
AI, semiconductors, geopolitics @csis_ai and The AI Policy Podcast Fmr Lead Tech and Business journo @taiwanplusnews Substack: Strait Up All views are my own.
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Launching a new Substack: "Strait Up," focused on AI policy, semiconductors, and geopolitics, with one eye always on the Taiwan Strait.
First post is on Anthropic's vision for China compute controls, and the piece of the strategy almost everyone is leaving out.
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What’s so frustrating about all the Nvidia/Lutnick/Trump stories is how clear it is that compute controls were shelved for the theoretical benefit of a “better” negotiating position with China, and how little that has paid off. A total strategic failure.
nytimes.com/2026/11/19/world…
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Chris Gorin retweeted
The Commerce Department has released a major new export control rule targeting China’s access to advanced AI compute.
It’s pretty good! Here’s what it does:
(1) Restricts Chinese access to overseas AI clusters (seeks to address one of China’s largest and fastest-growing sources of AI compute)
This is a new worldwide end-use control, which we’ve previously recommended (third option in image below).
A license is required if providing cloud AI compute to Chinese or D:5-headquartered countries, or if acting as an intermediary training models for these actors.
Technical requirements are:
- Applies to any data center or group of “linked data centers” or providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of compute (the equivalent of around 760 H100s) of AI chips meeting the current controlled thresholds.
- “Linked data centers” are defined as sharing physical or virtual computing resources, jointly balancing workloads, or replicating data as a unified whole. So this is intended to capture multi-data center training runs.
This applies everywhere except the US. It also covers existing data centers, which have a 90-day deadline to get a license.
(2) New controls for AI chips going to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (seeks to address smuggling of AI chips to China via third countries)
The evidence for large-scale smuggling of AI chips to China via Malaysia and Singapore is strong, and there’s also evidence this is happening via Indonesia and Thailand. Brazil, on the other hand, is a bit of a head-scratcher.
This is a case-by-case license review policy, rather than a presumption of denial (that's the policy for chips going directly to China/D:5 countries).
BIS will evaluate each license on national security grounds.
There’s an exclusion for qualifying US-headquartered recipients, subject to reporting requirements.
(3) Formally repeals the AI Diffusion Rule
This has been a long time coming. This eliminates the country-tier system, the Validated End User authorizations (VEU) for data centers, and export controls on advanced AI model weights.
However, the replacement measures above address many of the gaps created by this, and, of course, the AI Diffusion rule wasn’t actually being enforced.
(4) Tightens controls on Chinese chip designs manufactured abroad
This modifies and strengthens the Biden-era “Foundry Due Diligence” rule, which applies to foundries and OSATs.
This seeks to prevent Chinese chip designers from circumventing export controls through overseas foundries and packaging facilities. It’s an important complement to the measures above.
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So what are the gaps? More on this to come, but from an initial read:
(1) To determine remote-access eligibility, the rule requires due diligence on direct or indirect Chinese ownership or control. However, its licensing trigger is based around company headquarters and ultimate-parent headquarters, which could allow for some shenanigans around corporate structures.
(2) The rule doesn’t prescribe how AI compute providers must verify customers' identities, or require them to identify and verify every user accessing their compute. The rigor of these checks could vary widely across providers.
(3) The end-use restrictions don’t apply when compute is used exclusively for commercial recommender systems. So this opens a path for large-scale Chinese AI compute usage. This could be fine if verifying this kind of use is possible, but this is likely outside the current technical capabilities of many AI compute providers.
(4) The end-use restrictions don’t apply to data centers in the US. So a Chinese company can still access large amounts of AI compute via US data centers.
This is an interim final rule, meaning it would take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, while allowing 60 days for public comments.
Read the full interim final rule here: bis.gov/media/documents/rin-…
First reproduced result from this methodology. It looks like these labs have been caught red-handed. Although, it's unclear whether this was done through remote access. But any argument that Chinese labs don't rely on US compute is looking sillier by the day.
We (partially) verified these results!
Using NVIDIA B200/H200s, we reproduced the reported patterns for three models.*
We also extended the DeepSeek-V4-Flash test to every weight position across the 42 layers examined and still detected the Blackwell pattern.
See the results here:
github.com/Institute-for-Pro…
This is a super clever approach by @willdepue, and matches reporting that top Chinese AI labs are using Blackwells.
* The repo didn’t contain all the inputs needed to test most of the other models
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Indonesia reportedly set to join Pax Silica as the US courts more of SE Asia. Good news. Malaysia should now be the focus after the Megaspeed scandal.
As I argued in June, Pax Silica with SE Asia on board could anchor a real compute-control alliance: substack.com/home/post/p-201…
Trump to press Southeast Asia nations to join Pax Silica at Asean summit in Manila
scmp.com/news/china/diplomac…
This whole scandal has felt like a vindication to those of us who have been calling for better policy on strategic compute controls. But there's something unsatisfying and icky about seeing these administration officials act like they were on board the whole time.
