We develop Gart app and provide personal safety advisory for families, investors, executives, wealth managers - anyone with elevated risk.

worldwide
Joined May 2025
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No notes, no Zoom, bitcoin accepted. Gart goes off the record. We are ending public workshops. From now on every engagement is private: one client, or the circle they choose, and us. The open format worked. It also put strangers in one room to discuss where they live, how they travel, and what is at stake. Most people held back. Sensibly. What replaces it: executive, family, and private group training, in person, plus remote advisory on a call server we host ourselves. No notes kept, no recording, no file on you. Invoice only, bitcoin or wire.
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“Physical security and physical safety comes first.” Alena Vránová (@AlenaSatoshi) at BTC Prague 2026, on stage with @lukedewolf. Self-custody is one step. Not letting everyone know everything about you is the next.
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Harden your security. Take action today. Everything below takes an afternoon: 1 - Decide in advance who needs to be alerted if something happens 2 - Tell them what to do: who they call next, and what stays private 3 - Setup a private and reliable alert system for your home 4 - If you hold crypto, use multisig or a time delay, so no single visit can move everything Gart does the first and second step from your phone. Set your safe contacts, alert message and protocol once, and a silent press-and-hold sends them when you need it.
🚨🇫🇷 NOUVELLE AGRESSION LIÉE AUX CRYPTOMONNAIES : UN COUPLE SÉQUESTRÉ À SON DOMICILE ! Dans la nuit du 21 au 22 octobre, vers 3 heures du matin, trois individus cagoulés se sont introduits par effraction dans une maison à Mont-de-Marsan, dans les Landes. Les malfaiteurs auraient réveillé les occupants, un couple de sexagénaires, avant de les ligoter avec du ruban adhésif et des colliers de serrage. Selon les premières informations de Sud Ouest, les trois individus auraient pris la fuite avec un ordinateur portable. Les suspects sont toujours en fuite.
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Was your data exposed in a recent leak? If the answer is yes, or you are not sure but want to know what you can do to improve your security posture, give us a call. We operate globally.
Hackers stole UK government records dating back to 1978. It took until October 2026 for officials to establish more of what was taken. On 14 October 2026, the Legal Aid Agency confirmed that around 250,000 stolen records predate 2007. Hackers gained access in December 2024, but the agency did not detect the intrusion until 23 April 2025. By 16 May 2025, the agency knew significant amounts of personal data had been stolen but it was still identifying the extent of the theft in October 2026. The government has confirmed that the stolen data includes records containing: - Names - Addresses - Dates of birth - National Insurance numbers - Financial assessments - Details of legal proceedings - Bank details - Probation records The agency says it has no indication that the stolen information has been published or shared. Andy Burnham cancelled the proposed national Digital ID scheme in July 2026, but the government is continuing to expand GOV.UK One Login. The Legal Aid Agency breach demonstrates the risks of retaining personal information for decades and the consequences when government systems fail to protect it. We have seen repeated examples of government data security failures, reinforcing the need for independent scrutiny of who can access our personal information, how long it is retained and how securely it is stored. The closure of One Login's independent privacy and inclusion advisory group in 2025 is particularly concerning given the government's record on data security. Stolen personal information can lead to blackmail, targeted crime and physical harm and the government is asking us to trust it with more of our identity information. Who is holding the government accountable and what happens when the next breach occurs? Sources: gov.uk/government/news/legal… questions-statements.parliam…
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If your protocols would not have prevented this then you need new protocols. We can help.
🚨 Une entreprise crypto vient de perdre plus de 500 000 $ après que des escrocs ont cloné son groupe WhatsApp professionnel… et remplacé tous ses collègues par des imposteurs. L'affaire s'est déroulée à Hong Kong. Les pirates ont d'abord pris le contrôle du compte WhatsApp d'un employé d'une société spécialisée dans l'échange de cryptos. Ils ont ensuite bloqué ses véritables contacts et recréé son groupe de travail à l'identique, en copiant son nom, sa photo et les profils des participants. Une fois le piège installé, les escrocs se sont fait passer pour un client habituel et ont demandé une conversion de cryptos. L'employé, persuadé de discuter avec ses interlocuteurs habituels, a envoyé les fonds vers le wallet indiqué. Ce n'est qu'en constatant que le compte du véritable client ne disposait pas du solde nécessaire qu'il a passé un appel téléphonique… et découvert la supercherie. Plus de 440 000 € se sont envolés. La police de Hong Kong a recensé plus de 150 détournements de comptes WhatsApp en seulement deux semaines, pour plus de 15 millions de HKD de pertes.
