Pinetree-People Founder retweeted
🔻TRUMP JUST REPOSTED JFK’S MOST TERRIFYING SPEECH — AND THE DEEP STATE IS PANICKING
JFK saw it coming. In 1961. And now, Trump has just made sure 300 million Americans see it, too.
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I got this song by Freddy stuck in my head right now
WTF is it called?
youtube.com/watch?v=rY0WxgSX…
🚨 ILHAN OMAR IS FINISHED USCIS & DHS just dropped the documents BOMB:
ZERO naturalization records for her father after a full federal search.
She swore she got citizenship at 17 THROUGH HIM — but the agencies say the paper trail DOESN’T EXIST
A sitting congresswoman’s lied to Americans, and commit multiple crimes and fraud
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Do you know how many bills have been introduced in the US Congress over the past 3 months?
Roughly 1,800 bills (House and Senate measures) were introduced from about mid-August through mid-November 2026 in the 119th Congress. Monthly introduction totals from tracking data show around 442 in August, 941 in September, 386 in October, and a small number so far in early November. This is part of a Congress that has already seen nearly 20,000 bills introduced overall, with the vast majority never advancing far beyond introduction or committee referral.
That volume is exactly why it is important to sign up at billpulse.net. Congress produces far more legislation than any individual can reasonably follow. Most bills die quietly, a small fraction become law, and the ones that move can affect voting rules, taxes, healthcare, security, and everyday life. Without an easy way to engage, constituent voices stay fragmented and hard for representatives (or the public) to measure against actual votes.
BillPulse provides live constituent polling on federal bills. After you set your district once, you can indicate Support, Oppose, or Unsure on how your representative should vote, join discussions, and watch or pin measures. Those inputs feed district-level aggregates that the site uses for job-performance indicators, including rankings of House members by verified constituent agreement on comparable roll-call votes, plus views on divergence and attendance. Raw individual ballots stay private; only reduced aggregates are used for the public metrics.
Signing up turns passive awareness into measurable participation. It helps surface where representatives align (or diverge) from the people in their districts, supports greater transparency between elections, and gives you a practical way to stay informed amid the flood of new bills. In a system where introduction volume is high and enactment rates stay low, tools that aggregate real constituent preferences make accountability more concrete. You can browse as a guest, but voting, full results, and deeper engagement require an account.
Homegrown Transparency and Accountability
Know when your Rep votes against your majority
billpulse.net 22
The Greatest Threat to American Society Is Illiteracy
What is the greatest threat to American society today? Polarization, climate change, artificial intelligence, inequality, and geopolitical rivalry all command attention. Yet one quiet, foundational crisis underpins or amplifies nearly all of them: widespread low literacy. Not the complete inability to sound out words that defines traditional illiteracy, but the functional and low literacy that leaves millions unable to navigate the demands of modern life—reading a medical form, evaluating a news claim, following workplace instructions, or helping a child with homework. The evidence shows this is not a peripheral problem. It is a national vulnerability.
The most recent authoritative data comes from the 2023 Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), released by the National Center for Education Statistics. Among U.S. adults ages 16 to 65, average literacy scores fell 12 points from 2017 levels to 258—near the international average but declining. Far more concerning, the share of adults scoring at Level 1 or below rose sharply from 19 percent in 2017 to 28 percent in 2023. These adults can handle only the simplest texts and tasks. Roughly 44 percent reached Level 3 or above, down from 48 percent. Analyses drawing on earlier federal data estimate that about 54 percent of U.S. adults read below a sixth-grade level—roughly 130 million people. Student assessments tell a similar story. On the 2024 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), only about 31 percent of fourth graders and 30 percent of eighth graders scored at or above Proficient in reading; 40 percent of fourth graders scored below Basic.
These numbers have concrete, cascading costs. A Gallup analysis for the Barbara Bush Foundation for Family Literacy estimated that bringing all adults to at least Level 3 proficiency (roughly sixth-grade equivalent) would generate an additional $2.2 trillion in annual income—about 10 percent of GDP. Adults at higher literacy levels earn substantially more on average than those at the lowest levels. Other estimates from the World Literacy Foundation and ProLiteracy put annual costs from lost earnings, lower productivity, and greater reliance on public assistance in the hundreds of billions, with low health literacy alone linked to roughly $200–215 billion in unnecessary health-care spending. People with low literacy skills are far more likely to live in poverty; raising skills by even one proficiency level cuts that risk dramatically.
The damage is intergenerational. A parent’s reading ability is among the strongest predictors of a child’s academic success, stronger than neighborhood or family income in some analyses. Children of low-literacy parents face sharply elevated odds of low literacy themselves, perpetuating cycles of limited opportunity. Links to criminal justice are well documented: large majorities of incarcerated adults score at low literacy levels (commonly cited in the 60–75 percent range for functional illiteracy or reading at elementary-school levels), and early reading failure is strongly associated with later dropout and justice-system involvement. Military recruitment has also been constrained when too many young adults fail basic skills tests.
In a democracy dependent on an informed citizenry, low literacy erodes the capacity for independent judgment. Complex policy debates, ballot language, contracts, and media claims become harder to evaluate. Misinformation thrives where critical reading skills are weak. Economic stagnation, poorer public health, higher social costs, and diminished civic capacity are not separate crises; they are downstream effects of a population that cannot fully use written information.
This is not primarily an immigration story, though non-native-born adults are overrepresented among those with the lowest skills. The majority of adults with low literacy are U.S.-born. Nor is it solely a post-pandemic phenomenon—trends were concerning earlier—though learning disruptions accelerated declines. Schools have long underperformed on the “science of reading,” with too many students never mastering foundational decoding and comprehension. Adult education programs, chronically underfunded relative to need, serve only a fraction of those who could benefit.
Illiteracy (understood as low and functional literacy) is the greatest threat because it is the master variable. It limits individual agency, economic mobility, health, family stability, and democratic competence more pervasively than any single external force. Other challenges can be mitigated by a literate, skilled population; they are far harder to solve without one. The solutions are known and largely nonpartisan: systematic phonics and structured literacy instruction in early grades, early intervention for struggling readers, expanded high-quality adult and family literacy programs, and employer partnerships for workplace skills. These investments yield high returns in earnings, health savings, reduced recidivism, and stronger communities.
Ignoring this crisis does not make it go away. It quietly compounds every other problem America faces. The greatest threat is not outside the gates. It is the millions of citizens who lack the basic tools to fully participate in their own society.
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Federalist No. 10
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
From the New York Packet
Friday, November 23, 1787.
Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
Copied From: guides.loc.gov/federalist-pa… [last accessed: 11/12/26]
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"By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." James Madison (1787)
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Pinetree-People Founder retweeted
⚠️ la juez le dijo que lo enviaría a prisión. Antes de que pudiera terminar la sentencia, él acusado saltó por encima del estrado y pasó esto. 🤣🇺🇸👇🏻
Taxin' Jaxin' has already convicted President Trump before hearing any evidence at trial.
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