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Helping Nigerians invest better & earn more 🇳🇬 | 📊 NGX breakdowns | 💼 Nigeria + remote job leads | 💡 Simple, practical personal finance tips

2-4, Customs Street, Lagos
Joined February 2026
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The NGX Plug retweeted
Anyway, while we’re discussing the battle against poverty, it’s important to understand that the baseline for poverty is $3 per day. If you earn less than N4,200 per day or N126,000 per month, you are considered poor.
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You've built the throne. You've given him the game. You will IN FACT congratulate him. 😂😂😂
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Ronaldo fans would make you believe that this is what happened.
Lo voy a decir: Ayer se utilizó mal el VAR. Argentina ROBÓ. Pero no por la expulsión de Embolo, sino por esta patada de Messi. ¿Cómo no le sacaron roja? Es inexplicable.
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Please this is mostly inaccurate. Kindly Disregard.
It is highly interesting and deeply ironic that Nigeria is currently being paraded as having the "world's best-performing stock market." To put statistical illusion into clear mathematical perspective, South Korea comfortably has over 200 publicly traded companies with an individual market capitalization exceeding $1 billion USD. In stark contrast, the total number of companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange with a market cap exceeding that same $1 billion mark sits at a measly, fluctuating 11 to 18. Furthermore, the South Korean Stock Exchange is home to over 2,500 listed companies, whereas the entire Nigerian stock exchange is struggling to maintain even 150. To make matters infinitely worse, the annual revenue of just one single South Korean conglomerate, Samsung, comfortably exceeds the entire, devalued annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. So, it is obviously completely insane and deeply delusional to imagine that Nigeria is genuinely outperforming the rest of humanity in its actual economic output, industrial productivity, or stock market indices. Nigeria is currently the undisputed poverty capital of the world, where small businesses are collapsing by the dozens every single day. So that begs the question: what does this glowing market report actually mean for the ordinary people of Nigeria? Well, for one, if a struggling, debt-ridden developing nation suddenly starts to heavily outperform advanced, highly industrialized nations on its stock exchange, it is actually a massive, flashing red indicator that the country in question is facing a severe and monumental hyperinflation. Nigeria is currently experiencing historic, record-breaking inflation, so this stock market boom is merely an indicator that wealthy oligarchs, institutional investors, and local investment banks have smartly recognized that if they hold their cash in standard bank accounts during this highly volatile period, they will lose their purchasing power every single day. Since they cannot easily access scarce foreign currencies like US dollars or Euros due to strict government currency controls, they desperately dump their fast-depleting Naira into solid, tangible local stocks like Dangote Cement, BUA Group, or MTN Nigeria just to preserve their wealth. So, this triumphant news report that we are passionately commanded to celebrate is actually a terrifying warning sign that Nigeria is experiencing severe, runaway inflation. The local elites, corporate cartels, and bank directors are frantically tripping over themselves to buy blue-chip local stocks strictly to hedge against currency collapse, and this sudden, desperate surge in local demand has artificially driven up the prices of these shares to such a disproportionate, heavily padded percentage that on paper, it looks much more profitable to invest in the Nigerian stock market than in the highly productive, technologically advanced South Korean stock exchange. Another major reason for this artificial stock market spike is the aggressive, reckless increase in interest rates by the Central Bank of Nigeria on behalf of the IMF and the World Bank. While this brutal rate hike has successfully collapsed thousands of local manufacturing businesses because commercial banks are now charging as high as 40% interest on business loans, it has also temporarily attracted a massive influx of volatile "hot money" from foreign speculators who are lending money to the Nigerian government by purchasing short-term treasury bills and sovereign bonds just to greedily exploit these high yields. It is crucially important to historically emphasize that Nigeria is absolutely not the only developing country to be declared the "best-performing stock market in history." Mexico proudly achieved this exact same fraudulent title in the run-up to 1994, and it ended up almost collapsing their entire national economy into absolute oblivion. At the time, the Mexican government, acting on the strict advice of the World Bank, aggressively increased interest rates and adopted painful Structural Adjustment Programmes that triggered massive hyperinflation across the country. This temporarily, artificially increased their foreign reserves as