Seeking simplicity and distrusting it.
Joined October 2024
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Compliance enforcement process be that fast that victim proposing to exploiter “keep that 3M USDC in your wallet as bounty”
History has shown that Circle is a bad actor.
SwapNet contracts were exploited for $13M USDC on Base ~10 hours ago.
3M USDC is still sitting freezable at
0x6cAad74121bF602e71386505A4687f310e0D833e
Why should anyone continue building on $USDC when you never take care of your users as a centralized stablecoin issuer?
Good effort @ethena blocklisting Balancer exploiter on sUSDe by granting “FULL_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE” so they can’t perform transfer of sUSDe as there is a validation in beforeTokenTransfer hook.
Transfer of 10k sUSDe failed 10 minutes ago at tx etherscan.io/tx/0x2f14ac0f70…
Ye in Web3 retweeted
DPRK IT workers are now recruiting people on upwork/freelancer to hand over their accounts + install anydesk so they can work under someone else's identity
We found folders of IDs, recruitment scripts, and 80/20 payment splits.
This scales way better than individual infiltration & platforms need to detect the behavior (rmm tools, impossible travel) not just verify the identity.
Full research from SEAL Intel: radar.securityalliance.org/f…
StakeWise burned 5,041 osETH from Exploiters' wallet but somehow left 200 osETH in their balance, which was immediately swapped to ETH.
Exiting staked ETH tokens process started with osETH just 1 hour before "burn" multisig transaction was executed at etherscan.io/tx/0x914c35feb2…
Just half an hour earlier, StakeWise DAO emergency multisig has executed a series of transactions, recovering ~5,041 osETH (~$19M) and 13,495 osGNO (~$1.7M) tokens from the Balancer exploiter.
On Ethereum mainnet, this represents 73.5% of the ~6,851 osETH stolen earlier today, and is as much as we could recover due to the attacker promptly converting the missing portion of the stolen assets into ETH. Stolen osGNO were recovered in full.
The recovered funds will be returned to the users affected in the Balancer V2 exploit, distributed pro-rata according to their pre-exploit balances.
The full post-mortem of the operation and the next steps will be available shortly.
Thank you to the @Balancer & @gnosischain teams, and personally to @rimeissner and SEALs c0ffeebabe_eth and @pcaversaccio for their prompt advice on the execution of the recovery.
Nothing unusual here, just 5K USDC sitting at @Balancer Exploiter's wallet for almost 2 hours, but who cares? @circle
etherscan.io/token/0xa0b8699…
Bera be like “chat, protect the TVL at all costs, don’t let them bridge to Ethereum”
The Berachain validators have coordinated to purposefully halt the Berachain network as the core team performs an emergency hard fork to address Balancer V2 related exploits on the BEX.
This halt has been executed purposefully, and the network will be operational shortly upon recovering all affected funds.
Thank you in advance for your understanding, and expect more updates and a full retro soon.
1/ How you can be drained years after the protocol's hack?
Radiant Capital's users who have not revoked their approvals were drained ~$60K only during last month (more than a year after the incident).
The breakdown of how these attacks work and how to protect yourself:
6/ Drain example (BNB Chain, 20K USDT, 25 days ago): bscscan.com/tx/0x18f9895f482…
- user withdraws 20K USDT from Aster to their wallet (USDT allowance of Radiant's LendingPool was not revoked from that wallet)
- immediate 20K USDT drain by DPRK
7/ In order to protect yourself:
- do NOT grant infinite approvals;
- if you were granting infinite allowances in the past -- consider rotating the wallets;
- if you still tend to use the wallet from which you were granting infinite allowances -- make a list of such a contracts with allowances and revoke them now;
- monitor new incidents to check whether compromised contracts have active allowance of your ERC-20 tokens.
What’s shown at screenshot is not wallet compromise but a drain due to allowance.
Also @402bridge can you explain why you have implemented feature for contract owner to be able to pull the users’ funds?
Smh feels like a rug honestly.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Also website 402bridge[.]fun is down which is understandable (nobody use the bridge anymore) but wise man once said:
1/ 10 hours ago, account etherscan.io/address/0xa44f7… profited 26 ETH liquidating several positions in @PeapodsFinance LVF pod on Ethereum. But the similar attacks have been targeting different Pods for last 19 days and seems nobody spotted it.
2/ The root cause seems to be due to Pod’s reliance on Uni TWAP for fetching the price which become inadequate due to lack of liquidity in corresponding LPs.
The 26 ETH profit tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x385143092b…