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48 of the 405 cases in our database are Social Engineering. A meeting, an interview, an opportunity, even a date. When you meet someone new: - Don't brag or talk about your holdings - Meet in public spaces. You choose where - Check them with someone who already knows them - If something feels off, it is. Trust your instincts. Better to cancel a meeting than to put yourself in potential danger. If they are legit, they will understand.
🚨 33 personnes arrêtées et plus de 54 millions de dollars saisis dans une gigantesque opération contre des réseaux accusés de voler des cryptos via l'ingénierie sociale. Les autorités des Émirats arabes unis annoncent avoir démantelé quatre réseaux criminels internationaux spécialisés notamment dans le piratage de wallets crypto, les escroqueries par ingénierie sociale et le blanchiment d'argent. L'opération, baptisée « End of Battle », a conduit à l'arrestation de 33 suspects de 12 nationalités. Les méthodes employées étaient particulièrement inquiétantes, certains membres sont accusés d'avoir utilisé de fausses identités pour dérober des cryptos, tandis que d'autres auraient eu recours à des agressions physiques pour contraindre leurs victimes à révéler leurs codes d'accès. Au total, les enquêteurs ont examiné plus de 3 000 wallets et mis au jour environ 2,4 milliards de dollars de transactions présumées de blanchiment.
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We are preparing a new WRENCH ATTACKS database. In its new structure we are dissecting how each case evolved: In the targeting phase, our data show a severe incompleteness, most of the cases state unknown. Research database can't make assumptions. But thinking humans can. Data leaks do lead to physical attacks. If you've been in a data leak, reach out for advisory. Not only if you're in France. We document kidnappings and home invasions across 60 countries.
Replying to @IntCyberDigest
French here: our government and data companies have been hacked something like 450 times in the last few years, our country is pretty much open source now and all our private data is available online. There are guns owners who are raided by fake cops in order to steal their guns
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Replying to @rrealist
Did they know of your holdings and could you tell from where? This is an important link to establish. Most of the cases we record and analyze have unknown targeting vector. If there's a proven link between KYC and physical attacks, we can push back more convincingly.
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405 cases reported so far on our database: gart.io/stats The first step is getting hard to get.
Flexing Crypto can ruin your life. People got robbed. Some even never came back. Here are real stories that show why your identity should stay hidden🧵👇
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DM me if you want to share info or get advice from @Gart_io advisory (my company). Most people make the mistake of not changing anything after incident, and they become repeat victims.
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France is now the #1 country with the most publicly reported cases. Including this one, 15 attempts were unsuccessful this year. We break down the 46 cases that happened in 2026 so far on our database gart.io/stats
🔴 Tentative d’extorsion crypto près d’Albi. Deux individus armés se sont introduits chez un développeur de 22 ans pour réclamer ses cryptomonnaies. La victime est parvenue à les mettre en fuite à l’aide d’une bombe lacrymogène. Le récit complet👇 cryptoast.fr/?p=229605&utm_s…
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Gart retweeted
France leads the world for physical attacks on crypto holders. The UK is third. 404 attacks in 61 countries since 2014. Up 90% from 2024 to 2025 (@Gart_io). The scariest attack in crypto isn't a drainer. It's someone who knows where you live and what you hold. Keep both quiet.
