Creator of Debloat and https://xitter.cf/t.co/tIYqmw6pxt Support: https://xitter.cf/t.co/l9kCPRoD2y Join the Debloat/CertGraveyard discord: https://xitter.cf/t.co/ZcWIqa6ZA9

The Cert Graveyard
Joined November 2020
We updated the blogpost. After the original post: - I saw the malware in the network I monitor - Others reached out to me to share TTP - Others have published about it - We've connected it to other signers and malware All the signers have been added to CertGraveyard
Interesting malware signed “Guangzhou Guoying Communication Technology Co., Ltd.” and now revoked. Functional PDF editor with backdoor. My report has 3 C2, but have seen more: rogueauthority.org/quartzlin…
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Trojanized PeaZip signed "Listenmaa Consulting Oy" DLL swapped in for sideloading, h/t @malwrhunterteam who found it while it was FUD on VT. Certs been reported, getting detection now: C2: apiupdated[.]com/Hrd50dFgjQW53n 157.173.16[.]197 rogueauthority.org/signed-pe…
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Not malware analysis related, but still a project maintained with pride: Tkinterdnd2 0.7.0 Adds better pyinstaller hook support. Narrows the number of binaries it picks up and properly supports Tcl9. github.com/Eliav2/tkinterdnd…
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Signed "Lway Firmware" - 7th unique cert serial for them 🫥 h/t @malwrhunterteam Microsoft teams lure -> BabaDeda loader -> CNCMachineRMS RAT C2: wizardexpensive[.]com: 96.62.218[.]59 rogueauthority.org/signed-te…
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Debloat 1.7.1 - github.com/Squiblydoo/debloa… In 1.7.0, we added a "--no-extract" optional flag. This makes it easier to use Debloat in pipelines that expect only 1 item in return. Without it, it would extract NSIS installers automatically. 1.7.1 fixed the release bins for Tcl9
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Replying to @malwrhunterteam
@malwrhunterteam shared two MSI installers with this signer "SOPHISTICATED SOFTWARES (PTY) LTD" The first is a rust remote shell rogueauthority.org/signed-wi… The second is a tool which calls itself CrocoRAT: rogueauthority.org/crocorat-… We've seen CrocoRAT a few times 🧵
Some sample: https://updatestates.blob.core\.windows.net/files/WindowsDefender.msi A file named "WindowsDefender.msi" coming from Microsoft's network, with no AV vendor detecting it on VT and was signed using an SSL Corp given cert with name "SOPHISTICATED SOFTWARES (PTY) LTD" must be legit, right? 😂 🤷‍♂️
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In addition to this cert, we've also seen them using "JB Alpha Digital AB" and "1090 Fishing Mapp Oy" The blogposts really have more indicators and information than I can fit in a tweet.
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PackClient RAT signed "Zaozhuang ZhongStore District HaoYouhao Department" Kernel driver signed "Xidao E-commerce Studio, Yishui County" rogueauthority.org/signed-si… Payload: 108.187.43[.]139:8080/china4[.]zip C2: 91[.]204.224.87:8790 156[.]251.16.214:8790 161[.]248.14.20:8790
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
There's also a related file that is FUD on VT and was signed using a Certum given cert with name "Zaozhuang ZhongStore District HaoYouhao Department"... 🤷‍♂️
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As mentioned by @500mk500 , the ISO seems consistent with CastleLoader -> NetSupport (and StealC). @malwrhunterteam 's thread already covered most of the details, the C2 and such. My AI analysis mostly connects the dots: rogueauthority.org/setup-iso… CastleLoader: jumalputty[.]com NetSupport: nizariuserp[.]com StealC: crataga[.]site
Come across a very low detected, strange as fuck "setup.iso"... 100s of files, strange traffic to different domains/IPs, etc... 🤔 🤷‍♂️
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Amazing: it somehow went from 1 detection on VirusTotal to 0 CertGraveyard volunteers report certificates for revocation, but in this case, the certificate was revoked before @malwrhunterteam shared it with us. We add it to our database and use these opportunities to investigate the malware anyway. In his blogpost, @devmihaylov does an amazing job digging in and turning the malware inside out. (Note: We can always use more volunteers to analyze malware, pivot on known bad indicators, tracking infrastructure and more. If you're interested, join the Discord and reach out: discord.gg/dvGXKaY5qr.)
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Though the domains sound cute… your enterprise network probably shouldn’t be reaching out to these.
