Pinned Tweet
Tune out the noise. Keep stacking. Practice self custody.
Did I mention self custody. Get your coins off exchanges.
Don’t fk around with leverage.
Get your coins off exchanges.
Do this and you will sleep without worry.
A bitcoin treasury company just told investors it hasn't been able to withdraw its BTC from the exchange holding its entire treasury, after four months of transfer requests. The stock crashed.
At the same time, more big names want to hold bitcoin for you. Itaú, Latin America's largest bank, just registered with Brazil's central bank to offer it to clients.
More access is good. But custody isn't a detail. Three reasons I'd still hold my own keys:
1. A balance on someone else's screen is a promise. Coins at an address you control are a fact anyone can check.
2. A withdrawal is the only real audit of a custodian, and you don't get to pick the day you need one.
3. The tools are simple now: a hardware wallet, a seed backed up offline, and a node if you want to verify for yourself.
Use whatever custodian you like. Just make sure you can leave.
xitter.cf/lopp/status/2115200402…
A Bitcoin treasury company (@Datavault_ai $DVLT) just crashed because they informed investors that they haven't been able to withdraw BTC from the exchange (@BiconomyCom) that is holding all their treasury funds after 4 months of transfer requests.
OpenAI's new preprint says the Exponential Time Hypothesis is false. If it holds up, that's a big deal for complexity theory. It isn't a problem for your bitcoin.
The paper claims a deterministic algorithm that counts the solutions to k-SAT, the classic hard puzzle, faster than a 25-year-old assumption said was possible. MIT's Ryan Williams posted the PDF and its claimed bound. It's still a preprint, and the checking is just starting.
Three reasons I'm not worried:
1. Faster isn't fast. The claimed bound still grows explosively with problem size. It bends the curve; it doesn't flatten it.
2. Wrong target. The paper is about SAT. Bitcoin's keys are protected by elliptic-curve cryptography, and the paper makes no claim about it.
3. This is how security should work. Big claims get posted openly and attacked by experts in public. That's the process you want guarding the math your keys depend on.
Better math is good news. Your keys still have to be guessed.
github.com/openai/math/blob/…
So much for privacy…. They were my favorite too
INVESTIGATION UPDATE
Many of you have asked how personal information ended up in the phishing emails, particularly those who ordered from us years ago. Here is what we have found so far.
Phishing emails:
We have identified more than 23,000 phishing email attempts across our email systems, including 19,057 messages delivered through Mailgun and 1,503 messages sent through Google Workspace. Some addresses received multiple messages, and some attempts failed or were stopped before delivery.
These numbers do not tell us how many people had personal information exposed. We are still determining that number and will share it once we can confirm it.
Older orders and abandoned carts (WooCommerce):
Before moving to Shopify in May of this year, our store ran on WooCommerce. We had configured automatic redaction of customer details 60 days after shipping. When we viewed those orders in our store admin, the customer details were no longer visible and the orders showed as redacted.
During past database migrations, orders were copied into a new set of tables, but copies remained in the old tables. The redaction process updated the newer tables, which were also what our store admin displayed. Orders therefore appeared redacted even though older copies still contained personal information.
We also found personal information in other order and refund records, as well as abandoned carts. This included shipping details entered by someone who never completed a purchase. We are still checking the historical settings and redaction process to understand why these records retained data.
Those older records were held in systems the attackers were able to reach. We relied on the redaction shown in our admin dashboard, and we now know that was insufficient to verify that the underlying data had been removed. Whatever the shortcomings in the tools we used, protecting your information was still our full responsibility.
We plan to share our findings with WooCommerce and the relevant plugin developers. When an order is marked as redacted, its personal information should not remain in another table in the same database.
For other WooCommerce store owners: do not rely solely on what your admin dashboard shows when personal data is redacted. Have your developer or agent check the entire database for information left behind, including legacy tables, refund records, and abandoned carts. This is especially important if you have used WooCommerce for years or have been through database migrations.
