🇸🇦 🇸🇾 🇾🇪 My interview with @GiorgioCafiero for @amwajmedia on the possibility of Syria joining Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen amwaj.media/en/article/shoul… “Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East studies at Sciences Po in Paris, said the most plausible option would be political and logistical support for Saudi Arabia, “Possibly accompanied by intelligence-sharing, military coordination or the deployment of a small number of liaison officers.” That, he said, would allow “Damascus to demonstrate solidarity with Riyadh without committing significant resources or exposing Syrian forces to major casualties.” (…) Syria could also send military advisors or small contingents, Bitar told @amwajmedia, but their effectiveness would be “questionable.” “Syria’s military establishment is still being reorganized, and its forces lack the capabilities required for sophisticated expeditionary operations,” he said. Bitar sees the “more dangerous option” as deploying Syrian ground troops to Saudi territory or, in a more extreme scenario, into Yemen. He calls this option “particularly problematic” because the Houthis have “repeatedly demonstrated their ability to withstand technologically superior adversaries.” Yemen’s mountainous terrain, complex tribal landscape and deeply entrenched local power dynamics make it an “exceptionally difficult” operating environment, Bitar noted, warning that the Houthi-Saudi conflict could turn into a long and bloody war of attrition. Drawing Syria into it could end much as Egypt’s troubled military intervention in Yemen did in the 1960s. (…) History suggests that outside powers with ambitions in Yemen are repeatedly frustrated. With Syria’s state institutions weak and its economy fragile, any deployment could undermine the recovery that Sharaa must prioritize. Between issuing statements of support and sending ground forces to fight the Houthis, Sharaa’s government has options. Damascus will want to show Riyadh that it is helping the Kingdom in the face of Houthi attacks without being pulled into a campaign whose military costs are high and whose consequences could be dangerous for Syria. (…) Should Damascus intervene militarily against Ansarullah, Landis warned that “Syria’s minorities will see this as confirmation of Sharaa’s pro-Sunni prejudices.” Bitar acknowledged there is no “automatic solidarity” between Syrian Alawites and Yemeni Zaydis, but noted that “the danger lies less in theological affinities than in the political instrumentalization of sectarian identities.” A Syrian deployment would be “particularly damaging if official rhetoric or mobilization campaigns adopted religious or sectarian language,” he warned.   From one dependency to another? Iran could see Syrian involvement in the Saudi-led campaign not simply as an attempt to distance Damascus from Tehran but as active work against the ‘Axis of Resistance’. That would be despite the Sharaa government’s earlier refusal to intervene against Hezbollah in Lebanon under pressure from US President Donald Trump’s administration. (…) Whatever Sharaa decides about military support for Saudi Arabia could shape Syria’s position in the region’s geopolitical order. As Bitar argued, “The greatest danger for Syria would be to exchange its former dependence on Tehran for a new form of strategic subordination to Riyadh.”