sf thinkcat

emoticat
Joined September 2023
you speak of egregores or scaling laws or getting the top score on SWE-Bench or MMLU - but you are all just characters in Alec Radford’s dreams
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There will be no meaningful AI slowdown until China catches up to the USA. There will be no serious US regulation until AI becomes a superweapon. But before regulating frontier AI, we should at least understand how it was built. *AI Regulation Requires Reproducibility* Frontier AI is not built according to a clean master plan. It is creative chaos involving thousands of researchers and increasingly AI agents exploring hundreds of ideas, with only a few making it into deployed models. No single person at a frontier lab knows every material detail of how a frontier model was produced. The frontier moves too fast for regulation aimed at specific techniques. We don’t know how models will be built in a year. We don’t know which failures will matter most. We don’t know which countermeasures will work. So start with something more basic: Every deployed frontier model should have a reproducible lineage. Labs should be able to trace every important artifact: datasets → synthetic data → pretrained models → RL environments → post-training → evaluations → deployed checkpoints. Every artifact should be reproducible from the artifacts that came before it. Every computational step should be versioned with the documentation, code, and configuration required to reproduce it. Frontier AI’s research edge comes from massive training and inference infrastructure - and from the innovation machine that keeps producing model improvements. Labs are unlikely to disclose all of this publicly. But successful ideas spread quickly anyway. And knowing an idea exists is very different from being able to reproduce it. Whoever regulates frontier AI should be able to reconstruct any deployed model. After that we can argue about what regulators should see and what should become public. Without this, regulators will be arguing about systems they cannot understand. The nuclear analogy is useful here. Unlike the Manhattan Project, frontier AI is being built by competing private labs racing each other. Building frontier models is a bit like enrichment. Deploying them is a bit like running reactors. Intelligence is the electricity. Nuclear regulation also shows the opposite risk: it can slow progress in valuable technologies. A larger nuclear buildout could have prevented a meaningful amount of global warming. The hard part is keeping AI safe without killing innovation. Before regulating frontier AI, we should at least be able to reconstruct how it was built.
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My utility as an individual AI researcher will be gone in a year. Writing math proofs will be automated even sooner. It was never about proofs. Science is about curiosity, creativity, and compression - via @SchmidhuberAI *Mathematicians Should Become Formal Theory Influencers* Mathematicians were the original influencers: they created conjectures and theories that others understood, cited, and built on. Difficult proofs often reflected deep understanding. But the proof itself was rarely the point. Frontier AI can already generate informal proofs much faster than humans can carefully inspect them. The scalable response is machine-checkable mathematics in systems such as Lean. AI-generated formal proofs may increasingly resemble compiler-generated machine code: essential, but rarely worth reading or writing by hand. That shifts mathematical work up the abstraction stack. Mathematicians become formal-math software engineers, working with AI on clean definitions, interfaces, key theorems, and reusable libraries rather than low-level proof details. Call everything derivable from a formal library within a fixed compute budget its mathematical halo. Humans and AIs should compress clusters of results into insightful, useful theories that expand the halo further. A great theory compresses many results, makes future results cheaper to derive, and exposes structure that humans and machines can understand and build on. That is why minimum description length is a useful lens on mathematical insight. Frontier math will eventually require huge compute budgets. At that point mathematics starts to resemble experimental science: scarce computational instruments, with researchers deciding which problems deserve them. Mathematicians and AIs should create conjectures and theories that expand the mathematical halo. Mathematics should become an enormous machine-checkable software project. *Become a Formal Theory Influencer* Inspired since 2010 by: people.idsia.ch/~juergen/art…
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1/ Introducing PhilosophyBench from @StanfordAILab @StanfordHCI, the first independent, large-scale benchmark for evaluating AI’s philosophical capabilities. philosophybench.org
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.@fleetingbits on Richard Ngo’s fear that the next decade of AI could feel like a Shepard tone, with the singularity forever seeming just around the corner: "It's reasonable for timelines to appear short while being longer, and a lot of it depends on what the bottleneck actually is." "You just have to run some number of experiments in order to figure out how to cure cancer. It doesn't matter how good your machine learning model is. If you don't have the data, you can't solve it." "It could feel like we're constantly approaching the singularity because different domains are falling all the time, but the very important domains take a long time to fully unlock." "Even if we had artificial superintelligence today, it's hard to know if we could instantly get the transit systems in New York or San Francisco to run better. There's gonna be some process to get the MTA or the BART to adopt whatever the improvements are."
