Tal beeri retweeted
🚨🇺🇸🇱🇧פרסום שלי ב @N12News : תסכול אמריקני ולבנוני ברקע ביקור השגריר האמריקני בלבנון
• גורמים בארה"ב, ישראל ולבנון מכירים בכישלון "הפיילוט" בדרום לבנון, שבמסגרתו צה"ל נסוג משני אזורים וצבא לבנון נכנס במקומו. בפועל פעילי חיזבאללה נמצאים באזורי הפיילוט
• גורם שבקיא בפרטים אמר לי שהאמריקנים "מאוד לא מרוצים ממה שקורה בפיילוט בלבנון, אפילו יותר מהישראלים", והביעו תסכול מיוחד מהרמטכ"ל הלבנוני רודולף הייקל
• גם גורם פוליטי בלבנון אמר לי שהוא מאוכזב מכך שצבא לבנון לא התנגד לפעולות של חיזבאללה באזורי הפיילוט
• היום הגיע שגריר ארה"ב באו"ם מייק וולץ ללבנון ודן ביום שאחרי יוניפי"ל, כוח האו"ם שהמנדט שלו פג בעוד חודש וחצי.
• גורם ישראלי אמר לי שישראל אינה מעוניינת ב"יוניפי"ל 2.0". גורם אחר אמר שישראל מעדיפה כוח לבנוני מקומי או כוח בין-לאומי שיאמן את הכוח הלבנוני, אך לא כוח בין-לאומי נוסף שישלוט על שטח באזור.
•המשא ומתן על פתרון חלופי ליוניפי"ל נמצא בעיצומו, כאשר גורם זר אומר שיש חשש בינלאומי מ"וואקום".
Tal beeri retweeted
A Russian-made Zveroboy FPV drone used by Hezbollah was in the Bint Jbeil sector of southern Lebanon. The drone is adapted to carry a warhead and equipped with a fiber-optic guidance system.
FPV drones are currently one of Hezbollah’s key areas of military buildup, reflecting a shift toward guerrilla warfare tactics based on small cells and targeted attacks.
In our assessment, these drones are expected to play a central role in future attacks against IDF forces operating in the security zone in southern Lebanon.
Read the full analysis >>
israel-alma.org/hezbollah-us…
Tal beeri retweeted
Listen to @TonyBouloss: An organization that plots assassinations must be confronted like any other terrorist organization: through prosecution, a ban, and the dismantling of its networks across all of Lebanon. No immunity in the name of politics, and no exceptions under the threat of arms. #YesToLebanonNoToHezbollah
⚠️ حان وقت حظر حزب الله
🔴 إذا صحّت المعلومات عن ارتباط المجموعة التابعة لحزب الله في الجرود بين بشري والبترون بمخطط لاغتيال رئيس حزب القوات اللبنانية سمير جعجع خلال زيارته المرتقبة يوم الأحد، فنحن أمام تحضير لجريمة سياسية خطيرة.
🔴 آن الأوان للدولة اللبنانية أن تصنّف حزب الله تنظيماً إرهابياً، وتحظر نشاطه وتفكّك منظومته الأمنية والعسكرية. وأي مواجهة جدية للإرهاب تبدأ بإنهاء الحماية السياسية التي يتمتّع بها.
🔴 وأين القضاء؟ المطلوب مذكرات توقيف بحق كل من يثبت تورّطه، من المنفّذين إلى المخطّطين والآمرين. لا يجوز اختزال الملف بأفراد وترك التنظيم الذي يموّل ويسلّح ويصدر الأوامر خارج المحاسبة.
🔴 التنظيم الذي يخطّط للاغتيالات يجب أن يُواجَه كأي تنظيم إرهابي آخر: بالملاحقة والحظر وتفكيك شبكاته على كامل الأراضي اللبنانية. لا حصانة باسم السياسة، ولا استثناء تحت تهديد السلاح.
Tal beeri retweeted
The IDF struck a Hezbollah weapons shipment that crossed the border from Syria into Lebanon.
