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“Hierarchies are celestial. In hell all are equal.” - Nicolás Gómez Dávila

Samsara
Joined February 2024
Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)Photo by Brian Shaffer (@bshaffer1973)
Charles Hoskinson on the Quantum Threat to Bitcoin. "What the fuck are you going to do!?" 1.7 Million coins guaranteed to be stolen and dumped. $QRL is First Quantumcurrency ever made, and has had post-quantum security since 2018.
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Replying to @vlatdd
The biggest lie is that governments primarily serve the public interest. In reality they expand their own power, shield elites and connected interests, and treat citizens as resources to tax, regulate, and manage. The costs fall on ordinary people through debt, inflation, and eroded freedoms. This pattern holds across most regimes and centuries.
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Replying to @vlatdd
The biggest lie society sells is that anyone can become anything through pure effort and belief. Genes, cognitive ability, family background, health, and luck set hard limits for most people. The blank-slate meritocracy myth keeps people grinding and blaming themselves when the outcomes stay uneven.
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In 2022, a post-quantum algorithm that had spent five years in NIST's process was broken in about an hour on a single processor core. Nobody used a quantum computer. Castryck and Decru found a new classical attack that recovered the key for SIKE's smallest parameter set in roughly 62 minutes. SIKE was a fourth-round candidate at the time. Rainbow, a NIST finalist for signatures, took a heavy hit the same year. An attack recovered keys for its lowest-security second-round parameters in an average of 53 hours on a laptop, and the same research undermined its wider security claims. PQR uses ML-KEM to set up its keys. ML-KEM is built on lattices, a different family of maths from SIKE, and NIST currently believes it is secure. No cryptography comes with a permanent guarantee, though, so PQR is designed to stop depending on it: after one exchange nobody could capture, a later break of ML-KEM can't be used to rebuild the keys. We call the wider principle Contained Cryptographic Failure. PQR keeps evolving its keys and keeps security domains apart, so the damage from a broken algorithm is designed to stay inside the domain it hits. That depends on independent keys, secure erasure of old ones and a correct implementation, and recovery needs fresh secret material the attacker can't reach. Does your migration plan have a page for that day? qustream.co.uk
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Real networks don’t behave like perfect lab conditions. Radio signals fade. Packets get lost. Remote sensors miss transmissions. Yet communication still needs to continue securely. QuStream's Post-Quantum Ratchet design addresses this by separating two jobs: deriving the right key for each new packet, and updating the shared security state when both ends confirm they have processed the same traffic. The result? A lost packet doesn't automatically mean restarting the connection or negotiating new keys. Communication can continue, while the ratchet waits for a clean confirmation before strengthening its state. The link can lose packets without the devices losing their place in the secure conversation.
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Unpopular opinion: Slavery still exists. Back then, Slaves worked endlessly for no pay but were given food, water, and shelter. Today, we work endlessly for pay, then spend it all on food, water, and shelter.
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PQC upgrades the algorithm for a quantum world. But the last-mile problem remains. Every endpoint, device, application and network still has to be migrated, integrated, updated and trusted to handle the new stack correctly. That is where exposure lives. What can an attacker capture? What can they store? What can they reuse later? QuStream takes a different route: - public quantum-random material - secret endpoint paths - fresh keys derived locally - no bulk key material moving across the network Not just stronger post-quantum maths. Less valuable exposure at the places real systems actually fail.
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Somewhere, a server is filling up with recordings of encrypted traffic. Nobody can read them yet. The plan is to wait until the lock that set up those connections breaks, then open everything at once. Adrian Neal's new paper gives that server a problem: In our Post-Quantum Ratchet, one batch of random data swapped where nobody could listen gets mixed into every key that follows. Break the lock in 2045, hold every recorded byte, and those keys still won't rebuild. #EverlastingSecurity
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Every encrypted recording made today is a bet that the lock holds forever. Adrian Neal's paper shows how PQR stops making that bet. After one exchange nobody could capture, a future break of the post-quantum setup lock can't rebuild the keys that follow. He calls it everlasting security ➡️ qustream.co.uk/assets/pqr-xx…
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Same coin. Same price. Same evening. @coingecko: #300 @CoinMarketCap: #4,335 $QRL has been post-quantum secure since 2018 – while the rest of crypto is just starting to prepare. Hey CMC, time to verify that supply? ⚛️
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The quantum attack on your wallet doesn't start when the quantum computer arrives. It started the day your public key hit the chain.
