Dr. J 𒉭

BACHIR’S ISRAEL GAMBIT Bachir Gemayel was never Israel’s client. From the first request in 1978 to the 1982 invasion, Israeli intelligence and leadership repeatedly registered the same reality, The LF commander wouldn’t subordinate his forces, his political project or his reading of Lebanese interests to Israel’s design. He extracted weapons, political cover, and the destruction of his immediate enemies while withholding the military commitment Israel required and so desperately sought after. In the process he became the rare Levant figure who was able to use Israel as a puppet as opposed to being used BY Israel as a puppet. During Operation Litani in March of 78, Israeli officers asked Bachir to send 800 men south to reinforce Haddad who was operating as Israel’s client in the border zone. He complied. Bachir’s men deserted within the first couple of hours of arriving. Israel accused him of withdrawing them himself. More decisive was his refusal to give Haddad public backing despite sustained Israeli pressure. Schiff and Ya’ari record that this was read inside Israeli defense circles as early proof that Bachir wouldn’t serve as a reliable client. By April of 82, the same assessment had hardened inside the agencies responsible for the Phalange line. Mossad chief Hofi and intelligence chief Saguy, who never before agreed on the Christians, jointly warned Begin that Bachir wasn’t an ally and that he was deceiving Israel for his own gain. They go on to push that Bachir’s presidency wouldn’t be worth an Israeli war and he couldn’t be counted on to fight or form a diplomatic relationship between Lebanon and Israel. To Bachir, Israel was no more than a foreign invader on Levant land that was easy enough for him to manipulate. The intelligence consensus was that Bachir would take what Israel offered and then withhold the reciprocal commitment. In the meetings that preceded the invasion, Bachir maintained the gap between Israeli expectations and his own intentions with deliberate precision. He told the IDF that his problem was the Maronite hinterland not the resolution of Israel’s Beirut problem and that he wouldn’t sacrifice his forces to the latter. When told Israel had no interest in a war with Syria, he answered that if they didn’t intend to confront the Syrians then “don’t come at all”. On the character of a future government he was clear, a narrow government would be one the Christians established and a broad one would require Israel to help “essentially destroy all the rest.” Neriah records that Israeli participants left convinced he understood the unspoken bargain. Subsequent events showed he had given them only enough to preserve the illusion of alignment. The LF received arms from Israel yet Bachir treated both the weapons and the IDF as assets to be taken rather than obligations to be repaid. When a price was later attached to the arms, he accepted the condition and then evaded it. Israeli planners had assumed the LF would join significant combat. They didn’t. Israel complained that the Christians hadn’t lifted a finger. Sharon and Eitan eventually conceded that the expectation the LF would fight was false. Bachir held his own men in reserve, allowed Israeli and opposing forces to bleed one another and preserved the LF for the political settlement that would follow the clearance of Beirut. Sharon asked the CIA for $10 million in support for the Phalange in early 1982. Admiral Inman, opposed it, calling Bachir a “baby faced war lord” the Agency should avoid. Israel was pushing for US backing of a partner its own intelligence already distrusted, while US officials wanted no part in it. Israel accused the US of trying to create a rift between them and Bachir which caused friction between US reps in the region and Israeli reps. Consciously, or unconsciously, Bachir caused the situation to escalate. In his meetings with Israeli reps, he would cynically say: "Do you know what your friends told me? Not to deal with you!"