flashfish (@flashfish0x) profile picture

⚡️🐠

Joined August 2021
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flashfish retweeted
Many sophisticated MEV bot contracts use control flow obfuscation techniques to protect their logic. However, this also causes existing tools to struggle with analyzing obfuscated smart contracts, leaving critical vulnerabilities hidden. Excited to share our solution: SKANF (1/n)
One of the top arbitrage bots was drained yesterday with a total loss of 22 Eth by a token called Destroyer Inu. Attacker even made his contract open source on etherscan lol. Not a huge event but didn't see any attacks on MEV bots for quite a long time.
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Interesting challenge. Even if you’re not looking for a job it’s useful for anyone wanting to improve their improve their on chain skills.
1/6 Today, we’re launching The Alpha Challenge, a two-week experiment for the crypto community to test their on-chain analysis skills and for Wintermute to hire top talent We've also collaborated with six companies to provide exciting awards for those who will not be hired👇
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Worth saying that historically cvxCRV has had a worse peg than ycrv. Yes ycrv has less liquidity, but in reality a dca exit strategy of 3m exiting ycrv would probably net a better result that cvxCRV. I liked the rest of your thread though
Replying to @EvgenyGaevoy
2.5 a really obvious one is convex (and we going to deploy at least half of our CRV there today actually). It’s good yield, battle tested and, very importantly - you can exit from cvxCRV with relatively low slippage fairly quickly - 1% slippage on 3 mil if you are desperate
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To expand. Medium liquidity on the curve pool is a feature not a flaw. It is easier to maintain peg (cheap to incentivise, smaller swaps to repair) and stops large single swap dumps (due to exponential price curve). While allowing reasonable trades to happen with no price impact
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My guess at how this was done. Sandwichers submit their bundle to flashbots (or another builder) who build it into a block and send that block to a trusted relay. The relay sends the block head to the validator for signing. Only after signing does the validator see inside
Dusk for sandwich bots? A few top mev bots were targetted in block etherscan.io/txs?block=16964… @peckshield @BlockSecTeam @bertcmiller @samczsun @bbbb
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This is normally safe as there are slashing penalties if the validator validates a block with a different head. Due to having now signed two heads. But what happens if it is worth paying the slashing cost for the opportunity to exploit the block? Maybe that’s what happened here
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Looks like it was possible because of a bug with mevboost relay. It didn’t verify the validator signed the head correctly before revealing the internal block. So no double signing slashing and no risk of reorg
Block 16964664: A user managed to drain five MEV bots by exploiting a bug in mev-boost-relay. Here's the block: etherscan.io/block/16964664 Here's the user: etherscan.io/address/0x3c98d… Here's the patch: github.com/flashbots/mev-boo… Here's the longer explanation:
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flashfish retweeted
Block 16964664: A user managed to drain five MEV bots by exploiting a bug in mev-boost-relay. Here's the block: etherscan.io/block/16964664 Here's the user: etherscan.io/address/0x3c98d… Here's the patch: github.com/flashbots/mev-boo… Here's the longer explanation:
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Really feeling for Euler and the team at the moment. A project doing some real innovation. Sometimes I hate this space.
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In a dazzling reverse hack, a substantial chunk of the Playtpus hack stolen funds have been recovered. Here's how it worked: (1/4)
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I think we could use these in normal defi while preserving transfer restrictions. Imagine a lending market where you could lend Ondo tokens and borrow any other. As long as the liquidators are whitelisted there is no risk of non-kyc users touching the Ondo tokens
Replying to @nathanlallman
15/ Please also reach out to us if you are a developer building a protocol that could utilize these security tokens in a compliant manner (i.e., while preserving their transfer restrictions). We'd love to work with you!
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For instance, non-whitelist user could lend DAI to the platform. Ondo users could lend Ondo tokens and borrow that DAI. If the Ondo user enters liquidation a whitelisted entity does the liquidation. non-white list gets repaid DAI and liquidator gets the Ondo token
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flashfish retweeted
As a trader, there is barely a time that you can transparently share edge, but since FTX has gone down, it is clear that this strategy is never coming back, and I thought I would share insight on how i extracted round 5000% of value from the incompetency off SBF (1/x)
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What's the going rate for a senior smart contract dev these days? Has bear market impacted it a lot?
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Doing some rough analysis on the Avi CRV situation. He funded the account with 54.456m USDC and transferred out to OKX 71.550m CRV. As he only has 378k USDC left he effectively bought the CRV at an average price of $0.756. Loss at possible sale prices: $0.5 = -$18m $0.6 = -$11m
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Maybe he's just conspicuously losing money while hedging elsewhere. Spending a few m to clean his mango earnings.
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On a side note. I was surprised Aave ended up with some bad debt. SCREAM had a similar liquidation crisis in April where $58m of FTM was liquidated fine. That looked more dangerous than this situation. Still, it costing ~$15m to create $1.5m of bad debt is a hat tip to Aave
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