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Assume a device gets captured one day. What can the attacker read? That depends on how its keys were built. A drone goes down behind the line. If its radio shares one long-lived key with the rest of the fleet, whoever recovers it may be able to read every radio on that key, including traffic recorded months earlier. Grid equipment stays in service for decades. Take a controller from an unmanned substation, and a key that never changes can open years of recorded control traffic. Smart meters ship by the batch. If a batch shares one key baked into firmware, a single meter opened on a workbench can be enough to read the rest. A seized satellite ground terminal is the same story, on a link that may need to stay secure for as long as the satellite flies. PQR is designed to keep the answer short. Keys keep evolving and old ones are erased, so a captured device exposes only the messages under its current key. Systems with independent keys in separate security domains stay outside the breach. How long that window lasts is a setting. Once fresh secret material arrives that the attacker can't reach, protection recovers.
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Post-quantum signatures prove who you're talking to when a connection starts. What if the scheme breaks years later? In PQR, later messages are checked with a key grown from the conversation's own history. A forger could start a new connection, but couldn't join an existing one.
"Harvest now, decrypt later" has a simple plan: record encrypted traffic today, break the lock that set up the connection years from now, then read everything. Adrian Neal's new paper on our Post-Quantum Ratchet shows where that plan can fail. Every confirmed message gets folded into the next key, a bit like a recipe where each step uses some of the last batch. To rebuild later keys, the attacker needs every confirmed piece. Miss one that's hard to guess, and breaking the lock years later doesn't give it back. The keys after the gap stay out of reach. qustream.co.uk
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One week until the 100 QRL draw. Beyond the giveaway, this account has a purpose: making quantum computing and post-quantum security easier to follow. What should we explain next: the quantum threat, how QRL works, or PQC migration? Entry details in the original post.
I believe QRL deserves more attention. So I'm giving away 100 QRL. Follow + repost to enter. One entry per person. No purchase needed. Draw: Oct 25, 2026. Winner announced publicly and contacted by DM. By reposting, you agree to be tagged if you win.
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There will be many situations like this
Replying to @WillHerkelrath
I don't have a problem with the algorand:native community spamming txns on their own chain. The problem starts when the official @Algorand account markets that bot activity as "#1 in post-quantum" to look better than @QRLedger. It's misleading.
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Claude found a new way to do modular inversion, the costliest step in elliptic-curve arithmetic. One of its point-addition circuits uses 17x fewer gates than the smallest previous design, for 12% more qubits. A quantum attack on ECDSA keys spends most of its effort on exactly those point additions. Nothing is broken today. The cost estimates keep falling, though, and this drop came from a single 53-hour run.
New from our STEM Fellows Program: Designing more efficient quantum circuits with Claude. Given plain-language instructions, Claude Mythos 5 designed quantum circuits that improve on the best published ones, sometimes by an order of magnitude or more. More efficient circuits reduce the resources needed by quantum algorithms, which could bring quantum computing applications in chemistry and materials science within reach sooner. Read more: anthropic.com/research/desig…
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10 years ago today, QRL's first code commit marked the beginning of a mission to build for a future few were thinking about. From a forward-thinking idea to a live post-quantum blockchain, and now toward QRL 2.0, none of it would be possible without the builders and community behind it. Here's a look back at how far we've come...and what's ahead ⤵️ theqrl.org/blog/10-years-of-…
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"Harvest now, decrypt later" has a simple plan: record encrypted traffic today, break the lock that set up the connection years from now, then read everything. Adrian Neal's new paper on our Post-Quantum Ratchet shows where that plan can fail. Every confirmed message gets folded into the next key, a bit like a recipe where each step uses some of the last batch. To rebuild later keys, the attacker needs every confirmed piece. Miss one that's hard to guess, and breaking the lock years later doesn't give it back. The keys after the gap stay out of reach. qustream.co.uk
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10 years ago today, on 16 October 2016, QRL began with a single GitHub commit. At the time, few in the industry took the quantum threat seriously. Fast forward to today and it's an industry-wide priority. What started as an early vision has grown into a global community building for what's next. The next decade starts now. Be part of it.
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Learn more about QuStream's Post-Quantum Ratchet: qustream.co.uk/assets/pqr-xx…
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