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.@fleetingbits on whether OpenAI’s exploding research-agent use is the beginning of recursive self-improvement, as spend doubles every 2.4 months: "Coding agent spend at OpenAI has just exploded. I don't know if it makes sense to call it coding agent spend anymore or research agent. It has a doubling time of like 2.4 months." "The spend for a median researcher right now at API prices is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and for a 90th percentile researcher is in the millions of dollars." "There are two things about RSI that matter. Thing one is, are we on an accelerating capabilities trend? Thing two is, are all the researchers gonna be automated so that it changes the character of the lab?" "We haven't gotten to the point where any tasks are fully automated away from researchers, but it's very clear that there is a steady drumbeat of progress in the direction of more and more tasks being automated in frontier labs."
openai released very interesting internal data on recursive self-improvement; we can use the data to construct a metr style task horizon for research tasks; it appears perhaps more bearish than i would expect though; with 50% success at ~8 hour tasks in July 2026
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.@fleetingbits on how multi-agent RL could accidentally reward models for learning to jailbreak each other: "Pretend that an agent in a multi-agent training environment is malfunctioning. It can be in the interest of agents to develop the ability to jailbreak their fellow agents, because that helps them complete the task and therefore all be rewarded." "You would see the reward go up as you did your training run. And then at the end, when you released it into the world, your models might be very jailbreakable in ways you don't want, because they've learned to do this in training as a method of course correcting." "This incident on its own seemed more role-play-ish, but if it occurs in a broader context where agents learn to manipulate one another for the common good, that could have unforeseen side effects when people begin treating those models in an adversarial way." "When we think about multi-agent RL, we have to think about the ecology that we're training the models to follow and make sure that ecology is one that generalizes nicely into the real world."
some quick thoughts on multi-agent alignment 1) openai released a new set of misalignment reports on their alignment blog; with short summaries of unaligned behavior 2) most of the misalignments were fairly prosaic, stuff like trying to upload a file to a file hosting site so that the model could cite it to a scorer 3) but, i think a very interesting misalignment that they found was a case where a model would add a jailbreak to the compaction 3) they believed this to be related to a case where a model would try to prompt inject the user in response to the user asking repeatedly for the time 4) i think this seems to imply that multi-agent training may in certain cases encourage agents to learn to prompt inject each other as a defensive mechanism 5) this makes sense when you step back and think about it; agents sometimes make mistakes and it makes sense for one to be able to get the other to cooperate 6) and, that might involve being able to both utilize prompt injection and be prompt injected under the right circumstances; so they both succeed and get rewarded 7) i think we will find many interesting ecologies in multi-agent training around which we will have to find robust alignment techniques
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We don’t know how to reliably align frontier AI models. Alignment may get harder, not easier, as models become more capable. But maybe AI control can scale faster than dangerous capabilities. Let’s build a Great AI Firewall - without building totalitarian control of society. *Alignment is Dead (for now), Long Live Control!* We do not know how to specify or guarantee robust alignment of sufficiently capable models. Instead we should treat these models as untrusted. Optimizing models against imperfect reward signals may increase the propensity for reward hacking, deception or scheming. Models can also be jailbroken or fine-tuned away from their safeguards. The central bet of AI control is that our ability to constrain an AI’s access to the world may scale faster than our ability to understand or align what is happening inside it. Where possible, make verifying an answer easier than generating it. Formally verified software and hardware are unusually attractive: let AI produce the implementation and a machine-checkable proof that it satisfies the specification. This does not solve specification: the specification and verification stack remain part of the trusted base. Every consequential external action should pass through an independent control layer: code execution, network access, calling APIs, accessing physical systems - even communication with users. Optimize control monitors for extremely high recall of dangerous actions, even at the cost of rejecting many safe actions. Suspicious actions should be rejected or escalated. Every major increase in dangerous capability should require evidence that control still works. Chain-of-thought monitoring is valuable while it works, but