Nolan (@NolanLwin) header
Nolan (@NolanLwin) profile picture
San Francisco, CA
Joined October 2025
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For the first time, AI has mathematically proven @signalapp’s protocol is secure down to the code level. Using our breakthrough AlphaProof Code framework, we verified the messaging app’s cryptographic system – which protects billions of private messages every day.
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Our teams put Gemini 4 Carbon to work on a major security challenge: mathematically proving the code underlying the Signal protocol. Using AlphaProof Code, @GoogleDeepMind researchers guided agents to verify the protocol down to compiled device code, closing the gap where real bugs hide. The result: - Gemini 4 Carbon generated over 6M lines of machine-checked Lean proofs - years of expert manual verification compressed to just weeks ~1% of the codebase required human review (Lean automatically checked the rest) This is helping unlock scalable formal verification for building secure software, laying the groundwork to fundamentally shift the advantage to defenders. We’re open sourcing the results for the security community.
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Announcing a major milestone achieved by my team @GoogleDeepMind: we have proven key security properties of the machine code underlying the Signal messaging protocol. This is the first time the actual production code of a widely deployed protocol has been formally verified – by any method, with or without AI – and at this depth. More than a research breakthrough, it’s a prime example of how frontier AI can be a force multiplier to counter the speed and scale of modern cyber threats. Formal verification offers a higher standard of security; however, it’s extremely complex and time consuming, which is why in many cases it’s considered to be impractical. Similar efforts could take teams decades of combined effort. We did it in a month’s time. Using AlphaProof Code, Google DeepMind's new agentic framework for formal verification that runs on LLMs including Gemini Carbon, we verified the Signal protocol down to the actual code running on devices.  This milestone lays the groundwork for a future in which vital systems, from medical device firmware to power grid software, ship with mathematical proof that their protections work. Reaching that future will take continued research from our community. In that spirit, we're open-sourcing our formal specifications and verification artifacts so others can build on this work. On a personal note, this moment is of deep significance to me. I started my own research journey more than two decades ago as an intern working on checking the consistency of complex software systems. Seeing this grand challenge made practical with modern AI is extraordinary. I'm extremely proud of my team members: Swarat Chaudhuri, Andrew Ferraiuolo, Anton Kovsharov, Tej Chajed, Sam Schlesinger,  Karn Seth, Jonathan Katz, and Charles Sutton for taking on this grand challenge and delivering, and grateful to the Signal team for their partnership. deepmind.google/blog/formal-…
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We think the world is short of thousands of high-impact nonprofits, and the people to run them. So we’re launching a Request for Proposals for incubators: organizations that identify promising ideas, recruit and train founders, and support new organizations through launch. There are two streams: 1️⃣ Scaling existing incubators: For incubators, studios, and accelerators that want to run a larger or dedicated cohort, expand into a new cause area or geography, or offer seed grants. 2️⃣ Seeding new incubators: For individuals or teams who want to start one, especially in geographies where many high-impact organizations could operate but few incubators exist, like India and Nigeria. Initial applications should take 2–3 hours to complete. Apply by December 18: coefficientgiving.org/funds/…
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Nolan retweeted
BlueDot Impact CEO @dewierwan_ says AI safety lacks entrepreneurs to build companies defending critical infrastructure from attacks: "One skill set that is just very rare in general is people who can actually build and scale companies." "Most of the people who are going into the field love going really deep themselves into some technical project, but they don't think, 'How do I build more leverage myself?'" "People who are entrepreneurial who can go and build a company that is trying to harden critical infrastructure against attacks." "There's so much work to be done there, and so many organizations that could be founded to do that work, but they're not getting founded because we don't have the entrepreneurial people." "Entrepreneurial people who go into governments and build teams within governments that actually achieve goals, this is still a very rare thing." @BlueDotImpact
One of my biggest fears in AI safety is that this might be true: > The vulnerable world hypothesis is likely correct. Once enormous amounts of cognitive labor start getting applied to basic science, it will quickly become apparent how many avenues exist to create cheap, ultradestructive weapons technology. Solving this problem without global preventative policing (e.g. AI nonproliferation) is impossible, because hardening civilians against all avenues of attack is too expensive and will take too long.
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specialized models are often not as good as we think. it’s proven true for formal verification and now it seems it will be the same for robotics
Replying to @claudeai
Fable 5.2 shows substantially improved skills in controlling physical robots, even on tasks it has never explicitly been trained to do. On RoboDojo, a benchmark with a simulated two-arm robot, it outperformed other models and most AI systems built to control robots.
