I am looking for an intern (paid), remote, 10-20 hours per week (flexible), to be a TA for an online AI course. Work involves answering student questions; working with me to build AI-based systems for monitoring and evaluation—and then monitoring and evaluating those systems

🚨SHOCKING - FIR against Malabar: A man walked into a Malabar Gold showroom in Bilaspur with a simple request: exchange his old 22-carat HUID-hallmarked bracelet. The staff ran it through their XRF machine. Once. Twice. Three times. Every reading came back the same: 20 carat. They even told him the hallmark didn’t exist. He called the local jeweller who had sold him the bracelet. The jeweller walked in, confirmed the HUID, and asked them to test it again. Same machine. Same bracelet. Same room. This time an employee adjusted something on the machine. Suddenly the reading flipped to 916 - pure 22 carat. The jeweller recorded everything. The Sarafa Association arrived. Police registered an FIR against the showroom manager and the machine operator. The machine and DVR were seized. This wasn’t a small local shop. This was Malabar Gold “the chain that advertises trust, purity, and BIS standards across India”. One bracelet. Two readings. An 8% gap in gold value. And the only thing that changed was who was watching. If a hallmarked piece can magically lose two carats the moment a customer wants to exchange it, and magically regain them the moment someone pushes back, what exactly is the machine testing? Customers don’t walk into Malabar expecting a calibration error that only appears when they’re selling gold. They walk in expecting the purity printed on their receipt. The FIR is real. The readings are on record. The machine was seized. Malabar still hasn’t explained why the same piece of gold needed a “setting” before it became 22 carat again. Until they do, this isn’t a machine glitch. It’s a business model.

Governments keep telling us ID checks will make the internet safer. Here is what an ID check actually did for a woman in Pennsylvania. Cash App demanded Social Security numbers to stop fraud. Hers leaked in a data breach, a scammer opened an account with it, and the police arrested her for his crime. She spent three nights in jail. Cash App now refuses to show her the account because she can’t prove it’s hers, which is exactly what she has been telling them. Every ID check builds another vault of stolen identities waiting to happen. The more of them we’re forced through, the easier fraud gets, and the people paying for it are the ones who did everything they were told.

A once successful company appoints an insecure idiot as its chief. The leader culls out all talented, far seeing staff and board members. They are replaced by lackeys whose lives and salaries depend on saying yes. What would you say is in the future of the company?

What are you reading this fall?

The EDF (Export Declaration Form) rules are now in effect, and it seems like RBI and banks have conspired to create a new hell. Or actually 5 hells. I consult for an American company. Raised October invoice. Received the Inward remittance. And bang! Mail from @HDFC_Bank detailing everything needed before the payment can be processed. Let me tell you what the 5 hells are: 1. The hell of confusion – RBI clarified last month that the EDF rules do not apply to individuals. But looks like they haven’t told the banks. And CAs also don’t seem to know. There’s no official communication on who is exempt. Last I checked, I was an individual. No company, no LLP. But HDFC still wants me to file the EDF to credit my payment. 2. The hell of complexity – See the attached pic of the form the bank has sent in excel. It has 5 sheets. To be filled and submitted. Some abstruse acronyms like “AD” - no clue what it means. Some fields are mandatory. Some fields are to be filled by the bank. No idea which is what. And it needs a physical signature. Which leads to... 3. The hell of paperwork - They also sent a pdf with a bunch of request letters. I’m supposed to choose the right letter, print, sign, scan and submit. Creating more paper today is incredibly silly. And, I suppose, someone in the bank will have to upload all this somewhere. Reminds me of those hand-filled immigration forms. Pointless. 4. The hell of repetition – At least for me, most of the details are constant. One client, one payment. If it’s a one-time exercise, fine. I’ll grit my teeth and get it done. But no. These details have to be given month after month. Else… no payment will be credited. 5. The hell of unpreparedness – It would have been simple enough for RBI or HDFC to create an online portal for this. With dropdowns, saved formats, contextual help, etc. to at least make this easy. But that would be too convenient, no? So, they’ve chosen to dump the entire burden on the taxpayer. I have no opinion or understanding of why this is needed. Maybe it is critical information. Okay! But why make the process so confusing and painful? And poor communication has meant that the banks have just passed on the pain to the exporter, and even CAs can’t help. Basically RBI & HDFC feel I should consult less, and comply more. Maybe my client will also agree :)

