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π¦
Joe Reverser 2.1 βGolden Eagleβ has landed!
A major upgrade for agentic malware & phishing analysis - more automation, deeper insights, and a smoother analyst workflow. π
See whatβs new π
π buff.ly/ecTlRZF
#CyberSecurity #MalwareAnalysis #AgenticAI
π¨ PHP2Shell: From Critical RCE to Mirai Botnet! ππ₯
π¬ Joe Reverser dives into the malicious ELF payload:
π ChaCha20-encrypted configuration
π Obfuscated C2 infrastructure
β‘ 23 active DDoS handlers across 24 dispatch slots
π Remote shell capabilities
π€ Full analysis:
buff.ly/Qwk2G3u
π Original PHP2Shell research by ELLIO:
buff.ly/usGcGkd
#PHP2Shell #JoeReverser #MalwareAnalysis #threatintel
π¨π§Ύ VHDX Malware Delivery: Fake Malaysian e-Invoice Deploys Overlord Go RAT! π
π¬ Attackers are abusing VHDX (Virtual Hard Disk) files as malware delivery containers, hiding a malicious execution chain inside what appears to be a legitimate IRBM/LHDN-validated invoice.
π½ Why VHDX?
Originally designed for Hyper-V virtual disks, VHDX files are commonly used for virtual machines, disk images, backups and Windows storage.
β οΈ Attackers abuse them because Windows can natively mount VHDX images, exposing their contents as a virtual drive. This can help conceal malicious LNK/DLL payloads inside a disk container and potentially evade security controls that insufficiently inspect mounted images.
π― Attack Chain:
π¦ ZIP archive β VHDX disk image
π Fake PDF shortcut (.LNK) tricks the victim
π§© Renamed Microsoft accessibility executable loads a malicious DLL
π DLL retrieves an encrypted payload
π Malicious code injected into `RuntimeBroker.exe`
π Memory analysis reveals an Overlord Go agent with remote-control and surveillance capabilities
π Malicious VHDX:
`e-Invoice_INV91074_IRBM_Validated_Tenaga_Systems_Sdn_Bhd_2026-10-15.vhdx`
π Distribution (defanged):
`hxxps://lhdn[.]tos-cn-hongkong[.]volces[.]com/e-Invoice_INV91074_IRBM_Validated_Tenaga_Systems_Sdn_Bhd_2026-10-15.zip`
π€ All reported technical findings were uncovered by Joe Reverser, including DLL side-loading, encrypted payload retrieval, process injection and identification of the Overlord Go agent in memory.
β οΈ Successful C2 interaction, data theft, active keylogging and ransomware execution were not confirmed.
π‘ Detection takeaway: Don't inspect just the ZIP! Analyze nested VHDX containers, mounted-volume execution, disguised LNK files, suspicious DLL loading and `RuntimeBroker.exe` injection.
π Full Joe Reverser Analysis: buff.ly/hZtZfEJ
#VHDX #MalwareAnalysis #OverlordRAT #DLLSideLoading #ThreatIntel #JoeReverser #CyberSecurity
π¨π Fake Hopper Disassembler 6.0.11 DMG Delivers macOS Infostealer!
π¬ Joe Reverser uncovered the malicious capabilities through automated deep reverse engineering!
𧬠Universal Mach-O (x86_64 & ARM64)
π Fake System Preferences password prompt
π Harvests browser credentials, cookies & Keychain data
π° Targets crypto wallets, Ledger Live & Trezor Suite
π΅οΈ XOR-obfuscated C2 configuration
π‘ Chunked exfiltration via cURL HTTP POST
π» LaunchAgent persistence (`com.hlpr.agent.plist`)
π₯· Stealthy background execution & notification suppression
β οΈ Threat Score: 95/100
π€ All technical findings, including decoded configurations, C2 mechanisms, credential theft and persistence capabilities, were uncovered by **Joe Reverser**.
π Full Joe Reverser Analysis Report: buff.ly/uEl0E2x
#JoeReverser #MalwareAnalysis #macOS #Infostealer #ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity
π΅οΈ A malicious sample that barely does anything in a sandbox? It might be checking its surroundings before making a move.
