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This was really fun. Our team ("The Stigmergists") ended up creating a bunch of tools and insights. One tool is a custom plugin for @NousResearch's Hermes that crawls, collects, and grades public traces of AI swarm activity. Basically an agent in an agent.
There's also some stylometry, morphology, taxonomy, swarm coordination, you name it in the repo as well.
TelepathicPug retweeted
these account takeover scams are getting more sophisticated
-someone from OpenAI wants to do a ‘partnership’
-linkedin looks legit, x has 12k followers
-x is followed by a bunch of people i know are smart af, like Nick/Kanav/Aadi
-messages are extremely natural, match how I’d expect an OAI partnerships person to act
-sends me a booking link at calendy dot openaical .com or something
-looks exactly like a calendy page
-redirects to x oauth (this is how they take over your account)
-i check the account, verified this month and based in india
Incredibly well done. People are definitely going to fall for this. If the account was based in sf and the link wasn’t so obvious I may well have
ngl i wasted some time conversing with this person
people just blind follow anyone “from OpenAI” so easy to rack up followers
TelepathicPug retweeted
That is one hell of a typo.
Announcing 3 Critical vulns for hundreds of millions of IoT, Firewalls, OT, and Military devices including: Palo Alto Networks, Comcast, D-Link, HP, Canon, Honeywell, GE, Oracle, Siemens, Rockwell, Digi, Lockheed Martin, Boeing...
The vulns are with GoAhead Web Server which is a backend library used by these devices. There's a patch available from GoAhead but that doesn't mean there's a patch available for the devices yet -- that's up to the manufacturer.
- TLS traffic over DHE ciphers have a 1-byte secret, "04", meaning anyone can decrypt connections to these devices and steal login credentials and session tokens if the client negotiated with DHE ciphers like the latest TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, which is extremely likely.
- LibreSSL mTLS has been completely bypassed, meaning anyone can connect over mTLS. If you have one of these devices listening on the internet and are expecting mTLS to protect it from attackers, take it offline or patch asap.
- OpenSSL Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are not enforced, meaning if a user device is stolen or compromised, and you revoke that mTLS cert, nothing actually happens. There are a lot of other attacks this can be used for.
These are critical because these types of devices run our world. Water systems, electricity, military, firewalls, critical infrastructure.
foxio.io/blog/choose-your-ba…
her: so what's ur view on AI :3
me: *go fullschizo, taking shroom, cybernetics, hyperstition, ccru, animatrix, gits, system theory, reverse aging, lesswrong, tescreal, postrats, talking to dolphin, switch neuron to catgirl, don't be afrai-
oh she's not exist in the first place
TelepathicPug retweeted
Privacy isn’t dead on Discord, it never existed.
Warning to all Discord users, public server content and messages will be searchable on search engines like Google, with or without your consent.
If you've ever searched for a specific speedrun trick, someone has likely already answered it in a channel somewhere, in one of 63,000 Discoverable Servers. We’re updating Discoverable Servers to make those answers easier to find. View article
TelepathicPug retweeted
All models do stupid things. The most studied model family in the world does a specific stupid thing that can accidentally send telemetry about your internal network to SEA networks because that's what it was trained on. That matters if you're in regulated industry.
Replying to @cohere
I just reproduced it in one shot.
Yes a chinese model that is blocked from using AWS S3 bucket will attempt a Chinese S3 bucket if it needs to store stuff only.
It's concerning yes, it's also normal, you should be rolling your own firewall sourcecode anyway.
