Gal Rakover retweeted
Every sentient journalist here knows these are the sources of "news" in Gaza, and have been since the Hamas takeover 19 years ago. This is obviously a major story, but Western editors can't cover it honestly because they've all played ball and are thus implicated themselves.
Gal Rakover retweeted
Coming soon, to a choice architect near you
penguinrandomhouse.com/books…
Gal Rakover retweeted
אצל אמסטרדמסקי הכלכלה הישראלית היא זירת פשע מרתקת: בנקים, אשראי, יוקר מחיה, שחיקת שכר. אבל בסוף, איכשהו, הנאשם הוא תמיד: אתם.
כי לא התמקחתם,
כי לא חסכתם,
כי לא השוויתם,
כי לא התנהלתם נכון.
במקום מדיניות כלכלית - הטפת מוסר אישית.
davar1.co.il/695759/
Gal Rakover retweeted
Time to make all the armchair yappers mad again...🖕
"Economics has always been preoccupied with equilibrium. That's like analyzing how a car works by studying a parked vehicle."
-Jay Forrester
Gal Rakover retweeted
השמאל הישן יודע היטב להסביר מאיפה צריך לסגת, אבל פחות טוב במה שצריך לבנות ביום שאחרי. שלום הוא לא רק נסיגה ופינוי, אלא גם גבול בר הגנה, חקלאות, קהילות ויחסי שכנות. @Noa_shalit במאמר חשוב מאד על רעיון שהשמאל הציוני צריך להחזיר לעצמו: התיישבות לצורכי שלום.
haaretz.co.il/opinions/2026-…
Gal Rakover retweeted
הראיון המלא של בנותיו של הרב עובדיה.
לכל מי שהתבלבל וחשב שש"ס הם ממשיכי דרכו של מרן, אינו אלא טועה. מה שבנותיו אומרות כאן זאת דרכו של מרן.
הפיצו ושתפו!
Gal Rakover retweeted
Financial Times: "Thailand’s household debt stands at 86 per cent of GDP, the highest among upper middle-income countries in the world, according to HSBC, with consumers using loans to fund daily expenses amid slowing economic and wage growth."
Thailand seems to be an extreme case of what has become a global problem, but I wonder if this is really a demographic problem so much as a global trade problem. Thailand has a very high manufacturing share of GDP, roughly 24% of its GDP, versus a global average of around 16%, and in order to remain "competitive", it cannot allow wages to rise too much given that global competitiveness has mostly become a function of low wages relative to productivity.
The problem with low wages relative to productivity, of course, is that it results in low domestic demand relative to production, and the only way to make up for it is either to run trade surpluses that force the low demand onto trade partners, or to increase household debt, which works temporarily to boost demand but increases financial fragility.
I would argue that as long as we have a global trading system that rewards countries that suppress wage growth relative to productivity growth, this problem isn't going away. This is what Michael Kalecki explained: suppressing wages may be good for those who do it, but bad for the system as a whole, and so it only "works" when a very few countries do it and the rest don't notice. The problem, as Joan Robinson warned, is that eventually everyone notices it, and trade breaks down.
The word needs faster growth in workers' wages, not more debt to make up for it, but in an unevenly globalized world, no country can afford to let wages rise too quickly because the benefits accrue mainly to those of its trade partners who keep wage growth below productivity growth.
This is something labor unions everywhere should be more worried and more vociferous about. Wage growth is sluggish not because businesses are evil but because our system punishes manufacturers in countries that allow wage growth to keep pace with productivity growth.
Just look at Germany. When it suppressed wage growth in the 2003-05 reforms, it became the most competitive manufacturer in the world, but during the past 5-10 years, as wages once again caught up, its manufacturers lost much of that competitiveness. Germany was heavily rewarded for doing the wrong thing, and then got punished for reversing it.
This is a terrible global incentive structure, and it affects manufacturing countries like Thailand. The only way Thailand can reduce household debt without slowing the economy either is to raise wages or to run surpluses, but it can't raise wages without making its manufacturers less competitive.
ft.com/content/daeaa13e-ef22…
Gal Rakover retweeted
I just presented my paper titled "Cut in public investment, increase in market concentration and the decline in productivity growth: Durable goods" at the 7th Pluralumn* Workshop.
I am very grateful for the insightful discussion...
For the real ones. (Not me, I can’t read Hebrew.)
This is based on a *very* fun three hour email I did with @YoelDavar while I hung out on a balcony in J’lem. (Take me back.)
davar1.co.il/693809/
Gal Rakover retweeted
This editorial by @washingtonpost gets everything wrong about Milei's policies. The issue is not whether inflation has fallen, or even if sovereign ratings have been upgraded, but whether this have anything to do with "free market" policies /1
Gal Rakover retweeted
"There are two kinds of (economic) forecasters: those who don't know, and those who don't know they don't know."