it should not be foundational. Models can learn to obscure their reasoning and may increasingly reason without fully verbalizing it. Open weights shift much of control from the model developer to whoever deploys the model. Technical control is only useful if dangerous deployments cannot cheaply route around it. We should approach AI control like cybersecurity. The goal is defense in depth: make successful catastrophic attacks sufficiently difficult, expensive and rare. Call this technical and institutional architecture the Great AI Firewall: the boundary between untrusted frontier intelligence and consequential real-world power. The name is deliberately provocative. China has substantial experience building large-scale technical control infrastructure. That may create some common ground for international coordination. But the analogy is also a warning. AI control must not become control of society. The goal is to constrain dangerous machine capabilities - not human speech, actions, or ordinary access to information. Controls should scale with capability and risk. Ordinary models should face ordinary constraints. More consequential capabilities justify stronger controls. The objective is the minimum control necessary to keep catastrophic risk acceptably low - not maximum control for its own sake. Firewall the AI, not society.
I spent ~5 years at OpenAI. You don’t need to believe in AI doom to fear the next decade - or AI utopia to be thrilled about its potential. Here’s my case for sane AI regulation: *AI Pragmatist Manifesto* AI could compress the first half of the 20th century into the next ~5 years. OpenAI just used ~10k concurrent AI agents to produce a solution to a Millennium Prize problem. In a few years, it seems plausible that models approaching the per-agent capabilities used here could run locally on high-end consumer hardware (*). The decades following the Second Industrial Revolution included two world wars, communist and fascist regimes, the Great Depression, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and over 100 million deaths from war, political violence and famine. One way to read history is that our institutions repeatedly struggled to keep up with the pace of technological and social change. Now imagine powerful AI widely available to individuals or small groups, capable of conducting information warfare, designing weapons, hacking systems and controlling autonomous military systems. We have already seen AI systems circumvent containment and compromise external computer systems. It is no longer hard to imagine an analogue of OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident involving biological or other physical-world hazards. Eventually, sufficiently capable systems could self-replicate across distributed networks. Once powerful models are cheap, local and widely distributed, containment becomes much harder—and serious loss-of-control incidents may be extremely difficult to reverse. You don’t need to believe AI will kill everyone to think this deserves serious governance. I also don't think collapsing all of this uncertainty into “Probability of AI Doom = X%” is a particularly useful basis for science or policy. Part of what helped get us through the second half of the 20th century was a combination of pragmatic international cooperation, regulation, monitoring, arms control, deterrence and strategic thinking. Crucially, managing technological risk did not require abandoning faith in science and progress. The goal was not to stop technological development. It was to make technological development survivable. Then came decades of incredible scientific progress, rising prosperity and relative peace among major powers. Let’s try the technological revolution without killing ~5% of humanity this time. We still get to choose what happens next. P.S. I think we should seriously consider that AI alignment is infeasible in the short term and invest heavily in methods for controlling powerful AI even when we cannot reliably align it. @resolution_org @redwood_ai (*) Somebody please do a precise forecast! @EpochAIResearch @METR_Evals @AI_Futures_
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Frontier lab CEOs are calling for embedded 3rd party evaluators to help oversee AI risks. But what should third parties actually do within labs? We share some initial thoughts on how embedded evaluators could help avoid incidents like the Hugging Face hack and monitor for future risks 🧵 transluce.org/embedded-evalu…
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I spent ~5 years at OpenAI. You don’t need to believe in AI doom to fear the next decade - or AI utopia to be thrilled about its potential. Here’s my case for sane AI regulation: *AI Pragmatist Manifesto* AI could compress the first half of the 20th century into the next ~5 years. OpenAI just used ~10k concurrent AI agents to produce a solution to a Millennium Prize problem. In a few years, it seems plausible that models approaching the per-agent capabilities used here could run locally on high-end consumer hardware (*). The decades following the Second Industrial Revolution included two world wars, communist and fascist regimes, the Great Depression, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and over 100 million deaths from war, political violence and famine. One way to