yield-hungry international speculators dived in to exploit these high interest rates, causing their local real estate markets and stock exchanges to explode into a virtual goldmine for foreign investors. But this artificial boom did not even last for a few years. The moment the United States Federal Reserve increased its own interest rates, international investors panicked, liquidated their assets overnight, and pulled their hot money completely out of Mexico. This massive, sudden capital flight almost collapsed the Mexican Peso, forcing their desperate government to raise domestic interest rates to an astronomical 70%, but even this extreme measure was not enough to save the country from descending into total state failure. This was the exact moment Mexico was forced to accept a humiliating, sovereignty-destroying bailout from the IMF and the United States totaling a massive $57 billion. Exactly $20 billion of that came directly from the US treasury, but it came with the highly insulting, neocolonial condition that all revenues from the global sales of Mexican state-owned oil must be deposited directly into the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City as collateral to secure the debt, while the IMF forced even more brutal, structural adjustment programs on Mexico that the country has still not fully recovered from even to this very day. So, while this stock market boom is currently being heavily marketed as another monumental, ground-breaking macroeconomic achievement by the Tinubu Administration, it is in reality extremely dangerous, deceptive, and reckless. Not only does it completely fail to reflect the actual, material reality on the ground, which is that Nigeria is currently the bleeding poverty capital of the world, but this exact, artificial economic bubble has the direct, terrifying potential to completely collapse the Nigerian economy, trigger massive capital flight, and permanently reduce the country to a subservient, bankrupt puppet state run entirely by the harsh austerity measures, economic dictates, and financial chains of boardroom terror organizations like the IMF and the World Bank.
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Only one Cardi B
CBN Governor, Mr. Olayemi Cardoso, on Wednesday, June 10, 2026, in London, formally received the 2026 Central Banking Central Bank of the Year Award.
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Aigboje Aig-Imoukhuede during the Access Holdings 2026 AGM today. “Many stocks in Nigeria have re-rated because the capital market has adjusted to what I would describe as the roughly 400% currency depreciation that occurred about four years ago. One of the remaining high-quality stocks that has not yet fully benefited from this re-rating, which has largely taken place over the last nine months, is Access Holdings. And that is only, or largely, because of the disappointment shareholders feel regarding the dividend. Well, let us accept that reality for what it is. However, the message I want to leave you with is this: you are getting value. We are addressing the compliance issues that the Central Bank has requested of us. Importantly, the profits required to pay dividends are already in the books of Access Holdings. We do not even need to make the money, the profit is already there. So, once we resolve that issue, we will resume dividend payments. This remains one of the few high-quality stocks yet to re-rate, which means that re-rating is imminent. And you have all seen the extent to which other stocks have re-rated. I do not want to speak about share price at an AGM, but you may have noticed that I have continued buying Access shares because I want to benefit from that re-rating. From both a price and quality standpoint, I believe this is one of the most attractive stocks in Nigeria today. A word is enough for the wise. Thank you.”
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Aradel should better do the needful today.
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I see no reason why we should be at work today. We should have just carried the public holiday through into the weekend.
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Aradel Is Bigger Than The Market Thinks Before going further, it is important to note that I am bias towards Aradel, I have a decent position in them too. A post about that can be found here: teapawt.net/TheNGXPlug/status/2028… So lets get into it. Every now and then, a listed company changes so fundamentally that looking at it through the lens of its old numbers stops making sense. That may well be where we are with Aradel. For many investors, Aradel is still the company they came to know over the last few years: a well-run indigenous oil producer with solid cash flows, a refinery business that added some diversification, and a sometimes rewarded shareholders. The problem with that view is that the Aradel of today is not the Aradel of yesterday. I would like to make a somewhat compelling argument that the market may still be underestimating just how much the business has changed following its acquisition of an additional 40% stake in ND Western, completed in December 2025. The transaction pushes Aradel’s effective economic interest in Renaissance Africa Energy Company (RAEC) to 53.3%, crossing the threshold