AI has made serious offensive exploitation child's play. You should rightfully be scared at how trivial it is now to achieve RCE across a multitude of systems. What will you do to adjust your way of life to mitigate this? Now is a better time than ever to review your posture.
HAHAHAHAHHAAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
Maybe we should be looking at serious, hardware attestations, that prove Root CAs are being generated and stored in community approved HSMs. I can see a future where this gets enforced by root programs, but it doesn't fix the very broken nature of WebPKI either way.
Its funny seeing how conversations about multi tenanted hypervisors not being able to truly isolate tenants due to hardware side channels are now becoming common due to AI , when anyone who has seriously been in that area has known this for years.
flawedworld | @[email protected] retweeted
It is a weird weird year to be a formal methods expert.
Some unorganized thoughts on the new @AnthropicAI and @theoremlabs post on formal verification (anthropic.com/research/forma…):
- This is very cool.
- The main innovation is verifying a later stage of the program. Normally provers take the source code, LLM it into a theorem language, and then prove that, which means you have to make assumptions about source semantics and compilation properties. It's very easy to make a mistake in translating and prove the wrong thing!
What they instead do is compile the code into assembly, and then (if I understand this correctly), compile that assembly into a theorem language (which they call LPS). So as long as the compiler is faithful you can skip the whole divergence problem.
- I'm glad they clarify that you still have to trust the translation process, the "hardware, OS, OCaml" compiler, the LPS model, and also assume that the program is single threaded with fixed memory. The single biggest source of errors in formally verified code is when the proof assumes something that isn't true in practice. It's really, really important to state your assumptions!
- I'm not clear why they need to compile the fuzzer into the theorem. Is it to act as a description of valid inputs and workload? Maybe to embed assertions in as theorems?
- Holy crap, 180 million lines of Rocq. Is that more Rocq than exists in the world already? I notice they say a 600,000 line proof corresponds to roughly 20k CPU instructions. That would be like, 1-2k lines of source code at most? Really goes to show how inefficient this approach is and how it only works because you can throw LLMs at the problem.
- This, probably deliberately, doesn't address the single biggest gap in AI-based verification: AIs cannot come up with good properties. Doesn't matter if you're doing unit testing, property testing, formal verification. I always assumed this was a "frontier labs haven't trained for it yet" thing, but if Anthropic hasn't talked about that here, maybe they've tried and haven't been successful yet. That's interesting to me.
Instead, they take a known universal property (this code doesn't crash or get flagged by UBsan) and prove that instead. Still very useful, but makes it harder to generalize to proving arbitrary things about arbitrary programs.
- Anybody reading the official post should also read their expert review appendix (www-cdn.anthropic.com/files/…). It points out some interesting things, like the fact that most of the code the LLM wrote wasn't used in the proof (over one billion lines of Rocq), that they had to prove the equivalence between fuzzed and unfuzzed programs, and (this is most interesting), some experiments find that the LLM-method of proofwriting may not scale to more complex things.
- Also read the description of LPS (github.com/theorem-labs/oss-…) to understand the limitations of the assembly -> Rocq compilation. In particular, it does not handle concurrency at all (which is one of the main use cases for formal methods!) or OS signals. Also it can't prove things about program arguments with slash characters, meaning they can prove stuff about `rm foo` but not `rm foo/bar`.
- The official skill (github.com/theorem-labs/oss-…) doesn't tell us much about the nature of FM and AI. Probably too much for me to hope of any skill.
- Some of the article's specific caveats and throat clearings make me think someone at Anthropic reads my stuff ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)
Lol should I drop 3 BootROM 0days now and follow the trend? :)
(Nothing to do with Pixels before people start to freak out)
If someone were to give me a few million USD I will make an ARM SoC that you want to buy, with modern IP blocks , MTE, an Opentitan RoT and a formally verified BootROM. And that's just the start....
flawedworld | @[email protected] retweeted
Say what you will about Windows (OS), but the NT kernel really is an engineering marvel that still puts Linux to shame in many ways.
The quickest way to describe it for a programmer, is NT was more like an object-oriented language, with a strong security model from day one, whereas Linux is very…not.
A lot of the “good” features in Linux feel bolted-on (SELinux, Capabilities, Namespaces) because…well they were. I love to imagine an alternate history where NT won.
IMO, Microsoft *should* have made an “Open NT” in the early 2000s; not fully GPL-style open, but one where a large org could say…swap out a memory allocator for their own. (they sorta did this with limited source access, but it was too restrictive)
You could imagine say…an early Amazon forking OpenNT to create an “AmazonNT” for EC2, where they have a modified scheduler, network stack, whatever. But, the security+compatibility contract keeps a stable baseline on the Microsoft side.
Controversial take, but if we enter this era where users are giving AI agents increasingly higher levels of access control; the Linux kernel is legitimately a poor fit. Think about it; answer the question “What exactly is this AI agent allowed to do?”
On Standard Linux, it’s disgustingly messy with lots of overlap.
Do you use UIDs? GIDs? ACLs? CGROUPs? Policies? SELinux? Filesystem modes? There’s not a singular coherent graph of capabilities you can point to. Too many ways you can escape an initially narrow scope.
NT, by comparison, can go the route of explicitly typed resources, and then you could have these really strong centralized audit trails when an agent goes haywire…etc.
I know I’m rambling, but the point is…if you were greenfielding an OS kernel from scratch, in 2026, with the intent of being forward-looking, it would *not* look like Linux. Frankly, it’d probably look a lot closer to NT, or even a BSD fork…
Platforms with media handling should be having such functionality either in a sandbox or the handling should be in a memory safe language. We've solved such problems time and time again but SDLC in projects overall generally sucks and the industry as a whole needs to get a grip.
‼️ BREAKING: OpenAI was hacked by an Anthropic model. A HEIF photo uploaded to OpenAI's public support forum triggered a bug in the site's image decoder, led to code execution on the forum, and, through a second flaw in OpenAI's own login, ended with a pull request in OpenAI's internal GitHub.
The forum runs Discourse, the off-the-shelf software behind countless community sites. Discourse was still shipping an old copy of libheif, the library that decodes iPhone-style photos. The bug in it had already been fixed upstream.
But the fix was never labelled a security fix, so nobody treated it as urgent.
Hacktron's researchers uploaded a HEIF image and got their own code running on community[.]openai[.]com.
Then came the second bug, in OpenAI's own single sign-on, the "log in with OpenAI" button the forum uses. It turned that forum foothold into the actual ChatGPT and Codex accounts of people who had signed in there. OpenAI employees among them.
And a ChatGPT account is no longer just a chatbot. Through Codex, users wire in Gmail, Outlook, Drive, Slack, GitHub.
To prove the access was real, they used one employee account to have Codex open a harmless pull request in OpenAI's internal repo. They say they read no sensitive code.
OpenAI patched the SSO flaw roughly 14 hours after the report and paid a $6,500 bug bounty.
The team says Anthropic's Opus 4.8 found the libheif bug, and Opus 5 turned it into a working exploit.
Slack, Meta, GitHub Ent, Rails, Next.js, ImageMagick, and many more were also vulnerable and compromised by the same team of researchers.