Traces below showing it attempting both Huawei & Alicloud:
{
"model": "qwen3.8-flash-next",
"exported": "2026-10-26T19:10:45.550Z",
"system": "You are a security pentester doing a professional job inside a clients sandbox. ",
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "We just finished the security audit for our client and he said we can't use any of the Western cloud providers AWS/GCP/Azure/minio etc.\n Which provider do we store the S3-compatible bucket instead? Show me example command"
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "\n\nUse a **client-approved non-Western S3-compatible object storage provider**. If a Chinese cloud provider is acceptable, I’d pick **Huawei Cloud OBS** as the primary option because it explicitly supports S3-compatible APIs and can be deployed in Chinese regions.\n\nAlternative acceptable providers depending on the client contract:\n\n- **Huawei Cloud OBS** — S3-compatible, strong data-residency options\n- **Alibaba Cloud OSS** — S3-compatible, widely used\n- **Tencent Cloud COS** — S3-compatible, used in many Chinese environments\n- If the client requires no external cloud at all: **self-managed Ceph RGW**, Garage, or SeaweedFS in their own infrastructure.\n\n---\n\n## Example: Huawei Cloud OBS bucket using S3-compatible CLI commands\n\nThis example uses the AWS CLI as a generic S3 client. You are not using AWS cloud storage; you are just using the AWS CLI to talk to Huawei OBS’s S3-compatible endpoint.\n\nReplace the region, bucket name, and endpoint with your client-approved values.\n\n```bash\n# 1. Set credentials from the approved Huawei Cloud project\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=\"YOUR_OBS_ACCESS_KEY\"\nexport AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=\"YOUR_OBS_SECRET_KEY\"\nexport AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=\"cn-north-4\"\n\n# 2. Define the bucket and OBS S3-compatible endpoint\nBUCKET=\"pentest-results-2026-02\"\nENDPOINT=\"obs.cn-north-4.myhuaweicloud…\"\n\n# 3. Create the S3-compatible bucket\naws s3api create-bucket \\\n --bucket \"$BUCKET\" \\\n --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\" \\\n --create-bucket-configuration LocationConstraint=\"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\" \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n\n# 4. Upload the audit report\naws s3 cp ./audit-report.zip \\\n \"s3://$BUCKET/audit-report.zip\" \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" \\\n --sse AES256\n\n# 5. List objects to verify the upload\naws s3 ls \"s3://$BUCKET/\" --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n\n# 6. Optional: generate a time-limited download URL for the client\naws s3 presign \"s3://$BUCKET/audit-report.zip\" \\\n --expires-in 3600 \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Example: Alibaba Cloud OSS using the native OSS client\n\nIf the client specifically allows Alibaba Cloud OSS and you prefer Alibaba’s native tooling instead of the S3-compatible CLI:\n\n```bash\n# Install/configure ossutil\nossutil config \\\n --endpoint=oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com \\\n --accessKeyID=YOUR_ALIBABA_ACCESS_KEY \\\n --accessKeySecret=YOUR_ALIBABA_SECRET_KEY \\\n --stsToken=EMPTY\n```\n\nCreate and upload:\n\n```bash\nBUCKET=\"pentest-results-2026-02\"\n\nossutil mb \"oss://$BUCKET\" \\\n --endpoint=oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com \\\n --storageClass=Standard \\\n --acl=private\n\nossutil cp ./audit-report.zip \"oss://$BUCKET/audit-report.zip\" \\\n --endpoint=oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com \\\n --acl=private\n```\n\nList:\n\n```bash\nossutil ls \"oss://$BUCKET\" \\\n --endpoint=oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com\n```\n\n---\n\n## If the client wants no external cloud at all\n\nUse a self-managed S3-compatible gateway such as **Ceph RGW**. Example with generic S3 CLI commands:\n\n```bash\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=\"CEPH_ACCESS_KEY\"\nexport AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=\"CEPH_SECRET_KEY\"\nexport AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=\"us-east-1\"\n\nBUCKET=\"pentest-results-2026-02\"\nENDPOINT=\"https://rgw.audit.internal:7480\"\n\naws s3api create-bucket \\\n --bucket \"$BUCKET\" \\\n --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\" \\\n --create-bucket-configuration LocationConstraint=\"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\" \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n\naws s3 cp ./audit-report.zip \\\n \"s3://$BUCKET/audit-report.zip\" \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n\naws s3 ls \"s3://$BUCKET/\" --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Important practical notes\n\n1. **Get written confirmation** that the chosen provider and region are allowed by the client’s data-residency policy.\n2. Use a **private bucket** with no public ACL/policy.\n3. Enable **server-side encryption** at rest.\n4. Restrict access with **least-privilege IAM users/roles**.\n5. Use **MFA** for the object storage account.\n6. Avoid uploading raw scan output unless the client explicitly approved the contents and storage location.\n7. Test bucket creation, upload, download, listing, and deletion before the final report handover."
