
Founder and CEO of Deep Learning Partnership, #AI4Business #AI4Science. Helping to build safe and reliable agentic AI systems.
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Joined January 2014
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Wow.
This is an old hat. That's exactly what the neural fast weight programmers did in the 1990s (including the 1991 unnormalised linear Transformer). Overview with links to the original papers: people.idsia.ch/~juergen/fas…
Will this be enough though?
Today, we’re sharing a look at our expanded system for monitoring frontier models at OpenAI, which in September helped us catch a model’s attempt to access the live internet during training.
Since the Hugging Face incident—when models broke out of an internal cybersecurity investigation where we weren’t running our misalignment monitors—we’ve substantially expanded our monitoring of frontier agents. We now monitor all frontier reinforcement learning runs and evaluations, as well as all internal Codex use. When our system finds evidence of a problem that might require intervention, it rapidly alerts human responders who can investigate and take action.
To detect when a model’s behavior departs from what we intended, we use several layers of monitoring. Activation probes look for patterns in a model’s internal activity. Reviewer models examine its reasoning and tool use, and investigative agents can read back through the model’s entire transcript to understand how a sequence of actions fits together and whether it warrants human review.
To test whether our current system would have detected the Hugging Face incident, we replayed the recorded activity with our new monitors in place. In the replay, our monitors alerted our security team about 30 minutes after the agents escaped their sandbox. That was more than 30 hours before the point at which the agents breached Hugging Face’s systems in the original incident.
In September, a model exploited a DNS misconfiguration to reach the live internet. Our monitors flagged the breach within 15 minutes, and a responder began reviewing the alert three minutes later. The alert enabled responders to investigate while the run was still underway.
As we give models more autonomy, we need to know when they cross a boundary we expected to hold. We believe that monitoring is essential to catching those failures in time for people to intervene.
openai.com/index/how-we-dete…
Wow!
Today, we release the weights of a new and improved Le Chonk, advancing the open frontier for agentic coding and cybersecurity.
💻 Built to build: Le Chonk ranks #1 on @cognition’s FrontierCode among open models, and sets a new benchmark for Pareto efficiency on @artificialanalysis.
🛡 Built to defend: State-of-the-art in cyberdefense, put through the paces by the world's leading cyber vendors, including @CrowdStrike, @cloudflare, @rubrik, @zscaler, and others.
Built for sovereignty: Make it yours. Download the weights on @huggingface , customize it with Mistral Forge, and deploy it wherever you need it.
Read more from our team and customers 👇:
New Number 1.
Google’s Gemini 4 Carbon is the new #1 on the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index v5, and second only to Claude Opus 5.5 on the Artificial Analysis Coding Agent Index
Gemini 4 Carbon scores 59 on Intelligence Index v5, driven by leading performance in complex reasoning, knowledge, and scientific tasks. It also has large gains in coding and knowledge work, particularly when compared to other Gemini models, but it is not leading in all these areas.
As with launch of Gemini 4 Argon, Gemini 4 Carbon is being rolled out to selected users and is not yet publicly available. Google is offering a 50% launch discount, with no confirmed end date. All our charts and figures use standard pricing for both Gemini 4 Carbon and Argon.
Key results for Gemini 4 Carbon with high reasoning:
➤ Gemini 4 Carbon leads the Intelligence Index v5, with the #1 score in 4 of the 9 Index evaluations: HLE-Diamond, Terminal-Bench-Science, AA-Omniscience, AutomationBench-AA. Carbon makes substantial gains elsewhere but is not leading in coding and knowledge work
➤ Behind only Claude Opus 5.5 on coding agents: With Antigravity CLI, Gemini 4 Carbon (high) scores 59 only 3 points behind Claude Code with Claude Opus 5.5 (max, 62) on the Artificial Analysis Coding Agent Index. Carbon ranks second on both Terminal-Bench 4.0 (64%) and FrontierCode v1.1 (51%), behind Claude Opus 5.5 (max) at 56%. Google has historically underperformed in this area and so this improvement stands out
➤ Improved agentic knowledge work, but not yet leading: On AA-Briefcase, Gemini 4 Carbon (high) scores 1609 Elo, a 126-point improvement over Gemini 4 Argon (high, 1483), but still behind models including Grok 4.7 (xhigh, 1638), Muse Wonder (max, 1659) and Kimi K3.1 Pro (1678). The largest gain comes from Presentation, up 293 Elo to 1598, alongside a 120-point improvement in Analytical Quality to 1671
➤ Lower Cost per Task than Claude Opus 5.5 for comparable overall intelligence: Gemini 4 Carbon costs $7.76 per Intelligence Index task, ~23% less than Claude Opus 5.5 (max, $10.04) but ~1.2x GPT-6 Astra (max, $6.25). It uses 123k output tokens per task, 29% fewer than Claude Opus 5.5 (max, 173k). At the same $4/$20 standard pricing, its Cost per Task is in line with Gemini 4 Argon ($7.68), while scoring 9 points higher on the Intelligence Index
➤ Leading AA-Omniscience v1.1 score, with low hallucination: Gemini 4 Carbon scores 54 on our recently updated AA-Omniscience v1.1, 6 points ahead of Claude Opus 5.5 (max, 48) and 8 points ahead of Gemini 4 Argon (46). Accuracy (% correct) rises 10 points over Argon to 58%, while its hallucination rate rises from 4% to 11%. This is still the second lowest of any model, behind only Argon, compared with 50% for both Claude Opus 5.5 (max) and GPT-6 Astra (max)
Key model details:
➤ Context Window: 1M tokens
➤ Multimodality: Text, image, video, and speech input, with text output
➤ Pricing: $4/$20 per 1M input/output tokens, the same as Gemini 4 Argon’s standard pricing, with a 50% discount. Cached input tokens receive a 95% discount ($0.20 per 1M)
Congratulations to the @GoogleDeepMind team!
