مُـهَــاجـِـر 🪡

Defected Rapid Support Militia Officer: “Even Hemedti and Abdel Rahim Are Mere Instruments of a UAE Agenda,” Reveals Emirati Role in Paying Fighters and Managing Operations Captain Jiddu Mohammed Hamed Shugar, a defected officer from the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia, has revealed new details about the United Arab Emirates’ alleged role in directing and financing the militia’s military operations. He accused its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and his brother Abdel Rahim of being mere instruments of a foreign agenda originating in the UAE. Shugar also identified a figure known as “Abu Mohammed the Emirati”, whom he accused of paying fighters’ salaries and managing military operations, while describing supply routes through Chad and Ethiopia used to transport, arm and equip militia forces before deploying them to battlefronts in Sudan. In a recorded statement announcing his defection and voluntary decision to join the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Shugar declared: “Even Hemedti and Abdel Rahim are merely instruments. The Rapid Support Militia’s operations serve a foreign agenda from the UAE.” His testimony is particularly significant given his extensive military experience within the militia, including serving as deputy commander of the Third Elite Unit in El Fasher and commander of Group 99, following earlier deployments in Khartoum, air defence positions, the Al-Shajara Armoured Corps, Wad Madani and Nyala. Shugar said he knew the militia’s military capabilities and operations “inside out”. Describing the militia’s supply routes, Shugar said fighters were initially assembled in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, before being flown to Amdjarass Airport in Chad and subsequently to Assosa Airport in Ethiopia. From there, they were transported by road to a camp known as “Fana”, where they received weapons and military equipment before advancing towards Kurmuk in Sudan’s Blue Nile State. He stressed that the fighters arrived in Assosa without weapons or military gear, saying: “Nobody was wearing military uniforms. Nobody was carrying anything.” However, they found new vehicles, military uniforms, artillery, ammunition, food and other supplies waiting for them at the camp. He added that Ethiopian territory was also used to support the fighters and treat their wounded, with more serious cases transferred to other countries for medical care. One of Shugar’s most significant revelations concerned an individual he identified as “Abu Mohammed the Emirati”, whom he described as responsible for paying fighters’ salaries and managing military operations. According to Shugar, delayed salary payments prompted fighters to protest and raise their grievances with senior commanders, including Abdel Rahim Dagalo, the militia’s second-in-command. After insisting that the outstanding payments be settled, Shugar said he was handed a telephone and spoke directly with Abu Mohammed, who later visited the fighters personally in the Ethiopian town of Kurmuk. Abu Mohammed reportedly promised to pay the soldiers on Sunday and fulfilled that promise. This account goes beyond allegations of remote financial or military assistance, describing direct involvement by an Emirati individual in paying fighters and overseeing battlefield operations. Shugar also described the involvement of foreign personnel in operating attack drones, identifying Colombians and Spaniards among those controlling the systems. He expressed anger at the use of foreign operators to deploy weapons against Sudanese civilians, explaining that this was among the reasons he decided to abandon the militia. He also appealed to tribal leaders, chiefs and community elders in Darfur to protect their young men from recruitment, claiming that thousands of fighters from formations including Brigades 1 through 13 had been killed in battle. His testimony comes amid international investigations and reports examining the militia’s cross-border military and logistical networks, including allegations that UAE-linked entities have supplied weapons, training and foreign fighters. Previous reporting has also described the use of Ethiopian territory for transporting and equipping militia forces, providing broader context for Shugar’s account of the Assosa and Fana supply route. Shugar’s defection is the latest in a series of high-profile departures from the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia. These include Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as Al-Nour Al-Gubba, and Brigadier General Ali Rizgallah, known as Al-Savana. During a press conference in Khartoum in May 2026, Al-Savana explicitly accused the UAE of fully financing and arming the militia, including transporting weapons by air to Darfur and Kordofan. He alleged that the war had been planned and financed by the UAE and that its management was now in Emirati hands, leaving the militia’s leadership unable to bring it to an end. Other prominent defectors include Major General Sadiq Abdel Rahman Ander, who described the militia as a family enterprise in which Hemedti’s relatives control the money, weapons, fighters and military decisions. Lieutenant Colonel Jiddo Mohamed Adamo Hamma, whose defection video was previously published by Sudanese Echo, similarly accused the Dagalo family of surrendering its decision-making authority to foreign powers. Further defections include Major General Mohamedain Ismail Ahmed and Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Azraq Al-Fanjari, who announced his departure alongside approximately 300 fighters and 30 combat vehicles. Taken together, these testimonies reinforce an assessment advanced by observers of the Sudanese conflict that the Rapid Support Militia operates as a family-controlled armed organisation serving the strategic interests of the UAE, rather than pursuing an independent national political project. Shugar’s account adds a particularly significant dimension to these allegations by combining an explicit accusation that Hemedti and Abdel Rahim are instruments of an Emirati agenda with specific details about an Emirati individual allegedly involved in financing fighters and managing operations, as well as the routes used to transport, arm and support militia forces across international borders. #Sudan #RSFisTerroristOrganization #UAEKillsSudanesePeople #UAESponsorsTerrorism