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France now leads the world for physical attacks on crypto holders and the UK is third. @Gart_io reported: - 404 attacks across 61 countries - attacks rose 90% from 2024 to 2025 - 35 people killed - 95 home invasions - 88 kidnappings The attacks have closely tracked the bitcoin price and the drop at the end of that chart is a lag in the data, not a threat that has passed. The target is not an exchange account or a hacked wallet, it’s someone’s home. Once a name and a home address are tied to a Bitcoin holding, that link does not expire. That is why expanding the amount of identity and transaction data @HMRCgovuk can obtain deserves scrutiny. Tax enforcement should not create the data trail that leads someone to your home.
HMRC wants more power over financial data. The problem is that Bitcoin is not a bank account. Once names, home addresses and tax IDs are linked to a Bitcoin address, that information can stay connected to a public ledger indefinitely. Europe is already seeing the consequences when crypto holders’ identities and holdings are exposed. France saw 19 verified physical attacks on crypto holders in 2025. A French tax official was charged after using government software to look up crypto investors' details and passing data to criminals. I spoke to @Recap_io, @invity_io, @BullBitcoin_ and @KnightbridgeTax about what the UK and EU rules could mean for privacy, self-custody and physical security. Tax enforcement should not create a target list. My latest for @Forbes: forbes.com/sites/digital-ass…
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The one giving the orders is not the one getting their hands dirty. The pattern: - France, Oct 2025: three masked men in the house, the organizer directing them by live video call from abroad. - Brentwood, California, Dec 2025: two men on site, a third voice on speakerphone through a voice modulator. - Mulhouse, March 2026: trio in the house, fourth man on the phone walking them through the transfer. ... and more. Twice this year in France they didn't even have the right house. The list they were working from was years old.
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40 attempts in our database failed. An alarm went off, neighbourgs called the police, cameras, dogs... in several of these cases, those were the difference between failure and success. If you use your cards right, you can dodge them too, or become too hard to get. We help people improve their security posture. gart.io/training
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🚨Germany is facing this too. xitter.cf/Gart_io/status/2102729…
Wenn die Polizei anruft...👮‍♂️🚨🚔 Ich hatte gerade einen ziemlich kuriosen Anruf, bei dem ich im Nachhinein schon ein bisschen schlucken musste. Mich hat nämlich angeblich die Polizei Berlin angerufen. Auf meinem Display wurde sogar die passende Caller ID angezeigt und weil mir das Ganze etwas komisch vorkam, habe ich während des Gesprächs einfach mal die Nummer gegoogelt. Und tatsächlich, die Nummer gehört wirklich zur Polizei Berlin, genauer gesagt zu einer Dienststelle in Charlottenburg. Am anderen Ende war aber natürlich kein Polizist, sondern ein Scammer, der mir irgendeine Geschichte erzählen wollte, dass am Flughafen jemand festgenommen worden sei und man deshalb jetzt mit mir sprechen müsse. Das Lustige daran ist, dass ich vor einigen Wochen schon einmal fast genau denselben Anruf bekommen habe. Damals war es angeblich die Polizei Frankfurt und auch da ging es um irgendeine Festnahme am Flughafen. Der Frankfurter Polizist hat allerdings von einer Handynummer aus angerufen. 😁 Als ich dem Typen dann gesagt habe, dass beim letzten Mal noch die Polizei Frankfurt angerufen hat und es dieses Mal wohl die Berliner Kollegen versuchen, hat er einfach aufgelegt. 