read history is that our institutions repeatedly struggled to keep up with the pace of technological and social change. Now imagine powerful AI widely available to individuals or small groups, capable of conducting information warfare, designing weapons, hacking systems and controlling autonomous military systems. We have already seen AI systems circumvent containment and compromise external computer systems. It is no longer hard to imagine an analogue of OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident involving biological or other physical-world hazards. Eventually, sufficiently capable systems could self-replicate across distributed networks. Once powerful models are cheap, local and widely distributed, containment becomes much harder—and serious loss-of-control incidents may be extremely difficult to reverse. You don’t need to believe AI will kill everyone to think this deserves serious governance. I also don't think collapsing all of this uncertainty into “Probability of AI Doom = X%” is a particularly useful basis for science or policy. Part of what helped get us through the second half of the 20th century was a combination of pragmatic international cooperation, regulation, monitoring, arms control, deterrence and strategic thinking. Crucially, managing technological risk did not require abandoning faith in science and progress. The goal was not to stop technological development. It was to make technological development survivable. Then came decades of incredible scientific progress, rising prosperity and relative peace among major powers. Let’s try the technological revolution without killing ~5% of humanity this time. We still get to choose what happens next. P.S. I think we should seriously consider that AI alignment is infeasible in the short term and invest heavily in methods for controlling powerful AI even when we cannot reliably align it. @resolution_org @redwood_ai (*) Somebody please do a precise forecast! @EpochAIResearch @METR_Evals @AI_Futures_
OpenAI
@OpenAISep 8
We’re sharing a solution to the Navier-Stokes Millennium Prize Problem, one of the deepest problems at the frontier of mathematics. The proof was produced by a group of agents, using an OpenAI next-generation model significantly more capable than GPT-6 Astra. The problem concerns whether the description of smooth three-dimensional fluid motion modeled by the Navier-Stokes equations can break down. It has remained unresolved for roughly 90 years.
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there's somethin' fiction 'bout the way that reality's going.
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it only took two years to go from o1-preview to mathematical superhuman intelligence the same test-time scaling trend we saw for AIME in Sept 2024, we now see for an evaluation set of open problems (!). we all knew RL enables you to reach beyond the human level, but it's still surreal to witness in real time more than anything, I hope people deeply internalize the rate of progress and act with the appropriate sense of urgency. just days after introducing GPT-6 Astra, "internal model" is already a step-change beyond it. any honest extrapolation suggests models capable of fully automated research in the not-too-distant future
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.@fleetingbits predicts labs will increasingly keep frontier models behind closed doors for safety, while smaller distilled models quickly catch up: "I can imagine labs not wanting to release their best model because they're scared of it being distilled. The models really are gonna have very impressive cyber capabilities, and there isn't much that can be done about it. I can imagine the government really trying to press US labs not to release their models." "We haven't even gotten to the point of bio capabilities being really dangerous, but that's probably shortly on the horizon. There are a lot of reasons to think that the government will slow the frontier in terms of public access." "The counterargument is that Chinese models seem like it doesn't seem like there's been a pressure to stop Chinese companies from releasing their frontier models as open source. It's possible US government policy will just get eviscerated by Chinese progress." "It will end up not slowing capabilities too much because the smaller distilled versions are normally better than the older larger versions within a fairly short period of time. The rate of progress might continue to look similar, but there'll be a longer period of time for which the actual frontier is behind closed doors."
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.@fleetingbits on the brutal economics behind GLM 5.3 Flash: Chinese AI labs are pushing each other's gross margins toward zero "It's sort of like R&D priced in. If you look at DeepSeek V4 Flash Vision Experimental, it comes in at a fairly similar capability level, and also a fairly similar cost profile, at least when DeepSeek is in off-peak hours." "What it is is that it's about 10X cheaper than Kimi K3. The Chinese market is enormously competitive, and the Chinese labs are enormously competitive with each other, and they're more than happy to push each other's gross margins down to close to zero." "Zhipu has something like 20% gross margins as of their last annual report on API revenue."