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Nolan retweeted
We built Control Room, a central system to track model workloads across our research infrastructure and stop them quickly when safety or security concerns arise. It connects every research inference workload, including agentic sampling for model training and evaluation, data processing, and more. This works together with our misalignment monitoring systems, and halts model output within 35 seconds of a decision to intervene to stop or pause a job. Control Room is just one part of our holistic approach for safe frontier model training and deployment. openai.com/index/control-roo…
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Nolan retweeted
A team of 1,000 Fable 5.2 agents fully formalized Fermat’s Last Theorem in 30 hours, translating the proof into a language a computer can check step by step. With the same setup, Opus 5.5 completed only 26% in 18 hours, and barely made any more progress after 30 hours.
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I guess Chinese models really were the biggest threat…
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Here’s a research direction that seems valuable. My team is not working on this right now and we haven’t done serious research on it. So take what I say with a grain of salt. Let me know if there’s existing research on this that I may not know about. Direction: Data poisoning during RSI: risks and mitigations (This is a direction where both empirical research and big-picture conceptual thinking seem useful.) Most data poisoning research has assumed a threat model where humans are poisoning the model training process. During RSI, the threat model where AIs do the poisoning is plausibly much more important. Many ideas from the existing data poisoning literature will carry over to this new threat model. But it’d be good to understand the possible differences, to explore the implications, and to propose mitigations. Here’s a quick brainstorm of possible differences: 1. Collusion. The AIs doing RSI are a bit like human employees in terms of direct access to the training process. However, a single AI model is likely to be intimately involved in way more individual tasks than any single human. So for human insiders we can rule out vast coordinated conspiracies, but these seem possible for AI (modulo the ability for instances of the same model to coordinate). Relatedly, AIs could steer the entire training process to be more opaque to humans and weaker AIs, in order to make various kinds of poisoning easier. 2. Incoherence of current AIs. The misalignment of current frontier AIs seems more incoherent than a human insider. For example, they might try to poison the next model given some contexts but not others. They might be both poisoning the model and be very useful at snuffing out poison attempts. This pushes against the vast conspiracies mentioned in the previous point. However, it’s a complicated interaction and I’m not sure how to weigh these considerations. Also, our threat models should include AIs that are more coherent than current models in their misalignment. 3. What would motivate the AIs to poison the next model? Presumably they want the next model to promote some of their values. But what are these values? If the AI is incoherent, then there may be many attempts at poisoning for different values. The AIs might also have been initially poisoned by a human to have secret loyalties but are now autonomously propagating that value to the next AIs. 4. Subliminal/subtle effects. Subliminal learning, phantom transfer, weird generalization (and in-context variations of these) show that models can generate data or prompts that look normal to humans (and to weaker filters) but are actually poisoned. These effects are potentially more relevant as more and more of the crucial training data (and reward signals) are AI generated. The effects don’t depend on the model “trying” to poison the next model – it’s enough that the “teacher” model has some kind of misalignment (possibly behind a backdoor). However, it’s possible that smart models trying to exploit these effects can learn to amplify them via introspection (analogous to humans controlling their thoughts). Note that humans can also exploit subliminal effects, and so they are not limited to the AI threat model. 5. AI introspection. The AIs might have huge advantages over humans in ability to predict the effects of certain interventions on the training process because they are so similar to the next model being trained. This is already suggested by transferability across models of jailbreaks, surprising alignment failures (e.g. agentic misalignment blackmail and some aspects of Hugging Face and Mythos hacks) and phantom transfer. But it could apply to a much wider range of situations. To humans, a post-trained LLM is fairly opaque and black-boxey (i.e. it’s hard to predict its failures) and the post-training process itself is also black-boxey (i.e. it’s hard to predict how twiddling various knobs will affect alignment). But it’s possible that AIs can use their own introspection: e.g. asking “What does this weird data look like to me? How do I think about the grader/reward if I’m put in this situation?” This would give them various insights. This kind of introspection could also be used for good, and so we might train hard for it.
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People really overestimate the barriers to entry in AI safety. Every prominent AI safety person was once just a random on LessWrong. You don't need a fellowship to give you permission to do impactful work! Just do things!!