for full consolidation. In plain English, this means Aradel is no longer merely taking a share of profits from RAEC. It is now bringing the business fully onto its books, including revenues, production, assets, debt and cash flows. That distinction matters more than many people appreciate. Before now, Aradel’s investment story was partly obscured. Investors could see earnings flowing in from associated businesses, but the economics beneath were harder to fully appreciate because they sat outside the reported operating line. Going forward, the company begins to look very different. Bigger. More asset-heavy. More cash generative. And perhaps more deserving of a different valuation framework altogether. The easiest way to think about this is simple: Aradel has moved from having exposure to a giant upstream business to effectively controlling one. And scale changes everything (yes, size matters...sometimes). According to some analysts' estimates, consolidated production could rise to 48.7 mmboe in 2026, increasing to 68.1 mmboe by 2028 as RAEC ramps production toward its longer-term targets. But here is where the story gets even more interesting. At the same time that Aradel is becoming a materially larger company, oil prices have been unexpectedly supportive. The geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have inserted a risk premium into global oil markets, with Brent spending much of early 2026 around the $100/bbl mark, even if analysts expect prices to normalize over time. For an upstream oil company, price matters immensely. If you own a business producing meaningfully more barrels while simultaneously selling those barrels at a higher price than previously expected, operating leverage kicks in hard. Personally, I believe upstream gross margins could expand to over 56% in 2026, while group EBITDA may cross $1.2 billion. I expect revenue to rise to about $2.4 billion in 2026 under the new consolidated structure too. Now, before anyone accuses this of sounding overly euphoric, there are important caveats. Oil is cyclical. The same geopolitical premium helping oil prices today could disappear tomorrow. If tensions in the Middle East ease faster than expected and Brent drifts back toward the $65 to $70 range, earnings expectations would need to be revised lower. I am aware that Aradel is benefiting from tailwinds that may not last forever. There is also execution risk... Much of the upside case depends on RAEC continuing to ramp production smoothly toward its targets. Operational bottlenecks, underperforming wells, delays or integration issues could all slow the earnings trajectory investors are currently beginning to price in. The refinery business also faces timing risks after the expansion timeline shifted from late 2025 to early 2027. None of these risks are fatal, but they matter. Still, even after accounting for those risks, one question remains difficult to ignore: Is the market fully pricing in the new Aradel? This is where the bull case becomes harder to dismiss. Personally, I value the stock at about NGN2,500 per share (this valuation is not driven by one heroic assumption. It comes from a sum-of-the-parts framework that separately values the upstream business and refinery segment). Interestingly, even on reserve-based peer comparisons, Aradel does not appear outrageously priced. On an EV/2P reserves basis, it trades broadly around peer averages despite arguably having a higher quality, newly consolidated reserve base through RAEC. That suggests the market may still be treating Aradel partly like the company it used to be, rather than the one it is becoming. And then there is the dividend conversation. This is probably the question many retail investors care about most. Though the management has not yet announced a formal post-consolidation dividend policy, which is understandable given the enlarged balance sheet and integration process. But if Aradel were to broadly maintain its historical approach of paying the higher of 50% of PAT or 20% of operating cash flow, dividend capacity could increase materially simply because the earnings and cash generation base is now much larger. That said, expecting management to aggressively distribute cash immediately may be optimistic. Debt reduction, operational integration and reinvestment into growth will likely compete for attention. Investors expecting an overnight windfall could be disappointed. But perhaps that misses the bigger picture. The real debate around Aradel today is not whether next year’s dividend will be slightly higher or lower. It is whether the market has fully internalized that this is now a fundamentally different company. For years, Nigerian investors have often been slow to re-rate businesses after transformational shifts, particularly when the change is buried in accounting consolidation and not immediately obvious in headline earnings. Markets sometimes anchor themselves to old narratives long after reality has moved on. Aradel may be testing that tendency in real time. Because if the underlying assumptions prove broadly right, investors are not looking at the same Aradel that traded a few years ago. They are looking at something significantly larger, more cash generative, and potentially more valuable. PS. This is not financial advice.
