Hereward

The British Businesses That Will Answer to Brussels Without Ever Trading There Andy Burnham's Brexit reset contains a remarkable bargain. In exchange for easier trade with the European Union, Britain is preparing to accept rules written in Brussels, including those governing businesses that have never exported a single product to Europe. Consider the family butcher in Yorkshire, the dairy farmer in Wales or the small food producer supplying local shops. Their customers are British. Their businesses operate under British law. Yet the Government's proposed agrifood agreement would bring them within a regulatory system whose future rules will be decided by institutions in which Britain has no vote. The Government's own guidance confirms it. The agreement will apply domestically whether businesses trade with the EU or not. As Brussels changes its rules, British regulations will change accordingly. This principle, known as dynamic alignment, reaches far beyond removing paperwork at Dover. The scope is considerable. Food safety, pesticides, animal health, nutrition labelling, organic production and marketing standards are included. Dozens of EU regulations and directives would fall within the arrangement. Future changes could affect what farmers grow, which products manufacturers use and how food is sold. Burnham argues that closer alignment will reduce costs and improve trade. Removing unnecessary border checks makes sense. Exporters have faced genuine difficulties since Brexit, and businesses would welcome relief from costly certificates and inspections. But a government surrendering future regulatory freedom should explain precisely what Britain receives in return. The promised economic prize is £5.1 billion a year by 2040. That is a forecast, dependent on assumptions about future growth. Meanwhile, Britain's financial contribution to Brussels remains unclear. Ministers are asking the public to applaud the benefits before disclosing the full bill. More troubling is democratic control. Britain would be consulted during the development of relevant EU legislation. Consultation, however, guarantees no influence. We would have no vote in the Council of the European Union, and the European Court of Justice would remain the ultimate authority on questions of EU law covered by the agreement. Parliament would retain its legal powers. But exercising them against an international agreement could carry consequences, including disputes and retaliatory measures. Future governments might therefore face a choice between laws they oppose and economic penalties for refusing to follow them. That is an extraordinary position for a country whose voters chose to leave the European Union. Britain also imports food from countries far beyond Europe. Aligning our standards and import controls with Brussels could restrict our freedom to negotiate different arrangements with those suppliers. The Fresh Produce Consortium has warned of substantial additional costs for importers sourcing produce outside the EU. Such warnings deserve examination before commitments become binding. Brexit never meant Britain should stop trading with Europe or reject sensible cooperation. Restoring national control meant allowing elected British governments to decide which rules best served this country, while remaining answerable to the people who elected them. Burnham now proposes an arrangement under which future EU decisions could reach into British farms, factories and shops without those affected having a meaningful vote over the lawmakers responsible. The question Parliament should put to him is simple. Why must a business that never trades with Brussels surrender its regulatory independence for the benefit of one that does? Until Burnham answers that, his Brexit reset looks less like practical government and more like a transfer of democratic power whose full price remains unknown.