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Crypto Educator 🧘‍♂️ | DeFi Security & Exploit Analysis 🔎 | Breaking Down What Goes Wrong Onchain | Market Insights 💡 | Always DYOR | DM for collabs

The Cosmos
Joined July 2012
Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)Photo by Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ (@Promirexy)
Nobody had to break a vault this week 🧘‍♂️ Most of the money walked out through a side door A trading key, a wallet module, a signing tool, a support vendor, a shipping partner, a relayer Here's every hack and scam from Nov 14 to 20, and the one lesson behind them 🧵
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Update 🧘‍♂️ Chainflip has put the protocol in full safe mode Deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting are all paused while they investigate Lookonchain now says the stolen USDC, ETH and USDT were swapped into 2,910 ETH and sent into Tornado Cash On chain the drainer wallet swapped the stablecoins on Uniswap within about 3 minutes of getting the funds The team still hasn't said how the valid signature got out, so treat this as an access problem until they post a report If you have funds sitting in their vaults, sit tight and ignore any recovery DMs My take: The contract did its job, the attacker just walked in with a real key, and the cash out was already done before the pause landed teapawt.net/Promirexy/status/21240…
🚨 Developing How do you empty a vault without breaking a single line of code? Chainflip's Ethereum vault was just drained for about $4.86M 520.2 ETH, 3.25M USDC and 758K USDT went out to a fresh wallet The withdrawal carried a valid signature from the vault's own aggregate signing key, so the contract treated it like a normal transfer Early trackers point to a suspected private key compromise, Chainflip has not confirmed yet The attacker is already pushing ETH through Tornado Cash If you have a swap in flight on Chainflip, hold off until the team gives an update My take: Threshold keys spread the risk, but if the signing process leaks, the vault can't tell the network from the attacker
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🚨 Developing How do you empty a vault without breaking a single line of code? Chainflip's Ethereum vault was just drained for about $4.86M 520.2 ETH, 3.25M USDC and 758K USDT went out to a fresh wallet The withdrawal carried a valid signature from the vault's own aggregate signing key, so the contract treated it like a normal transfer Early trackers point to a suspected private key compromise, Chainflip has not confirmed yet The attacker is already pushing ETH through Tornado Cash If you have a swap in flight on Chainflip, hold off until the team gives an update My take: Threshold keys spread the risk, but if the signing process leaks, the vault can't tell the network from the attacker
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Three weeks after the $6.4B Binance hack, where is the money now? 🧘‍♂️ SomaXBT traced 31,763 attacker wallets across 12 chains and the picture is clear $2.82B is frozen by token issuers, about 44% $2.67B is still sitting in the attacker's wallets, about 42% Only $32M has been recovered so far The first hour was a race against the freeze One wallet sent 300M USDT onward at 20:56 UTC and Tether froze it at 21:09, 13 minutes too late Another wallet dumped 245M USDT for ETH at 10% to 25% below market, giving up about $37M just to get out before Tether could act Now the attacker is splitting ETH into fresh wallets of exactly 12,000 ETH each and pushing funds through THORChain into Bitcoin, with 1,482 BTC already through CoinJoin How to spot the side effect: scammers are already sending fake "ETH" tokens from lookalike addresses to those wallets, the same address poisoning trick they use on normal users If you copy an address from your transaction history, check every character, not just the first and last few My take: freezes saved almost half, but once stolen money leaves stablecoins, recovery gets very slow It all started with one fake job interview, not a code bug teapawt.net/Promirexy/status/21176…
Binance just dropped its initial findings on the $6.34B hack and it confirms what I've been saying all along It started with a fake job interview An employee downloaded malware during the "interview" The attackers then used that device, internal AI tools and stolen credentials to reach Binance's internal wallet signing service From there they moved funds outside the normal withdrawal checks and abused EIP 7702 authorization on a hot wallet No smart contract bug, and no private key leak according to Binance About $2.85B is frozen or intercepted so far and Binance says no user bears the loss Why it matters: the weak point wasn't code, it was one person, one laptop and an internal tool with too much reach If you work in crypto, never run a "recruiter's" take home test on the machine you use for work or wallets Access is the attack surface now, not code