According to reports from Lebanon, on November 16 at approximately 4:30 a.m., an airstrike was carried out in the Al-Shaara–Janta area, in the Nabi Chit barrens of Lebanon’s eastern Beqaa Valley. According to the reports, the strike followed intensive intelligence-gathering activity conducted by UAVs throughout November 15. The targeted area is isolated and located very close to the Syrian border. It is well known as a route for smuggling weapons from Syria into Lebanon.
No casualties were officially reported in the strike, although social media reports mentioned two fatalities.
Since May 2026, following Operation “Roar of the Lion,” we have identified, based on open-source material, six attempted smuggling operations from Syria into Lebanon involving rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles, cruise missile components, explosives, and small arms.
It should be recalled that a major Radwan Unit training camp operated in the same geographical area where the strike took place. A major underground facility for the production of precision surface-to-surface missiles and the storage of Hezbollah weapons was also constructed there. These sites have been struck several times since 2024.
The IDF rarely conducts strikes beyond the security zone, known as the “Yellow Line.” Israel should pursue a consistent policy of striking Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts throughout Lebanon. These efforts are currently proceeding without interference in the area north of the security zone and south of the Litani River ( Jabal Amel), as well as deep inside Lebanon.
With regard to weapons shipments and smuggling operations, subject to intelligence coverage and operational capabilities, Israel should strike every weapons shipment or smuggling operation entering Lebanon or taking place within Lebanon.
Tal beeri retweeted
Weapons Seizure in Beirut’s Dahiyeh: A Significant Security Achievement or a False Impression of Progress in Disarming Hezbollah?
On November 13, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) published photographs of weapons and ammunition seized during a raid on a warehouse in the al-Musharrafieh area of Beirut’s Dahiyeh. The LAF described the operation as a “high-quality security operation” and emphasized that a large quantity of weapons had been seized.
However, considering the quantity and characteristics of the weapons seized, it is difficult to regard this operation as a significant achievement. The weapons are of very limited quality, military value, and quantity. Even if the seized weapons do belong to Hezbollah (based on the circumstantial evidence of the warehouse’s location, north of Haret Hreik and east of Ghobeiry), their seizure has no meaningful operational impact on the organization’s military capabilities. The LAF did not attribute the seized weapons to Hezbollah, and the operation was presented as part of its efforts to combat arms trafficking.
As during the ceasefire period from November 2024 to February 2026, we continue to witness an enormous gap between the Lebanese Armed Forces’ public reports of weapons seizures and the reality on the ground. The false impression of progress persists.
The Lebanese Armed Forces are not systematically working to dismantle Hezbollah’s military power. Highly limited, isolated weapons seizures, even in the heart of the Dahiyeh (assuming the weapons do belong to Hezbollah), are no substitute for dismantling the organization’s weapons arsenal, military infrastructure, and military control.
This is even before addressing additional questions: Was the operation coordinated with Hezbollah? Are the seized weapons eventually returned to Hezbollah through a revolving-door mechanism?
Tal beeri retweeted
This is what was found inside a civilian home in Meiss al-Jabal, southern Lebanon: rockets, ammunition, communications equipment, and Hezbollah military gear.
All of this was found in civilian structures located just 100 to 200 meters from UNIFIL posts.
These findings once again demonstrate how Hezbollah exploits civilian areas in southern Lebanon to store weapons and establish military infrastructure, right under the noses of UNIFIL forces.
On December 31, 2026, UNIFIL's mandate is set to expire. Since 2006, the force has operated in southern Lebanon under a mandate authorizing the deployment of up to 15,000 troops. One of its primary missions has been to help ensure that the area south of the Litani River remains free of Hezbollah's military presence and weapons.
In reality, over the past two decades, Hezbollah has built an extensive military infrastructure across southern Lebanon, including facilities and weapons stockpiles inside civilian homes and near UN positions, while the international force has stood idly by as Hezbollah expanded its military capabilities.
The findings in Meiss al-Jabal are yet another example of the gap between UNIFIL's mandate and the reality on the ground.
After two decades in which the international force has failed to prevent Hezbollah's military buildup in southern Lebanon, it is difficult to see how extending its mandate or deploying a replacement international force, without fundamental changes to its authority and enforcement capabilities, would produce a different outcome.