My ARADEL Investment Journey Most of us have heard the phrase, “time in the market beats timing the market.” It sounds simple, but in my experience, it has proven true. I started buying ARADEL shares in January 2025. My investment thesis was based on its 9M’24 unaudited results. At the time, ARADEL had grown revenue by 30% in USD terms to about $274 million. This was driven by higher production volumes across crude oil, gas, and refined products. I expected the company to continue leveraging its existing assets and newly acquired assets from SPDC to drive further volume growth. Based on this conviction, I purchased 3,460 units at an average price of ₦540.90 per share, investing approximately ₦1.8 million. As the year progressed, the company delivered strong results and the share price appreciated accordingly. Later, I bought an additional 1,910 units at ₦770 per share, costing ₦1,470,700. In total, I invested ₦3,270,700. Today, that investment is worth ₦6,975,630, in just over a year. When I bought at ₦770, my price target was around ₦1,050. At the current price of ₦1,299, the stock has exceeded my expectations. Because I remain well in profit and still believe in the fundamentals, I can continue accumulating if liquidity allows. However, that may not be suitable for everyone, especially short-term investors or those whose capital or risk tolerance cannot withstand potential retracements. Why I Still Believe in ARADEL I maintain a positive long-term view on ARADEL. Indigenous oil and gas players generally have a stronger grasp of the local regulatory environment and are better positioned to unlock shareholder value. Despite ongoing industry M&A activity, significant opportunities remain. Approximately 10 oil wells holding about 2,006mmboe of reserves are still available through IOC and NNPC JV divestments. ARADEL is well positioned to capitalise on these opportunities. The management team has demonstrated strong execution capability. Following the acquisition of OML 34 via ND Western, crude oil and gas production increased meaningfully. Given that ARADEL shares similar partnership structures across ND Western and Renaissance Africa Energy, there is reason to expect that the SPDC acquisition will also be value accretive. The company benefits from: #1. Underutilised gas processing and refining capacity #2. Access to long-term debt capital #3. Diversification through stakes in ND Western, Renaissance Africa Energy, and Chappal Energies These factors could extend reserve life beyond the current 10.7 years and sustain strong growth metrics. FY25 Performance Overview In FY25, ARADEL reported: - Revenue up 17% year on year to USD459.63 million - Gross profit down 23% to USD184.57 million - Gross margin compressed to 40%, from 61% in FY24 The decline in gross margin was largely due to an 81% increase in cost of sales, driven by: - 40% rise in depreciation and amortisation - Higher royalties - Increased crude handling costs Operational Performance - Crude oil production increased 3% to 14.4 kbbls/d - Gas production surged 59% to 51.4 mmscf/d - Refined product volumes grew 18% to 313.4 million litres The sharp rise in gas production was driven by new gas wells, including Ogbele 16, and enhanced recovery initiatives. Other Income and Acquisitions Other income rebounded to USD144.52 million from a loss in FY24, largely due to a USD132.5 million bargain purchase gain from acquiring a 40% stake in ND Western for USD300 million, below its estimated fair value of USD433 million. Profitability - Operating profit declined 9% to USD179.44 million - Net finance costs fell 18% to USD3.47 million - Share of profit from associates increased fivefold to USD129.83 million Profit before tax rose 43% to USD305.79 million. Although tax expense increased modestly, the effective tax rate fell to 14%, largely because the bargain purchase gain boosted PBT without a corresponding tax charge. As a result: - Profit after tax increased 51% to USD264.60 million - Net profit margin expanded to 58%, from 45% in FY24 My Outlook Looking ahead to FY26, I expect further earnings growth. The core business remains solid, and the yield from the ND Western acquisition comfortably exceeds the cost of debt used to finance the transaction. This positive spread should enhance equity returns. For me, this reinforces the principle that disciplined conviction and time in the market, when backed by strong fundamentals, can be more powerful than trying to time short-term price movements. That said, this is not financial advice. Every investor must align decisions with their own risk tolerance, liquidity profile, and investment horizon.
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Ladies and gentlemen, what are your dividend predictions for Aradel? Maybe later today I’ll write a post regarding my thoughts on Aradel & target price I’m looking at.
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Realistically, what do you expect Aradel to declare as its FY2025 dividend?
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More of this.