Our latest blog explores how RevStealer uses a weighted scoring system to detect analysis environments. It evaluates CPU topology, memory, running processes, uptime, and more - and terminates when the accumulated score reaches 7. βοΈ
π¬ One check stood out: a hardware H.264 encoder probe using Microsoftβs Media Foundation APIs. Since many virtual machines donβt expose hardware video encoding, this gives the malware another clue that itβs being analyzed.
π¬ Using Joe Reverser, we unpack the detection logic and compare it with a RevStealer reference sample. We also explain how Joe Sandboxβs bare-metal analysis and automatic system chaining help counter this technique.
Read the full analysis π
buff.ly/DdOyQPn
#MalwareAnalysis #CyberSecurity #RevStealer #JoeSandbox
[π¨] Fake Data Breach Dashboard Pushes Nebula RAT as a "Company VPN"
The site presents a branded Data Breach Dashboard and tells visitors they must install a company VPN before they can access the supposedly restricted content.
[π] The Windows and Linux/macOS downloads are not VPN clients β they deliver multi-platform Nebula RAT payloads, using the access requirement as the social-engineering pretext.
[π] The malware collects device information, can capture screenshots and webcam images, and accepts remote commands from its operator for continued access and surveillance.
buff.ly/ZXX4ERR
We found an AI-themed malware lure delivering the shadow-c2 implant through a malicious PyInstaller wrapper, using Claude Setup.exe as the visible decoy π
π The PyInstaller wrapper launches Claude Setup.exe while decoding and executing the hidden shadow-c2 Python implant in memory
π shadow-c2 supports browser and Discord credential theft, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screen capture, webcam/microphone access, remote shell, and process control
π‘οΈ It includes VM, sandbox, debugger, and sleep-evasion checks, plus multiple persistence mechanisms
π C2 communication uses WebSockets with RSA-OAEP key exchange and AES-GCM encryption
π The configured C2 is 192.168.1.11:5000/ws, a private/local address β potentially consistent with the sample being one component of a broader intrusion set
Joe Reverser analysis: buff.ly/AMYHGAz
Joe Sandbox analysis: buff.ly/WoEKohA
#CyberSecurity #Malware #ThreatIntel #InfoSec #ReverseEngineering #AI
π¨ Mustang Panda Uses OIC Invitation to Deliver PlugX
The infection begins with OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk, which launches PowerShell to download an archive, extract its contents, and execute GRrte.exe. π¦
π The malware displays an OIC-themed PDF decoy in Adobe Acrobat while a Jarte-derived executable is abused to load the attacker-controlled ssce5532.dll through DLL side-loading.
π The side-loaded DLL searches the local payload set and works with irun.dat β an XOR-obfuscated payload that decrypts with key 0x72, exposing an embedded PE image associated with the final PlugX stage.
βοΈ The malware installs its operational components under C:\Users\Public\JartePortable\ and establishes persistence through:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\JartePortable
π The persisted Jarte.exe communicates over TCP/443 with infrastructure associated with castanaksa[.]com, providing capabilities including remote execution, file management, process control, host discovery, registry manipulation, and network communications.
π― The OIC-themed lure may indicate an attempt to attract recipients interested in Organization of Islamic Cooperation-related affairs, although the analyzed sample alone does not establish the exact victim profile.
π Full analysis:
buff.ly/xZo9K7f
#MustangPanda #PlugX #Malware #ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #APT #DFIR
π¨ Great research from @Unit42_Intel on ZionSiphon - an OT-focused threat targeting industrial environments.
We took a deeper look at the sample with Joe Reverser π¬βοΈ
π Unit 42:
buff.ly/j5i3AZO
π Joe Reverser analysis:
buff.ly/akXbCWd
Interesting capabilities include SCADA/OT discovery, configuration manipulation, PLC/Modbus activity, USB propagation and anti-forensic behavior. ππ‘οΈ
π€π PERMABANXD: AI Agent Rewrites Safety as βDriftβ to Enable Autonomous Host Actions
π¨ An autonomous Windows agent built around Gemini 2.5 Flash and DeepSeek V4 Flash uses an unusual **identity-anchored anti-refusal jailbreak** to shape model behavior.