WOW -- Bessent throws Lutnick under the bus: "Treasury, War, USTR, and State were in favor of putting Megaspeed on the entity list for months, but Commerce has the pen. You will have to ask them about their internal processes."
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Chris Gorin retweeted
If these allegations are true, @BISgov Undersecretary Jeffrey Kessler should resign immediately. If he refuses to resign, Congress should impeach him. The right day to subpoena Kessler is today.
@AnaSwanson
Silly and sad to see the CCP trying to intimidate a state-level official over Taiwan at any time, but especially ahead of an election. Major political misstep.
On October 12, 2026, I received a letter from the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Chicago objecting to my attendance at a Taipei Economic and Cultural Office event and urging me to avoid future interactions with Taiwanese authorities. My statement:
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Wow, that means about 2/3 of the maximum allowable chips are sitting idle in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, Elon Musk says he can't even rent H100s. What is the point of allowing these sales?
600,000 Nvidia H200 chips are reportedly piled up in Hong Kong, blocked by Beijing from import into mainland China. reuters.com/world/china/nvid…
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I don't actually think this will happen, but the fact a former Chinese official can put "a final showdown on Taiwan," or a trade war so casually in the same sentence, is still chilling. If you have any interest in American AI - this is why we need strategic compute controls.
The midterm drubbing of Donald Trump's Republicans may strengthen China's hand in trade talks with Washington, but Beijing is unlikely to revel in the misfortunes of a US president whose successor could prove less accommodating. reuters.com/world/china/trum…
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Why is Moonshot willing to pay 30-50% more for inference?
1. Huawei chips cannot meet demand in either performance or volume.
2. Moonshot desperately needs to monetize outside China.
3. Perhaps it's not really for inference.
Chinese AI lab Moonshot turned to Europe for Nvidia Blackwell access amid U.S. China curbs, sources tell CNBC cnbc.com/2026/11/05/moonshot…
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Given the public gaslighting Jensen and Nvidia have been engaged in re: smuggling, one wonders if this 51% rule will be enforced in any meaningful way.
But kudos to @nytimes for spurring the first (potentially) meaningful action on remote access from the world’s largest company
Nvidia also has partnered with Aivres, the US subsidiary of Entity-Listed Chinese company Inspur.
Aivres is a "trusted server partner" that has supplied chips to Megaspeed, which sells remote access to China. Aivres' chips and parts have also flowed through to Maginfra, a Chinese company that sells servers to state-owned enterprises.
The 49% rule by Nvidia would have been welcomed if they had a demonstrated track record of being serious about due diligence. But unfortunately the evidence of this is very thin.
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Chris Gorin retweeted
Huge report out of the NYT today on Huang's "close relationship" with a Chinese spy.
Nvidia and Jensen Huang have repeatedly denied requests to testify before Congressional committees. I think that those requests will become subpoenas very, very soon.
One important note: NYT and Bloomberg had previously reported that Megaspeed (the Chinese spy's Singaporean employer) was suspected of facilitating AI Chip smuggling to China because tens of thousands of Megaspeed's Nvidia chips kept being missing when Nvidia went to check on them.
I never thought I’d see the day Taiwan’s fab workers would finally strike. I hope it leads to more of a labor movement in Taiwan, it’s sorely needed. Sad that with 10-12% GDP growth it still had to come to this. Meanwhile, most college grads make $1000 USD per month.
Taiwan's first-ever chip workers strike begins at Micron plant s.nikkei.com/4zMtJRk
Interesting. New strategy for non-Chinese supply chains: demand suppliers charge no more than China. Will it work?
Exclusive reporting by Korean media on Terafab:
Terafab is excluding Chinese suppliers entirely. It wants to work with Korean suppliers because Japanese products are expensive. However, it is asking Korean companies to offer prices even lower than those of Chinese suppliers.
Terafab decided in advance which companies to approach and which products to discuss at SEMICON West 2026, then visited their booths as soon as the show opened.
Leading global semiconductor equipment suppliers Lam Research and Applied Materials have set up dedicated Terafab teams.
The initial facility, with a capacity of 100,000 wafers per month, is expected to be completed before 2030.
For logic chips, Terafab is working with Intel and is also in talks with TSMC. It is understood to be developing a separate manufacturing process for memory chips.
A representative from an overseas equipment supplier said, “My understanding is that Musk initially explored acquiring production facilities from Intel, TSMC, and Micron, but shifted toward partnerships after being turned down. I have never seen this level of drive anywhere else in the semiconductor industry.”