SBI told the stock exchanges about its data breach. Customers? Not a word. Purrjury breaks down what was leaked, why it’s a scammer’s dream, and what IFF is demanding. Swipe to read. #DataBreach #SBI #DPDP #DigitalRights #IFF

Statement : SBI has told the stock exchanges about its data breach, but not the customers whose data was leaked New Delhi, 21 October 2026 Today, the State Bank of India told the BSE and the National Stock Exchange, in a disclosure under Regulation 30 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, that it has experienced an incident involving the loss of customer data. On 16 October 2026 the bank received alerts from its threat intelligence service provider, the Defence Cyber Agency and CERT-In that its customers’ data was available on the dark web. Its preliminary analysis of about 3.75 lakh records found 3,897 customer records containing personal information. These include registered mobile numbers, dates of birth, names, gender, email addresses, residential addresses, branch and CIF identifiers, lead IDs and details linked to loan records. The bank says it does not yet know where the data came from, and it has engaged a CERT-In empanelled agency to find out. SBI did not detect this breach itself and learnt of it from outside agencies after the data had already been published. On the same day, a threat monitoring account on X flagged a claim by a group calling itself “Siriusim” that it had released 3.75 lakh rows of SBI data and 2,722 PDF documents, including loan applications and account opening forms. The bank’s disclosure does not mention these documents. It also does not say what the remaining records, beyond the 3,897 it has identified, contain. At the time of this statement, SBI has not said that it has informed any of the affected customers, and its disclosure is silent on the point. Five days passed between the alert and today’s filing. The filing assures investors that the incident has no material impact on the bank’s operations, financial performance or business continuity. However, it does not state anything to the 3,897 people whose phone numbers, dates of birth and home addresses are now with fraudsters. These customers are the most likely to receive calls from persons posing as SBI officials who can recite their account details back to them. A customer cannot guard against a fraud she has not been warned of. The Internet Freedom Foundation calls on SBI to inform every affected customer directly and without further delay. We regret to note that the law in force today does not compel the bank to do so. Section 8(6) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 requires a Data Fiduciary to intimate a personal data breach to the Data Protection Board and to each affected Data Principal, and Rule 7 of the DPDP Rules, 2025 prescribes how this is to be done. But the Union Government chose a staggered commencement, and these provisions will take effect only on 13 May 2027, nearly four years after Parliament enacted the law. The reporting obligations that apply today, under the CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022 and the RBI’s cyber security framework for banks, are owed to regulators and not to customers. A listed bank is bound to keep the stock exchanges informed. No law in force clearly binds it to inform the people whose data it holds. Our demands 1. SBI must inform each affected customer by SMS, email and letter to the registered address, in English, Hindi and the language of the customer’s branch, stating what data was exposed and what steps they should take. It should open a dedicated helpline and an online facility for customers to check whether their data is affected. 2. SBI must state what the 3.75 lakh records and the 2,722 documents contain, how many customers they relate to, and whether they include KYC documents such as Aadhaar, PAN or passport copies. 3. When the investigation concludes, SBI must disclose how the data left its systems, including whether it came through a vendor or a direct selling agent, and publish a summary of the investigating agency’s findings. 4. The Reserve Bank of India should direct all regulated entities to notify customers of personal data breaches within a fixed period, pending the commencement of the DPDP Act. 5. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology should bring Section 8(6) of the DPDP Act and Rule 7 of the DPDP Rules into force immediately.