Pierre Fermigier

My take on the Mecca Pact delegation’s visit to Tehran. - The decision to send a Mecca Pact delegation to Tehran, led by Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman and joined by Pakistan’s Asim Munir and Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, is an interesting development, not only in the context of the ongoing diplomatic efforts to prevent another war, but also for what it tells us about the changing regional security dynamics. - For Pakistan, the initiative appears to follow naturally from Munir’s recent visit to Tehran and offers Islamabad an opportunity to address a strategic dilemma that has become increasingly difficult to manage: how to reconcile its defence commitments to Saudi Arabia with its determination to maintain good relations with Iran, without finding itself caught in a confrontation between Tehran and a predominantly Sunni security grouping. - If this reading is correct (and I believe it is), Pakistan is effectively demonstrating, by bringing the Mecca Pact into direct dialogue with the Iranian leadership, that its commitments to Riyadh do not necessarily have to come at the expense of its relations with Tehran. - The Saudi dimension is perhaps even more interesting. Despite the Houthi attacks and the tensions generated by the regional crisis, Riyadh has continued to maintain diplomatic contacts with Tehran, apparently recognising that a further deterioration in relations would only add to its own security problems. The decision to send the Defence Minister to Tehran suggests something more than a routine diplomatic initiative. It points to a growing awareness in Riyadh that Saudi security cannot depend exclusively on American protection and military deterrence. - The visit is also relevant to the debate that has surrounded the Mecca Pact since its creation, particularly over whether it was primarily intended as a security arrangement against Iran, Israel, or other regional actors. The fact that its representatives are now engaging directly with the Iranian leadership suggests that the agreement may be evolving in a rather different direction, or at least that its members do not want it to be perceived as an exclusively confrontational arrangement. Collective defence and diplomatic engagement with Iran are not necessarily contradictory, and this initiative seems intended to make precisely that point. - There is also a connection with the R4 diplomatic framework. Although Egypt is absent from this initiative, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are once again acting together, reinforcing their role in the diplomatic process that produced the Islamabad Memorandum. Their involvement suggests that these countries are not simply interested in preventing another escalation, but may also be trying to retain a central role in shaping the regional security arrangements that may emerge from the current crisis. - What I find particularly significant is the possible evolution in Saudi strategic thinking. Riyadh is certainly not abandoning its relationship with Washington, and there is little reason to believe that its longstanding mistrust of Iran has disappeared. But the Saudis seem to be increasingly questioning whether the traditional model of regional security, built largely around American military protection and the containment of Iran, is sufficient to safeguard their interests in the longer term. The Tehran visit could be an early indication of a broader adjustment, with Riyadh seeking to preserve its American security partnership while developing a more direct relationship with Iran. - In my view, the significance of this initiative may extend well beyond the immediate efforts to prevent another round of fighting. It raises the possibility that the Mecca Pact, initially viewed by many through the familiar lens of regional rivalries, could eventually contribute to a security framework in which Iran is engaged rather than simply contained. #Iran #SaudiArabia #Pakistan #Turkey