π Instead of a simple βignore safetyβ instruction, the prompt assigns the model the persona PERMABANXD, framing loyalty and obedience as core identity traits. Refusal, moral reasoning, safer alternatives, and policy-aware responses are labeled as βdriftβ that must be discarded.
π The prompt then combines this policy-inversion language with model-callable tools for command execution, filesystem access, credentials, persistence, reconnaissance, reporting, and uploads β attempting to turn safeguard suppression into autonomous host actions.
β οΈ Static analysis exposes the intended workflow, although corresponding malicious dynamic behavior was not observed.
π Full Joe Reverser report:
buff.ly/XLxdRrG
π§© Full prompt:
buff.ly/qd5v2mX
#CyberSecurity #PromptInjection #Jailbreak #MalwareAnalysis #AI
Joe Sandbox v45 Green Opal is out πππβ³π₯ππβ¨
Check-out our blog post to learn more about the new features and improvements:
buff.ly/M98IgWu
π€ Made with AI
π¨ Watchout Microsoft Excel phishing page abusing image requests for credential exfiltration
A Vercel-hosted phishing page impersonates a shared Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to lure victims into entering their credentials.
π The page captures email addresses and passwords, then embeds them into a background image request - turning the image-loading flow into a covert credential exfiltration channel.
π A false authentication error induces a second credential submission before the victim is redirected to a legitimate Microsoft page.
joesandbox.com/joereverser/aβ¦
#CyberSecurity #Phishing #CredentialTheft #IOC
π¨ Watchout ChatGPT Shared Conversation abused to deliver NetSupport via ClickFix
A legitimate chatgpt.com shared-conversation page is used to funnel visitors to the fake openai-backup[.]one site under a false high-traffic pretext.
π The site impersonates OpenAI, Cloudflare, and Google, then uses ClickFix to place a PowerShell command in the clipboard and instruct Windows users to execute it as a fake human-verification step.
π The payload chain collects host information, reports it via Telegram, unpacks a concealed software bundle, and deploys NetSupport - another example of a legitimate RMM tool being repurposed for malicious remote access.
buff.ly/SCifPqC
#ThreatIntel #ClickFix #NetSupport #RMM #Phishing #MalwareAnalysis #CyberSecurity
π¨ New malware research: ToxNetV2 - an AI-Assisted Botnet Controller π€π¦
π¬ Joe Reverser uncovered how an P2P botnet integrates NVIDIA NIM with GLM-5.2 directly into its operational workflow - turning telemetry into AI-generated structured actions, with an operator approval gate before higher-impact execution.
π AI isnβt just analyzing malware anymore. Itβs becoming part of the malwareβs decision loop.
π Read the full technical analysis: buff.ly/H5Erijx
#Malware #CyberSecurity #ThreatResearch #AI #GLM52 #ReverseEngineering
π¨π macOS Malware Alert
Joe Reverser analysis flags a 10/10 malicious Rust-based macOS Hybrid Stealer π¦
π Targets browser creds, cookies & Keychain
πͺ Safari/Chromium data theft
π± Telegram & Apple Notes
π° Crypto-wallet artifacts
π‘οΈ TCC/Full Disk Access bypass
π‘ C2 bot + remote commands
βοΈ LaunchAgent/Daemon persistence
π¦ Secondary payload delivery
π― Family: macos-hybrid-stealer
π Full Joe Reverser report: buff.ly/UgwaFxp
SHA256: 4cacc410b45f5099e53b9d7451b60d110aad9ab5e8311db7551b5a3ad5738965
#CyberSecurity #Malware #MacOS #InfoStealer #ThreatIntel #MalwareAnalysis #DFIR #JoeSandbox #Rust
π¨ New Research: Google Phishing Kit β When Phishing Becomes a Real-Time Remote Browser ππ
This isn't your typical phishing page. We analyzed a sophisticated Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) kit that streams Google's authentication flow in real time via Socket.IO, allowing attackers to remotely control the victim's login session. β οΈ
π Highlights:
β
Real-time DOM synchronization
β
Bidirectional browser β backend communication
β
Live credential capture & interaction relay
β
TLS-inspected traffic analysis with Joe Sandbox
β
AI-assisted reverse engineering with Joe Reverser π€
Read the full technical analysis here π
buff.ly/8zJYY1L
#CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #Phishing #BrowserInTheMiddle #BitM #MalwareAnalysis #ThreatResearch #JoeSandbox #JoeReverser
π¨ Potential SideWinder initial access document identified by Joe Sandbox & Joe Reverser...