In a rare show of toughness against a corrupt official, the judge ordered that the sentences attached to each of the 12 counts run consecutively, not concurrently. A concurrent term would have amounted to seven years’ imprisonment, the highest imposed for any of the counts. premiumtimesng.com/news/top-…
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GTCO Q1 2026: Strong Core, Softer Bottom Line (Initial thoughts) GTCO's Q1 2026 results tell a very familiar story in today’s banking environment: core banking remains solid, but profitability is increasingly being squeezed by costs, FX, and taxes. At the top level, the bank still delivered growth. Gross earnings rose by 9% year-on-year to ₦571.4 billion, supported primarily by a strong 18% increase in interest income. GTCO benefited from repricing its loan book and significantly expanding its exposure to government securities, which grew by 59% year-to-date to ₦11.9 trillion, while loans themselves were largely flat, up just 1% to ₦3.17 trillion. Deposits also remained healthy, rising 5% to ₦13.2 trillion. However, beneath that strong revenue growth, the pressure points become clear. First, funding costs rose sharply. Interest expense increased by 40% year-on-year, which compressed net interest margins from 12.2% to 11.1%. In simple terms, while GTCO earned more from lending and investments, it also paid significantly more to fund those assets. The result is that net interest income growth, while still positive at 12%, was less efficient than it appears on the surface. Second, and more importantly, non-interest revenue disappointed materially. Non-interest income declined by 20% year-on-year to ₦93.9 billion. Two drivers stand out here. Fees and commissions were weighed down by a 35% increase in related expenses, and more significantly, the bank recorded FX-related losses of ₦40.4 billion. In a period where FX gains had previously been a major earnings tailwind for Nigerian banks, this reversal is notable and directly impacted profitability. Costs also continued to trend upward. Operating expenses rose by 14% year-on-year to ₦139.2 billion, driven by higher staff costs and an increase in the AMCON levy. This pushed the cost-to-income ratio slightly higher to 32.7%, indicating a gradual erosion of operating efficiency. To GTCO’s credit, asset quality improved. Impairment charges declined by 42% year-on-year, bringing the cost of risk down to 0.2%. This suggests that credit performance remains strong and that the bank is not currently facing significant stress from its loan book. But even that positive was not enough to offset the broader pressures. Profit before tax came in broadly flat, up just 1% to ₦302.9 billion. The real hit came below the line. Profit after tax declined by 15% year-on-year to ₦218.1 billion, driven by a significantly higher tax charge of ₦84.8 billion, which pushed the effective tax rate to 28%, double the 14% recorded in the prior year. This is the key story of the quarter. GTCO is still generating earnings, but a larger portion of those earnings is now being absorbed by taxes and operating costs. Unsurprisingly, profitability metrics adjusted downward. Annualised return on equity fell sharply to 26.4% from 42.1%, while return on assets declined to 5.4% from 9.1%. These are still strong numbers in absolute terms, but the direction of travel is clearly negative. That said, the outlook is not entirely pessimistic. Despite weaker bottom-line performance, GTCO’s capital position remains robust. This is important because it underpins one of the key investment arguments for the stock: dividends. The bank is unlikely to retain a significant portion of earnings to build capital buffers, implying continued capacity for dividend growth even in a softer earnings environment. Stepping back, the Q1 2026 numbers reinforce a broader shift in the banking landscape. The era of outsized gains from FX revaluation appears to be fading, and banks are returning to a more traditional earnings profile, where core lending income matters more, and cost discipline becomes critical. For GTCO, the fundamentals are still intact. The balance sheet is expanding, asset quality is holding up, and core income is growing. But the margin compression, weaker non-interest income, and rising tax burden mean that translating those fundamentals into bottom-line growth is becoming more challenging. In essence, this was a quarter where the engine is still running well, but the road has become steeper.
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I love Access Bank, but on God, this aint it.
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UBA Q1 2026: Strong Revenues, But Rising Costs Take the Shine Off UBA kicked off 2026 with a mixed set of results. On the surface, revenue growth remained intact and core banking income held up well. But beneath that, rising costs and higher loan loss provisions weighed significantly on profitability. Here’s a clear breakdown of what really happened. Revenue Growth Still Holding Up UBA reported Gross Earnings of ₦801.46bn, up 5% year-on-year . - Interest Income rose 7% YoY to ₦640.09bn, largely driven by increased investment in government securities. - Net Interest Income came in at ₦383.71bn, up 9% YoY. This pushed Net Interest Margin (NIM) slightly higher to 6.8% (vs 6.6% in Q1 2025). Non-Interest Income: A Bright Spot Non-interest revenue showed stronger momentum: - Non-Interest Revenue increased 22% YoY to ₦137.14bn - Growth was driven by a 2.3x surge in other income - Net fees and commission income also grew 22% YoY, helped by a 10% drop in fees-related expenses A key driver here was improved efficiency in e-banking, with expenses in that segment dropping 49% YoY. The Real Problem: Costs Are Rising Fast This is where things start to unravel. Operating Expenses jumped 30% YoY to ₦318.95bn. Major drivers being: - Staff costs: +17% - Technology costs: +2.6x - Advertising & branding: +1.8x As a result, the Cost-to-Income Ratio worsened sharply to 61.2% (from 52.9%). Also, credit losses spiked. Another major pressure point. Impairment charges surged 191% YoY to ₦41.24bn. Profitability Took a Hit Despite solid revenue growth: - Profit Before Tax declined 21% YoY to ₦160.66bn - Profit After Tax fell 23% YoY to ₦146.23bn Profitability metrics also weakened: - Return on Equity (ROE): 14.5% (down from 33.4%) - Return on Assets (ROA): 1.7% (down from 2.6%) Final Take UBA’s Q1 2026 results tell a clear story: - Core banking performance is resilient - Digital efficiency is improving - But cost discipline has weakened - And credit risk provisions are rising sharply In simple terms: The engine is working, but expenses are eating into the gains. The one encouraging signal is the reduction in e-banking costs, which suggests that some of the current cost pressure may normalize over time. However, for near-term performance, the key question is whether UBA can rein in operating expenses and stabilize credit costs. Until then, profitability will likely remain under pressure despite solid revenue growth.