Tal beeri retweeted
Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal: Attrition, Recovery, Renewed Attrition - and Another Attempt to Rebuild.
Two wars have severely damaged Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, but they have not eliminated the ballistic missile threat to Israel.
June 2025: On the eve of Operation Rising Lion, Iran possessed approximately 2,500 ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. By the end of the operation, an estimated 1,000–1,500 remained.
February 2026: Within approximately eight months, Iran had rebuilt its arsenal to around 2,500 missiles on the eve of Operation Roaring Lion.
November 2026: Despite renewed damage to its missile stockpile and production infrastructure, Iran still possesses more than 1,700 missiles capable of reaching Israel, according to a published Israeli assessment.
However, the numbers tell only part of the story.
Iran continues its efforts to rebuild its missile industry, but significant gaps remain between its final assembly capabilities, which have remained relatively strong, and its capacity to produce raw materials, engines, and warheads, which has been severely degraded.
In our assessment, bottlenecks in the production chain are currently limiting the pace of recovery, but they do not eliminate the potential for renewed military buildup.
The strategic question is not merely how many missiles Iran has left, but how quickly it can restore its entire production chain and expand its arsenal once again.
Read more. israel-alma.org/irans-missil…
@YaakovLappin
Tal beeri retweeted
The "Hezbollah State" Within the Lebanese State: The Civilian Influence Network That Sustains the "Resistance Society"
In the following study, we mapped Hezbollah's network of area and sector heads across Lebanon.
Hezbollah divides Lebanon into five areas of responsibility, each subdivided into local sectors. Officials in each area and sector maintain direct ties with local authorities, government institutions, religious figures, associations, and political actors.
This mechanism of civilian and political influence enables Hezbollah to extend its reach into the population's daily lives, create dependency on the organization, and strengthen its position as a provider of services in place of the Lebanese state.
These officials are not military commanders, but their activities are essential to sustaining the "resistance society" – the social and civilian infrastructure that enables Hezbollah's continued military activity.
The key finding: Hezbollah's power rests on more than weapons, missiles, and tunnels. Its civilian infrastructure is a central strategic component of its strength and its ability to survive.
Weakening Hezbollah over the long term requires more than degrading its military capabilities. The game changer lies in its civilian mechanisms, which enable it to rebuild and sustain its power.
Read the full study.
israel-alma.org/the-hezbolla…
Tal beeri retweeted
Hezbollah Hands Out Promises: Does Its Influence Campaign Far Outweigh the Financial Assistance Actually Delivered?
Hezbollah is expanding its “Promise and Commitment” assistance campaign for displaced residents and families whose homes have been damaged in Lebanon, pledging $12,000–$14,000 per eligible housing unit, payable over one year.
In our assessment, this is a significant influence campaign designed to achieve two main objectives: restoring Hezbollah’s standing as a provider of funding and support for its Shiite base, and directing blame at the Lebanese government for its failure to assist those affected and advance reconstruction.
Yet Hezbollah faces a dilemma: the need to prioritize resources for its military rehabilitation versus the need to retain the loyalty of its civilian support base, amid financial difficulties and restrictions on transferring funds to Lebanon.
We assess that Hezbollah is providing some financial assistance, but the actual scale is likely considerably smaller than the impression created by the campaign.
The bottom line: The scale of the influence campaign does not necessarily reflect the amount of money actually being distributed. For Hezbollah, the very promise of assistance is also a tool for maintaining its power and influence within the Shiite community.
Read the full analysis. israel-alma.org/hezbollah-ha…
Tal beeri retweeted
Lebanese Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal says Israel is the main problem - while ruling out internal armed conflict.
In practice, that means no confrontation with Hezbollah. So who is Israel expected to rely on to enforce the ceasefire?
Tal beeri retweeted
U.S. vs. Iran: Will Hezbollah Join the Conflict?
Hezbollah's current priority is to avoid another full-scale war with Israel and continue rebuilding its military capabilities.
However, a renewed U.S. military campaign against Iran could change this calculation. IRGC pressure or independent action by elements within Hezbollah could draw the organization into the conflict.
Even limited attacks against Israel could rapidly escalate into a broader confrontation.
