision and ambition. Stock performance mattered more than platform risk and network opportunity. Financial optimization replaced product conviction.
I'm not claiming I would have made every call differently. Running a public company at scale involves tradeoffs I didn't have to make after I left. But the pattern, choosing predictability over platform risk, again and again, was a choice, not an inevitability.
Over time, the company that had every advantage and could’ve become the most consequential and relevant payments company of our time, lost its mojo, its product edge, and its ability to compete in a market that’s being rewired and reinvented in front of our eyes.
That's the part that's hardest to watch for a company I care so deeply about.
This is why valuation and story matters. Despite 35-40% top line growth, if you had invested $100 in Figma on first day of trading, you would be down to $23 today.
Great company, poor investment. Lots of companies in the public markets will come back to reality eventually. Be careful where you enter positions
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Key takeaways from Databricks CEO Ali Ghodsi on the Series L:
1. Retail/public investors are now missing early, mid-cycle, and even late-stage gains (ex: #Databricks/#Figma)
2. We need to make going public less burdensome while still preserving financial oversight.
3. Froth and volatility in public markets create real uncertainty for private operators trying to raise capital consistently.
#AI #PublicMarkets #seriesL
youtube.com/watch?v=loEONrnD…
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Market is no longer blindly rewarding increased capex. If you are Oracle or Meta and you announce increased capex without a clean path to return on that invested capital, you are punished.
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2% inflation halves your money in ~35 years.
3% does it in ~23.
That extra 1% steals 12 years.
Get back to 2%.
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Figma: $821 M LTM revenue, still clipping ~50 % YoY. At >$100 a share (≈ $60 B cap) that’s ~73× current sales.
Even if 50 % growth holds five straight years (≈ $6 B revenue), you’d still be paying 10–12× sales. Great company and Product — but CRAZY price.
BTW, no public SaaS company at this scale has maintained 50% growth for over 3 years...
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May #PCE: headline +0.1 % m/m (2.3 % y/y); core +0.2 % m/m (2.7 % y/y). Disinflation keeps crawling, but the Fed’s 2 % target is still a stretch.
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Next catalysts: June CPI (July 10) and July jobs (Aug 1). Another weak real-income print + cooler prices could tip the Fed sooner.
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TL;DR: Inflation inching lower, stimulus fades, wages fine, spending soft. Economy cooling, not collapsing—and the rate-cut clock is still ticking. #Macro #Fed #Inflation #Economy📷📷Sources
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