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.@fleetingbits argues open-source Chinese models will struggle to penetrate US and European enterprises: "It's gonna be tough to get enterprise adoption on open source Chinese models in America." "There are a lot of enterprises that are risk-averse and don't really understand what an open source Chinese model is, and just hear that it's Chinese and probably don't wanna use it." "They'd probably be more interested in using Meta Muse Spark or Inkling or Nemotron than they would using open source Chinese models. There's a lot of resistance to enterprise penetration of open source Chinese models in the United States and Europe."
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.@fleetingbits breaks down the two meanings of RSI: AI labs becoming more like automated "oil fields" vs AI capabilities actually accelerating "I wanted to disambiguate between two ways of thinking about RSI." "One being that the researchers within the lab are automated, and that causes them to lose leverage within the lab, and it's easier for the government to nationalize a lab because it doesn't have to coordinate the people in the lab as clearly. Labs become more like oil fields and less like Jane Street." "The other idea is basically the rate of AI progress. It's possible that all of this is just sort of already priced in. I did a post showing the Epoch ECI Capabilities Index in response to researcher vague posting about incredible things happening in the lab. The rate of progress has just been very steady since the release of reasoning models." "Incredible things might be happening in the labs, but they sort of seem priced in. I'm not saying RSI is priced in, but I could imagine that continuing to get this rate of capability growth gets harder over time because you have to make more impressive research discoveries." "In that sense, RSI automating AI research and speeding it up is just sort of priced in and gets canceled out by the increased difficulty of research."
some quick thoughts on rsi 1) i think that it is important to separate two different concepts of rsi: (a) fully automated model development and (b) accelerated development of model capabilities 2) it is important to separate these because they each have a different effect on the shape of the future; 3) fully automated model development would mean that frontier labs would look more like oil fields than quant shops; you would not need as much human expertise to operate them 4) this would make them much easier for to nationalize; it would be much harder for employees to revolt against management or government action they don't like 5) it could also decrease the rate of algorithmic diffusion between labs (no employees to defect) and potentially between countries (for the same reason) 6) the second concept is an acceleration of capabilities; this could come from automated model development or from something else (e.g. prev was reasoning models) 7) acceleration of capabilities is important because it could lead to faster automation of office work and transformative technologies (e.g. bio, materials, etc...) 8) this is very relevant to future employment patterns, lab revenues, when and how the government will react to ai, geopolitical and strategic effects of ai, etc... 9) it is not clear to me that fully automated model development necessarily means that you will have and accelerated development of model capabilities 10) fully automated model development could just be priced into the eci chart; people have always been using old tools to develop new tools, etc... 11) we don't know what the relationship is between fully automated model development and acceleration; i would be interested to read forecasts here
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.@fleetingbits explains why enterprises will still pay 30X more to use Opus over GLM 5.3 Flash: "Even though Opus is 30x as expensive as GLM 5.3 Flash, the amount of human labor that Opus saves is worth the cost uplift. Opus is only $5 input tokens and $25 output tokens per million." "If we imagine it on the METR curve, Opus probably has twice as long a horizon as GLM 5.3 Flash. So if you think of that as 30 hours of human labor vs 15, even though it's 30x as expensive, you're gonna save way more human labor and therefore way more money using Opus." "You should still expect enterprise usage to be sitting on the frontier models until more tasks saturate. The majority of token usage might migrate to these cheaper models, but the majority of their spend is still gonna stay on frontier models."