Read the full assessment >> israel-alma.org/u-s-vs-iran-…
Tal beeri retweeted
In October 2026, Lebanon's central bank revoked the local operating license of Bank Saderat Iran (بنك صادرات ايران), one of Iran's largest and longest-established banks, which has operated in Lebanon since 1962. Central Bank Governor Karim Souaid (كريم سعيد) confirmed the decision on October 15, explaining that it was intended to protect Lebanon's banking system from sanctions risks and preserve its ties to the international financial system. Souaid also linked the move to Lebanon's efforts to exit the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list and curb illicit financial activity.
Bank Saderat has a history of U.S. sanctions for facilitating terrorist financing. In 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department cut the bank off from the U.S. financial system, and in 2007, designated it for supporting terrorism. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, between 2001 and 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its London subsidiary to its Beirut branch for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Bank Saderat's operations in Lebanon have contracted significantly over the years amid sanctions, exclusion from the clearing system, and the loss of local and international banking ties. The bank currently has five branches: three in Beirut, in the neighborhoods of Verdun (فردان), Ghobeiry (الغبيري), and Burj al-Barajneh (برج البراجنة); one in Baalbek, and one in Sidon.
The decision to revoke the license drew opposition from the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, Sheikh Ali al-Khatib (الشيخ علي الخطيب). On October 29, after meeting with a delegation from Bank Saderat's management, al-Khatib called for the decision to be reversed, claiming that it represented capitulation to American dictates and warning of harm to employees and customers. He also called for the ban on Iranian civilian flights to Lebanon to be lifted.
The revocation of Bank Saderat's license in Lebanon comes 20 years late, at a time when its operations and financial influence are limited. Concrete evidence of the Lebanese state's willingness to act against the active and influential financial network associated with Hezbollah should take the form of revoking the license of al-Qard al-Hassan Bank and closing its branches. The institution received its operating license as a "charitable association" from the Lebanese Ministry of Interior in 1987.
Tal beeri retweeted
On October 27, 2026, it was reported that Amal representatives on the municipal council of Hallousiyah (الحلوسية), in the Tyre district, had threatened to resign following a dispute with Hezbollah representatives over the naming of the village's main street.
Amal representatives proposed naming the street jointly after Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Amal Movement, along with Hassan Nasrallah.
The Hezbollah representatives insisted on commemorating Nasrallah alone. Amal representatives opposed putting the matter to a vote, called for a consensus, and accused the council chairman of undermining their partnership and turning the council into a partisan instrument. We note that before Hezbollah's establishment, Nasrallah himself had been shaped by Musa al-Sadr's worldview and admired him, leading him to join the Amal Movement in his youth.
This was not the first dispute in Hallousiyah. In January 2021, five council members affiliated with Amal, including the deputy chairman, held a boycott of the council meetings which lasted more than three months. According to these members, one reason for the boycott was the placement of Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization emblem on an ambulance registered as council property. Amal representatives demanded the emblem's removal, arguing that public property should not be used to serve partisan interests.
The current dispute reflects the ongoing competition between Hezbollah and Amal over influence, resources, and their presence in Shiite public life. Alongside their political alliance, the two sides engage in local struggles over the management of public institutions, service provision, and at times, military activity near residential areas, shown in several recent incidents. At this stage, these events alone do not indicate a significant rift between the two organizations.
They do, however, demonstrate that their interests do not always align, raising the question of what costs Amal’s support base is now willing to bear as a result of Hezbollah’s conduct.
Tal beeri retweeted
The “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association – Continued Cooperation with Hezbollah
Following our August 2026 article on the Sunni “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association (جمعية قولنا والعمل), which operates in Bar Elias in the Beqaa Valley under Hezbollah’s patronage, cooperation between the association and Hezbollah-affiliated organizations continues.
“Qawluna wal-Amal” continues to cooperate with Hezbollah’s “Wa Ta’awanu” (“Help One Another”) Association, including through the provision of assistance, such as clothing and food, to families in the area.
The head of the “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association, Sheikh Ahmad al-Qattan, presented the cooperation between the two associations as part of a community assistance network intended to address economic and social hardship in light of the state’s weakness in providing services to citizens.