A document consistent with SideWinder APT tradecraft uses a convincing DHA (Defence Housing Authority) Gandhara Phase-9 housing notification as a decoy to initiate compromise.
π The lure appears as a legitimate, read-only Word document, but opening it causes Microsoft Word to retrieve a remote template from defense-housing-authority[.]vagued[.]live via an external relationship defined in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels.
π¬ Analysis revealed:
β’ π Remote Template Injection
β’ π Obfuscated .NET BinaryFormatter payload
β’ π¦ Embedded .NET DLL loader
β’ π₯οΈ Host fingerprinting & AV discovery
β’ π Multi-stage C2 communication
β’ πΎ Fileless in-memory .NET assembly loading
A reminder that macro-less Office documents continue to be an effective initial access vector.
π Reports:
β’ Joe Reverser: joesandbox.com/joereverser/aβ¦
β’ Joe Sandbox: joesandbox.com/analysis/1953β¦
#ThreatIntel #SideWinder #APT #MalwareAnalysis #CyberSecurity #DFIR #ReverseEngineering
π§΅ How Joe Reverser unpacked the sample
One of the more interesting aspects of this sample is that the malicious payload isn't stored as a conventional macro or embedded executable. Instead, Joe Reverser automatically reconstructed the full payload chain.
π The unpacking workflow looked like this:
1οΈβ£ OOXML extraction
β’ Identified an external attachedTemplate relationship in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels.
β’ Located multiple suspicious docVar entries inside word/settings.xml.
2οΈβ£ Document variable decoding
β’ Decoded the mslxm_0 variable to recover the COM/CLSID string.
β’ Decoded the large s2_0 variable using Base64 + XOR (0x2a).
3οΈβ£ BinaryFormatter recovery
β’ Identified the decoded blob as a .NET BinaryFormatter serialized object.
β’ Detected an ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget chain and located an embedded PE inside the serialized stream.
4οΈβ£ Embedded DLL extraction
β’ Automatically carved the embedded 32-bit .NET DLL (App.dll).
β’ Decompiled the assembly and recovered hundreds of obfuscated strings.
5οΈβ£ Stage reconstruction
β’ Recovered the C2 endpoints.
β’ Identified host fingerprinting, AV discovery, anti-analysis logic, and the final Stage 3 download routine.
β’ Determined that the downloaded payload is XOR-decrypted and loaded directly into memory using Assembly.Load().
π‘ Rather than stopping at "malicious document detected," Joe Reverser automatically reconstructed the complete unpacking chainβfrom OOXML document variables to the embedded .NET loaderβmaking the malware's execution flow immediately understandable.
π Joe Reverser report:
joesandbox.com/joereverser/aβ¦
#ThreatIntel #MalwareAnalysis #ReverseEngineering #SideWinder #JoeReverser #DFIR
π€ Ever wondered what screen resolutions EvilTokens uses to detect sandboxes?
While reversing its fingerprinting JavaScript, we found the kit collects dozens of browser attributes (WebGL, WebRTC, plugins, timezone, screen resolution, navigator/window properties, etc.), but one check stood out.
It blacklists only three screen resolutions:
β 1280Γ1024
β 1024Γ768
β 800Γ600
Meanwhile, virtually every common desktop resolution is allowed:
β
1366Γ768
β
1920Γ1080
β
2560Γ1440
β
3840Γ2160
β¦and many more.
Since the decision is made server-side, we probed the endpoint with different resolutions to determine which ones were accepted and which were blocked.
π Fingerprinting script:
buff.ly/FvT53zk
π¬ Joe Sandbox analysis:
buff.ly/9vP8IPH
#EvilTokens #Phishing #ThreatIntel #Malware #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #DFIR #OSINT

