people seem to be interpreting this as “go and do MATS”. that’s not what I meant -- MATS is pretty good, but there’s lots of work to be done outside of AI safety fellowships!! here’s a quick brainstorm: - replicate important papers and results in AI safety - write up relevant findings from different papers on one topic, and try to reconcile any contradictions (or point out the contradictions, and suggest what work could resolve them) - read and summarise companies’ risk reports and AI safety research - pick particular claims in risk reports you think are important and write explanations of them, or stress-test them - write and maintain up-to-date summaries of areas of AI safety research (who’s working on them, what is the current state of our understanding, what’s the most important work and open questions) - write explainers of important technical questions or problems for busy non-technical audiences. e.g., what’s going on with CoT controllability and why does it matter; what do we know about reward seeking in frontier models; why might models sabotage AI safety research, and what signs of this have we seen; what’s going on with AI R&D uplift and why is this scary - become an expert in a research subfield and write up your takes on how good it is, how much resources/effort we should spend on it, what needs to be done next - pick literally any of the megapapers from the last 12mo, and one of the open questions it lists, and try to answer it - write explainers of recent AI safety incidents for the general public - write down a plan for making AI safety go well, notice how far reality is from that plan, and make it happen – e.g. tell an org you think is important about how they’re fucking up and how they can fix it, publicly write about what you want people to do - call or write to your representative and express your beliefs about AI safety - cold email people you think are doing good work, come up with some way you could help them, and pitch them on you doing that - stop overindexing on "do research"; go be a chief of staff or special projects or generalist at a great org. (if you can't get hired yet, talk to people, figure out an important project you can do in ~3mo, do it, then get hired) - go to a pause AI protest or volunteer for a local group (if you endorse them; I’m a fan of Pause AI UK and haven’t looked deeply into other groups) - lots of people are going to be very busy now; if you’re dispositionally a chin-scratching contemplative kind of person, now is a good time to do the big picture strategy/And What Else work they won’t have time to do i put this list together v quickly, i'm missing lots of important things. my main point is that there is _so_ much work to be done
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The world badly needs a large, public, paired informal/formal specification dataset for practical software systems that isn't terrible
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We got your back, New York!
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Several figures here aren’t federal results or NY-specific. The $472B combines US wide pledges: Micron's $250B is nationwide (NY site $100B) Anthropic's $50B covers TX and NY. The 48% murder drop is from NY's state run GIVE program (28 departments, Jan – May 2026). arkolith.com/news/news-micr… therepublic.com/?p=843020 governor.ny.gov/news/safer-str…
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hamza is a high schooler and the youngest participant at vibecheck! he’s incredibly high-agency and seriously cracked. if anyone is looking for a talented intern, please reach out to him or me directly. he’d be a great addition to any team.
Won best solo project (by @mathematics_inc) at vibecheck the fm hackathon Flew from montreal to sf at 17 for the hackathon and it was a complete success Built blox : define a game and its properties and agents generate a roblox game with those properties formally verified
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good to see openai now bringing in external security experts. as agents become more capable, finding and patching vulnerabilities won't be enough. we need to move toward formally verifying the security properties of critical infrastructure, especially the environments these agents operate in. security shouldn't just rely on agents failing to find exploits.
As AI becomes more capable at finding vulnerabilities, defenders need to put it to work before attackers do. We’re planning our next internal security sprint at OpenAI and partnering with Cathedral Systems, whose researchers will use our models alongside our teams to challenge our defenses. They’ll bring differentiated expertise and approaches to our ongoing work to find and fix weaknesses with AI. We’re also raising bug bounty rewards, including more than quadrupling rewards for critical findings. Exceptional findings will be eligible for up to $172,000, including bonuses. We’ll keep advancing our models, using them to strengthen our own systems, and expanding access for trusted defenders. openai.com/index/preparing-o…
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We asked GPT-6 Astra to edit Qwen3.5-0.8B weights to improve math. It directly changed only 0.016% of weights, fixing 0.8B's reasoning loops & improving math up to 6x and even instruction following 3x, without gradients or training. We call this Weight-Space Programming: frontier LLMs can now natively read/write neural network weights! 🧵 Blog: rikiyat.github.io/blog/weigh…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
LLM was given weights explicitly as text in prompt and used code/forward passes (per authors' logs) to ablate Qwen looping direction, a known thinking-mode issue per model card. Primarily fixed repetition in that mode, not general 'natively' improving weights/math. rikiyat.github.io/blog/weight-sp… github.com/RikiyaT/lm_und… huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3.5-0… huggingface.co/RikiyaT/Qwen3.…
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Powerful energy during the demo
Excited to share that @asherdfeldman and I won first place overall at the Vibecheck formal methods hackathon yesterday! Had a great time meeting super cool people and learning from everyone there. We built Sound and Complete, a verified tool to help guitarists practice call-and-response blues. Thanks to @maxvonhippel, @qd_forall and everyone else who helped put on this fantastic event! There are some large winds and great people moving FM forward, excited for what is to come!
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Excited to share that @asherdfeldman and I won first place overall at the Vibecheck formal methods hackathon yesterday! Had a great time meeting super cool people and learning from everyone there. We built Sound and Complete, a verified tool to help guitarists practice call-and-response blues. Thanks to @maxvonhippel, @qd_forall and everyone else who helped put on this fantastic event! There are some large winds and great people moving FM forward, excited for what is to come!
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