Recent orders (Shopify):
Customer details from orders placed on our Shopify store since May may also have been exposed. We are still investigating the extent of any unauthorized access.
These orders had not yet been manually redacted. We updated our privacy policy when we moved to Shopify and were building a tool to automate redaction, but automatic deletion was not yet active.
Other possible sources:
We have received reports of phishing emails containing personal details that customers say they never shared with us. We are investigating whether the attackers combined information from our systems with data obtained elsewhere, but we have not confirmed a connection to breaches at other companies. Historical support records are also part of our investigation.
What we have done:
We have revoked affected email credentials, cleared queued phishing messages, and taken affected legacy services offline while preserving evidence. Our investigation into the full extent of the compromise is continuing.
We have found no evidence that this incident compromised Passport devices or the private keys they hold. The phishing emails are designed to trick you into revealing your recovery phrase, and including your correct personal information makes them more convincing.
Never enter your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation.
We will continue sharing confirmed findings and publish our full report when the investigation is complete.
Foundation's phishing incident shows where self-custody actually breaks: not in the device, but in the inbox.
Sunday night, emails that appeared to come from Foundation's official domains told Passport owners their funds were at risk and pointed them to a site that asked for their seed phrase. Foundation says funds on Passport are safe and the hardware is not compromised. Three takeaways:
1. A real sender proves nothing. These came from the company's own domains, some with customers' real names and addresses attached. No legitimate recall ever needs your recovery phrase.
2. The hardware did its job. The scam only works if the owner types the seed into a website. Keys that never leave the device can't be emailed away.
3. Customer data is the attack surface. Foundation's CEO says attackers likely reached the support inbox. Every company holding your address is part of your threat model, so give out as little as you can.
The device is the vault. Your inbox is the lobby.
unchainedcrypto.com/passport…
Now I have to move. Who is paying for this?
ANNOUNCEMENT: SPAM EMAILS HAVE BEEN SENT THAT APPEAR TO HAVE COME FROM OFFICIAL FOUNDATION DOMAINS.
We have traced this back to one or more compromised API keys on Cloudflare, and have already revoked all API keys.
The malicious domain in the spam email has been taken down.
Funds stored on Passport are safe and Passport hardware is not compromised.
We are working nonstop to discover exactly what happened and will put out a report ASAP.
Lightning Labs opened Wavelength to everyone on mainnet yesterday, and the design gets the most important part right: the user can always leave.
Wavelength is a toolkit for adding bitcoin payments to apps and AI agents, built on an Ark-like settlement layer. Three reasons it's worth watching:
1. Keys stay with the user from the first command. Lightning Labs says the coordination service that settles transfers never has unilateral control of funds, and the exit command moves a balance back on-chain without anyone's permission.
2. Agents get least-privilege access. A service can be given the right to receive payments with no ability to sign or recover the wallet.
3. The limits are stated up front. Mainnet accounts cap at 300,000 sats and each VTXO at 50,000. Small caps on day one are honest.
Convenience that keeps the exit open is how self-custody scales.
lightning.engineering/posts/…
Bitcoin Core just changed how it handles easy-to-find bugs, and it's the right call.
On Oct 22, Core developer Antoine Poinsot told the bitcoin-dev mailing list that reports of easily rediscovered vulnerabilities are up, largely because LLMs have lowered the bar to find them. For bugs flagged as easy to discover, Core will now backport a fix to every maintained release and ship it as soon as possible with a security advisory, instead of holding it behind the usual embargo.
1. A bug anyone can find with one prompt isn't a secret. Waiting only helps whoever finds it first.
2. Backports put the fix on the version node runners already run, without forcing a major upgrade.
3. Everything else still follows the severity-based disclosure timelines. The policy adapted in public, in writing. That's how open source should work.
Run a node. Keep it patched.
bitcoincore.org/en/security-…