Replying to @SquiblydooBlog
Some other potentially related domains: biggerworldclassstandard[.]com maximalmaxing[.]com sparksetuptechnology[.]com supporterupdate[.]com biggerskills[.]com familypenguins[.]com jumpingpenguin[.]com hedgehogsbunny[.]com lesliemonkeyinfants[.]com commonhedgehogs[.]com fastestsprints[.]com babychimpserenity[.]com
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RdViewer RMM tool that deletes itself, signed "温江区明宇网络技术服务工作室" C2: 1[.]14[.]146[.]76 rogueauthority.org/signed-di… h/t @malwrhunterteam
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Gh0stRat variant signed "Zhengzhou Xiaoye Network Co., Ltd." ca47e13a2980817e7849ddfef70312542ed11efaeba7b1b583161c06a440baf2 C2: Primary: 103[.]82[.]53[.]214:7661 Backup: 103[.]82[.]53[.]214:80 rogueauthority.org/signed-se… h/t @malwrhunterteam
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Nice to see another analysis of Quartzline published.
Replying to @ExpelSecurity
(2/2) What we saw in real environments, plus IOCs, detection tips, and cleanup steps: expel.com/blog/quartzline-a-…
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I never thought a malware with C2 like tabbyottercub[.]com motherotters[.]com westbeavers[.]com familypenguins[.]com was going to be such a pain. We've seen this family of malware going back several months, and I don't fully know what the end game is yet.
Interesting malware signed “Guangzhou Guoying Communication Technology Co., Ltd.” and now revoked. Functional PDF editor with backdoor. My report has 3 C2, but have seen more: rogueauthority.org/quartzlin…
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Signed "FILIP KOZJAK" and added to the Cert Graveyard. Regular reminder to be logged into VirusTotal even if it is a free account: If you're logged in, it shows you Proofpoint's Suricata detection for the file reaching out to Telegram.
Analysts @HuntressLabs have been seeing an uptick of malicious MFA apps from the Microsoft Store the last few days. In some cases, they're being delivered via tech support scams through Teams, in others via malvertizing. We've been digging into it, and hopefully we'll have more info soon.
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Low detection Stealer, internally named "Zalmoxis". Uses a signer that we've seen from two other CA: "YOUR CHANCE j.d.o.o." ad0d08d54c9bbe2309bb7a8ae92def8a04297d0238f2799764d93929b57cbd5f rogueauthority.org/signed-cr… cdn[.]simplynetworking[.]eu Zalmoxis c2: 45[.]152[.]149[.]66:6969 Panel was on port 3000 Previously seen signed as "Komers Trading Company LLC" 1534e8091708e13a24698de848faccac0ccbf82cc625f990bed0c7ec5388c345 h/t to @malwrhunterteam We've seen this certificates for this signer issued by SSL, Sectigo, and GlobalSign
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h/t @malwrhunterteam Signed EtherRAT dropping signed StealC: EtherRAT: 1b61b95a61996b44322e9841af2fa2b63fcdd18a569f16fa8acd30eb8d8ac854 Signer: "KARA-TASH I KO, OSOO" StealC: 37d7a8c504227f9c1986619fd8148f1737cf94e56ac91687f8ba33be7e945f5e Signer: "AirTiki ApS" C2: presanis[.]com Stealer Download: csg-soft[.]com / 45.135.180[.]185 StealC C2: glamour-studio[.]com / 194.11.226[.]153
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This malware uses a non-functional captcha to distract the user. The installer is signed "HOLLIDAY DIGITAL LLC" and drops a trojanized aerodynamic design app signed by "Evelyn Paredes". Both have been reported and added to CertGraveyard rogueauthority.org/signed-in… h/t @g0njxa
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This file was mentioned in Google/Mandiant's report here: cloud.google.com/blog/topics… Used in ShinyHunter's campaign against PeopleSoft. The file is an updated version of SnappyClient. See the analysis of the file here: rogueauthority.org/light-all…
'Tobias Weihmann Software Development OU' ba0ec19a36d0e08979ae38a2c8977a9c @SquiblydooBlog
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This is our second EV cert from "C&P Global Investors LLC" signing "BlackCrypt RMM". We're calling bullshit. blackcryptknight[.]com, ws[.]blackcryptknight[.]com, devicehubcloud[.]com, apinetsolworkspace[.]network, 89.117.54[.]201 rogueauthority.org/blackcryp…
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
What it gave when checked (from here: https://dei-in[.])cfd/cloudflare-desk/eSign/admintion.php) is a FUD on VT file named "AgreementPayment-PolicyDocs_DCVBV4.msi", that was signed with a Sectigo given cert with name "C&P Global Investors LLC". 🤷‍♂️
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