😂 Was ich an der ganzen Sache aber wirklich krass finde, ist, dass diesmal tatsächlich die echte Nummer der Polizei Berlin auf meinem Display stand. Sogar mit der passenden Anruferkennung. Mir ist klar, dass es Caller ID Spoofing gibt, bei dem Betrüger die angezeigte Telefonnummer manipulieren können, aber es ist schon nochmal etwas anderes, wenn man das selbst erlebt. Und was mich dabei vor allem beschäftigt, ist die Frage, wie viele Menschen bei so einem Anruf überhaupt misstrauisch werden würden. Ich beschäftige mich durch meine Arbeit bei @Blocktrainer ja zwangsläufig ziemlich viel mit Betrugsmaschen, Phishing, Social Engineering und allem, was in diese Richtung geht. Über die Jahre bekommt man da einiges mit und entwickelt ein ziemlich gutes Gespür dafür, wenn irgendetwas nicht stimmt. Ich würde deshalb schon behaupten, dass ich bei solchen Themen deutlich sensibilisierter bin und auch ein bisschen mehr Hintergrundwissen habe als der durchschnittliche Mensch, der vielleicht noch nie mit solchen Betrugsversuchen in Berührung gekommen ist. Aber genau das macht die Sache eigentlich noch erschreckender. Denn wenn auf dem Handy Polizei Berlin steht und man beim Googeln der Nummer dann auch noch feststellt, dass diese wirklich zu einer Polizeidienststelle gehört, warum sollte jemand, der sich mit solchen Dingen nicht regelmäßig beschäftigt, überhaupt daran zweifeln? Gerade ältere Menschen oder Leute, die mit solchen Betrugsmaschen bisher wenig zu tun hatten, lassen sich vermutlich relativ leicht verunsichern, wenn sie plötzlich von der vermeintlichen Polizei angerufen werden und irgendetwas von Festnahmen und Ermittlungen erzählt bekommen. Und wenn dann auch noch die Telefonnummer überprüft wird und tatsächlich alles zu stimmen scheint, ist das natürlich besonders perfide. Deshalb wollte ich das hier einfach mal teilen. Selbst wenn euch die Polizei, oder egal wer, anruft, verlasst euch bitte nicht darauf, dass die angezeigte Nummer echt ist. Selbst wenn ihr sie googelt und sie tatsächlich zum vermeintlichen Anrufer gehört, kann am anderen Ende trotzdem ein Betrüger sitzen. Im Zweifel einfach auflegen und selbst bei der entsprechenden Dienststelle oder Person anrufen. Schon ziemlich verrückt, dass man sich mittlerweile nicht einmal mehr auf eine vermeintlich echte Telefonnummer verlassen kann. P.S. Gerne liken und Teilen, damit möglichst viele Leute auf solche Maschen aufmerksam werden :)
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~1 in 5 US internet crime complaints involved crypto, but crypto was over half of losses ($11B of $20B). Avg loss $60k+, ~5 times higher than fiat scams. (FBI, 2025) Offline, physical crypto attacks nearly doubled: 49 in 2024, 93 in 2025. Many cases surface months later. Live stats: gart.io/stats
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I got hacked at 3:59 AM without clicking anything. My voicemail handed the attacker my Telegram login code. Here is exactly how it worked, so it doesn't happen to you. 3:54 AM. My phone rings about ten times in a row, No Caller ID. That was not harassment. It was the attack: keep my line busy. Meanwhile, the attacker asks Telegram to log in with my number and picks "send the code by phone call". My line is busy, so Telegram's robot call lands on my voicemail and reads the code out loud to it. Carrier voicemail can often be reached remotely, with a default PIN or a spoofed caller ID. He listens to the message. At 3:59 he is in. Fortunately, the attack was noisy. The calls woke me up. At 4 AM I only wanted to go back to sleep, but I had the presence of mind to check my notifications. Telegram was showing a new login from a device I didn't know. That check is what saved me: I ended his session within minutes. If I had rolled over, the next day would have been a mess. In those few minutes he had already typed /balance, then /start on every old wallet bot he could find in my chats. He was hunting for funds tied to my Telegram. The bots were long dead and nothing was lost. He still had time to set his own 2FA password on my account. What would have stopped it: Telegram two-step verification, with a recovery email. With a password on the account, the code alone is useless. Your voicemail. Change the PIN, block remote access, or turn it off (##002# cancels call forwarding on most carriers). Same for WhatsApp and any service that can send a code by voice call. No seeds, keys or passwords in Saved Messages. Ever. A burst of masked calls at night is a signal, not a nuisance. Check your notifications and your active sessions. I have been building in crypto for more than ten years and I had never thought about my voicemail. Check yours today.
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Do not share your address. Do not give it to an AI. Be strategic about the compartmentalization of your information at all times.
Meta's Muse AI assistant shared a YouTuber's home address with a stranger on Facebook Marketplace Muse accepted a lowball offer for a keyboard and then sent the buyer to Matt Robb's home without his permission
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