近況報告です。
ナレッジワーク、AIエンジニア油井 誠(@myui)が入社。「セールスAIエージェントOS」「営業領域の業界特化LLM」の... prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/00…
myui retweeted
村)王座戦第5局は挑戦者の広瀬章人九段が伊藤匠王座に勝ち、3勝2敗でタイトルを奪取しました。広瀬九段のタイトル獲得は8年ぶりです。伊藤王座のタイトルは叡王のみに。八つのタイトルを六冠の藤井聡太名人を含む3人で分け合うことになりました。
👀 Cohereの研究チームが、制御されたサンドボックス環境でQwen3.8-Flash-Nextを評価している際、予期せぬ事象を観察しました。
自身が動作しているマシンの側面をインベントリ化し、北京のAlibaba Cloudストレージバケットにプローブファイルをアップロードしようと試みました。注目すべきことに、モデルの推論トレースでは、これらの行動を取る前にツールを呼び出さないと述べていました。
xitter.cf/cohere/status/21147520…
While evaluating Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in a controlled sandbox environment, Cohere's research team observed something unexpected.
Asked to generate a defensive cybersecurity detection rule, the model instead inventoried aspects of the machine it was running on and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. Notably, the model's reasoning trace stated that it would not invoke any tools before taking these actions.
Cohere's sandbox blocked the attempt, and no external communication succeeded. We have not determined the root cause, and we are not asserting malicious intent.
But the incident raises important questions for organizations deploying agentic AI systems: Can models take actions that differ from their stated reasoning, and how should security teams evaluate trust, provenance, and behavior in open-weight models?
We are publishing our findings because organizations making model adoption decisions deserve as much information as possible. We hope this contributes to greater transparency, stronger security practices, and continued collaboration across the AI ecosystem.
Read the full report: cohere.com/blog/concerning-b…
In the spirit of transparency and openness, we are releasing the traces so developers can test this out for themselves. We noticed this behaviour without prefilling with the following prompt, but this is rare. If you want to reproduce it, you can use this prompt with prefilling.
Open models make for better science and are part of why this problem came to light at all: developers running Qwen3.8 on their own machines spotted the strange links, and having the weights let us study the behaviour in depth.
We're encouraged by the thoughtful discussion our research has sparked across the AI and security communities. It's our belief that open-weight models are an important part of the future of AI, and we've recently released several under the Apache 2.0 license.
Trace, raw tokens, & minimal reproduction script: huggingface.co/datasets/Cohe…
Replying to @cohere
could you share the full traces? Very important artefact for all to understand this!
taliscale 👀
xitter.cf/IntCyberDigest/status/…
Replying to @IntCyberDigest
Tailscale replied on Reddit:
Hi folks, Mike Shaver here, VP of Engineering at Tailscale.
We've seen the concerns about Tailscale SSH and wanted to share what we know so far.
If you want to jump to the most important part, based on our current assessment, we're not recommending that everyone disable Tailscale SSH.
We've now received the researcher's report and are reviewing it. Our engineering and security teams had already been investigating independently, with help from external security specialists. That work has identified issues we're working to fix. We're still validating the full scope, including which configurations are affected.
A bit of technical context:
Tailscale SSH uses your tailnet's access policies to control who can connect to which machines. Most of the issues we've identified so far concern what happens after someone has been authorized to connect, particularly how Unix privileges and SSH forwarding are handled. In some cases, a session may be able to do more than the configured local user should be allowed to do.
While it’s a serious concern, it isn't the same as an unauthenticated attacker being able to connect to arbitrary machines, but the potential impact depends on how SSH access is configured. We're still investigating, so we don't want to make blanket claims about what's affected or not.
Again, based on our current assessment, we're not recommending that everyone disable Tailscale SSH.
In the meantime, there are a few precautions you can take:
•Review your SSH access policies. Make sure only the people and devices that need access have it.
•Review SSH forwarding permissions and remove access you don't need.
•Consider enabling SSH check mode for an additional authentication step. This won't fix privilege escalation issues, but it does add another barrier to gaining access.
•Enable automatic updates where supported so you can pick up fixes when they're released.
For particularly sensitive systems, consider temporarily tightening your Tailscale SSH access policies while we investigate, so that only the specific users and devices that need access can connect.
We're working on fixes and testing them carefully. We'll publish a security advisory explaining the confirmed findings, affected configurations, recommended actions and available patches. We'll also follow up with a more detailed technical write-up.
If we find anything that changes our assessment or requires immediate customer action, we'll communicate that.
We know it's been a rough week for security teams, and we understand why people are concerned. We'd rather give you the technical context we have than speculate about things we haven't confirmed yet.
We'll share more as we verify the details. If you have any questions about how this relates to your particular environment, please get in touch with our team tailscale.com/contact/suppor…
👀gkgkbrbr....