-John Kenneth Galbraith
Gal Rakover retweeted
הבוקר בשער של כלכליסט, (בערך באיחור של שנה מול התכנית).
תרומתנו לשיח מדיניות כלכלית מבוססת עובדות - בעוד בשווקים תחרותיים, פיקוח מחירים מועיל מעט ומזיק יותר, בשווקים ריכוזיים, כמו כמעט כל מה שנמכר בסופר, יש בהחלט מקום לבחון הטלה של פיקוח על מוצרים נבחרים.
Gal Rakover retweeted
מנכ"ל תנובה - הרפתנים הישראלים הם בין היעילים בעולם.
calcalist.co.il/conferences/…
Gal Rakover retweeted
Although I agree with much of Milanovic says about inequality, I disagree with him here. I think he is confusing "efficient" manufacturing with "competitive" manufacturing.
China is not necessarily building things better and more cheaply than Germany or France, but it is certainly selling them far more cheaply, and the difference shows up both in the extremely low share households receive of what they produce and in the astonishing rise in China's debt-to-GDP ratio. This was the same strategy Japan followed in the 1980s, and not only was it unsustainable, but the high debt and low consumption share ultimately forced Japan into an extraordinarily difficult adjustment.
If Germany and France were willing to suppress wages (or, which is the same thing, to eliminate social transfers), or if they were willing to borrow comparable amounts to subsidize the competitiveness of their manufacturers, it is pretty obvious that French and German manufacturers would also be able to sell much more cheaply in global markets.
But while these policies would increase manufacturing competitiveness, they would not make manufacturing any more efficient. They would simply shift part of the economic costs of production onto the rest of the country.
michaelpettis858496.substack…
Nobody can take seriously European complaints about China. China is now building things better and more cheaply than Germany or France. When France and Germany built things better and more cheaply than others, they ridiculed such complaints. Now they are losing and not liking it.
Moreover, Europe came to that position by exploiting the rest of the world. China did not.
Gal Rakover retweeted
The interest rate is not simply the price of time. It is a monetary and financial institution shaped by liquidity, expectations, and policy.
That distinction overturns much of the story told by Austrian Economists. They begin with the assumption that the interest rate is fundamentally determined by the balance between saving and investment, differing only on whether markets or central banks distort that process. Keynes rejected that foundation altogether. Interest is not the reward for abstaining from consumption, rather its the reward for surrendering liquidity.
People do not merely choose between consuming today and consuming tomorrow. They also choose between holding wealth in liquid form or committing it to less liquid financial assets. That choice depends on uncertainty about the future, not simply on time preference. During periods of instability, individuals often hoard cash regardless of how much they save. In those circumstances, interest rates reflect liquidity preference and the willingness of the financial system to provide credit, not some underlying ratio of present goods to future goods.
This is where the Austrian story breaks down. It assumes that saving automatically creates the real resources necessary for investment and that the interest rate faithfully communicates society's willingness to defer consumption. But in a monetary production economy, investment decisions are driven primarily by expectations of future profitability. Businesses do not invest because households saved more. They invest because they expect customers, revenues, and profits. If those expectations collapse, investment falls even if savings are abundant and interest rates are near zero.
The experience following the 2008 financial crisis illustrates this point. Central banks reduced policy rates dramatically, yet investment remained weak for years. If low interest rates alone created unsustainable booms, one would have expected an explosion of excessive investment. Instead, businesses remained cautious because demand was weak, balance sheets were damaged, and uncertainty was high. The problem was not that interest rates had become "false." The problem was that pessimistic expectations overwhelmed the incentive created by lower borrowing costs.
Keynes understood this dynamic in The General Theory. The central question was never whether central banks could manipulate an otherwise "natural" interest rate. It was whether financial markets, left to themselves, could reliably generate the level of investment needed for full employment. His answer was no. The interest rate is not a neutral market signal emerging from time preference. It is a convention shaped by financial markets, institutional arrangements, and public policy, all operating under conditions of fundamental uncertainty.
The real danger, then, is not that central banks occasionally influence interest rates. The danger is believing there exists a unique "natural" rate that perfectly coordinates saving and investment in an uncertain monetary economy. History repeatedly shows that markets can settle into prolonged periods of high unemployment, idle resources, and deficient investment without any central bank distortion. In those moments, the task of policy is not to preserve an imagined market signal but to stabilize demand, restore confidence, and support the investment necessary for economic recovery.
Gal Rakover retweeted
Now that the California billionaire tax is officially on the ballot this November, voters deserve logical arguments.
This guest essay in today’s New York Times, by two economists from the Hoover Institution, is based on a shocking logical mistake. 🧵



