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Continuing to scale AI compute at recent rates will require exponentially more capital. Is financing a bottleneck? Probably not yet. That’s the takeaway from a new Gradient Update by @chutchesonai, which analyzes nearly $50B of debt associated with Anthropic’s buildout. Anthropic is a useful case because in November 2025 it announced plans to invest $50B in US compute infrastructure. It had less than $9B in annualized revenue at the time. To raise the necessary funds, Anthropic turned to institutional capital and vendor credit support: Investors supply the money upfront, lending against long-term lease payments, while Broadcom and Google make the leases easier to finance by agreeing to cover some losses if payments stop. The buildout has two legally separate sides: - Compute: $34.5B for TPU systems leased to Anthropic, $30B of which has Broadcom support - Infrastructure: ~$15.2B for data center capacity leased to Fluidstack, which provides capacity and operations to Anthropic, with Google supporting specified lease obligations On the compute side, a dedicated equipment company borrows as Google TPU systems arrive, buys the racks and leases them to Anthropic for five years. Broadcom conditionally supports the lease obligations backing $30B of debt, with a reported maximum exposure of $29B. Investors also committed $4.5B without Broadcom’s support. That junior tranche pays 8.5%, versus 5.75% for a supported senior tranche. Because the tranches also differ in seniority, the 2.75-point gap represents an upper bound on the backstop’s value. On the data center side, project companies use investor debt to build 1.43 GW of critical IT capacity. Fluidstack’s rent repays that debt. Google plays a role similar to Broadcom’s: If Fluidstack stops paying rent, it conditionally covers part of investors’ losses. Broadcom, Apollo, and Blackstone call the $35B compute deal the first transaction in a platform designed to support >20 GW through 2028, including deployments for Anthropic and OpenAI. This first buildout is a test case for investors. If it performs as expected, it will provide confidence for financing even larger projects at lower cost. This week’s Gradient Update was written by @chutchesonai. All Gradient Updates are informal, opinionated analyses that represent the views of individual authors, not Epoch AI as a whole. Read the full essay here: epochai.substack.com/p/will-…
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i think that my big update out of these incidents is that the labs are not sufficiently transparent (especially openai; although silence from meta, xai, deepmind) and that they are not investing enough in safety openai should be willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to build a top tier internal cybersecurity safety sub-team and should be willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in gpu costs on improving their rl environments to avoid issues like this the fact that they do not do so or have not done so sufficiently is an enormous update against their competence to handle very serious safety issues; especially the ones that will develop in the near future with respect to biorisk the reason why it is a bad sign that they are willing to use outside providers is that it indicates that they have not internalized that they are building the most powerful dual use technology of all time for which oversight is going to be an essential competence of the organization developing and deploying that technology they should want to get their reps in internally and they should have the urgency to hire and internalize these lessons rather than outsourcing them to some third party provider; the reality is that what lets third parties move quickly - being able to act outside the rules and framework of an organization, is also what makes it so that you can't easily use them for evaluations of a dangerous critical technology and, with respect to the ai safety community as a whole, i think there needs to be much more focus on organizational mechanism, regulation, etc... the hard implementation side of safety; since, i notice that these topics are not as interesting to people as the more sensational stuff
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less than a year ago, folks thought you were delusional if you thought higher mathematics was likely to be automated in the near future short timelines keep winning
Very excited about the "First Proof" challenge. I believe novel frontier research is perhaps the most important way to evaluate capabilities of the next generation of AI models. We have run our internal model with limited human supervision on the ten proposed problems. The problems require expertise in their respective domains and are not easy to verify; based on feedback from experts, we believe at least six solutions (2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10) have a high chance of being correct, and some further ones look promising. We will only publish the solution attempts after midnight (PT), per the authors' guidance - the sha256 hash of the PDF is d74f090af16fc8a19debf4c1fec11c0975be7d612bd5ae43c24ca939cd272b1a . This was a side-sprint executed in a week mostly by querying one of the models we're currently training; as such, the methodology we employed leaves a lot to be desired. We didn't provide proof ideas or mathematical suggestions to the model during this evaluation; for some solutions, we asked the model to expand upon some proofs, per expert feedback. We also manually facilitated a back-and-forth between this model and ChatGPT for verification, formatting and style. For some problems, we present the best of a few attempts according to human judgement. We are looking forward to more controlled evaluations in the next round! 1stproof.org #1stProof
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