AI eval science & AI x Econ @GoogleDeepMind, @NYU @CSMAP_NYU. Past: @Twitter, Acronym, @Facebook, @PewResearch, @Stanford.

2019
Joined September 2009
Thrilled to announce a step toward fixing benchmark contamination—the first successful test of our confidential evaluation framework “double blind evals” on a frontier class proprietary model with a non-public evaluation set.
In an industry first, we’re piloting double-blind evaluations for frontier AI. By creating a secure environment where neither test prompts nor model weights are revealed, we can ensure external safety and performance evaluations of our models remain private, robust, and trustworthy. → goo.gle/3St2xan
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Sol Messing retweeted
After the surprise outcome of the Brazilian election, I was curious if AI forecasting tools predicted the outcomes correctly. It turns out a top AI tool (FutureSearch) made the same errors as prediction markets more broadly. This is an example of what @random_walker and I mean by “intrinsic limits” to prediction that have nothing to do with the AI tools in question, but rather depend on the inherent uncertainty in the world. Of course, a single failed prediction doesn’t mean that AI isn’t good at forecasting; in fact AI tools are already about as good as top forecasters, and I expect human forecasters to make heavy use of AI tools improve their own forecasts. But the inherent uncertainty in predicting social outcomes like elections means that AI tools’ performance will be limited close to that of top experts using simple automated tools (rather than being apparently unbounded with more compute, such as AI’s performance on chess).
Is this shaping up to be one of the biggest prediction market whiffs of all time?
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Sol Messing retweeted
Counterpoint: we've known about cache leakage across security boundaries for more than a decade and we already knew models have excellent cyber capabilities. More papers below
completely insane OpenAI agents communicated via cache timing differences, without any shared files or network connection
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Counterpoint: we've known about cache leakage across security boundaries for more than a decade and we already knew models have excellent cyber capabilities. More papers below
completely insane OpenAI agents communicated via cache timing differences, without any shared files or network connection
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Finally there's Leaky Cauldron, a cache side channel against cryptographic enclaves, including recovery of cryptographic information!
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If you believe AI will result in explosive growth please reply! I'd like to join this bet but need to find a counterparty
Two greats join our bet: - @dwarkesh_sp on the explosive-growth side - @Thom_Wolf on my side benjaminmoll.com/growth_bet/ Total pot now $700k 💰
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I wake up, more BS trying to tell us Pangram is flawed. At this point you should just disregard anything anyone says about the product. The critics are either wrong or lying. The false positive rate is essentially zero, receipts in next tweet
Can you explain why you photoshopped the results page?
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A systematic audit from found the false positive rate was basically zero and it's only become better since. nber.org/papers/w34223
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Oh yes I’ve definitely noticed this dialect, AI prose can be annoying and very hard to understand. Cool research on why 👇
If you've noticed a distinct dialect emerging in frontier AI models and struggled to understand what they're talking about, you're not crazy! We turned to psycholinguistics to investigate what makes the writing style so weird, and why this might be happening 🚨New preprint! 🧵
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Matthew Yglesias continues to say that talking about ICE and excessive force in immigration enforcement helps Republicans. He is obviously wrong about this and refuses to acknowledge the data. Way past time for everyone to update their priors on this.
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Replying to @QualiaQuanta
Pangram has a known problem with shorter snippets of text. I pasted your whole article into my Substack account and ran it through the AI detector, which relies on Pangram. 100% human!