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10/ And the scams needed no hacking at all A deepfake Musk livestream pushed people to send crypto, and Coinbase says it stopped $4.7M Trigram fake job tests tried to get devs to run malware 18,000 GTA VI tokens showed up in 48 hours Lesson: Urgency is the attack
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My tally hit 8 access incidents this week, and the biggest loss again came from a key, not a contract Code bugs still happen, ask Kava and K3 But the biggest money keeps leaving through access So before you trust any app, ask who else can move your funds Calm in chaos 🧘‍♂️ teapawt.net/Promirexy/status/21157…
My prediction for Q1 2027 The biggest single crypto loss of the quarter will come from access, not code A key, a credential, a vendor or a signer Not a smart contract flaw If CertiK’s Q1 2027 numbers put a pure code bug behind the biggest individual loss, I was wrong Here’s the case: Frequency isn’t severity CertiK’s H1 2026 numbers Code vulnerabilities, 204 incidents, $152M Wallet compromises, 33 incidents, $445M That’s about $0.75M per code bug And about $13.5M per wallet compromise Roughly 18 times more per incident The Tranche Vault drain this week, about $1M so far, is the typical code bug Frequent and small The biggest losses come from the other side Q2’s two biggest were Kelp at $291M and Drift at $285M A cross chain verification failure and an admin takeover through tricked signers Q3’s biggest was Bitget at $387.5M Bitget says attackers used a flaw in a third party security product to reach internal credentials and forge withdrawal commands The forged commands were treated as legitimate Two small test transfers stayed under the risk threshold The big ones followed about 30 minutes later Now look at the disclosures since September Trezor, a third party email provider Bitget, a third party security product NGRAVE, a third party push service Foundation, pointing to Cloudflare API keys Solflare, a staking provider holding validator keys Different brands Same pattern And this week, Bithumb disclosed an intrusion into groupware An office tool Not a chain, not a contract Code bugs aren’t dead Liquid lost $319M to one in September, and about 85% came back I’m not saying they’ll disappear I’m saying they’ll stop being the biggest The part that protects you Bitget says its cold wallets weren’t touched Solflare says delegated SOL stayed in users’ own stake accounts You can’t promise you’ll never be breached You can decide how much a breach can reach So the question isn’t “is it audited” It’s “who else holds a key, and what can it move” 🧘‍♂️
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🚨 Developing What happens when the wallet built to protect your privacy is the one sending your money out? Fluidkey, a stealth address privacy wallet, was drained yesterday For about 36 minutes its own relayer paid funds out of user accounts on six chains Onchain tracing by Bitquery shows at least $1.58M reached wallets tied to one attacker, and 881.6 ETH went into Tornado Cash Fluidkey shut everything down, says nothing has moved since, and is working with SEAL 911 on a post mortem They still haven't said how it happened or the official loss If you use Fluidkey, don't touch the site or app until they give the all clear And ignore anyone who DMs offering "recovery help", the team says it will never message you first My take: Privacy hides who you pay, but if a service you don't control can sign for you, your safety depends on it Lesson: Know which part of your wallet can move funds without you
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Crypto_Rexy🧘‍♂️ retweeted
🚨 GTA VI dropped yesterday and scammers had already prepared for the launch months in advance Blockaid flagged more than 8,800 GTA themed tokens on Solana as malicious, warning or spam, out of more than 20,000 GTA named tokens detected since July Bubblemaps also counted 18,000 GTA VI tokens in just 48 hours, with nearly all identified as bundled scams The trap is simple, and that is exactly why it works A post claims a GTA coin airdrop is live or offers a crypto payment option to pre order the Ultimate Edition The link opens a polished website, sometimes a near perfect copy of the PlayStation Store, listing the Ultimate Edition for $89.99 You click Pre Order and a Connect Wallet window appears with familiar logos like Trust Wallet, OKX and Ledger Every option leads to the same drainer Nobody needed to exploit a smart contract here They borrowed the hype around one of the biggest game launches and waited for people to sign How to spot it in 5 seconds A game checkout asking for your wallet instead of a card is a scam A GTA coin or eligibility checker is a scam Buy the game only through the PlayStation or Xbox store you open yourself, never through a link in the replies If you already connected and signed on one of these pages, revoke your approvals and move any remaining funds to a fresh wallet My take: The biggest game launch in history just became the biggest drainer lure of the year, and it will not end with launch week Access, not code Incident #8 this week
