Henrik Strøm 🕊

Peak China: When Building Railways Was a Mistake, and Finishing Them Was Too Breaking news from London: China has built too many railways. Yes, after twenty years of headlines saying China urgently needed modern infrastructure, China has apparently committed the grave offense of... building modern infrastructure. The verdict is in. When China had dirt roads, it was underdeveloped. When China built highways, it was debt-fueled. When China built high-speed rail, it was overcapacity. When China stopped building quite so many railways because the network is largely complete, that's proof the model has run out of steam. Amazing. China can apparently be wrong at every stage of the same process. Imagine applying this logic elsewhere. "America's interstate highway construction has peaked." "Europe's cathedral-building industry is slowing." "Japan isn't opening a new Shinkansen to every village every Tuesday." Clearly civilization is collapsing. The funny part is that many of the same people spent years mocking China for constructing railways before demand fully materialized. Then the trains filled up. The cities grew. The logistics networks worked. So, the goalposts moved. Now the criticism is: "Sure, those railways exist and millions use them, but have you considered that some line in a sparsely populated province doesn't generate enough quarterly profit?" By that standard, half the rural roads in Europe should be shut down tomorrow. Apparently, a transport network is no longer infrastructure. It's a venture-capital startup that must achieve unicorn status by next quarter. The article also treats redundancy as waste. This is a fascinating theory. When airlines maintain spare aircraft, it's resilience. When militaries maintain reserve forces, it's preparedness. When banks maintain liquidity buffers, it's prudence. When China builds extra transport capacity, suddenly it's a crime against economics. But perhaps the funniest assumption is that infrastructure only matters if the railway company itself makes money. A railway arrives. Factories arrive. Tourists arrive. Workers commute. Property values rise. Supply chains improve. Regions integrate. The entire local economy changes. Western analysts stare at the railway's balance sheet and announce triumphantly: "Ah-ha! The train itself isn't profitable!" It's like looking at a bridge and complaining that the bridge isn't selling enough tickets. And now we're told transport investment has peaked. Well... yes. That's what happens when you've already built the world's largest high-speed rail network. Once you've connected most major cities, eventually you stop laying track everywhere and move on to power grids, semiconductors, AI infrastructure, data centers, and advanced manufacturing. That's called development. The underlying assumption never changes: If China builds, it's overbuilding. If China slows building, it's stagnating. If China shifts sectors, it's running out of options. One begins to suspect that the conclusion was written first and the evidence added afterward. Next week's headline: "China's Great Wall Construction Has Also Peaked, Raising Serious Questions About the Long-Term Sustainability of Dynasty-Era Growth." economist.com/china/2026/10/…