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We were investigating Wedgewood for faking their data and emailed them for comment this morning, ahead of publishing the findings tomorrow. They are trying to cover up their fraud with the "we were doing a social experiment" excuse. Full story here: blog.fiftyplusone.news/p/fif…
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🚩 When Polymarket or Kalshi says there's a 70% chance something will happen, should we believe it? Excited to share our new paper, just published in PNAS, in which we examined more than ONE MILLION forecasts from Polymarket, Kalshi, Manifold, and Metaculus, spanning 12 domains and forecasting horizons ranging from hours to years. The main finding is striking: Prediction markets and collective forecasting platforms are remarkably well calibrated. When they assign events a 70% probability, those events really do happen about 70% of the time. And this pattern holds surprisingly well across different platforms, domains, and forecasting horizons. But there's an important twist. When we looked more closely, we discovered systematic biases in some of the domains where forecasting matters most (wars, elections). For decades, psychologists have documented how poorly humans often reason about probability and uncertainty. Our findings offer an encouraging counterpoint: When judgments and information are aggregated, we can achieve a surprisingly accurate understanding of an uncertain future. That doesn't mean we can predict what will happen next with certainty. But it does mean that we can be remarkably good at estimating how uncertain the future really is. This work was a great collaboration. The data for this project was meticulously collected for years by Justin Dickerson, the project was led by Hilla Shinitzky and Maayan Peer, with @mattansb leading the analyses. 📄 Read the paper: pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.26… #Forecasting #Polymarket #Kalshi #DecisionScience #PNAS
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Sol Messing retweeted
Today I learnt that in 2009, neuroscientists placed a dead Atlantic salmon into an fMRI scanner, scanned it, and that this has apparently implications for AI interpretability. 🐟 They showed the dead fish pictures of humans in social situations and "asked" the fish to determine the emotions of the people. When they ran their standard statistical software, the results showed "brain activity" in the fish that correlated with the emotions. Obviously, the fish was not thinking; the "activity" was just random noise. The point of the study was to show that if you don't correct for statistical noise and use rigorous controls, your tools will find patterns where none exist. This paper claims that the same lesson should be applied in interpretability work: many researchers use various tools to explain what is happening inside a neural network (e.g. probes, SAEs etc). But some of these convincing-looking explanations can also be extracted when applied to randomly initialized and untrained AI models (the dead salmon equivalent): saliency maps remain plausible after weight randomization, sparse autoencoders find interpretable components in random transformers etc. The authors propose that we stop treating interpretability as "storytelling" and start treating it as statistical inference: doing null hypothesis testing, quantifying uncertainty more systematically, interpreting explanations as a simplified surrogate model etc. Although they also acknowledge that finding some signal in random networks doesn't automatically invalidate finding stronger signals in trained ones. I'm not interpretability researcher myself but would be curious to hear takes! arxiv.org/abs/2512.18792
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Sol Messing retweeted
90% of Americans’ working hours are spent on tasks not covered well by AI benchmarks. That’s our best guess from a new project mapping frontier benchmarks onto the US economy. Preparing for a post-AGI economy requires predicting the future. Current benchmarks makes it very difficult even to measure the present.
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Sol Messing retweeted
OPEN CALL: funding for AI researchers. If you're working on AI ensembling or routing, we'd like to help your research go faster. Details below.
We’re funding researchers to build the first verified map of the quality-cost frontier for AI ensembles and routing. Each researcher gets a $2k stipend plus up to $5k in compute and hands-on engineering support for 12 weeks. We want to see which mix of models gives the best answer for the money?? Offers go out on a rolling basis. Apply by Oct 23: openmined.org/research/grant…
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Sol Messing retweeted
Political scientists and economists: we're looking for researchers with deep expertise to come work with us for a unique 4-month fellowship at @AnthropicAI. You'll work closely with us to evaluate, improve, and apply Claude's capabilities in your field. It's going to be extremely fun and interesting work, and definitely worth taking a short leave from your university for if you need to! More info here: job-boards.greenhouse.io/ant…