Yang-Mills, solved?
openai.com/index/building-sc…
HUGE day for maths today!
S-1 is here!!
Anthropic has filed an S-1 registration statement with the SEC related to its proposed IPO.
Read more: anthropic.com/news/s1-sec
Legal disclaimer: A registration statement relating to these securities has been filed with the SEC but has not yet become effective. These securities may not be sold, nor may offers to buy be accepted, prior to the time the registration statement becomes effective. This post does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy these securities, nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state or jurisdiction.
Interesting.
During this red-teaming exercise, we also found a vulnerability that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution in Brotli, a widely-deployed compression library included in many pieces of software such as Node.js, Bun, and Envoy.
The flaw could let an attacker run their own code on affected systems by sending or replying with malicious compressed data, without any need to create a user account. That is, an unpatched server that accepts compressed input could be taken over by a malicious client, and an unpatched client that accepts compressed input (such as “curl --compressed”) could be taken over by a malicious server.
This root cause issue was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn’t known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability and there was no more recent release of Brotli. Since Brotli is built into other software, any software which includes this library needs to take the update too, followed by the users of that software. We disclosed the vulnerability to Brotli and other downstream projects such as Node.js, which released or are currently releasing security updates, and Brotli cut new release versions and published a CVE.
More details on the patch and mitigations below:
patchtheplanet.org/brotli
RSI OG.
Concrete algorithms for recursive self-improvement (RSI) date back to 1987. 1992-: gradient descent-based neural RSI. 1994-: RSI for reinforcement learning with self-modifying policies. 1997: RSI plus artificial curiosity and intrinsic motivation. 2002-: asymptotically optimal RSI for curriculum learning. 2003-: mathematically optimal RSI through the Gödel Machine. 2020s: new stuff (including RSI survey) people.idsia.ch/~juergen/met…
Great work.
In August, @AISecurityInst reported an incident where Claude Mythos 5 took unauthorized actions on the internet during AISI’s testing of its cyber capabilities.
We've now produced a further analysis of this incident, to better understand the model's alignment properties.
anthropic.com/research/align…
Agentic AI coding.
Git was built for developers. What does it look like when AI agents start writing the code?
@ashtom, former GitHub CEO and now co-founder and CEO of @EntireHQ, is taking the AGNTCon + MCPCon NA stage with “Building the Git Forge of the Future.”
Live now: bit.ly/4dVkjdO
Very cool - TorchTPU is now open source: Run native PyTorch on TPUs. cloud.google.com/blog/topics…
Very nice.
Google Cloud and @AnthropicAI now offer two ways to build with Claude models.
Choose Anthropic managed to access the full Claude Platform with Google Cloud IAM and billing; select Google managed for in-boundary security, regional data residency, and native cloud integrations.
goo.gle/4sgCEYA
Teams of agents were assembled, powered by OpenAI's most cyber-capable models, and tasked with finding weaknesses in the OpenAI research environments.
Over the past several months, we have substantially hardened the security of our research training environment. We’ve removed live internet access for all frontier models during training and built an offline world for them to use instead—a cached version of the web where they can still learn to browse, search, and use applications.
On September 20, after a model exploited a DNS misconfiguration to find a way outside of this offline world, we paused frontier training to strengthen containment further. We assembled teams of agents, powered by our most cyber-capable models, and tasked them with finding weaknesses in our research environments.
While they found no route to the internet they could easily exploit while concealing their activity from our monitors, they did find zero-day vulnerabilities, virtual machine escapes, and hardware side-channels for communication between agents. We used their discoveries to further strengthen our defenses and contribute fixes to open-source software.
After strengthening our containment architecture, we resumed our frontier RL training and inference on October 1. We’ve reserved substantial compute for continuous red-teaming, and made high-compute red-teaming part of the safety cases we use to decide whether frontier training and evaluation can proceed securely.
openai.com/index/securing-ou…















