Ethiopian News

A few points on what’s at stake: The main stakeholders who played key roles in delivering the Pretoria agreement for cessation of hostilities must take today’s meeting as opportunity to recognise that the absence of a transparent monitoring and verification mechanism has made the likelihood of deterioration and relapse into hostilities more than distant possibilities. Key examples include, but not limited to, the following five points: * There has been no publicly available progress report on the follow up of joint committee between members of the federal army and Tigrayan forces that was announced on November 12/2022 with the aim to “elaborate on the modalities for the implementation of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.” * Despite the report dated May 19/2023 by the African Union (AU) Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism (MVCM), delivered by Maj. Gen. Stephen Radina during the second joint meeting confirming that 85 to 90% of the heavy weapons disarmament of Tigrayan combatants was completed, there has been no progress to reciprocate the steps by ensuring the implementation of key aspects of the Pretoria agreement and the subsequent Nairobi Declaration of the Executive Plan, the later of which stated the “disarmament of heavy weapons to be done concurrently with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces” from Tigray. * Despite the establishment of the National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) to oversea the monumental tasks of DDR, and despite having its first national consultation on demobilisation and reintegration a year ago on March 10/2023 in Tigray’s capital Mekelle, the actual process remained elusive, feeding into increasing lack of trust between the federal government and Tigrayan authorities. * There has been zero attempt at kick starting the political dialogue to address the root causes of the crisis, leaving the core objectives of this genocidal war untouched, unchanged and completely unaddressed. *There has been no publicly known consensus between the federal government and Tigray interim administration on the transitional justice policy document that is reportedly in the process of being sent to the Council of Ministers for review. In the absence of all the above five key points, we are watching the keen attempts to reinterpret and misinterpret the CoHA, including by key stakeholders who appeared to be laser focused on DDR & return of IDPs as end game of the CoHA itself. Whereas domestically, local media outlets associated/affiliated with the federal government are now citing unnamed officials as “credible sources” to broadcast serious allegations against Tigrayan officials, including the president of the interim administration, of plotting with Egypt & Eritrea from abroad, and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Fano armed groups from inside to undermine the federal government in Finfinne (Addis Ababa). It is particularly important to take note of this development, which can easily be exacerbated by the unmet commitments, and take the necessary preemptive measures. The tone and frenzy with which these allegations are being broadcast have the potential to rile up the public into the return of a hostile rhetoric similar to the ones in the run up to the November 04/2020 outbreak of this devastating war and during the two years when it was ongoing, mostly hidden from the outside world. @MikeHammerUSA @RedwanHussien @reda_getachew @Bankole_Adeoye @EUSR_Weber