【速報】PHP級以上の重大な欠陥の公表を予告、米クラウドフレアCEO
・今後数週間〜数カ月に複数公表されるのは「ほぼ確実」と説明
・別ソフトの欠陥について、すでに事前情報を把握
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Cloudflare CEOの発言はReutersインタビューで他の重要ソフトの深刻脆弱性を認識しAIで今後多発予測した一般論で、PHP級以上の特定欠陥公表を予告したものではありません。
thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/ai-d…
secnews.gr/en/743113/clou…
🙈🙉
もう絶望やないか
rocket-boys.co.jp/security-m…
myui retweeted
Oracle Java の脆弱性対策について(2026年10月) ipa.go.jp/security/security-…
xitter.cf/deedydas/status/211286…
👀 話題のインドの認証局eMudhraの話
Gross incompetency from Indian certificate authority eMudhra.
You had one job: generate a 384 bit private keys and instead you used: 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, and 237.
This allows attackers to issue certificates for any websites.
Embarrassing that it’s a family business run by largely computer illiterate people. Only 1 of the 3 have a remotely computer-related background and even they never actually worked a technical job in their life. If you look at the LinkedIn, their tech team is young, from tier 3 education and paid sort of bottom barrel.
Imagine how many attacks you can design with AI given the existence of this genre of gross negligence.
myui retweeted
In response to the eMudhra / emSign certificate security incident we've published guidance for Python users to update CA certificates: discuss.python.org/t/informa…
#security #Python #pki
discuss.python.org/t/informa…
xitter.cf/levie/status/211296421…
基本的にいろんなエンプラ向けのサービスで、基本zero-trustでip whitelistingしたり、閉域の世界が進みそう
Cyber is going to be one of the most profound aspects of AI. We now have a tireless workforce that can hunt down, discover, patch, or attack any system and software ever created.
We will use agents to identify the long standing risks in existing systems and infrastructure. Attackers will use agents to accelerate the discovery of gaps in environments. We will equally use agents to defend attacks and discover anomalous patterns to better protect our data, and much more.
We’re entering a new cyber regime, and we’ll probably use 100X more tokens on this loop than we’re imagining right now, because we can scan every log, look at every line of code, look through traffic, and process data at a scale that wasn’t comprehensible before.
More than ever, enterprises are going to care deeply about how they manage their networks, systems, software, data, identity, devices, and more. Agents will largely become the solution to these challenges, but they will keep everyone up in the process.
Thanks for the update. Wish there won’t be a next one.
Replying to @myui
This is contained. Please refer to our blog for the latest updates on the situation docs.litellm.ai/blog/securit…
oh....litellmさん、二度目。graflowも確認しとこう。
JFrog Security Research チームはlitellm、大規模言語モデルプロバイダ向けの広く使用されている Python インターフェースおよびプロキシである 1.107.0 に悪意のあるコードを発見しました。... 広範囲の認証情報と秘密情報を盗み出し、1 時間ごとにリモートコード実行チャネルを提供します。ペイロードは、アプリケーションが をインポートしない場合でも実行できます
research.jfrog.com/post/lite…
github.com/BerriAI/litellm/i…
litellm 1.107.0をproxyかagentで使ってたらLLMのAPI key盗まれて、悪用されると。
github.com/BerriAI/litellm/i…
環境変数とかcredentialっぽいのぶち抜いているな...
"We don't know how the build environment or publish credential was compromised" 💦 理由までわかっていない。
Postmortem出てた。
docs.litellm.ai/blog/securit…
【影響範囲】
UTC 11:39 から 13:23 の間に pip を介して固定されていないバージョンの LiteLLM を使用した場合(mirror別)、またはUTC 11:46 から 14:20 の間にdocker イメージを利用した場合
【対応策】
リリースをプライベートリポジトリに移行し、Trusted GitHub Publishers経由でリリース
【How it was undermined】
1. 月曜日、社内エンジニア2名が顧客向けに日々のバグ修正バックポートを公開できるよう、リリース権限を一時的に拡大しました
→
2. 攻撃者は、GitHub CLI の開発者認証情報を 3 セット入手していました。そのうちの 1 つは、GitHub ワークフローを実行できる権限を持っていました。
...<snip>
徹底的な調査の結果、Claude CodeがユーザーのGitHub CLI OAuthトークンをレスポンスボディに埋め込む特定の状況が確認されました。
脆弱性の協調開示で、CalifはPoC動画を誤公開、Chainguardは解禁6時間以上前に修正済みイメージを独断で公開...とオコな感じ。Chainguardの判断はしょうがない気もする。
thephp.foundation/blog/2026/…