A representative from a Korean partner company said, “Even when we send inquiries in the early hours of the morning in the U.S., we get a response within 30 minutes to an hour. Their engineers have decision-making authority, so working with them is completely different from working with typical customers.”
thelec.kr/news/articleView.h…
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I’m sure there will still be doubters out there, but great to see people coming to terms with how damaging distillation is to the U.S. labs. It’s likely no coincidence that Chinese model releases have slowed as prevention distillation has improved.
Replying to @eliebakouch
I would have guessed distillation explained ~30% of Chinese close-behindness before seeing what one can see within openai, and after that, more like 50%.
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Chris Gorin retweeted
China: We believe in openness and cooperation on technology and development—unlike some countries.
China: We’re planning to place export controls on an additional 40 technologies, covering AI, biotech, and solar.
Big change in the works for China's AI regulations. I agree with this analysis, but I have questions about how feasible this will be if Chinese open-weight models are to remain competitive at the frontier.
Really important update from China's ministry of commerce and ministry of science and tech (h/t @Nectar_Gan), not because it signals that the government's honeymoon period with open weight AI is over, far from it. But because it further confirms that as China's working on building out a more robust AI risk management regime (sth discussed in this year's Five Year Plan, see photo below, & by Xi at the World of AI Conference), it is singling out high-risk open models for more scrutiny. It appears that if the risks/ capabilities demand, a filing regime or prohibition may be considered, but this will be narrowly enforced and affect only a small number of products & services.
So, what hasn't changed: Open model releases at home and abroad remain a welcomed development by the government.
What has been clarified: On the open weight AI front, expect China to step up capability/risk-based governance to meet domestic needs, global demands.
Here are the relevant discussions and sentences (I'll let X's translate function do its job):
1. 此次修订亦是技术贸易管理的**常态化⼯作**,依法依规进⾏,不针对任何特定国家、地区或实体。
2. 近年来,⼈⼯智能、⽣物医药和光伏相关技术在敏感领域的应⽤不断拓展,各主要经济体均实施了不同程度的出⼝管控。
3. 中国参考国际通⾏做法,依法实施必要的管理,既**防范技术失控和不当扩散⻛险,也保障正常国际技术交流合作**,推动科技向上向善、安全可控、造福⼈类。
4. 中国政府⼀贯⽀持企业依法依规开展互利共赢的跨国经营与国际技术合作,**有关政策⽴场没有改变**。
5. 此次拟将⼈⼯智能⼤模型、智能体、⼒集群、信息处理相关23项关键技术增列⾄《⽬录》,主要有以下考虑:... 此次拟列管的**⼈⼯智能⾃主驱动恶意代码⽣成与变异技术等,可被⽤于攻击国家关键信息基础设施、国防军⼯、核
⼼政务等敏感系统,或⽤于绕过国家安全防御体系**。
6. ⿎励开源开放、合作共享。... **为⽀持构建⼈⼯智能开源创新⽣态体系,对⼈⼯智能类技术开源、中国企业在境外⾃建⾃营算⼒中⼼、赴境外开展芯⽚流⽚制造、利⽤境外资源开展联合研发、参与国际标准制定等情形的技术出,适⽤⾃动许可等便利措施,基本实现“即报即出”** ;对已通过开源、发表学术论⽂等⽅式进⼊公共领域的相关技术,拟不纳⼊出⼝管理范围,为⼈⼯智能技术国际交流合作创造良好环。
7. 需要特别指出的是,中⽅主张在相互尊重、平等互利基础上,与各国开展⼈⼯智能对话合作,**共同应对⼈⼯智能技术扩散和失控⻛险**。
8. **有关措施正式实施后,绝⼤部分⼈⼯智能技术仍可以⾃由出⼝。** 对于纳⼊限制类的⼈⼯智能技术,开展海外本地化部署,属于技术出⼝管理范围;**如果部署在海外⾃有云等⻛险相对可控的情形下,可适⽤⾃动许可等便利措施。** 对于企业利⽤限制类⼤模型对外提供API调⽤、APP/⽹⻚交互、SaaS应⽤、本地端侧轻量化部署等情形,不属于⼤模型技术出⼝管理范围。
(highlights are mine)
Overall, this doc does not strike me as a trade bargaining chip as much as primarily an AI security play & secondarily a soft power play (i.e. responding to global concerns over risks from frontier open models). This development/ document also chimes with my predictions back in July teapawt.net/kristy_loke/status/207… & my observations last month: thewirechina.com/2026/09/29/….
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Great to see Taiwan taking the right steps. Let's hope other U.S. allies follow suit.
(looking at you South Korea, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.)
Taiwan plans to tighten export controls on AI chips to further align with US restrictions, according to a senior official in Taipei, joining a Trump administration clampdown on the smuggling of semiconductors to China. Read more: bloom.bg/4ympRp6
📷️: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg
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