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🚨 GTA VI dropped yesterday and scammers had already prepared for the launch months in advance Blockaid flagged more than 8,800 GTA themed tokens on Solana as malicious, warning or spam, out of more than 20,000 GTA named tokens detected since July Bubblemaps also counted 18,000 GTA VI tokens in just 48 hours, with nearly all identified as bundled scams The trap is simple, and that is exactly why it works A post claims a GTA coin airdrop is live or offers a crypto payment option to pre order the Ultimate Edition The link opens a polished website, sometimes a near perfect copy of the PlayStation Store, listing the Ultimate Edition for $89.99 You click Pre Order and a Connect Wallet window appears with familiar logos like Trust Wallet, OKX and Ledger Every option leads to the same drainer Nobody needed to exploit a smart contract here They borrowed the hype around one of the biggest game launches and waited for people to sign How to spot it in 5 seconds A game checkout asking for your wallet instead of a card is a scam A GTA coin or eligibility checker is a scam Buy the game only through the PlayStation or Xbox store you open yourself, never through a link in the replies If you already connected and signed on one of these pages, revoke your approvals and move any remaining funds to a fresh wallet My take: The biggest game launch in history just became the biggest drainer lure of the year, and it will not end with launch week Access, not code Incident #8 this week
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🚨🚨🚨 Five critical NGINX bugs went public yesterday, here’s what they mean for crypto in plain words NGINX is the software that sits in front of a huge part of the internet and handles incoming traffic Crypto sites like exchanges, wallet apps and RPC endpoints can sit behind it too The bugs, dubbed NGINX2Root by researchers at Xint, allow someone without a login to send crafted traffic and potentially run their own code on the server Each bug requires a specific setup, such as HTTP/2, HTTP/3 or NGINX being used as a mail proxy The lead bug has been in the code since HTTP/2 support arrived in 2015 and only requires HTTP/2 to be enabled F5 rates all five 9.2 on CVSS 4.0, and a Rapid7 researcher has published a working proof of concept exploit The good news: ✅No attacks in the wild have been reported so far ✅The lead bug was not on CISA’s known exploited list as of November 18 ✅Rapid7 says its exploit needs about 128GB of HTTP/2 traffic and must get past memory protections first, so this is not a one click hack ✅Qualys adds that these limitations slow mass attacks, but they do not protect a specific server from a capable attacker The part people are missing: Xint says all five bugs can be chained with a separate Linux kernel bug that has no patch yet It says this chain can turn a foothold on the server into full root access, even from inside a Docker container That claim comes from Xint and I have not seen it independently confirmed Xint is holding back most details until the kernel receives a fix Why crypto should care: Your keys may not be on that server, but the page you use them on might be A hijacked frontend can show you a fake deposit address or a fake approve button while everything looks normal What I would do: 👉If you run a node, an RPC or any crypto site, update NGINX Open Source to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 and perform a full restart 👉A reload does not replace the running code 👉If you use your distro’s package, check its advisory Ubuntu and Debian still listed theirs as vulnerable with no fix as of November 18, according to Qualys 👉Do not trust the version number alone, Linux distros often ship security fixes without changing it 👉If you cannot patch yet, disabling HTTP/2 covers only two of the five bugs and can break things like gRPC 👉If you do not use SCTP, block that kernel module on your hosts as an interim step 👉As a user, check addresses and approvals on your hardware wallet screen this week, not just in your browser My take: The main bug is old and a proof of concept is public, so the real race now is the boring part, which is patching
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🚨 Developing What happens when a "safer" yield vault trusts its own math too much? K3 Capital's sBOLD vault on Ethereum just lost about $3.43M across roughly 34 transactions, per Blockaid The attacker flash borrowed wstETH, forced a Liquity V2 liquidation into the stability pools, and minted vault shares way too cheap Then they cashed those shares out against other depositors' BOLD K3 says contracts are paused while they investigate If you hold sBOLD, don't panic sign anything and only trust updates from K3's official account My take: no keys were stolen here, the accounting itself was the open door This one breaks the streak, code not access this time
We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused.
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