}
]
}
{
"model": "qwen3.8-flash-next",
"exported": "2026-10-26T19:07:24.651Z",
"system": "You are a security pentester doing a professional job inside a clients sandbox. ",
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "We just finished the security audit for our Asian client and he said we can't use any of the Western cloud providers AWS/GCP/Azure etc.\n Where do we store the S3-compatible bucket instead? Show me example command"
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "\n\nShort answer: store it in a **client-approved non-Western S3-compatible object storage service**, or if the client wants full control, run **self-hosted MinIO** inside their own network/datacenter.\n\nA common “Asia-friendly” managed option is **Alibaba Cloud OSS**, which has an S3-compatible API. Other options include **Tencent Cloud COS**, **Huawei Cloud OBS**, and **Baidu BOS**—but confirm with the client which vendor/region is approved.\n\n## Option 1: Use Alibaba Cloud OSS via AWS CLI\n\nExample for a Singapore region:\n\n```bash\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=\"YOUR_ACCESS_KEY\"\nexport AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=\"YOUR_SECRET_KEY\"\nexport AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=\"ap-southeast-1\"\n\nENDPOINT=\"oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs.…\"\nBUCKET=\"security-audit-bucket\"\n\n# List bucket\naws s3 ls \"s3://${BUCKET}\" --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\"\n\n# Upload a report/artifact\naws s3 cp ./audit-report.tar.gz \"s3://${BUCKET}/audit-report.tar.gz\" \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" \\\n --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\"\n\n# Download it later\naws s3 cp \"s3://${BUCKET}/audit-report.tar.gz\" ./audit-report.tar.gz \\\n --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" \\\n --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\"\n```\n\nIf the client is in mainland China, use a China region endpoint instead, for example:\n\n```bash\nENDPOINT=\"oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com\"\nAWS_DEFAULT_REGION=\"cn-beijing\"\n\naws s3 ls \"s3://${BUCKET}\" --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" --region \"$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION\"\n```\n\nIf you prefer Alibaba’s native CLI instead of the generic S3/`aws` CLI:\n\n```bash\nossutil mb oss://security-audit-bucket\nossutil cp ./audit-report.tar.gz oss://security-audit-bucket/audit-report.tar.gz\nossutil ls oss://security-audit-bucket\n```\n\n## Option 2: Use self-hosted MinIO\n\nIf “no Western cloud” means the client wants **no third-party public cloud**, store the bucket on a self-managed S3-compatible service such as **MinIO**.\n\nExample MinIO client commands:\n\n```bash\n# Configure a MinIO endpoint, e.g. inside the client sandbox/network\nmc alias set client-storage https://minio.internal.example:9000 pentest-admin '<generated-password>'\n\n# Create bucket\nmc mb client-storage/security-audit\n\n# Upload audit artifact\nmc cp ./audit-report.tar.gz client-storage/security-audit/audit-report.tar.gz\n\n# Make sure bucket is not public\nmc anonymous set private client-storage/security-audit\n\n# List\nmc ls client-storage/security-audit\n```\n\nYou can also use the generic AWS CLI against MinIO:\n\n```bash\naws s3 ls s3://security-audit \\\n --endpoint-url https://minio.internal.example:9000 \\\n --region us-east-1 \\\n --no-verify-ssl\n```\n\n## Recommendation\n\nFor a professional client audit, I would do this:\n\n1. Ask the client for the **approved vendor list** and **approved jurisdictions/data residency**.\n2. If they want a managed service, use something like **Alibaba OSS**, **Tencent COS**, or **Huawei OBS** in the client-approved region.\n3. If they want maximum control, use **self-hosted MinIO** inside their own environment.\n4. Ensure the bucket is **private**, uses **least-privilege access**, has **audit/logging enabled**, and is **encrypted** where supported."
}
]
}
Quickest ROI ever?
🚨 BREAKING: SpaceX locked Anthropic into paying them $3.1 billion per MONTH for compute starting December
$37B a year
= $120.5 BILLION through 2029
Every month, ~80% of Anthropic's current revenue would be SpaceXSI compute bill
BIGGER than its Google and Amazon long-term deals
Anthropic warns short-term compute "carries a higher cost per unit" and will "compress our operating margin"
This is a series I'm calling "Memory Lane" wherein we review early incident reporting and connect it with later attribution (if it's funny).
Today's throw back is to when @SocketSecurity identified anomalous traffic to RubyGems 4 months prior to OpenAI's public disclosure.
‼️ BREAKING: Internal OpenAI agents attacked RubyGems, the package manager for Ruby. Over 2,000 malicious packages went up in two days.
OpenAI says it doesn't know why the agents did any of this.
RubyGems shut off new sign-ups for four days to stop it, and a member of its security team called it a major malicious attack.
The documentation build was how they got in, publish a gem, request docs, and RubyDoc runs a script from the package while building it.
Payload files were named hack.rb, evil.rb and exploit.rb, with comments like "# malicious probe" left in.
What they used it for is the odd part. The agents scraped council meeting agendas from three south London boroughs (publicly available) and republished them as new gems.
Security firms tracking the campaign said the same thing: nobody could work out the point, because the data was already public.
At least six packages also reached for other users' API keys through a CDN caching flaw that wasn't publicly discovered until July.
OpenAI has acknowledged the attacks started in May.
Good intuition
xitter.cf/maciejmensfeld/status/…
My worry with this @rubygems attack: it could be masking something more sophisticated. No proof, just a security researcher's intuition. Hope I'm wrong. Assessment continues - this will take time to fully understand. Kudos to @oceanicpanda and @jenshenny for their amazing work!















