On October 24, the “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association organized a rally in support of Muslim women and girls in Azerbaijan, amid claims of restrictions on wearing the hijab in educational institutions.
Nibal Raad, a representative of Hezbollah’s Women’s Activities Unit, participated in the event alongside additional female representatives affiliated with the organization in the Beqaa Valley.
The “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association continues to operate on the basis of a deep and enduring ideological, political, and practical affiliation with Hezbollah, Iran, and the “Axis of Resistance,” and serves as a platform for Hezbollah’s civil and religious influence within the Sunni community in the Beqaa Valley.
Tal beeri retweeted
The investigation into Hezbollah’s explosives shipment, seized at the Dahr al-Baydar (ضهر البيدر) checkpoint while en route from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut, is expanding.
According to reports, three Hezbollah members who traveled in a Kia escort vehicle and continued toward Beirut before the shipment was seized have been identified. Hezbollah members reportedly disabled surveillance cameras along the route following the seizure, but investigators obtained footage from other cameras.
The two operatives detained in the Dodge vehicle carrying the explosives have been identified as Ali al-Kurdi (علي الكردي) and Haitham Amhaz (هيثم أمهز). The full names of the Hezbollah operatives known as "Sajed" (ساجد) and "Dhu al-Fiqar" (ذو الفقار), who were responsible for handing over the shipment in Baalbek and receiving it in the Dahieh, respectively, have not been published.
At this stage, efforts to refer the case to the Judicial Council – a special court that hears, among other cases, offenses against state security – have been blocked. Hezbollah has issued threats over possible action against its operatives and facilities.
The case tests the Lebanese state’s ability and willingness to enforce its decisions asserting exclusive state control over weapons. A key test is whether the authorities can reach those who organized the transfer and were to receive the shipment, particularly "Sajed" and "Dhu al-Fiqar."
Failure to pursue the investigation to its conclusion, arrest all those involved, and implement measures informed by its findings to prevent further Hezbollah weapons transfers within Lebanon, particularly to areas south of the Litani River, would provide further evidence of the state’s inability to exercise its sovereignty effectively.
For further details, read the full report. israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-e…
Tal beeri retweeted
Turkey’s Force Buildup for the Syrian Navy
On October 23, 2026, the Turkish Ministry of Defense announced a force buildup program to develop Syria’s naval forces. Following meetings between commanders and ship visits, cooperation is now taking on a broad force buildup framework encompassing vessel maintenance, repair and upgrades, the construction of new vessels, personnel training, and the development of port infrastructure. This represents another layer of Turkish influence and involvement in Syria’s military force buildup.
A delegation of senior Turkish Navy officials and representatives of ASFAT, a company subordinate to the Turkish Ministry of Defense, visited Latakia and conducted technical assessments to advance the Syrian Navy’s capabilities. The delegation included Istanbul Naval Shipyard Commander Erdinç Yetkin, Turkish Navy Logistics Chief Timur Yılmaz, and Turkish Navy Training and Education Commander Yücel Darcan. Following the visit, a force buildup program was formulated covering the areas outlined above.
The latest move reflects the deepening of maritime cooperation that began in 2025. In September 2025, reports described a Syrian Navy delegation’s visit to Turkey and a meeting with the Turkish Navy commander to discuss the development of long-term mechanisms for coordination and cooperation in maritime defense. The Syrian delegation visited the Turkish Fleet headquarters in Kocaeli province and toured the frigate TCG KEMALREIS.
Visits by Turkish naval vessels to Syria have also been documented. The Turkish warship TCG Meltem visited the port of Latakia on May 11. The visit was presented as an expression of Turkey’s growing military presence in Syria and the deepening security ties between the two countries. On July 13, it was reported that the Turkish warship TCG Istanbul had docked in Latakia after its visit had been postponed by several weeks.
Syria’s reliance on Turkey for maintenance, training, upgrades, and construction will strengthen Turkish influence over the Syrian Navy’s professional priorities and operational practices, while increasing Syrian dependence on Turkey. The participation of ASFAT representatives also adds an industrial dimension: a link between Syria’s reconstruction needs and Turkey’s defense industries.
