Was happy to participate in Quantum Security for Digital Assets event together with @Quantovafnd and @anna_tutova during #TOKEN2049 week. A lot of good conversations around post-quantum security, digital signatures, key management, blockchain infrastructure, and how the industry should prepare for what comes next. Thanks to everyone who joined us, shared their perspectives, and stayed for the conversations after the panels. Always good to bring the right people into one room and discuss what the industry should be preparing for next. See you at the next one 👋 #PostQuantum #TOKEN2049 #Web3Security

The core step of a quantum attack on Bitcoin and Ethereum now fits in under 900 logical qubits within Google's gate budget. In three published attack designs, the machine would shrink by zero to about 28%. On October 13, Jieyi Long of Theta Labs posted an 893-qubit circuit to ECDSA Fail, an open benchmark for the point addition that Shor's algorithm repeats to recover a private key. A day later he posted an 874-qubit version. Both stay below the 1,175 qubits and 2.7 million Toffoli gates Google proved for its own circuit in March. Narrower circuits exist, down to 676 qubits, but all of them exceed Google's gate count. The 676-qubit one needs about 150 times as many. Pierre-Luc Dallaire-Demers, a co-author of the ECDSA Fail paper, put the physical saving at 25% for the IonQ, Oratomic and Google attack designs. I checked each one. - Google: about a quarter, if every part of the machine shrank with the qubit count. - Oratomic: nothing with its published codes, and at most 16% with a code sized for 893 qubits. - IonQ: about 28% fewer ions, but longer attempts, because the circuit needs about 1.6 times IonQ's Toffoli gates per addition. Nobody has compiled a full attack around either circuit yet. postquantum.com/security-pqc… #QuantumComputing #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC #QuantumSecurity #Cryptography #Bitcoin #Ethereum #Cybersecurity