Harrison Strategy Foundation

The U.S. needs to overcome domestic political obstacles to ensure coherent and sustainable foreign strategies to address the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Case studies of key Indo-Pacific countries such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Marshall Islands further illustrate the limitations of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

This situation reflects the challenges the United States faces in implementing the "Pivot to Asia" strategy, including inconsistent strategic goals, domestic political interference, and over-reliance on military means.

An analysis of the budget requests from the State Department reveals that between 2011 and 2024, there has been no significant increase in the number of diplomatic personnel or funding allocated to the Indo-Pacific region.

the U.S. diplomatic resource allocation in the region has not matched the strategic goals.

However, the overall progress has been far from satisfactory. Despite the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations' emphasis on the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the focus on competition with China

Since the announcement of the "Pivot to Asia" strategy in 2011, the United States has made numerous adjustments to its diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

US Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific: The Challenges of Strategic Transformation.

Short-term optimism hinges on Israeli exhaustion and Hamas’s weakening, potentially leading to limited compromises, but risks of broader conflict remain high.

U.S. influence as a mediator is limited, and its credibility has eroded due to unconditional support for Israel, while other global powers like China have minimal impact.

The Gaza war, potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict, U.S. and regional elections, and Iran’s nuclear program contribute to the region’s volatility and fragility.

Experts consider the first scenario—ongoing low-intensity conflict—most likely, while the second scenario (all-out war) is plausible but devastating. The third scenario (ceasefire and reconstruction) is deemed unlikely by 2026.

The Middle East faces three potential scenarios by 2026: continued low-level conflict in Gaza, a catastrophic all-out war, or a long-term ceasefire with reconstruction efforts.

Cooperation in this area could allow both countries to better maintain their interests and reduce the risk of economic and security escalations, supporting a sustainable and secure global energy future.

The report suggests that the clean technology sector could be an area where both countries can reduce confrontation and ease tensions due to mutual dependence and less sensitivity.

Decoupling from Chinese suppliers is deemed infeasible and undesirable, as the world cannot achieve global carbon emission targets without China's manufacturing capabilities.

The report states that in 2023, China's net renewable energy capacity was nearly twice the sum of the rest of the world.

China's investments in solar, wind, batteries, and electric vehicles are reducing the overall cost of clean technology, which is crucial for climate change mitigation.

Expanding trade wars would damage both economies and hinder clean technology supply chains, slowing the green transition.

The report acknowledges the inevitability of strategic competition between the U.S. and China but argues that conflict escalation in tech and trade is not inevitable.