TeeSatt

After reading several articles critical of SFPD use of Flock, I've sent this to Oakland Council members and City Auditor Michael Hudson. The City Auditor's budget should be increased and set to a fixed percentage of the total budget. Make sure he has enough qualified staff to enforce OPD compliance. Can't rely on the Police Commission. DATA SHARING RESTRICTIONS AND FEDERAL ACCESS PROHIBITION 1. No Out-of-State or Federal Access The vendor must block all access to Oakland’s ALPR and camera data by any federal agency or any law-enforcement agency outside California. This must be enforced by the vendor at the system level, not through Oakland’s user settings. The platform should not be able to return results to any non-California or federal user under any circumstance. 2. California-Only Technical Separation All California data, including Oakland’s data, must be kept separate in a way that prevents out-of-state or federal accounts from retrieving or decrypting it. This cannot depend on Oakland’s configuration choices. 3. No Participation in Flock’s National Network Oakland’s data may not be included in any national or multi-state search network. The vendor may not enable or re-enable this without a public vote by the Oakland City Council. 4. Immutable Access Logs The vendor must keep permanent, tamper-proof logs of every query made to Oakland’s data. A full copy must be sent to the City every day. Logs must show who made the query, what agency they work for, the time, the type of search, why it was run, and what data was accessed. 5. Independent Audits Every 90 days, an independent auditor selected by the City will verify that: * out-of-state and federal access is technically blocked, * Oakland’s data is not exposed through any API or cross-agency feature, * access logs are complete, * and no unauthorized agency has been granted access in any way. The vendor pays for these audits. All results are public. 6. Automatic Breach and Penalties Any attempt by a federal or out-of-state agency to access Oakland’s data counts as a material breach. If this happens, the City may suspend the service immediately. The vendor must pay damages of at least $25,000 per unauthorized query and fund a full forensic investigation. The City must be notified within 24 hours, and the incident must be made public. 7. Controlled Sharing Settings Sharing settings cannot be changed by a single person. Any attempt to add or remove an agency must be approved by both a City administrator and a civilian privacy officer. The City Attorney must receive automatic alerts for any changes or attempted changes. The same applies to any first-time queries by outside agencies. 8. Quarterly Vendor Certification Once every quarter, the vendor must sign a statement under penalty of perjury confirming that: * there has been no federal or out-of-state access, * California-only data separation is still in place, * Oakland’s data is not included anywhere in the national network, * and the access logs provided to the City are complete. 9. Technical Documentation (optional) At the City’s request, the vendor must provide enough technical documentation for an independent reviewer to confirm that the above protections are in place.