Tal beeri retweeted
The “Shiite Duo,” representing the respective support bases of Hezbollah and Amal, rests on a shared sectarian identity and common political interests. But interests can change, particularly when the interests of one party, Hezbollah, begin to harm those of the other, Amal. Is the realization beginning to take hold among Nabih Berri and the Amal Movement that Hezbollah has become a liability rather than an asset?
Several recent statements have been attributed to Nabih Berri:
“The army is a red line.” The Amal Movement will stand alongside the Lebanese army even if it is required to carry out sensitive missions in southern Lebanon.
Relations between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah were closer during Hassan Nasrallah’s leadership.
Messages reportedly conveyed on Berri’s behalf also stated that the previous framework of coordination between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah has effectively come to an end. Amal is no longer willing to accept a situation in which Hezbollah makes decisions independently and then expects Amal to stand behind it and share the consequences.
At this stage, we do not identify significant indications that the “Shiite Duo” is breaking apart or that a political rupture is developing between Amal and Hezbollah. Berri continues to act as a mediator, seeking to prevent a direct confrontation between Hezbollah and state institutions. Nevertheless, under Lebanon’s current circumstances, the Amal Movement and Nabih Berri face a significant dilemma: whether to preserve the alliance with Hezbollah even at the cost of another war, or to widen their political distance from Hezbollah in order to protect the interests of Amal’s Shiite support base and forge a meaningful alternative alliance.
On October 25, it was reported that the positions of Berri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt had moved closer on issues concerning the state’s monopoly on arms and the need to prevent Hezbollah from dragging Lebanon into another military confrontation. Could this be a new “duo”?
Tal beeri retweeted
On October 4, 2026, the “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan International Turkish School” opened in the Artouz area in the Damascus region. The school was established as part of cooperation between Turkey and Syria and follows the Turkish Ministry of Education’s curriculum. It offers education from kindergarten through high school, with 36 classrooms and a capacity of approximately 1,000 students.
Among the families seeking to enroll their children were Syrian families who had returned from Turkey following the fall of the Assad regime, and whose children had studied in the Turkish education system.
The school's opening is part of #Turkey's expanding involvement in education in Syria, which includes rehabilitating schools and supporting the development of new institutions in cooperation with the Syrian authorities. This involvement may create long-term linguistic, cultural, and institutional ties. Education serves as another channel through which Turkey is strengthening its influence in #Syria .
For more information, read the attached report
israel-alma.org/turkish-invo…
Tal beeri retweeted
Whose “Future Leaders”? The al-Mahdi Scouts and the Making of Hezbollah’s Next Generation
On October 15, Hezbollah’s Imam al-Mahdi Scouts in the Sidon area reported holding 22 activities involving 163 members of its senior section over a single week. The activities included educational, cultural, religious, medical, and scouting training, emphasizing the development of “future leaders,” strengthening a sense of belonging, and instilling values. Behind this educational language lies a mechanism designed to build organizational capacity and indoctrinate: preparing Hezbollah’s next generation and maintaining its hold on the population.
The al-Mahdi Scouts are part of Hezbollah’s educational network. The movement operates within the Executive Council’s Education Unit, combining social and scouting activities with religious and ideological education. This framework enables Hezbollah to guide young people throughout their adolescence, shape their worldview, and connect their religious and communal identity with membership in the “resistance society.”
What does “developing future leaders” mean? It means cultivating a pool of instructors, operatives, and personnel who can take on roles within Hezbollah’s civilian, political, and military structures.
These activities take on added significance against the backdrop of the hardship facing Hezbollah’s support base following the war. Families coping with loss, financial hardship, and disruption to daily life also need a stable framework for their children. Hezbollah seeks to exploit this need to maintain and deepen its presence in community life. Activities that provide a sense of belonging, responsibility, and social connections can strengthen ties to the organization, even among families struggling to bear the cost of its decisions.
The scout movement is another component in building dependency, loyalty, and legitimacy.
Hezbollah’s recovery also involves retaining and nurturing the younger generation, training it, and ensuring organizational continuity. In this sense, the “future leaders” cultivated by the al-Mahdi Scouts form the pool of operatives and personnel from which Hezbollah can develop its next generation.
