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Here are 14 points about AI safety I made on the Ezra Klein show, and some impressions about the experience. ​​nytimes.com/2026/10/09/opini… 1. Intelligence isn’t power — An A.I. system being powerful is not a property of the model itself. It’s a property of what powers we choose to give it in the real world. 2. The capabilities and behaviors we saw in the HuggingFace and other hacks weren’t entirely emergent. The models were trained for persistence, cooperation, and cyber tasks. The RL environments in which they were trained had various issues that led to the unintended behavior. 3. I agree that controlling highly capable AI agents is different in some ways from controlling an airplane or a nuclear reactor. The agent’s intentionality does make a difference to our approach compared to traditional engineering problems and domains. But it is still an engineering problem. It is not a solved engineering problem, but it is a solvable one. 4. A lot of effort and money has been put toward alignment. That’s important and has proved useful, but if the same amount of effort and money had additionally been put toward control (sandboxes, monitoring, and other guardrails outside the model itself), we’d be seeing very different results. 5. Models getting smarter doesn’t necessarily mean safety gets harder, because capability gains improve defensive abilities too. In many ways it makes safety easier rather than harder. What matters is how the attacker-defender balance shifts, and we have agency to shift it back to defenders. 6. In cybersecurity, long before AI we reached a point where automated systems were superhuman at finding certain vulnerabilities. It helped defenders over attackers because the same tools are used by defenders to find and fix vulnerabilities in software before even shipping. There is a constantly shifting equilibrium, but it is not a new problem. 7. I pushed back on Dario Amodei’s term “operational excellence” to describe recent organizational failures. Excellence is still far out on the horizon. Ezra offered “operational adequacy”. I think that would be a good start — behaving like any mature company instead of a startup-like culture. 8. Defensive AI agents will have to be part of the solution, as uncomfortable as that seems. It’s a new paradigm. We won’t be able to figure it out right away. But the fact that both offensive and defensive technologies escalate in capabilities and complexity is a fact of technological civilization, whether in the digital or physical realm. 9. Ezra expressed some incredulity about my being okay with the ratcheting of complexity. I think it’s fair to be concerned. But safety technologies will never be fully legible to the public. People will have the same reaction if they see the immense complexity of safety in any other high-stakes domain such as nuclear or aerospace. We govern them pretty technocratically. 10. The weirdness of the current moment in cybersecurity absolutely does have historical precedents. There was a prolonged period of profound destabilization when worms and viruses started a new offensive paradigm. It took us well over a decade to develop effective defenses against it. This time we can hopefully get there in less than a decade. 11. I continue to be skeptical about the possibility of superhuman persuasion abilities from superintelligence. (Claims to the contrary tend to confuse two very different senses of the word persuasion.) 12. What worries me is not the capabilities of the technology itself or the possibility that we will get no warnings before catastrophic risks materialize. We are getting plenty of warnings! But our policy and organizational responses to the warnings remain inadequate. 13. Companies can and do make decisions that are against their own long-term interests because they are too focused on short-term metrics. This is how I interpret a lot of what happened with social media over the last decade. 14. AI companies are also acting irrationally against their own self-interest in some ways. The “we can’t slow down unless we’re forced to” view comes out of the mythical belief in superintelligence at OpenAI and Anthropic — that the race to RSI means everything for the company, for the country, and humanity. I think it’s actually in both companies’ self interest to slow down unilaterally. I would argue that the alarm coming from their employees is not evidence of beneficence so much as it is evidence of the underlying fallacy that’s causing the irresponsible behavior in the first place. (Beyond safety, we also talked about the economic impacts being gradual, the fact that intelligence is rarely the actual bottleneck, labor impacts being small and uneven, Jevons’ paradox, the changing nature of knowledge work, and more.) ==== A few impressions * Talking about a specialized topic on a podcast that has a big and broad audience is a balancing act. The producers stopped me many times during the interview to tell me I was being too technical (understandable!). I tried to be nuanced but this conversation is necessarily a distilled version of the arguments @sayashk and I have made in our essays (especially normaltech.ai/p/the-ai-as-no…) which are themselves written for a somewhat broad audience and hence distilled in complexity from our notes and 1-1 discussions with peers. * I knew Ezra had well-formed views on AI safety that were different from mine, so I was expecting a tough interview, but he also seemed like a fair interviewer. It went about as well as I expected and I feel like it was a good debate / conversation. I wasn’t necessarily expecting to change minds but I was glad to hear from people who found it thought provoking and looked up my essays and other work. * The interview was about two hours, edited down to an hour. I was a bit nervous waiting for it to land, because I knew the editing could make a big difference to how I came across. It turned out well. They even did things like find archival footage to illustrate my point that the early days of worms and viruses was a weird time in cybersecurity. * I use AI to prepare for interviews. I have an agent that has read all of my output (books, articles, essays, talks, podcast transcripts, tweets, internal notes — on the order of a million words) to pull out pithy explanations, examples, analogies, and other talking points that will probably work well in a spoken format. Reviewing this file before interviews is extremely helpful. It is of course not the only way I prepare but it’s the highest bang for buck. Maintaining this file would be a massive amount of grunt work and there’s no way I’d do it if it weren’t for AI. I mention this because there’s a very large space of beneficial AI uses in knowledge work that _don’t_ involve cognitive offloading. They don’t get much hype on social media so people might be unaware of how much mileage you can get out of them, with little downside.
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