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UBA FY2025: When the Tide Goes Out, You See What Was Really Driving Earnings UBA’s FY2025 results are a clear reminder of a simple investing truth: not all profits are created equal. Sometimes, what looks like strong performance is largely driven by one-off or cyclical factors and when those fade, the underlying business is exposed. What the Numbers Say UBA reported gross earnings of ₦3.09 trillion, which is actually a slight 3% decline year-on-year. But the real story sits beneath the surface. The biggest hit came from non-interest revenue, which collapsed by 59% to ₦238 billion. Why? - Last year: large FX and trading gains - This year: ₦140.6 billion in trading/FX losses So the same line item that inflated earnings previously became a drag this year. Ironic, right? Meanwhile, core banking activity held up better: - Interest income grew 12% to ₦2.65 trillion - But interest expenses rose faster (23%), squeezing margins - Net Interest Margin declined from 8.3% to 7.3% On costs: - Operating expenses increased modestly (+6%) - But loan loss provisions surged 30% to ₦329 billion All of this fed into the bottom line: - Profit Before Tax: down 47% - Profit After Tax: down 47% to ₦404.7 billion Returns also normalized sharply: - ROAE fell from 29.0% to 10.9% - ROA dropped from 3.0% to 1.3% And then the part that caught many investors off guard: No final dividend was declared. What Actually Happened The simplest way to frame this: UBA moved from FX-driven earnings to core banking reality. The FY2024 performance was heavily supported by foreign exchange gains. Once FX stabilized, those gains disappeared and in FY2025, even reversed into losses. At the same time: - Funding costs rose - Impairments increased (balance sheet clean-up) - Margins compressed So what you’re left with is a much more “normalised” bank, but one with weaker profitability metrics. My Positioning and What Played Out This outcome was not entirely unpredictable. My rating for them in January was Sell. My thesis being the era of easy earnings from FX gains is over, Banks will struggle to grow earnings in a lower-rate, more stable FX environment, and crucially, while the sector still had upside, UBA was not among my preferred names at that point, unlike Zenith and GTCO. Based on that backdrop, I made a decision in January 2026: - Sold 50% of my UBA holdings - Locked in profits - Reallocated into Zenith and GTCO My logic was straightforward; UBA looked fairly valued with limited upside, Peers like Zenith and GTCO had stronger earnings quality and better forward positioning As it stands today, that rotation has been validated, with both names clearly “on the up and up.” Even with this cautious stance, I'll be honest. I did not anticipate zero dividend. At worst, I expected: - A flat dividend vs prior year, or - A 50% cut What This Means Going Forward UBA is not broken, but the investment case has clearly shifted. Positives: - Strong interest income growth - Ongoing balance sheet clean-up (higher impairments now = cleaner future) - Large pan-African footprint remains a strategic advantage Concerns: - Earnings quality has weakened - Heavy dependence on volatile income streams exposed - Margins under pressure Final Thought UBA’s FY2025 results are less about a bad year and more about a reset. Better days may come. For the avoidance of doubt, this is not financial advice.
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Hmm. Not a big fan of blanket statements like this.
Try and get SEPLAT shares. It is up and up away….
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Access Bank @ 32 naira? I used to pray for times like this.
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Sell in May & go away. Do you subscribe to this ideology?
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